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|a Tracing the politicisation of the EU
|b the future of Europe debates before and after the 2019 elections
|c aru Haapala, Álvaro Oleart, editors
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|a Cham, Switzerland
|b Palgrave Macmillan
|c [2022]
|c © 2022, 2022
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|a xix, 314 Seiten : Illustrationen
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|a Oleart, Alvaro <<[HerausgeberIn]>>
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|a Palgrave studies in European political sociology
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|a EG: VII Ad
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|a Europäische Union: Geschichte. Erweiterung.
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|u https://aleph.mpg.de:443/F?func=service&doc_library=VRH01&local_base=VRH01&doc_number=001089085&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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|z VIEW
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|a EDITED BY TARU HAAPALA ALVARO OLEART TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2019 ELECTIONS PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY SERIES EDITORS CARLO RUZZA, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO, TRENTO, ITALY HANS-JOERG TRENZ, FACULTY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE, PISA, ITALY PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY ADDRESSES CONTEMPORARY THEMES IN THE FIELD OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY. OVER RECENT YEARS, ATTENTION HAS TURNED INCREASINGLY TO PROCESSES OF EUROPEANIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SPACES THAT ARE OPENED BY THEM. THESE PROCESSES COMPRISE BOTH INSTITUTIONAL-CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND NEW DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL TRANSNATIONALISM. EUROPEANIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION ARE ALSO ABOUT CHANGING POWER RELATIONS AS THEY AFFECT PEOPLE'S LIVES, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND FORMS OF MOBILITY. THE PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY SERIES ADDRESSES LINKAGES BETWEEN REGULATION, INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE FULL RANGE OF SOCIETAL REPERCUSSIONS AT LOCAL, REGIONAL, NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL LEVEL, AND WILL SHARPEN UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGING PATTERNS OF ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS, THE POLITICAL USE OF NEW RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES BY CITIZENS, NEW CONFLICT LINES AND COALITIONS, SOCIETAL INTERACTIONS AND NETWORKING, AND SHIFTING LOYALTIES AND SOLIDARITY WITHIN AND ACROSS THE EUROPEAN SPACE. WE WELCOME PROPOSALS FROM ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL SOCI OLOGY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, ON DIMENSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP; POLITICAL ATTI TUDES AND VALUES; POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC SPHERES; STATES, COMMUNITIES, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS; FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; POPULISM AND THE RADICAL RIGHT; AND DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION. MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS SERIES AT HTTP://WWW.PALGRAVE.COM/GP/SERIES/14630 TARU HAAPALA ALVARO OLEART EDITORS
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|a TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2019 ELECTIONS EDITORS TARU HAAPALA DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID MADRID, SPAIN ALVARO OLEART DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY MAASTRICHT, THE NETHERLANDS PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY ISBN 978-3-030-82699-4 ISBN 978-3-030-82700-7 (EBOOK) HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7 THE EDITOR(S) (IF APPLICABLE) AND THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 THIS PUBLICATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WITH THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF OPENEUDEBATE JEAN MONNET NETWORK (600465-EPP-1-2018-1-ES-EPPJMO-NETWORK) FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. THIS BOOK REFLECTS THE VIEWS ONLY OF THE AUTHORS, AND THE COMMIS SION CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY USE WHICH MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN. THIS WORK IS SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT. ALL RIGHTS ARE SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY LICENSED BY THE PUBLISHER, WHETHER THE WHOLE OR PART OF THE MATERIAL IS CONCERNED, SPECIFICALLY THE RIGHTS OF REPRINTING, REUSE OF ILLUSTRATIONS, RECITATION, BROADCASTING, REPRODUCTION ON MICROFILMS OR IN ANY OTHER PHYSICAL WAY, AND TRANSMISSION OR INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL, ELECTRONIC ADAPTATION, COMPUTER SOFTWARE, OR BY SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR METHODOLOGY NOW KNOWN OR HEREAFTER DEVELOPED. THE USE OF GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE NAMES, REGISTERED NAMES, TRADEMARKS, SERVICE MARKS, ETC. IN THIS PUBLICATION DOES NOT IMPLY, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC STATEMENT, THAT SUCH NAMES ARE EXEMPT FROM THE RELEVANT PROTECTIVE LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND THEREFORE FREE FOR GENERAL USE. THE PUBLISHER, THE AUTHORS AND THE EDITORS ARE SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE ADVICE AND INFORMA TION IN THIS BOOK ARE BELIEVED TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE AT THE DATE OF PUBLICATION. NEITHER THE PUBLISHER NOR THE AUTHORS OR THE EDITORS GIVE A WARRANTY, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATERIAL CONTAINED HEREIN OR FOR ANY
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|a ERRORS OR OMISSIONS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN MADE. THE PUBLISHER REMAINS NEUTRAL WITH REGARD TO JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS IN PUBLISHED MAPS AND INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS. COVER CREDIT: VIENNASLIDE/ALAMY STOCK PHOTO THIS PALGRAVE MACMILLAN IMPRINT IS PUBLISHED BY THE REGISTERED COMPANY SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG THE REGISTERED COMPANY ADDRESS IS: GEWERBESTRASSE 11, 6330 CHAM, SWITZERLAND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS THIS BOOK STARTED TO TAKE ITS SHAPE IN THE SUMMER OF 2019 AND WAS FINALLY COMPLETED IN SPRING 2021. THIS PERIOD OF TIME HAS BEEN EXTREMELY RICH IN EVENTS THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS POLITICISED. THEY ENCOMPASSED THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, THE (END OF THE) BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS, THE OUSTING OF UNITED STATES PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP AFTER JOE BIDEN'S VICTORY IN THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, THE INAUGURATION OF THE VON DER LEYEN EURO PEAN COMMISSION AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC OUTBREAK WITH THE POST PONEMENT OF THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES. IT HAS BEEN A TIME FULL OF QUICK TURNS PROVOKING FASCINATION FROM A MYRIAD OF POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES. EVEN THOUGH THESE TWO YEARS HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT MANY CHALLENGES, THE BOOK WAS PRODUCED IN THIS INTELLECTUALLY INSPIRING ENVIRONMENT. WE ARE, FIRST OF ALL, GRATEFUL TO THE JEAN MONNET NETWORK 'OPENEUDEBATE: MATCHING POLITICS WITH POLICY' (JEAN MONNET-ERASMUS REF: 600465-EPP-1-2018-1-ES-EPPJMO-NETWORK), COORDINATED BY ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN AT THE UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID (2018- 2022), FOR THE INITIATIVE AND SUPPORT GIVEN THROUGHOUT THIS CHALLENGING INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY. THE 'OPENEUDEBATE' NETWORK WAS ALSO SUCCESSFUL IN ADAPTING TO THE 'NEW NORMAL' OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC. THIS INCLUDED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RECORDING OF A SERIES OF TEN PODCASTS ENTITLED 'EUROPE AFTER CORONAVIRUS', IN WHICH WE BROUGHT TOGETHER EXPERTS FROM ACADEMIA, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND POLITICS ON THE EFFECT OF THE PANDEMIC ON DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN
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|a UNION. SIMILARLY, WORKING ON THE BOOK V VI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CONTINUED IN THE FORM OF TWO ONLINE WORKSHOPS, ON THE 4TH AND 24TH OF JUNE 2020 AND 10-11TH FEBRUARY 2021. THESE WORKSHOPS CONTRIBUTED CRUCIALLY TO IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE DIFFERENT CHAPTERS AND THE DESIGN OF THE STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE OF THE EDITED VOLUME. WE WANT TO THANK ALL THE CONTRIBUTORS FOR THEIR CAPACITY OF ADAPTING TO THE DEMANDING CIRCUM STANCES, BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL. THANKS TO RAMONA COMAN, LUIS BOUZA GARCIA, ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN, LUCIANO MORGANTI, MIRUNA BUTNARU TRONCOTYYA, JAN BEYER, JULIE VANDER MEULEN, JORGE TUNON NAVARRO, CLAUDIA WIESNER, KARI PALONEN, ANA ANDGULADZE, NIILO KAUPPI, DRAGOS , IONIT , YY A, MARIA-ISABEL SOLDEVILA AND STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL TO BEN CRUM AND SIMONA GUERRA FOR THEIR ACADEMIC SUPPORT, AS WELL AS TO NOAH SCHMITT AND IAN CONNERTY FOR THEIR EDITORIAL HELP. WE WOULD LIKE TO WARMLY THANK THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN TEAM FOR ALL THE SUPPORT GIVEN THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOOK. OUR JOINT ADVENTURE STARTED DURING THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EURO PEANISTS, ORGANISED BY THE COUNCIL FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES AT THE UNIVER SIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID, THAT TOOK PLACE ON 20-22 JUNE 2019. DURING THOSE WARM DAYS WE STARTED COOKING WHAT EVENTUALLY HAS BECOME THE PRESENT EDITED VOLUME. WE THANK HANS-JOERG TRENZ AND CARLO RUZZA, EDITORS OF THE PALGRAVE SERIES ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, AND AMBRA FINOTELLO, PALGRAVE'S EXECUTIVE EDITOR, FOR THEIR CRITICAL ADVICE AND ENTHUSI ASTIC BACKING EVER SINCE THE MADRID CONFERENCE IN WHICH WE FIRST DISCUSSED THE BOOK. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ESPECIALLY THANK THE ANONYMOUS REVIEWERS FOR THE EXCELLENT COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS, WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF THE BOOK. LASTLY, WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT OF OUR HOME UNIVERSITIES, THE UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES AND MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY-STUDIO EUROPA MAASTRICHT. MADRID AND
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|a BRUSSELS JUNE 2021 TARU HAAPALA ALVARO OLEART CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH TO POLITICISATION IN THE EU CONTEXT 1 ALVARO OLEART AND TARU HAAPALA PART I POLITICISATION OF THE EU AS A POLITY 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU POLITICISATION IN THEORY, CONCEPTUALISATION, AND RESEARCH 21 CLAUDIA WIESNER 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SCHOLARSHIP: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON EU POLITICISATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DISCOURSE 45 ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING POLITICISATION IN PARLIAMENTARY PLENARY DEBATES 67 KARI PALONEN VII VIII CONTENTS 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL:FR OM THE FRINGES TOWARDS THE CENTRE OF NATIONAL POLITICS THROUGH EU POLITICISATION 91 NIILO KAUPPI PART II SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE: RETHINKING THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES WITH THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 113 TARU HAAPALA 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU AND THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE: THE CASE OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS 139 STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS AND LUCIANO MORGANTI 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER: THE PERSONALISATION OF EU POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EU ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 159 LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND JORGE TUNON NAVARRO PART III EU POLITICISATION NARRATIVES AND PATTERNS 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: SALIENCE, POLARISATION, AND CONFLICT OVER EU INTEGRATION IN (EASTERN/WESTERN) MEDIA COVERAGE 187 ANA ANDGULADZE, JAN BEYER, RAMONA COMAN, AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION' AND CLASHES OF NARRATIVES ON SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 'FUTURE OF EUROPE' DEBATES 217 MIRUNA BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA AND DRAGOS , IONIT , YY A 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS A RESPONSE TO POLITICISATION IN TIMES OF EU CONTESTATION 243 MARIA-ISABEL SOLDEVILA
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|a AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN CONTENTS IX 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVE OF EMMANUEL MACRON IN FRANCE 271 LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND ALVARO OLEART 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU-A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR EXPLORING THE POLITICISING STRATEGIES IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES 295 TARU HAAPALA, ALVARO OLEART, AND JAN BEYER INDEX 307 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ANA ANDGULADZE IS A PH.D. CANDIDATE AND TEACHING ASSISTANT AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM. HER RESEARCH FOCUSES ON CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE EASTERN PARTNER SHIP COUNTRIES. SHE HOLDS AN M.A. IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND ADMIN ISTRATIVE STUDIES FROM THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE IN BRUGES, BELGIUM AND A B.A. IN EUROPEAN STUDIES FROM THE CAUCASUS UNIVERSITY IN TBILISI, GEORGIA. BEFORE HER ACADEMIC CAREER, SHE WORKED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS. JAN BEYER IS A PH.D. CANDIDATE AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM AND THE UNIVERSITE DE GENEVE, SWITZERLAND. HIS RESEARCH FOCUSES ON PROTESTS IN HYBRID AND ILLIBERAL REGIMES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE. HE HOLDS A B.A. IN EUROPEAN STUDIES FROM MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, THE NETHERLANDS AND AN M.PHIL. IN POLITICS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, THE UK. HE HAS ALSO STUDIED AT THE COMPLUTENSE UNIVERSITY OF MADRID, SPAIN, AND THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY IN BUDAPEST, HUNGARY. BEFORE HIS ACADEMIC CAREER, HE WORKED FOR THE GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (GIZ). LUIS BOUZA GARCIA IS A LECTURER IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MADRID. HE HAS A PH.D. FROM THE ROBERT GORDON UNIVER SITY IN ABERDEEN. HE IS ALSO A VISITING PROFESSOR AT THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE IN BRUGES, WHERE HE COORDINATED THE EUROPEAN GENERAL STUDIES COURSES BETWEEN 2012 AND 2018. HE IS THE AUTHOR OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND XI XII NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EU: AGENDA-SETTING AND INSTITUTIONALISATION (PALGRAVE, 2015). MIRUNA BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA IS LECTURER AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE OF
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|a EUROPEAN STUDIES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EURO PEAN STUDIES OF NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMIN ISTRATION (SNSPA) IN BUCHAREST, ROMANIA. HER RESEARCH INTERESTS INCLUDE EU INTEGRATION, EUROPEANISATION, AND THE WESTERN BALKANS. RECENT PUBLI CATIONS INCLUDE 'THE ASSOCIATION THAT DISSOCIATES'-NARRATIVES OF LOCAL POLIT ICAL RESISTANCE IN KOSOVO AND THE DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRUS SELS AGREEMENT IN AROLDA ELBASANI (ED.) INTERNATIONAL-LED STATE-BUILDING AND LOCAL RESISTANCE. HYBRID INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN POST-CONFLICT KOSOVO (ROUTLEDGE, 2020). RAMONA COMAN IS A PROFESSOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM. SHE IS THE AUTHOR OF REFORMER LA JUSTICE DANS UN PAYS POST COMMUNISTE. LE CAS DE LA ROUMANIE (EDITIONS DE L'UNIVERSITE, 2009) AND THE CO-EDITOR OF POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-CRISIS EUROPEAN UNION (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2020). HER RESEARCH FOCUSES ON THE EU'S RULE OF LAW POLICY TOOLS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS IS AN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION AGENT AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND A PH.D. CANDIDATE AT THE VRIJE UNIVER SITEIT BRUSSELS, BELGIUM. HE GRADUATED IN MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION FROM THE NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS, GREECE, AND HOLDS A MASTER'S DEGREE IN EUROPEAN STUDIES FROM THE KATHOLIEKE UNIVER SITEIT LEUVEN, THE NETHERLANDS, AND A MASTER'S DEGREE IN COMMUNICATION FROM THE VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSELS, BELGIUM. HE HAS ALSO WORKED AS A PARLIAMENTARY ASSISTANT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN IS A PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE SPECIALISED IN POLITICAL THEORY AT THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MADRID, SPAIN. SHE IS THE COORDINATOR OF THE ERASMUS+ JEAN MONNET NETWORK OPENEUDE BATE: MATCHING POLITICS WITH POLICY. EDITOR OF THE REVISTA ESPANOLA DE CIENCIA POLITICA . HER RECENT PUBLICATIONS INCLUDE 'THE
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|a CONCEPT OF "GOOD ENOUGH" CITIZEN REVISITED: AN EXPLORATION OF CURRENT DISCOURSES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION' IN WIESNER, C. ET AL. (EDS.). SHAPING CITIZENSHIP. A POLITICAL CONCEPT IN THEORY, DEBATE AND PRACTICE , (ROUTLEDGE, 2018). NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS XIII TARU HAAPALA IS A MARIE CURIE FELLOW WITHIN THE MSCA-COFUND INTERTALENTUM PROGRAMME AT THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MADRID, SPAIN AND A DOCENT IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AT UNIVERSITY OF JYVAESKYLAE, FINLAND. SHE WAS A VISITING SCHOLAR AT THE CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVER SITY. HER RESEARCH INTERESTS INCLUDE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL RHETORIC AND HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS. RECENT PUBLICATIONS INCLUDE DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION: PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS (2017). DRAGOS , IONIT , YY A IS A PH.D. CANDIDATE AND JUNIOR RESEARCHER AT THE DEPART MENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES OF NATIONAL UNIVER SITY OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (SNSPA) IN BUCHAREST, ROMANIA. HIS MAIN FIELDS OF INTEREST ARE EU'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, EUROPEANISATION, AND PARTICULARLY THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS. HE IS CURRENTLY PART OF SEVERAL RESEARCH ACADEMIC NETWORKS THAT AIM TO BRING EU POLICIES CLOSER TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. NIILO KAUPPI IS A CNRS RESEARCH PROFESSOR AT SCIENCES PO STRASBOURG, FRANCE AND VISITING PROFESSOR AT THE SWEDISH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI, FINLAND. HIS RESEARCH INTERESTS RANGE FROM INTELLEC TUAL AND POLITICAL RADICALISM TO EUROPEAN POLITICS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. RECENT PUBLICATIONS INCLUDE '(DE)POLITICISATION: SHIFTING DYNAMICS IN AN EMERGING POLITICAL FIELD AND PUBLIC SPHERE' (WITH HANS-JOERG TRENZ), IN CLAUDIA WIESNER (ED.) RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2021) AND EXPLORING E-CAPITAL AS SOCIAL POWER: A NEO-CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE
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|a (2020). LUCIANO MORGANTI IS A PROFESSOR, SENIOR RESEARCHER, AND PROJECT COOR DINATOR AT THE RESEARCH CENTRE STUDIES ON MEDIA, INNOVATION AND TECH NOLOGY VUB/SMIT, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM. HE IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE MASTER NEW MEDIA AND SOCIETY IN EUROPE. HE TEACHES COURSES RELATED TO THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE, THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (NEW) MEDIA AND SOCIETY. HIS MAIN RESEARCH INTERESTS CONCERN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, MEDIA AND PARTICIPATION, AND MEDIA GOVERNANCE. ALVARO OLEART IS A POSTDOCTORAL RESEARCHER AT STUDIO EUROPA MAASTRICHT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, AND A XIV NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATOR AT THE INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES OF THE UNIVER SITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES. HIS MAIN RESEARCH INTERESTS ARE THE INTERACTIVE RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICS, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, AND DEMOCRACY. HE IS THE AUTHOR OF FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EU INTEGRATION (PALGRAVE, 2021). KARI PALONEN IS A PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF JYVAESKYLAE, FINLAND. HIS MAIN RESEARCH TOPICS INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF POLI TICS AND ITS HISTORY, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY OF MAX WEBER, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND THE CONCEPTS, PROCE DURES, AND RHETORIC OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS. HE HAS RECENTLY AUTHORED DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION: PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS (2017) AND PARLIAMENTARY THINKING. PROCEDURE, RHETORIC AND TIME (2018). MARIA-ISABEL SOLDEVILA IS A JOURNALIST AND COMMUNICATION DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES OF THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM. SHE HOLDS M.A. IN JOURNALISM FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND AN EXECUTIVE MASTER IN EU STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM. SHE WAS KNIGHT-WALLACE FELLOW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
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|a MICHIGAN AND UNESCO CHAIR OF COMMUNICATION, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF LISTIN DIARIO NEWSPAPER. JORGE TUNON NAVARRO IS AN ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AT THE CARLOS III UNIVER SITY OF MADRID, SPAIN. EUROPEAN DOCTOR (EXTRAORDINARY PRIZE) IN COMMU NICATION, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EU, AFTER GRADUATING IN LAW, JOUR NALISM AND POLITICS, HE HAS ALSO WORKED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. HE IS AN EXTERNAL SCIENTIFIC EXPERT FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, EVALUATOR OF EUROPEAN PROJECTS, AS WELL AS COLLABORATOR OF THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE IN BRUGES, THE SPANISH NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (INAP), THE OBS BUSINESS SCHOOL, AND THE LA CAIXA FOUNDATION. JULIE VANDER MEULEN IS A PH.D. CANDIDATE AND TEACHING ASSISTANT AT THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM. HER RESEARCH FOCUSES ON SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF HOW LITERARY, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL IMAGINARIES INTERACT AND INFLU ENCE ONE ANOTHER IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE. SHE HOLDS TWO MASTER'S DEGREES IN MODERN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE, ONE SPECIALISED IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND ONE IN NORTH AMERICAN STUDIES, AS WELL AS AN M.A. IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND IN EUROPEAN STUDIES, ALL FROM THE UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BELGIUM. NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS XV CLAUDIA WIESNER IS JEAN MONNET CHAIR AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT FULDA UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES, GERMANY. HER RESEARCH FOCUSES ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY IN THE EU AND ITS MULTILEVEL SYSTEM, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF ANALYSIS AS WELL AS ON THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ACTION, DEBATES, AND DISCOURSES. SHE HAS PUBLISHED BROADLY IN RENOWNED INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING HOUSES AND LEADS SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECTS. LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 7 FIG. 1 MOST POPULAR ISSUES IN THE SPITZENKANDIDAT RELATED TWITTERSPHERE ( SOURCE AUTHORS' OWN COMPILATION, BASED ON DATA FROM BRANDWATCH) 148 FIG. 2 SENTIMENT SHARE OF VOICE ( SOURCE
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|a AUTHORS' OWN COMPILATION, BASED ON DATA FROM BRANDWATCH) 149 FIG. 3 TRENDING TOPICS OF THE 2019 MAASTRICHT AND EUROVISION DEBATES ( SOURCE BRANDWATCH) 150 FIG. 4 MENTIONS BY COUNTRY DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER OF TWITTER USERS ( SOURCE AUTHORS' OWN COMPILATION, BASED ON DATA FROM BRANDWATCH) 151 CHAPTER 8 FIG. 1 RECEPTION OF MACRON'S SPEECH IN TWITTER 174 FIG. 2 RECEPTION OF MERKEL'S SPEECH IN TWITTER 175 FIG. 3 RECEPTION OF SANCHEZ' SPEECH IN TWITTER 176 FIG. 4 MAP OF HASHTAGS FROM THE MAY 2019 CAMPAIGN 178 CHAPTER 9 FIG. 1 DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES BY JOURNAL 196 FIG. 2 DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES BY IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE NEWSPAPER (IN %) 197 XVII XVIII LIST OF FIGURES FIG. 3 FOCUS OF ARTICLES. EU, EU IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, EU FROM A DOMESTIC ISSUE PERSPECTIVE, EU IN THE WORLD (IN %) 198 FIG. 4 COVERAGE OF POLICY ISSUES BY JOURNAL 199 FIG. 5 CONFLICT DENSITY 204 FIG. 6 LEFT/RIGHT AND EAST/WEST-DENSITY OF CONFLICT 205 FIG. 7 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN DEMOCRACY VS. ILLIBERALISM 206 FIG. 8 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION 207 FIG. 9 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION 209 FIG. 10 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS 211 FIG. 11 CLUSTERS OF CONFLICT 212 CHAPTER 11 FIG. 1 EVOLUTION OF THE MEANS AND TOOLS PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGIES, ACCORDING TO THE APPROACH (TOP-DOWN VS. AUDIENCE-CENTRIC) 256 FIG. 2 EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION FOCUS/STYLE 2004-2019 257 CHAPTER 12 FIG. 1 DIAGRAM OF MACRON'S MEGA NARRATIVE, FORMED BY THREE STORIES THAT INCLUDE FIVE FRAMES 279 LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER 5 TABLE 1 THE FRONT NATIONAL IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, NUMBER OF SEATS. IN 1986, THE 35 SEATS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WERE DUE TO THE TEMPORARY TRANSFORMATION OF VOTING TO A PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM 99 CHAPTER 10 TABLE 1 SELECTED SPEECHES FROM THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES 225
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|a TABLE 2 SCENARIOS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017A) 228 CHAPTER 12 TABLE 1 DATA SET TO ANALYSE MACRON'S NARRATIVE ON 'EUROPE' 278 XIX CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH TO POLITICISATION IN THE EU CONTEXT ALVARO OLEART AND TARU HAAPALA IN RECENT YEARS, INTERNAL EUROPEAN UNION (EU) DEBATES ON MIGRATION, BREXIT, THE EUROZONE, TRADE AND THE RULE OF LAW, AMONG OTHERS, HAVE FOCUSED ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU AND THE DISSATISFACTION OF EURO PEAN CITIZENS VIS-A-VIS THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. AFTER THE BREXIT REFERENDUM OF 2016, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC) LED BY JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER LAUNCHED THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE WITH THE WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: REFLECTIONS AND SCENARIOS FOR THE EU27 BY 2025 , PUBLISHED ON 1 MARCH 2017. THE JUNCKER COMMISSION'S WHITE PAPER WAS A REACTION TO A PERCEIVED CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY, AS THE EUROPEAN PROJECT WAS CONSIDERED TO A. OLEART ( B ) MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, MAASTRICHT, THE NETHERLANDS E-MAIL: A.OLEART@MAASTRICHTUNIVERSITY.NL T. HAAPALA UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: TARU.HAAPALA@UAM.ES THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_1 1 2 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA BE AT STAKE. IT ENVISIONED A NEW PHASE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WHICH CONTINUED WITH THE INCREASED TURNOUT OF THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, AFTER WHICH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (COFOE). AS A REACTION TO THE INCREASING EU POLITICISATION, THE COFOE IS MEANT TO BE 'AN INCLUSIVE PLATFORM BRINGING TOGETHER DIFFERENT VOICES' AND A WAY 'TO UNDERPIN THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT' BY GIVING CITIZENS 'FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES'
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|a (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2020 ). ULTIMATELY, THE COFOE WAS DELAYED DUE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC BUT INAUGURATED ON 9 MAY 2021. IT IS TASKED WITH DRAFTING PROPOSALS FOR EU LAWS AND TREATY CHANGES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN EU INSTITUTIONS AND EUROPEAN CITIZENS. CLOSELY RELATED TO THIS POLITICAL CONTEXT, THERE IS A GROWING AMOUNT OF LITERATURE ON THE INCREASED POLITICISATION WHICH IS CONNECTED TO THE PERCEIVED GROWING CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE EU (BOUZA GARCIA, 2017 ), AND BY NOW, IT HAS BECOME A MAJOR THEME OF EU STUDIES. IN THE MAJORITY OF SCHOLARLY ANALYSES, HOWEVER, POLITICISATION SEEMS TO BE VIEWED IN A RATHER NEGATIVE LIGHT. IT IS OFTEN APPROACHED AS 'CONSTRAINING' EUROPEAN INTEGRA TION, SINCE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS FACE EUROSCEPTIC PUBLICS AND THE PRO-ANTI EUROPE DIVIDE LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR ADVANCING INTEGRATION (ESP. HOOGHE &M A R K S , 2009 ). TO APPLY HERE THE RHETORICAL STRATEGY OF PARADIASTOLE (SEE E.G. SKINNER, 2007 ), OF TURNING A VICE INTO A VIRTUE, AND VICE VERSA, FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES, IT COULD BE CLAIMED THAT THE INCREASED POLITICISA TION ALSO LENDS ITSELF TO BE DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF ITS BENEFITS. WHILE THERE ARE MANY DENUNCIATIONS OF POLITICISATION IN EU STUDIES SCHOLARSHIP, IT IS EQUALLY RELEVANT TO CONSIDER OPPOSITE VIEWS AS WELL. MORE SPECIFICALLY, WE CALL FOR CLOSER ATTENTION TO THE MULTI-FACETEDNESS OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE. THIS BOOK DEPARTS FROM THE IDEA THAT POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES ARE EMBEDDED IN THE VERY FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. FURTHERMORE, CONTESTATION IS NOT ONLY A HEALTHY DYNAMIC FOR THE EU BUT NECESSARY FOR ITS DEMOCRATISATION AND CAN EVEN LEAD TOWARDS AN 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS' (BOUZA & OLEART, 2018 ) FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. LOOKING AT POLITICISA TION FROM A BROADER CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, IT REVEALS ITSELF AS A MUCH MORE MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON THAN COMMONLY SUGGESTED. POLITICISATION IN THE EU CONTEXT TAKES PLACE IN
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|a DIFFERENT WAYS, AT DIFFERENT LEVELS, AND ACROSS DIFFERENT POLICY AREAS, ACTORS, CHANNELS, AND COUN TRIES (STATHAM & TRENZ, 2015 ). IN THE CURRENT EU STUDIES SCHOLARSHIP, 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 3 HOWEVER, LESS ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID TO THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OR FORMS OF POLITICISING AND IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, EVEN BEFORE THE SO-CALLED POST MAASTRICHT TURN (BARTH & BIJSMANS, 2018 ; STERNBERG, 2013 ). IF WE LOOK AT POLITICISATION AS A FORM OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY(WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ), THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS BECOMES MORE TANGIBLE. THIS BOOK SUGGESTS TO CONCEPTUALISE THE EUROPEAN CONTROVERSIES AND DISCONTENTS THROUGH A REAPPRAISAL OF POLITICISATION AS A KEY FEATURE OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP ON POLITICISATION (E.G. DE WILDE ET AL., 2018 ; HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ), WHICH OFTEN DEPARTS FROM A CLEAR-CUT DEFINITION OF POLITICISATION WHICH IS THEN APPLIED TO 'PROVE' ITS EXISTENCE AND DEGREE EMPIRICALLY, WE ARE AIMING TO ENCOM PASS DIFFERENT APPROACHES. RATHER THAN STRIVING FOR A 'SOLID FOUNDATION' ON WHICH TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ABOUT IT (WIESNER, 2021 )W I T HA N Y PRE-SET QUESTION, THE GOAL HERE IS TO SHOW A PLURALITY OF INTERPRETATIONS AND THUS PROVIDE NEW WAYS TO DISCUSS AND UNDERSTAND THE PHENOMENON OF POLITICISATION IN THE EU CONTEXT. THE REASON FOR CHOOSING THIS APPROACH IS TO MIRROR THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. IN THE SAME WAY THAT 'POLITICISATION' TAKES PLACE IN DIFFERENT WAYS ACROSS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, WE EMBRACE SIMILAR FRAGMENTATION AND PLURALITY IN THE APPROACHES TO STUDY IT. WE DO NOT AIM FOR A PRECISE DEFINITION, BUT RATHER SEEK TO SHOW A MULTI FACETED APPROACH TO POLITICISATION. IN OUR VIEW, THIS FITS WITH THE PLURALISM AND COMPLEXITY OF THE EU AS A POLITY (CF. ERIKSEN, 1999 ). WE ARGUE, FOLLOWING WIESNER ( 2021 ), THAT SCHOLARLY DISCUSSION ABOUT POLITICISATION HAS LARGELY NEGLECTED THE CONCEPTUAL ASPECT OF IT. THE WAY IN WHICH
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|a EU POLITICISATION IS CONCEPTUALISED DEPENDS ON HOW EUROPEAN POLITICS IS INTERPRETED (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). FOR EXAMPLE, TO INTERPRET POLITICISATION AS A NEGATIVE DYNAMIC IS OFTEN THE CONSEQUENCE OF CONCEPTU ALISING EU POLITICISATION AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CLEAVAGE BETWEEN PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. IF ONE LOOKS RATHER AT POLITICISATION FROM THE OPPOSITE ANGLE, CONTROVERSIES APPEAR INDIS PENSABLE FOR REVEALING THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS, AS WELL AS MAKING THEM AVAILABLE FOR DEBATE TO WIDER PUBLICS. THIS IN TURN MIGHT PROVE USEFUL FOR EUROPEAN DEBATES IN THE LONG RUN, AS IT CAN EXPAND THE RANGE OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL DEBATES. THE APPROACH PROPOSED HERE IS TO CONCEPTUALISE POLITICISATION IN TERMS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYTHROUGH CONFLICTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, WHICH MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS NEGATIVE OR POSITIVE, DEPENDING ON ACTORS AND THEIR CONTEXTS OF ACTING. THE BOOK AIMS TO TRACE A VARIETY OF UNDERSTANDING EU POLITICISATION BEFORE AND BEYOND THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. THE CORE ARGUMENT OF 4 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA THE BOOK IS THAT POLITICISATION, IN CONTRAST TO MOST OF THE CURRENT SCHOL ARSHIP ABOUT THE EU, CAN ALSO BE BENEFICIAL FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. VARIOUS ACTORS, INCLUDING POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (OLEART & BOUZA, 2018 ), INDIVIDUAL POLITICIANS AS WELL AS EU SCHOLARS, ARE POLITICISING ISSUES AND BRINGING THEM TO THE FORE THROUGH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOCIAL MEDIA AND MOVEMENTS. THUS, POLITICISATION CAN CONTRIBUTE TO INTRO DUCING EUROPEAN POLITICS TO WIDER PUBLICS, FURTHER INTERTWINING EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL POLITICS, AS WELL AS FAMILIARISING CITIZENS WITH EU INSTITU TIONS. THIS DYNAMIC IS NOT POLITICALLY NEUTRAL. IT IS, IN FACT, EMBEDDED IN THE SUPRANATIONAL POLITICS BRINGING NEW ACTORS TO THE INCREASINGLY EURO PEANISED POLITICAL ARENA. EU POLITICISATION, THEREFORE, BENEFITS ESPECIALLY THOSE ACTORS ABLE TO MOBILISE LARGE AMOUNTS OF PEOPLE ON EU ISSUES, AT THE EXPENSE OF HIGHLY
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|a PROFESSIONALISED BRUSSELS-BASED 'STAKEHOLDERS', THE TRADITIONAL CONSTITUENCY OF EU POLICY-MAKING. REGARDLESS OF THE WAYS IN WHICH POLITICISATION TAKES PLACE, IT CERTAINLY PRODUCES AWARENESS OF EU AFFAIRS. EVEN NATIONALISTS, SUCH AS MATTEO SALVINI, ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC SPHERES BY INTRODUCING 'EUROPE' IN THE NATIONAL POLITICAL DEBATE, AND BY COOPERATING WITH FAR-RIGHT POLITICIANS IN OTHER EU MEMBER STATES, AND THUS HELPING TO CONNECT DEBATES TRANSNATIONALLY. TO PUT IT SIMPLY, INADVERTENTLY, EVEN EUROSCEPTIC POLITICIANS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE EUROPEANISATION OF EU POLITICS THROUGH THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, SITUATING THE EU FRONT AND CENTRE OF NATIONAL POLITICS. 1 EU POLITICISATION (RE)INTERPRETED IN THIS BOOK, WE ANALYSE POLITICISATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT IN A HETEROGENOUS WAY, BRINGING TOGETHER DIFFERENT DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES FROM POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL THEORY AS WELL AS MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES. OUR STARTING POINT IS THAT POLITICISATION IS A CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION REQUIRING DEEPER ACADEMIC ANALYSIS (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). IN CURRENT SCHOLARLY DEBATES, THE POST MAASTRICHT EU IS THE REFERENCE POINT OF POLITICISATION (BARTH & BIJSMANS, 2018 ; STERNBERG, 2013 ). IN THE POST-MAASTRICHT CONTEXT, EU MEMBER STATES HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY EXPECTED TO TRANSFER MORE SOVEREIGNTY TO SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. SINCE THEN, IT IS ARGUED, THE TRANSFER OF COMPE TENCES FROM THE NATIONAL TO THE EUROPEAN LEVEL HAS LED TO PUBLICLY VOICED REDEFINITIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL READING OF THE EU (BELLAMY, 2013 ; MORAVCSIK, 2002 ), CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE NEED TO LOOK 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 5 AT SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EU BEYOND ITS LEGAL CONTENT AS A PRIMARILY DISCUR SIVE PRODUCT (AALBERTS, 2005 ; SAURUGGER, 2013 ). FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, SOVEREIGNTY CONTINUES TO BE AN ESSENTIAL
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|a VALUE OF POLITICS, BUT IT BECOMES VISIBLE ONLY THROUGH ITS USAGE BY POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE(S). CONNECTED TO THE DEFINITION OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, THE CONSTRUCTIVIST UNDERSTANDING FOCUSES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, IN THE EU, STATE POWER IS DISTRIBUTED UNEQUALLY BETWEEN POLICY-MAKING LEVELS. THAT IS WHY IT REQUIRES CONSTANT RE-NEGOTIATION (SAURUGGER, 2013 ). IN THE FIELD OF DISCURSIVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE MULTIPLE ACTORS ACTIVE IN THE EU DEBATING ARENAS, THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY IS ALWAYS VISIBLE IN ITS 'STRATEGIC USES' (WOLL & JACQUOT, 2010 ), ADAPTED TO VARIOUS CONTEXTS. THIS STAND POINT IMPLIES THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE USAGE THAT ACTORS MAKE OF THE CONCEPT (SEE ALSO AALBERTS, 2012 ). IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH SOVEREIGNTY IN ACTION. SIMILAR TO THE CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW, THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN POLITICS APPLIED IN THIS BOOK FOCUSES ON THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INDI VIDUAL ACTORS AND THE STRATEGIC USES OF CONCEPTS IN CONTEXT, EMPHASISING THE CONTROVERSIAL CHARACTER OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. IT HIGHLIGHTS THAT THE CONFLICTS IN EUROPEAN DEBATES, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY REFER TO PRIMARILY CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENTS. HENCE, A RENEWED PERSPECTIVE IS NEEDED, BECAUSE CONCEPTS AND THE MEANINGS THEY CARRY, AS WELL AS THEIR USE IN POLITICAL STRUGGLES, CAN BE IMPORTANT INDICATORS OF THE TRANSFORMA TIONS AND CHANGES IN EU POLITICS (WIESNER, 2019 , P. 59). THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT THERE ARE ALWAYS A VARIETY OF UNDERSTANDINGS, DUE TO THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF CONCEPTS THAT FORM THE ESSENCE OF POLIT ICAL ACTIVITY, AND THUS IT IS NECESSARY TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE INTERPRETED POLITICISATION IS TAKING PLACE. IN THIS REGARD, THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU REQUIRES THE REFLECTION ON THE RELEVANT ACTORS' INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES 'POLITICS' IN THE EUROPEAN ARENA. THE ACT OF POLITICISING
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|a IMPLIES A BREAK WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 , P. 73). IN THAT SENSE, POLITICISATION CAN BE CONSIDERED AS AN EFFORT TO INTRODUCE A NEW DIMENSION, A NOVEL WAY OF ACTING POLITICALLY. PALONEN ( 2019 ) HAS EMPHASISED THAT POLITICISATION IS AN ASPECT OF POLI TICS WHICH CAN BE VIEWED AS CAUSING DISORDER VIS-A-VIS THE STATUS QUO BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT CAN BE CONCEIVED AS CREATING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THIS INTERPRETATION IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN UNDERSTANDING THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEWCOMERS IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ARENA, WHICH ARE ULTIMATELY ENABLED TO INFLUENCE POWER RELATIONS. 6 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU TAKES PLACE IN VARIOUS FORMS AND DEGREES IN THE DIFFERENT EU MEMBER STATES AS THERE IS NO UNIFIED EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE(E.G. BEE, 2014 ; KOOPMANS & STATHAM, 2010 ). THE LACK OF A COMMON EUROPEAN LANGUAGE OR MASS MEDIA MEANS THAT POLITICAL INTER ACTION COMES LARGELY BY WAY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS SPEAKING TO THEIR NATIONAL PUBLICS IN NATIONAL LANGUAGES, AS REPORTED BY NATIONAL MEDIA AND DIGESTED BY NATIONAL AUDIENCES. NEVERTHELESS, THE RESULTING FRAGMENTATION OF DISCOURSE MAY BE SOMEWHAT ATTENUATED BY THE DEVELOPING EUROPEAN 'COMMUNITY OF COMMUNITIES' (RISSE, 2010 ). DESPITE THIS FRAGMENTATION, MORE CITIZENS AND POLITICIANS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELEC TIONS, DISCUSS SIMILAR EU-RELATED TOPICS AND ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH HOW THE EU WORKS. IT COINCIDES WITH, AND IS PERHAPS DRIVEN BY, A GREATER AND DEEPER POLITICISATION OF EU AFFAIRS. WITH THE OUTBREAK OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC THIS TENDENCY BECAME EVER MORE ACCENTUATED. IN COMBINATION WITH THE LACK OF A COMMON EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE, THE VERY NOTION OF A PUBLIC SPHERE OUGHT TO BE QUESTIONED IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. IN NANCY FRASER'S ( 1990 ) FAMOUS CRITIQUE OF THE HABERMASIAN BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE, SHE ARGUES THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR RETHINKING PUBLIC SPHERES IN TERMS OF INCLUSIVENESS AND PARITY.
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|a FRASER'S MAIN POINT OF CONTENTION AGAINST THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE LAID OUT BY HABERMAS IS THAT IT SEPARATES STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY AS TWO DISTINCT AREAS OF ACTION WHILE IT DOES NOT ADDRESS DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS. ACCORDING TO HER, THERE ARE 'WEAK PUBLICS' ENTAILING DELIBERATION CONSISTING 'EXCLUSIVELY IN OPINION-FORMATION' WITHOUT ANY DECISION-MAKING PURPOSE. THESE, IT IS ARGUED, DO NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH TOOLS FOR PROMOTING DEMOC RACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY. WHILE CONSIDERING THE IDEA OF MULTIPLE PUBLICS IN EUROPE, ERIKSEN, INSPIRED BY FRASER'S IDEAS, HAS ELABORATED ON HOW DEMO CRATIC LEGITIMACY IN THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION INCLUDES BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS (ERIKSEN, 1999 ). IN THAT SENSE, WHAT FRASER WOULD CALL 'WEAK' PUBLICS, CAN BE SEEN AS CONTRIBUTING TO DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE. IN CONTRAST, THE STRONG PUBLICS COMBINE BOTH PUBLIC DEBATE AND DECISION-MAKING, I.E. SOVEREIGN PARLIAMENTS. IN THE HYBRID FORM OF PUBLICS, THAT INCLUDES BOTH WEAK AND STRONG PUBLICS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO THINK DEMOCRATIC POSSIBILITIES ANEW (FRASER, 1990 , P. 77). AS THE THEORY OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IS BASED ON WESTPHALIAN FRAMEWORK WHERE NATION STATES WITH TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES REMAIN THE KEY PLAYERS, THE INTRODUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL POLITY, SUCH AS THE EU, BREAKS ITS PREVIOUSLY UNDERLYING CONNECTIONS WITH POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP (FRASER, 2007 , P. 21). FRASER SUGGESTS THAT, IN THIS CASE, INCLUSIVENESS AND PARITY 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 7 NEED NOT BE TIED WITH CITIZENSHIP AT ALL, AS ALL THOSE WHO ARE AFFECTED CAN PARTICIPATE AS PEERS. IN THIS SENSE, EU POLITICISATION MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO MAKING THE SEGMENTED EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES MORE INCLUSIVE, BRINGING NEW ACTORS TO EUROPEAN POLITICS. THIS MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY, YET THERE ARE IMPORTANT CHALLENGES THAT COME WITH IT, WHICH LEADS US TO CONCEIVE POLITICISATION AS BOTH A POTENTIAL VIRTUE AS WELL AS A VICE. COMPLEMENTING
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|a FRASER'S IDEAS ABOUT A MORE INCLUSIVE VIEW OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE, THE CENTRALITY OF POLITICISATION IN THIS BOOK ENCOURAGES US TO ALSO DISCUSS THE RELATION BETWEEN CONFLICT, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE. PUBLIC SPHERE THEORETICIANS HAVE OFTEN PLACED EMPHASIS ON RATIONAL DELIBERATION AND CONSENSUS, AS THEY HAVE IMPLIED THE NEED FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 'TO ARRIVE AT A RATIONALLY MOTIVATED CONSENSUS' (COHEN, 1997 , PP. 74-75). IN CONTRAST TO THIS VIEW, AUTHORS SUCH AS DUCHESNE AND HAEGEL ( 2004 ) AND MOUFFE ( 2000 , 2013 ) HAVE ARGUED THAT CONFLICT IS INHERENT TO POLITICS, AND THEREFORE THERE IS NO POLITICS WITHOUT CONFLICT. IN THIS LINE, PREVIOUS RESEARCH HAS CONCEPTUALLY DISTINGUISHED DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLITICISATION THAT CAN TAKE PLACE OVER EU ISSUES: AGONISM AND ANTAGO NISM (OLEART, 2021 ). THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AGONISTIC AND ANTAGONISTIC CONFLICT IN THE EU IS MADE ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS BEING CHALLENGED, WHAT IS AT STAKE. AGONISTIC POLITICISATION OF THE EU TAKES PLACE, IT IS ARGUED, IF CONFLICT IS CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF AN 'US' AND A 'THEM' THAT ARE RECOGNISED AS PART OF THE SAME POLITICAL COMMUNITY, BUT WITH FUNDAMEN TALLY DIFFERENT POLITICAL PROJECTS (E.G. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY VS NEOLIBERALISM). INSTEAD, ANTAGONISTIC POLITICISATION TAKES PLACE WHEN CONFLICT IS FRAMED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE 'US' AND 'THEM' ARE NOT LEGITIMATE ACTORS IN THE SAME POLITICAL COMMUNITY. THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE EU IS DISCURSIVELY CONSTRUCTED AS BEING IN OPPOSITION TO NATION STATES (E.G. THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF FRANCE VS THE EU). INSTEAD, AGONISTIC CONFLICT EMERGES OUT OF A POLITICISATION THAT IS FRAMED BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL PROJECTS BUT ACCEPTS THE 'OTHER' AS A LEGITIMATE RIVAL, RATHER THAN AN ENEMY (CF. ANTAGONISM). THE CONTENTION OF THE BOOK IS THAT THE POLITICISATION IS NOT 'CON STRAINING' EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, BUT RATHER EMPOWERING IT BY BRINGING IN NEW
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|a ACTORS INTO EUROPEAN POLITICS, THEREBY ENLARGING THE POLITICAL ARENA BEYOND THE NATIONAL LEVEL, CONNECTING TRANSNATIONAL STRUGGLES AND POTEN TIALLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE EU. THIS BOOK TAKES A FRESH LOOK AT CONCEPTUAL STRUGGLES OVER THE MEANINGS AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF POLITICISATION OF THE EU. IT IS UNDERSTOOD AS AN UNDERLYING FEATURE, 8 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA AND SINCE THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' ERA OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SEEMS TO BE FADING AWAY, IT HAS BEEN RE-EMERGING WITH THE INCREASING INTERTWINING BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICS. THE CLAIM OF POST-MAASTRICHT EU POLITICISATION ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE PRE-MAASTRICHT ERA OF NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AS WELL AS ELITIST BEHIND-CLOSED-DOORS POLITICS OF THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' WERE THE DEFINING FEATURES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THEY COULD ALSO BE VIEWED AS THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS BY POWERFUL POLITICAL ACTORS TO DEPOLITICISE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THROUGH REDUCING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO MERE TECHNOCRACY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIPLOMACY, DEPOLITICISING THE SUPRA NATIONAL ELEMENTS WERE ALSO ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS REGARDING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU. INSTEAD, THE POLITICISATION OF EU ISSUES IN NATIONAL CONTEXTS ACROSS ITS MEMBER STATES ESTABLISHES THE EU AS A LEGITIMATE POLITY BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE (DE WILDE & LORD, 2016 ). PREVIOUS RESEARCH HAS EMPHASISED THE ABSENCE OF 'POL ITICS' WHEN DISCUSSING EU 'POLICIES', CONCEPTUALISED BY VIVIEN SCHMIDT ( 2006 ) AS THE EU'S 'POLICY WITHOUT POLITICS'. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN 'POLICY' AND 'POLITICS' LIES AT THE CENTRE OF THIS VOLUME, AS THE DEPOLITICI SATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS HAS ENCOURAGED AN EU POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IN WHICH 'MAJOR POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE IN EXECUTIVE NETWORKS RELA TIVELY DETACHED FROM DEMOCRATIC CONTROL' (KAUPPI, 2018 , P. 20). FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU
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|a COULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS CONTRIBUTING TO MATCHING 'POLICY WITH POLITICS'. RATHER THAN A TRADI TIONAL INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH, THIS BOOK VIEWS THE 'DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT' OF THE EU AS BEING PRIMARILY BASED ON THE LACK OF BOTH EUROPEANISA TION AND RECOGNITION OF THE UNDERLYING POLITICISATION OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. FOR THIS REASON, THE POLITICISATION OF EU AFFAIRS IS UNDERSTOOD AS A DEMOCRATISING FORCE THAT EMPOWERS FURTHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. AS ARGUED BY TRENZ AND EDER, 'CRITICISING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT MEANS INITI ATING THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISING THE EU' (TRENZ & EDER, 2004 ,P .7 ) . CONFLICT OVER EU AFFAIRS CAN JUST AS WELL REVITALISE DEMOCRACY AND DEBATES OVER THE 'DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT' OF THE EU. 2 TRACING EU POLITICISATION: THE NARRATIVE AND DESIGN OF THE BOOK THE AIM OF (RE)INTERPRETING EU POLITICISATION IS AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT VIS-A-VIS THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE, THAT WAS LAUNCHED INSTITUTIONALLY, COINCIDING WITH THE 2019 EU ELECTIONS AND THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 9 THAT WAS DUE TO START IN 2020, AND THAT ULTIMATELY BEGAN IN MAY 2021. THE WAY IN WHICH THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE TAKES PLACE WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE AIM OF THIS BOOK IS TO PROVIDE CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL INSIGHTS TO INFORM AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEBATES. THE BOOK ALSO HAS A NORMATIVE COMPONENT THAT IS IMPORTANT TO HIGH LIGHT. WHEN QUESTIONING MUCH OF THE EU POLITICISATION LITERATURE, WHICH TENDS TO ARGUE THAT POLITICISATION 'CONSTRAINS' INTEGRATION BY THE STRUC TURAL OPPOSITION BETWEEN SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF INTEGRATION, WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT OUR ARGUMENT THAT POLITICISATION EMPOWERS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS A NORMATIVE CLAIM. FAR FROM BEING A 'DESCRIPTIVE' AND ONLY 'EMPIRICAL' APPROACH, THE BOOK AIMS TO RE-CONCEPTUALISE THE UNDERSTANDING OF EU POLITICISATION BY SHIFTING THE ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE TRADITIONAL
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|a CONSENSUS-ORIENTED UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE BOOK CAN THEREFORE BE SEEN AS AN INNOVATIVE AND POLITICALLY AWARE ATTEMPT TO CONCEIVE POLITICISATION IN A MULTI-FACETED AND HETEROGENOUS WAY. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON POLITICISATION IN THE EU HAS IN ITSELF BEEN LARGELY DEPOLITICISED. BURNHAM ( 2001 , P. 128) PORTRAYED DEPOLITICISATION AS A PROCESS BY WHICH POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE PRESENTED AS IF THEY ARE UNQUES TIONABLE, REMOVING 'THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF DECISION-MAKING'. BULLER AND FLINDERS ( 2005 ) FURTHER DEVELOPED THE CONCEPT, UNDERSTANDING DEPOLITI CISATION AS ARENA SHIFTING, A MECHANISM BY WHICH POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY IS MOVED AWAY FROM 'POLITICS', AS A PROCESS BY WHICH A POLITICAL DECISION IS PRESENTED AS UNCHALLENGEABLE, TECHNICAL AND/OR APOLITICAL. APPLIED TO ACADEMIC RESEARCH, THIS 'DEPOLITICISATION OF POLITICISATION' TYPE OF APPROACH WOULD REFER TO PRESENT SUCH RESEARCH AS IF THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO ITS 'OBJECTIVE' REFLECTION. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IN THIS BOOK WE TAKE A CONCEPTUALLY ENGAGED POSITION ON EU POLITICISATION, NOT ONLY ASSUMING A DIVERSITY OF APPROACHES BUT ALSO ACCEPTING THAT THERE IS AN IMPOR TANT NORMATIVE ASPECT TO IT. WE ARE NOT MERELY DESCRIBING AN EMPIRICAL PHENOMENON. WE ARE INSTEAD SUGGESTING NEW CONCEPTUAL WAYS TO UNDER STAND EU POLITICS AND HOW POLITICISATION MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO MATCHING 'POLICY WITH POLITICS'. DESPITE THE ABOVE MENTIONED NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES, INCREASINGLY MORE CITIZENS, JOURNALISTS AND POLITICIANS DISCUSS ABOUT SIMILAR EU-RELATED TOPICS AND ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH HOW THE EU WORKS, A PROCESS THAT IS PARTIALLY FUELLED BY THE POLITICISATION OF EU AFFAIRS. NOTABLE EXAMPLES ARE THE BREXIT DEBATE, WHICH LARGELY INTRO DUCED THE EU AS A CENTRAL PILLAR IN THE NATIONAL POLITICAL DEBATE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM; THE EMERGENCE OF EMMANUEL MACRON IN FRANCE, WHICH ALSO SITUATED THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AT THE CENTRE OF THE POLITICAL
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|a DEBATE; OR 10 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA EU TRADE POLICY, WHICH HAS BEEN WIDELY POLITICISED ACROSS EUROPE THROUGH TRADE AGREEMENTS SUCH AS TTIP (CONRAD & OLEART, 2020 ). EPISODES OF POLITICISATION HAVE ALSO APPEARED MORE RECENTLY IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19, AS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WAS IN CHARGE OF NEGOTIATING THE VACCINES WITH PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES, AND SEVERAL ACTORS, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEVEL, CRITICISED COMMISSION PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN FOR ITS MANAGEMENT. IN THIS BOOK, WE EXPLORE THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU BY MEANS OF CASE STUDIES AND TRACE THE DEBATES AROUND 'POLITICISATION' BACK TO CONSTITUTING AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. WE ASK: WHAT WERE THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE BEFORE AND AFTER THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN 2019? AND, WHAT WERE THE CONCEPTS AND MEANINGS CREATED FOR EU POLITICISATION THROUGH VARIOUS DEBATES? THE BOOK IS NOT STRUCTURED ALONG THE TRADITIONAL DIVI SION OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS. INSTEAD, IT IS PRESENTED IN THREE THEMATIC CLUSTERS OF CHAPTERS BASED ON HOW CLOSELY THEY SPEAK TO EACH OTHER IN ADDRESSING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU FROM DIFFERENT PERSPEC TIVES. IN THE FIRST THEMATIC CLUSTER, THE CONTRIBUTIONS ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF HOW TO CONCEPTUALLY ANALYSE THE EU AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE ROLE THAT POLITICISATION PLAYS IN IT. THE SECOND THEMATIC CLUSTER SCRUTINISES THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU, AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED INCREASE IN EU CONTESTATION. THE THIRD THEMATIC CLUSTER TRACES DIFFERENT NARRATIVES OF EU POLITICISATION, COVERING INSTITUTIONAL AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELATED CONCEPTS, SUCH AS 'SOVEREIGNTY', IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. THE FIRST PART OF THE BOOK DEPARTS FROM CLAUDIA WIESNER'S CHAPTER, IN WHICH SHE PROBLEMATISES THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU, PROPOSING A REDEFINI TION OF POLITICISATION AS A MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-STAGE CONCEPT. THE CHAPTER SKETCHES A
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|a NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF EU POLITICI SATION, PROVIDING EXAMPLES OF HOW IT IS NOT ONLY A TOP-DOWN PROCESS, BUT ALSO BOTTOM-UP, AS THE POLITICISATION REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE ILLUSTRATES. THEREFORE, IT PROVIDES NEW ANALYTICAL GLASSES TO LOOK AT PHENOMENA RELATED TO THE INCREASING POLITICISATION OF EUROPE DURING THE PAST DECADE, WHICH IN TURN HELPS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. IN THE NEXT CHAPTER, ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN ADDRESSES THE ACADEMIC DISCUSSION SURROUNDING THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OF THE EU, AND THE ROLE OF POLITICISATION GIVEN IN IT. THE CHAPTER ARGUES THAT THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS DEVEL OPED A NARRATIVE ON THE PROGRESSIVE POLITICISATION OF THE EU INVOLVING AN ASSESSMENT ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY DERIVED FROM ASSUMED PUBLIC 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 11 SUPPORT AND CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT. HOWEVER, THE STANDARD DESCRIPTION OF THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS REQUIRES RETHINKING AND A MORE COMPLEX THEO RETICAL APPROACH, FOCUSING ON THE MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION, FOR A MORE NUANCED ASSESSMENT OF EU POLITICISATION. KARI PALONEN OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE OUTLINE OF HOW TO APPROACH POLITICI SATION. THE STARTING POINT IS THAT POLITICISATION CAN BE VIEWED AS A SPEECH ACT, OR RHETORICAL MOVE, THAT INTRODUCES REINTERPRETATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE CHAPTER PROVIDES HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF HOW PARLIAMENTARIANS IN EUROPE HAVE TALKED ABOUT POLITICISATION AND THUS PROVIDES A BROADER PARLIAMENTARY PERSPECTIVE TO CURRENT POPULIST PARTIES' EXERTIONS OF POLITI CISATION OF THE EU. PALONEN'S CHAPTER PROVIDES AN ANALYTICAL FRAME TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPE, AN IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVE OUR ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. FINALLY FOR THE FIRST THEMATIC CLUSTER, NIILO KAUPPI'S CHAPTER TRACES THE RELEVANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN THE EVOLUTION AND SUCCESS OF THE FRENCH EXTREME RIGHT
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|a PARTY FRONT/RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL , ARGUING THAT EP ELEC TIONS HAVE BEEN, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF DIRECT ELECTIONS IN 1979, FIRST ORDER ELECTIONS. THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THE INCREASING POPULARITY AND POLITICS OF RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL LED BY MARINE LE PEN ARE INHERENTLY CONNECTED WITH EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN ELEC TIONS. IN THIS WAY, THE PARTY HAS GREATLY BENEFITED FROM ITS POLITICAL FOOTING IN 'EUROPE'. WHILE BEING AN EXAMPLE OF THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THE CASE OF FRONT NATIONAL ALSO SHOWS THAT POLITICISATION CAN PRESENT ITSELF IN UNEXPECTED, CONTINGENT WAYS. IN THIS WAY, THE POLITICISA TION OF EUROPE CAN BE CONSIDERED A NATIONAL RESOURCE USED BY NATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITIONING. THE CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS THE INHERENT INTERTWINING BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICS, WHICH IS CENTRAL FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. THE SECOND THEMATIC CLUSTER OF THE BOOK INTRODUCES THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. IN HER CHAPTER, TARU HAAPALA EXAMINES THE POLITICAL PROCEDURES OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATE WITH A FOCUS ON THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC AND TWITTERSPHERE. THE CHAPTER APPROACHES POLITICISATION IN TERMS OF PROCEDURES OF DEBATING AND ASKS HOW THE TWITTERSPHERE MIGHT SUPPORT THE LEGITIMACY OF PARLIAMEN TARY RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMERGING LITERATURE ABOUT THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN DEMOCRACY, THE CHAPTER MAKES A HYBRID CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN WHICH BOTH PARLIAMEN TARY PROCEDURES AND SOCIAL MEDIA ARE PART OF, EVEN THOUGH THEY OPERATE WITH DIFFERENT LOGICS. THE CHAPTER CONTRIBUTES TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF 12 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA THE ROLE OF TWITTER IN RELATION TO PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES IN ADVANCING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. THE CHAPTER BY STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS AND LUCIANO MORGANTI FOCUSES ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRESIDENCY CANDIDATE ( SPITZENKANDIDATEN ) COMPETITIONS IN 2014 AND
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|a 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS ON TWITTER. THEY SEEK TO IDENTIFY THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS' VISIBILITY ON TWITTER ACROSS MEMBER STATES AND PRESENT THE MAIN TOPICS DISCUSSED, UNDER WHICH ASPECTS, AS WELL AS THROUGH WHICH LINGUA FRANCA. THEY APPROACH POLITI CISATION AS A POLITICAL INNOVATION ARGUING THAT, WHILE NOT PRODUCING A LOT OF RESULTS, IT WAS NONETHELESS A DEMONSTRATION OF NEW DYNAMISM IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE. THE CHAPTER CONCLUDES THAT TWITTER CAN INCREASE THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU AND FACILITATE TRANSNATIONAL, ADHOC, AND ONLINE SPHERES DIMINISHING THE CONSTRAINTS OF NATIONAL BORDERS AND MASS-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION. THE NEXT CHAPTER BY LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND JORGE TUNON NAVARRO ANALYSES ONE ASPECT OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, NAMELY, THE LINK BETWEEN NATIONAL LEADERS' DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN ORDER TO ANALYSE COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN FORMS OF POLITICISATION, CIRCULATION OF FRAMES AND PERSONALISATION. THE CHAPTER ASKS WHETHER THE INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL LEADERS IN THE MULTI STREAM DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASING THE PERSONALISATION AND POLITICAL FRAMING OF THE TWITTERSPHERE DEBATES DURING THE EU ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 2019, TRACING THE RESONANCE OF EUROPEAN DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN 'TWITTERSPHERE'. AS POLITICAL DEBATES ARE INCREAS INGLY TAKING PLACE BEYOND INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA, THE CHAPTER BUILDS A RICH CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CONNECTING THE SPEECHES OF NATIONAL LEADERS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE DISCUSSION ON EUROPE ON TWITTER. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFERENT VISIONS OF EUROPE DISCUSSED BOTH AT THE INSTITUTIONAL EUROPEAN LEVEL AND ON TWITTER, WHICH FORM OF POLITICISATION IS TAKING PLACE AND WHICH CONTENTIOUS AND PROTEST FRAMES ARE BEING MOBILISED. THE THIRD THEMATIC CLUSTER ADDRESSES THE DIFFERENT NARRATIVES THAT ARTIC ULATE EU POLITICISATION. IN THEIR CHAPTER, ANA ANDGULADZE , JAN BEYER , RAMONA COMAN AND
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|a JULIE VANDER MEULEN EXAMINE POLITICISATION IN TERMS OF POLARISATION AND SALIENCE AS BEING DETERMINED BY THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING NATIONAL NARRATIVES, MEDIA RECEPTIVE NESS, COMPETITIVE PARTY POLITICS, REFERENDA, AND CRISIS. THE CHAPTER TRACES PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE EU PRIOR TO THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. SCRUTINISING THE COVERAGE OF EU ISSUES IN 16 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 13 NEWSPAPERS OF SEVEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EU MEMBER STATES, THEY SHOW THE SALIENCE OF EU-RELATED TOPICS AND THE WAY IN WHICH THEY ARE FRAMED, WITH A PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO POLARISATION AND LINES OF CONFLICT WHICH SHAPE THE INTEGRATION PROCESS. THEY DISCUSS THE DIFFERENT LINES OF CONFLICT AND POLITICISATION OF EUROPE PRESENT IN THE MEDIA, AND WHETHER IT ENHANCES OR HINDERS FURTHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE CHAPTER IS CONCEIVED AS AN EMPIRICAL TEST TO THEORETICALLY BRIDGE THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION TO THE EU'S THEORIES OF INTEGRATION AND TYPES OF CONFLICT OVER EURO PEAN INTEGRATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT, NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL, GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION, SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY VS. THREATS TO DEMOC RACY, SUPPORTERS OF IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION. AS SUCH, IT IS A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION AHEAD OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE, WHICH IS LIKELY TO ATTRACT MEDIA SCRUTINY. IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER THE CONTROVERSIES OVER INTERPRETATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES IS TAKEN UP BY MIRUNA BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA AND DRAGOS , IONIT , YY A .T H E YP R O P O S ETH A T A GROUP OF 'DISCURSIVE ENTREPRENEURS' (EU AND MEMBER STATE OFFICIALS BOTH AT THE EU AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL) INSTRUMENTALISED THE CONCEPT OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' FOR PROMOTING THEIR OWN VISION ON THE EU. THEY PROPOSE THE PERSPECTIVE OF 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION' TO ANALYSE TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGES IN DISCURSIVE PERFORMANCES. IN THEIR VIEW, THE FUTURE OF
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|a EUROPE DEBATE IS A FORM OF SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION, CREATING A PLATFORM FOR VARIOUS ACTORS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ON EUROPE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE. IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER, MARIA-ISABEL SOLDEVILA AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN ANALYSE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED INCREASE IN EU CONTESTATION. THE CHAPTER EXPLORES THE RHETORICAL TECH NIQUES AS THE 'HEARTS AND MINDS' APPROACH BY THE COMMISSION, AND ANALYSES WHICH ARGUMENTS OR IMAGES THE COMMISSION USES TO AUGMENT AND/OR MAINTAIN ITS AUTHORITY OVER EU DEBATES IN THE MIDST OF CONTROVER SIES. THE ANALYSIS FOCUSES ON THE JUNCKER COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS WELL AS THE SEVEN SHORT FILMS OF THE 2019 EU AND ME CAMPAIGN. GIVEN THE PREVAILING ARGUMENT OF THE INCREASING POLITICISA TION OF THE EU, THE CHAPTER PROVIDES AN INSIGHTFUL ANALYSIS AS TO HOW THE COMMISSION REACTS TO THE REVITALISATION OF PUBLIC DEBATE SURROUNDING EUROPE, A PERSPECTIVE THAT IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT AHEAD OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE, IN WHICH THE COMMISSION PLAYS A CENTRAL ROLE. IN THE LAST CHAPTER OF THE THIRD CLUSTER, LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND ALVARO OLEART TAKE UP THE FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON'S VISION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. THEY DISCUSS THE INITIATIVES PRESENTED IN MACRON'S 14 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA SPEECHES BETWEEN 2016 AND 2019. THE MAIN ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD IS THAT MACRON HAS MANAGED TO LAY OUT A NEW DISCURSIVE FRAMEWORK FAVOURABLE TO HIM AND HIS ALLIES WHILE PORTRAYING THOSE WHO DISAGREE AS 'ANTI-EUROPEAN', A NARRATIVE THAT IS CONCEIVED AS 'MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN'. MACRON'S NARRATIVE OBSCURES ALTERNATIVE PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVES BY SITUATING THEM AS OUTSIDE HIS EUROPEAN NARRATIVE, CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRO-EUROPEAN BLUEPRINT. THIS IS PROBLEMATIC FROM A DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM PERSPECTIVE, SINCE MACRON'S NARRATIVE DELEGITIMISES OTHER OPTIONS THAT SUGGEST AN ALTER NATIVE PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVE, IN WHAT COULD BE CONCEIVED AS ANTAGONISTIC POLITICISATION.
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|a FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, LE PEN AND MACRON ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: BOTH PUSH A PRO VS ANTI-EU POLITICISATION. LASTLY, IN THE EPILOGUE OF THE EDITED VOLUME, TARU HAAPALA , ALVARO OLEART ,AN D JAN BEYER REFLECT ON THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS, BRIDGING THE DIFFERENT WAYS OF APPROACHING, ANALYSING, AND INTERPRETING POLITICISATION AND LOOKING BEYOND TO DISCUSS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES. THEY MOBILISE THE FINDINGS OF THE BOOK TO SYNTHESISE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES IN LIGHT OF POST-COVID-19 EUROPE AND POLITICI SATION OF THE EU LITERATURE. THUS, THE CHAPTER AIMS AT LINKING THE DISCOURSE ON VISIONS FOR EUROPE TO THE SCHOLARSHIP ON THE 'CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY' AND POLITICISATION. THE EPILOGUE ALSO DRAWS LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF EU POLITICISATION, PUTTING FORWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA THAT OPENS AVENUES FOR INTERESTING UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF HOW THE EU GETS POLITICISED AND WHAT ARE ITS EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS. REFERENCES AALBERTS, T. E. (2005). FUTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE EUROPE- A CONSTRUCTIVIST READING. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 42 (1), 23-46. AALBERTS, T. E. (2012). CONSTRUCTING SOVEREIGNTY BETWEEN POLITICS AND LAW . ROUT LEDGE. BARTH, C., & BIJSMANS, P. (2018). THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND PUBLIC DEBATES ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES, 26 (2), 215-231. BEE, C. (2014). TRANSNATIONALISATION, PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND ACTIVE CITIZEN SHIP. THE EMERGENCE OF A FRAGMENTED AND FLUID EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE. SOCIOLOGY COMPASS , 8 (8), 1018-1032. BELLAMY, R. (2013). 'AN EVER CLOSER UNION AMONG THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE': REPUB LICAN INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND DEMOI CRATIC REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE EU. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 35 (5), 499-516. 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 15 BOUZA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S
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|a 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87-104. BOUZA GARCIA, L. (2017). THE 'NEW NARRATIVE PROJECT' AND THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES , 25 (3), 340-353. BULLER, J., & FLINDERS, M. (2005). THE DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF DEPOLITICISATION IN THE AREA OF BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 7 (4), 526-543. BURNHAM, P. (2001). NEW LABOUR AND THE POLITICS OF DEPOLITICISATION. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 3 (2), 127-149. COHEN, J. (1997). DELIBERATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. IN J. BOHMAN & W. REHG (EDS.), DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (PP. 67-91). MIT PRESS. CONRAD, M., & OLEART, A. (2020). FRAMING TTIP IN THE WAKE OF THE GREEN PEACE LEAKS: AGONISTIC AND DELIBERATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FRAME RESONANCE AND COMMUNICATIVE POWER. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 42 (4), 527-545. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. (2020, JUNE 24). CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: COUNCIL POSITION . 24 JUNE 2020. RETRIEVED MARCH 15, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/MEDIA/44679/ST09102-EN20.PDF . DE WILDE, P., LEUPOLD, A., & SCHMIDTKE, H. (EDS.). (2018). THE DIFFERENTIATED POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE . ROUTLEDGE. DE WILDE, P., & LORD, C. (2016). ASSESSING ACTUALLY-EXISTING TRAJECTORIES OF EU POLITICISATION. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 145-163. DUCHESNE, S., & HAEGEL, F. (2004). LA POLITISATION DES DISCUSSIONS, AU CROISE MENT DES LOGIQUES DE SPECIALISATION ET DE CONFLICTUALISATION. REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 54 (6), 877-909. ERIKSEN, E. O. (1999). THE QUESTION OF DELIBERATIVE SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE EU (ARENA WORKING PAPERS WP 99/4). RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2020, FROM HTTP:// WWW.ARENA.UIO.NO/PUBLICATIONS/WP99_4.HTM . FRASER, N. (1990). RETHINKING THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF
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|a ACTUALLY EXISTING DEMOCRACY. SOCIAL TEXT, 25 (26), 56-80. FRASER, N. (2007). SPECIAL SECTION: TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE: TRANSNATIONAL IZING THE PUBLIC SPHERE: ON THE LEGITIMACY AND EFFICACY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN A POST-WESTPHALIAN WORLD. THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY, 24 (4), 7-30. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. HUTTER, S., GRANDE, E., & KRIESI, H. (EDS.). (2016). POLITICISING EUROPE . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. KAUPPI, N. (2018). TOWARD A REFLEXIVE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIELDS, INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICIANS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. 16 A. OLEART AND T. HAAPALA KAUPPI, N., PALONEN, K., & WIESNER, C. (2016). THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITICI SATION OF THE EU. REDESCRIPTIONS, 19 (1), 72-90. KOOPMANS, R., & STATHAM, P. (EDS.). (2010). THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE: MEDIA DISCOURSE AND POLITICAL CONTENTION . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. MORAVCSIK, A. (2002). IN DEFENCE OF THE 'DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT': REASSESSING LEGIT IMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 40 (4), 603-624. MOUFFE, C. (2000). THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX . VERSO. MOUFFE, C. (2013). AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY . VERSO. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EU INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. OLEART, A., & BOUZA, L. (2018). DEMOCRACY AT STAKE: MULTIPOSITIONAL ACTORS AND POLITICIZATION IN THE EU CIVIL SOCIETY FIELD. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES , 56 (4), 870-887. PALONEN, K. (2019). POLITICISATION: DISORDER OR CHANCE? FROM LITERARY TO PARLIA MENTARY DEBATES. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY, 18 (2), 248-281. RISSE, T. (2010). A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES? CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS. SAURUGGER, S. (2013). IS THERE A SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM IN THE EU? SCIENCESPO
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|a GRENOBLE CENTRE DE DOCUMENTATION . RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS:// TEL.ARCHIVES-OUVERTES.FR/SCPO-GRENOBLE/HALSHS-00911482V1 . SCHMIDT, V. A. (2006). DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: THE EU AND NATIONAL POLITIES . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. SKINNER, Q. (2007). PARADIASTOLE: REDESCRIBING THE VICES AS VIRTUES. IN S. ADAMSON, G. ALEXANDER, & K. ETTENHUBER (EDS.), RENAISSANCE FIGURES OF SPEECH (PP. 149-164). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2015). UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF EU POLITI CIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE EUROZONE CRISIS. COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 13 (3), 287-306. STERNBERG, C. (2013). THE STRUGGLE FOR EU LEGITIMACY: PUBLIC CONTESTATION, 1950- 2005 . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. TRENZ, H.-J., & EDER, K. (2004). THE DEMOCRATIZING DYNAMICS OF A EURO PEAN PUBLIC SPHERE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONALISM. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY, 7 (1), 5-25. WIESNER, C. (2019). INVENTING THE EU AS A DEMOCRATIC POLITY: CONCEPTS, ACTORS AND CONTROVERSIES . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C. (ED.). (2021). RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. 1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH YY 17 WIESNER, C., HAAPALA, T., & PALONEN, K. (2017). DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION. PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS . RHETORIC, POLITICS AND SOCIETY. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WOLL, C., & JACQUOT, S. (2010). USING EUROPE: STRATEGIC ACTION IN MULTI-LEVEL POLITICS. COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 8 (1), 110-126. PART I POLITICISATION OF THE EU AS A POLITY CHAPTER 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU POLITICISATION IN THEORY, CONCEPTUALISATION, AND RESEARCH CLAUDIA WIESNER 1 INTRODUCTION THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION IS INCREASINGLY USED AND DISCUSSED IN CURRENT THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DEMOCRACY, MORE GENERALLY, AND ON THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU), MORE PARTICULARLY-BE IT IN CRITICAL WAYS OR IN MORE POSITIVE TONES (SEE THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN WIESNER,
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|a 2019C , 2021D ). THE FIRST CRUCIAL QUESTION IN THIS RESPECT IS WHAT POLITICISATION IS ABOUT IN THE EU CONTEXT (KAUPPI & WIESNER, 2018 )-IS IT EU POLITICS? EUROPEAN POLITICS? EUROPE (HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ; STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 )? EURO PEAN INTEGRATION (DE WILDE, 2011 ; DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 ; HOEGLINGER, 2016 )? EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE (DE WILDE ET AL., 2015 ), OR MAYBE EURO PEAN ISSUES? THE CHOICE OF WORDS IS MEANINGFUL HERE, AS THE CONCEPTS REFER TO DIFFERENT PHENOMENA OR ENTITIES. SECOND, AND EQUALLY DECISIVE, IS TO ASK C. WIESNER ( B ) FULDA UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES, FULDA, GERMANY E-MAIL: CLAUDIA.WIESNER@SK.HS-FULDA.DE THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_2 21 22 C. WIESNER WHAT EXACTLY IS MEANT AND UNDERSTOOD AS POLITICISATION IN THE EU CONTEXT? HOW IS POLITICISATION THEORISED, CONCEPTUALISED AND OPERATIONALISED? WHAT ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES AND WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS THAT ARE LINKED TO THE DIFFERENT RESPECTIVE DEFINITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF POLITICISATION? THE AIM OF THIS CHAPTER IS TO RETHINK THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND THE OPERATIONALISATION OF EU POLITICISATION. THE FIRST GOAL IS TO OUTLINE AND SUM UP CRUCIAL QUESTIONS AND KEY POINTS THAT ARE RELATED TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND USAGE OF POLITICISATION AS A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONCEPT IN THE DEBATE ON THE EU. SECOND, I WILL FURTHER DEVELOP THESE THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL REFLECTIONS BY DISCUSSING THE EU REFERENDUM DEBATE IN FRANCE IN 2005 AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) ELECTIONS IN 2019. ON THIS BASIS, I WILL CONCLUDE WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS ON HOW EU POLITICISATION CAN BE FURTHER THEORISED AND OPERATIONALISED. THE PAPER HAS THE FOLLOWING STRUCTURE. FIRST, IT WILL SKETCH TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF POLITICISATION AND THE UNDERLYING CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICS (BY SCHATTSCHNEIDER AND
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|a PALONEN), AND INTRODUCE POLITICISATION AS A MULTI LEVEL CONCEPT. SECOND, THE STATE OF THE ART IN THE ACADEMIC DEBATE ON EU POLITICISATION AND THE THEORETICAL PREMISES UNDERLYING THIS DEBATE WILL BE RESUMED. THE THIRD PART WILL FOCUS ON POLITICISATION AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE FOURTH PART WILL FURTHER DEVELOP THE ARGUMENT BY DISCUSSING THE EU REFERENDUM DEBATE IN FRANCE IN 2005 AND THE EP ELEC TIONS IN 2019. IN THE FIFTH AND FINAL PART, I WILL ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF INCLUDING THE ANALYSIS OF BOTTOM-UP POLITICISATION INTO EU POLITICISATION RESEARCH, GETTING TOWARDS A MULTI-STAGE AND MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION. 2 THEORISING AND CONCEPTUALISING POLITICISATION WHAT IS IT THAT HAPPENS WHEN POLITICISATION TAKES PLACE? THERE ARE VARIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS AND THEORIES BEHIND DIFFERENT CURRENT CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF POLITICISATION (SEE THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN WIESNER, 2019C , 2021D )TH A T CANNOT BE FULLY ELABORATED HERE. I WILL FOCUS ON TWO KEY STEPS OF CONCEPTUALISING POLITICISATION. FIRST, IT IS DECISIVE TO MENTION THAT THE RESPECTIVE CONCEPTUALISATION OF POLITICISATION CRUCIALLY DEPENDS ON THE CONCEPT OF POLITICS THAT GROUNDS IT (SEE WIESNER, 2020 , 2021C ). ONE UNDERSTANDING THAT IS BEHIND MOST OF THE CURRENT EMPIRICAL MODELS OF MEASURING POLITICISATION OF THE EU OR EU AFFAIRS HAS BEEN COINED BY ELMER SCHATTSCHNEIDER IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THE SUB-DIMENSIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICS (SCHATTSCHNEIDER, 1957 ). HE USES A CONFLICT-ORIENTED UNDER STANDING OF POLITICS, ARGUING THAT POLITICS IS BASED ON 'MILLIONS OF CONFLICTS', 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 23 AND FURTHER ARGUES THAT 'STRATEGY IS THE HEART OF POLITICS' (IBID., 1957 , PP. 933, 935). ON THIS BASIS, HE INTRODUCES FOUR DIMENSIONS THAT CHAR ACTERISE POLITICAL CONFLICTS: INTENSITY, VISIBILITY, DIRECTION AND SCOPE. THESE DIMENSIONS ARE APPLIED IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND AND ANALYSE WHEN AND HOW CONFLICTS ENTER THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN AN EASTONIAN UNDERSTANDING
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|a WITH A FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONS THAT WAS DEVELOPED IN THE SAME ERA (EASTON, 1953 ). IN SOME CASES, IT IS EXPLICITLY MENTIONED (HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ) BUT SOME TIMES IT HAPPENS MORE IMPLICITLY. THESE ARE ALSO DIMENSIONS AND CRITERIA THAT ARE USED IN A NUMBER OF EMPIRICAL ACCOUNTS ON POLITICISATION AND ITS RELATION TO THE EU AND/OR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THAT FOCUS ON THE SALIENCE OF EU ISSUES, AN INCREASE OF ACTOR INVOLVEMENT, AND AN INCREASE IN PARTY-POLITICAL POLARISATION (E.G. HOEGLINGER, 2015 ; STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 , SEE THE DISCUSSION IN KAUPPI, 2018 ). AN ASSUMPTION THAT IS IMPLIC ITLY MADE IN MANY ACCOUNTS ON EU POLITICISATION IS THE ONE THAT IS USED BY SCHATTSCHNEIDER AS WELL. IT IS THAT AN ISSUE ONLY BECOMES POLITICISED WHEN IT MAKES IT INTO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN AN EASTONIAN SENSE, WHEN IT IS REMARKABLE THERE, AND WHEN IT CREATES AN EFFECT. THIS ALSO MEANS THAT IN EU POLITICISATION RESEARCH THE PREDOMINANT UNDERSTANDING REGARDS POLITICS AS A SYSTEM, AND HENCE A SPHERE OR AREA INTO WHICH SUBJECTS AND ISSUES CAN BE PUSHED OR TAKEN OUT OF. IN OTHER WORDS, A SPATIAL CONCEPT OF POLITICS HAS BEEN THE PARADIGM. IN SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING POLITICISATION MEANS TO PUSH SOMETHING INTO THE SYSTEM, SPACE, OR ARENA OF POLITICS (SEE E.G. ZUERN, 2015 ; FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION, SEE KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). THE PATH FOR CONCEPTUALISING POLITICISATION THAT I PROPOSE INSTEAD OF SUCH A SYSTEM OR SPATIAL APPROACH IS BASED ON THE WORK OF FINNISH POLIT ICAL SCIENTIST KARI PALONEN (SEE IN DETAIL WIESNER, 2019B , 2020 , 2021B , AS WELL AS THE DISCUSSION IN WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ). IT DEPARTS FROM THE IDEA THAT POLITICS IS ACTIVITY (RATHER THAN A SPACE OR ARENA) AND IS BASED ON PALONEN'S DISCTINCTION OF FOUR SUB-DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS: POLICY, POLITY, POLITICISATION AND POLITICKING (PALONEN, 2003 , P. 171). IN THIS CONCEPTUAL CLASSIFICATION, POLICY REFERS TO THE REGULATING ASPECT OF POLITICS, POLITICKING MEANS THE ACTIVITY OF DOING POLITICS, AND POLITICISATION IS UNDERSTOOD AS THE
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|a ACT OF MARKING AN ISSUE AS POLITICAL WITHIN A POLITY. A CORE EXAMPLE OF SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IS THE FAMOUS DICTUM OF THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT, THE CLAIM THAT 'THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL'. THIS ACT OF MARKING WHAT FORMERLY WAS 'PERSONAL', OR 'PRIVATE', AS 'POLITICAL' IN REALITY AIMED AT A MAJOR QUESTIONING OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES SUCH AS MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, AND ALSO A POTENTIAL SHIFT IN POWER RELATIONS BY QUESTIONING INSTITUTIONS THAT 24 C. WIESNER WERE NOT TO BE QUESTIONED BEFOREHAND BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AS 'PRIVATE', AND HENCE AS NON-DEBATABLE, BY A DOMINANT SOCIAL DISCOURSE. BUT A DECISIVE QUESTION THAT FOLLOWS FROM UNDERSTANDING POLITICISATION AS THE ACT OF MARKING AN ISSUE AS POLITICAL WITHIN A POLITY IS HOW TO STUDY THE EARLY STAGES OF POLITICISATION: WHEN IS A POLITICISATION PROCESS SUFFICIENTLY FAR ADVANCED TO ALLOW FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS? 1 IN ORDER TO RETHINK POLITICISATION AS A CONCEPT, IT IS FURTHERMORE USEFUL TO RECAPITULATE AND UNDERLINE THAT IT IS A MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPT. AS MATTHEW WOOD PUT IT, 'A "MULTILEVEL CONCEPT" IS ONE THAT CAN BE APPLIED IN MULTIPLE CONTEXTS, AND CAN HAVE BOTH A DEEP CRITICAL THEORETICAL AND EVEN PHILOSOPH ICAL MEANING, BUT ALSO REFERS QUITE LEGITIMATELY TO CONCRETE ACTS THAT CAN BE USEFULLY MEASURED IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH' (WOOD, 2015 , P. 527). IT FOLLOWS THAT SUCH A CONCEPT CAN BE EMPLOYED AT 'A THEORETICAL LEVEL, A "MID-RANGE" CONCEPTUAL LEVEL AND A "MICRO" EMPIRICAL LEVEL' (IBID., P. 522). TO USE POLITICISATION AS A MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPT MEANS TO CLARIFY THE THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL LEVELS THAT ARE STUDIED OR DISCUSSED (MACRO/MESO/MICRO). MOREOVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS (A) PHILOSOPHICAL AND/OR NORMATIVE CLAIMS AND JUDGE MENTS (MACRO) FROM (B) THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPT (MESO), AND (C) THE ANALYSIS OR MEASUREMENT OF CONCRETELY OPERATIONALISED ITEMS AND RESEARCH
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|a DIMENSIONS (MICRO). WOOD ( 2015 ) GIVES SOME HINTS ON WHAT THIS CONCRETELY MEANS, EVEN IF HE FOCUSES ON THE CONCEPT OF DEPOLITI CISATION RATHER THAN POLITICISATION. ACCORDINGLY, HIS EXAMPLES ALL REVOLVE AROUND NEOLIBERAL, OR STRONGLY MARKET-LIBERAL REFORMS OF THE WELFARE STATE AND STATE INSTITUTIONS. HIS DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, GIVES SOME USEFUL HINTS ON CONCEPTUALISING MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPTS IN GENERAL AND THE CONCEPT OF POLITI CISATION IN PARTICULAR. AT THE THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE LEVEL, THE QUESTION WOULD BE FOR THE RESEARCHER TO THEORISE NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS RELATION TO THE PUBLIC SPHERE. ON THE MESO LEVEL, THE QUESTION WOULD BE TO ASK HOW DIFFERENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND BEHAVIOUR. AT THE MICRO LEVEL, FINALLY, THE QUESTION THEN IS TO EXAMINE CONCRETE SHIFTS, FOR INSTANCE IN BUREAUCRACIES AND POLICIES (WOOD, 2015 , P. 528). 1 THIS QUESTION WILL BE ELABORATED BELOW IN SECTS. 4 AND 5 . 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 25 3 POLITICISATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, QUITE A BROAD SET OF LITERATURE ON THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPE/EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS BEEN WRITTEN IN RECENT YEARS. REGARDING THE OBJECT OF POLITICISATION, IT IS SOON OBVIOUS THAT MOST ACCOUNTS DO NOT REFER TO EUROPE (AS A CONTINENT) OR THE EU (AS A POLITY), BUT TO THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE EFFECTS POLITICISATION HAS ON IT. ACCORDINGLY, MANY OF THESE ACCOUNTS EXPLICITLY RECUR ON EURO PEAN INTEGRATION THEORY (E.G. HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ). A CLOSER LOOK AT THE UNDERLYING SOURCE TEXTS IN EU INTEGRATION THEORY AGAIN INDICATES DIFFERENT CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND MODELS OF POLITICS AND, IN CONSEQUENCE, EU POLITICISATION. 3.1 THE CLASSICS THREE CLASSICAL NEOFUNCTIONALIST TEXTS ON THE POLITICISATION OF INTEGRATION BY SCHMITTER ( 1969 ), HAAS ( 1968 ) AND LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD ( 1970 ) RAISE THE CRUCIAL CONCEPTS FOR THE DEBATE, NAMELY 'SPILLOVER', 'INTEGRATION', 'POLITICISATION',AND
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|a 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS'. THE TEXTS, FURTHERMORE, HINT AT SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRA TION AND ITS EFFECTS, AND IN PARTICULAR THEY INDICATE DIFFERENT PATHWAYS FOR POLITICISATION. THE ACCOUNTS BY BOTH LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD ( 1970 ) AND HAAS ( 1968 ) DEPICT THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS DRIVEN BY POLIT ICAL ELITES. THEY CARRY OUT THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS, AND CITIZENS AGREE TO IT IN WHAT HAS FAMOUSLY BEEN TERMED 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' BY LIND BERG AND SCHEINGOLD ( 1970 , P. 41). THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS IS LARGELY NOURISHED BY CITIZENS' IGNORANCE AND DISINTEREST OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS, COUPLED WITH SILENT ACCEPTANCE. IF CITIZENS START TO GET INTERESTED IN INTE GRATION AND/OR SUPPORT DECLINES, THIS IS NOT TO SAY (AND THIS IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERLINE) THAT THIS WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR INTEGRATION. AS LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD EXPLICTLY STATE: 'CONSEQUENTLY, SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION AND PERSISTENT SOCIAL CLEAVAGE DOES NOT MEAN THAT INTEGRATIVE STEPS CANNOT BE TAKEN, BUT RATHER THAT THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BLOCKING THEM ARE GREATER' (LINDBERG & SCHEINGOLD, 1970 , P. 41). IN OTHER WORDS, AN END OF THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' DOES NOT NECESSARILY END INTEGRATION BUT CAN BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO IT. FURTHERMORE, WHAT LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD TELL US IS THAT SOLIDARITY IS IMPORTANT AS A POLICY ISSUE AND A POLICY OUTCOME OF INTEGRATION (IBID., P. 39). IT REMINDS US OF A CRUCIAL AND LARGELY 26 C. WIESNER FORGOTTEN DIMENSION IN TODAY'S DEBATE: SOLIDARITY BETWEEN CITIZENS IS A KEY CONDITION FOR MAKING ANY DEMOCRACY WORK, BE IT IN A NATION STATE OR IN THE EU (SEE ALSO WIESNER, 2019A , PP. 215-233). ERNST HAAS ( 1968 ) PROVIDES AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE CALLS POLITICAL INTE GRATION. HE UNDERLINES THAT THERE MAY BE LIMITS TO A PURELY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, AS IT WILL NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE BUILDING OF A POLITICAL COMMUNITY. WHILE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES, HE INDICATES A
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|a MODEL THAT SEES RISING ECONOMIC DISSATISFACTION AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MORE DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION-THERE MIGHT BE 'POLITICAL OPPOSITION WHERE NONE EXISTED BEFORE', BUT ALSO 'DEMANDS FOR MORE FEDERAL POLITICAL ACTION' (HAAS, 1968 , P. 13). IN THE SAME VEIN AS LINDBERG AND SCHEIN GOLD, HAAS SEES SEVERAL POSSIBLE PATHWAYS AND POSITIVE LINKAGES BETWEEN EU POLITICISATION AND THE CONTINUATION OF INTEGRATION. IF WE RECAPITULATE ANOTHER CLASSICAL ACCOUNT ON EU POLITICISATION, THE ONE BY PHILIPPE SCHMITTER ( 1969 ), WE COME OUT WITH A RATHER COMPLEX AND OPEN MODEL OF POLITICISATION. IN BRIEF, FOLLOWING SCHMITTER, IF EU INTEGRA TION BECOMES MORE CONTROVERSIAL, THIS LEADS TO A WIDENING OF THE AUDIENCE AND MORE DEBATE, AND IN CONSEQUENCE A MANIFEST REDEFINITION OF MUTUAL OBJECTIVES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE EXPERIENCE A SHIFT IN ACTOR EXPECTAN CIES AND LOYALTY TOWARDS THE NEW REGIONAL ORGANISATION, I.E. THE EU. FOR SCHMITTER, AN INCREASE IN ACTOR-DEFINED CONTROVERSIALITY IS AN INDICATOR OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICISATION. THE SCHMITTERIAN MODEL OF POLITICISATION IS ONE WHERE MORE CONFLICT AND MORE DEBATE ABOUT INTEGRATION LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN AUDIENCE, A REDEFINITION OF INTEGRATION OBJECTIVES AND MORE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CITI ZENS, AND HENCE AN INCREASE IN SUPPORT. THIS POLITICAL PROCESS REMINDS US OF WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NATION STATES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES: IF CITIZENS DO NOT SUPPORT A POLICY, THEY CAN DEBATE AND TRY TO CHANGE IT, AND IF MORE PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, THEY ALSO IDENTIFY MORE WITH THE POLITY. RATHER THAN POLITICISATION, THIS SCHMITTERIAN ACCOUNT COULD ALSO BE TERMED NORMALISATION OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND EU POLITICS TOWARDS THE STANDARDS OF NATION STATE REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. THIS IS NO SOPHISTICATED ACCOUNT OF DELIBERATIVE OR GRASSROOTS DEMOC RACY. NEVERTHELESS, IT LEADS TO AN OPEN MODEL OF UNDERSTANDING AND ALSO ANALYSING POLITICISATION, AND IT ALSO LEADS TO DIFFERENT PATTERNS AND
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|a TYPES OF OUTCOMES OF POLITICISATION PROCESSES TO BE EXPECTED. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER SCHMITTER HIMSELF MEANT CITIZENS CAN DO THIS, BUT AT LEAST HIS MODEL OPENS UP SUCH POSSIBILITY. 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 27 THESE THREE CLASSICAL NEOFUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNTS ON THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU OR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OPEN UP DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES, DYNAMICS, AND DIRECTIONS: (A) LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD DISCUSS THE CONSEQUENCES OF OPPOSITION TO EU INTEGRATION AND CLAIM IT CAN BUILD OBSTACLES TO THE INTEGRATION PROCESS BUT WILL NOT BLOCK IT. THEY ALSO UNDERLINE THAT SOLIDARITY IS CRUCIAL FOR BUILDING A COMMUNITY AND STATE THAT THE EU CAN AND SHOULD BUILD SOLIDARITY BETWEEN ITS CITIZENS. (B) HAAS DISCUSSES THE POSSIBLE OPPOSITION AGAINST THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND STATES THAT THIS POLITICAL OPPOSITION MIGHT ALSO CREATE DEMANDS FOR MORE FEDERAL POLITICAL ACTION-IN OTHER WORDS, HE SUGGESTS THAT OPPOSITION AGAINST THE INTEGRATION PROCESS MIGHT ALSO RESULT IN NEW POLITICAL CLAIMS TO THE EU. (C) SCHMITTER ARGUES THAT AN INCREASE IN CONTROVERSIALITY MIGHT CREATE MORE DEBATE AND A WIDENING OF THE AUDIENCE, I.E. THAT IT MIGHT TRIGGER MORE PEOPLE TO BE INTERESTED IN EU POLITICS. THIS MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE EU REDEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, AND TO MORE EU CITIZENS BECOMING LOYAL TO THE EU. WHILE ALL THREE MODELS OPEN UP ILLUSTRATING DIFFERENT PATHWAYS OF POLITICI SATION, IT IS ESPECIALLY THE SCHMITTERIAN ACCOUNT THAT CLEARLY CONCEPTUALISES A POSITIVE INTERRELATION BETWEEN POLITICISATION AND THE INCREASE OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT FOR EU INTEGRATION. 3.2 RETHINKING THE TOP-DOWN MODEL OF EU POLITICISATION SEVERAL OF THE CURRENT EU POLITICISATION TEXTS DEPART FROM A MORE PESSIMIST UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICISATION OF INTEGRATION, EVEN WHEN THEY ARE BASED ON THE CLASSICS. THE MOST CRITICAL ACCOUNT STEMS FROM HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ), WHO DEPICT WHAT I SUGGEST TO TERM A PESSIMIST TOP-DOWN MODEL OF EU POLITICISATION . THEY TERM IT
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|a 'POSTFUNCTIONALIST' IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT THE DIFFERENCE TO THE NEOFUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT BY THE CLASSICS ABOVE. IN THE HOOGHE AND MARKS' MODEL, UNDER THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS, CITIZENS GRANT ELITES SILENT SUPPORT AND LEGITIMATION FOR INTEGRATING EUROPE, AND AS LONG AS THEY DO SO, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCEEDS IN ITS COURSE. SHOULD THEY TAKE LEGITIMATION AND SUPPORT AWAY, THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS ENDS, EU INTEGRATION BECOMES POLITICISED AND THAT ALSO MEANS THAT ELITES 28 C. WIESNER FACE PROBLEMS. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT AND/OR LEGITIMATION FROM THE EU AND THE ENSUING POLITICISATION OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS HINDERS ELITES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR 'BUSINESS' BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING OPPOSITION, AND HENCE THE END OF INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION ARE TO BE FACED. HOOGHE AND MARKS SPEAK OF A SWITCH FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO 'CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS', WHICH IN THEIR MODEL BUILDS A FERTILE GROUND FOR PARTY-POLITICAL EU CRITICISM. POLITICISATION, THEN, IS MOSTLY DISCUSSED AS EU-CRITICAL POLITI CISATION. THIS THESIS HAS LED HOOGHE AND MARKS TO ADOPT A RATHER CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE POLITICISATION OF EU INTEGRATION. THIS READING OF THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' CONCEPT, HOWEVER, COMES WITH A UNIDIRECTIONAL MODEL OF BOTH EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. THE DICHOTOMY OF POLITICAL ELITES THAT DRIVE INTEGRATION AND SILENT CITIZENS THAT ACCEPT IT IS COUPLED WITH A TELEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION CONCEPT IN WHICH EU INTEGRATION IS CONCEPTUALISED UNIDIRECTIONALLY: AFTER IT BEGAN, IT HAS BEEN DRIVEN BY ELITES, AND IT LEADS TO AN EVER-CLOSER INTEGRATION. IN SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IT IS CONSEQUENT THAT, AS LONG AS PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS CARRIES ON AND EU INTEGRATION IS NOT POLITICISED, ELITES CAN CARRY OUT INTE GRATION UNHINDERED, AND IF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS ENDS, INTEGRATION STOPS. HOWEVER, BOTH THE UNIDIRECTIONAL RELATION BETWEEN ELITES AND CITIZENS AND THE TELEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION CONCEPT ARE TO BE QUESTIONED IN NUMEROUS RESPECTS.
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|a FIRST, AS THE END OF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS IN MOST OF THE CURRENT POLITI CISATION LITERATURE USUALLY IS SITUATED IN THE 1990S, AND THUS THE DEBATES AND REFERENDUMS ON THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, THIS DECADE IS OFTEN SEEN AS A TURNING POINT (SEE ALSO THE DISCUSSION IN KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). HOWEVER, RECENT EMPIRICAL RESULTS HAVE UNDERLINED THAT THE 1990S WERE NOT SUCH A DECISIVE TURNING POINT. IT HAS BEEN CONVINCINGLY SHOWN (HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ) THAT EU ISSUES HAVE BEEN POLITICISED THROUGHOUT THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN WAVES WHICH THEN EBBED OFF AGAIN. SECOND, THE CHICKEN-AND-EGG-QUESTION IS UNCLEAR AS WELL. IT IS NOT EXPLICIT WHAT COMES FIRST: THE END OF THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS AND THEN OPPOSITION TO THE EU, OR OPPOSITION TO THE EU AND THEN THE END OF THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS? IN ADDITION, THE DICHOTOMY IN THE PERMIS SIVE CONSENSUS APPROACH DESERVES ATTENTION. THE NOTION OF THE 'END OF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' ITSELF MAY BE QUESTIONED AS A CONCEPT, AS WE ONLY EXPERIENCE RELATIVE DECREASE IN SUPPORT, NOT ITS END AS SUCH. THIRD, THE CAUSE-EFFECT RELATION IS NOT AS OBVIOUS AS IT IS SUGGESTED BY THE UNIDIRECTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE PESSIMIST TOP-DOWN MODEL. IT IS BY NO 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 29 MEANS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THAT ELITES WILL FACE (CAUSAL) OPPOSITION WHEN INTEGRATION BECOMES POLITICISED, I.E. AN ISSUE OF POLITICAL DEBATE AND CONFLICT. THEY MERELY MAY FACE (POSSIBLE) OPPOSITION WHEN THIS IS THE CASE. NEITHER IS IT CLEAR WHAT WILL FOLLOW FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT AND LEGITIMACY. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES, AS LAID OUT IN THE ACCOUNTS BY LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD, HAAS AND SCHMITTER: (1) ELITES CONTINUE WITHOUT SUPPORT OR WITH REDUCED SUPPORT AND DO THINGS THEY ARE NOT LEGITIMISED FOR-IN THAT CASE CITIZEN SUPPORT WILL SHRINK MORE. THIS IS VERY MUCH WHAT WE SAW HAPPENING IN THE PEAK OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS. (2) ELITES STOP INTEGRATION, WHICH IS A PROBLEM FOR INTEGRATION INDEED. (3) THERE IS INCREASING POLITICAL DEBATE
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|a ON INTEGRATION AND THIS LEADS TO INCREASED LEGITIMACY AND INCREASED CITIZEN SUPPORT, WHICH RESEM BLES WHAT BOUZA AND OLEART ( 2018 ) CONCEIVED AS AN 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS' FOR EU INTEGRATION (SEE ALSO OLEART, 2021 ). THESE CRITICAL POINTS REFER TO THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF THE TOP-DOWN ACCOUNT OF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS AND ITS END, BUT IN ADDITION, THE TOP-DOWN MODEL OF ANALYSING POLITICISATION IS TO BE QUESTIONED AS WELL. IN THIS VIEW, CITIZENS' ROLE IS LIMITED TO GIVING OR WITHDRAWING SUPPORT, AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEN REACT TO THIS AND POLITICISE EU INTEGRATION. CITIZENS THEMSELVES DO NOT APPEAR AS POLITICISING ACTORS IN THIS MODEL, NEITHER DO INDIVIDUAL ACTORS-DESPITE THE CRUCIAL ROLE THAT CITIZENS' CHANGING OPINIONS HAVE IN THE MODEL. IN ADDITION TO THE CLASSICAL NEOFUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNTS AND THE POSSIBIL ITIES THEY OPEN UP, ALL THIS SPEAKS IN FAVOUR OF CONCEPTUALISING THE POLITI CISATION OF EU INTEGRATION IN DIFFERENT PATHWAYS. ACCORDINGLY, ALTOGETHER FOUR MODELS ARE POSSIBLE: (1) IN AN OPTIMIST DYNAMIC MODEL , AS IT HAS BEEN SKETCHED BY SCHMITTER, POLITICISATION OF INTEGRATION LEADS TO MORE CONFLICT AND MORE DEBATE ABOUT INTEGRATION AND, HENCE, AN INCREASE IN AUDIENCE WHICH ULTI MATELY LEADS TO A REDEFINITION OF INTEGRATION OBJECTIVES AND MORE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CITIZENS AS WELL AS AN INCREASE IN SUPPORT. THIS MODEL IS NOT ONLY MORE OPTIMIST, BUT ALSO REFERS TO ANOTHER RELA TION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND ELITES THAT IS MUCH MORE INTERACTIVE THAN THE FIRST ONE THAT WAS SKETCHED. POLITICISATION IN THIS ACCOUNT ALSO 30 C. WIESNER REFERS TO ANOTHER PROCESS MODEL OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE RELATION IS NOT JUST UNIDIRECTIONAL. INSTEAD OF CITIZENS BEING LIMITED TO GRANTING OR WITHDRAWING SUPPORT, CITIZENS ACTIVELY SHAPE AND REDEFINE MUTUAL OBJECTIVES. (2) WHAT CAN BE TERMED AN OPTIMIST TOP-DOWN MODEL IS MAINLY BASED ON PARTY-POLITICAL ACTIVITYOF PRO-EU PARTIES. IN THIS MODEL, WE NOTICE LESS INTERACTION BETWEEN ELITES, CITIZENS, AND
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|a ACTIVISTS THAN IN THE DYNAMIC MODEL. AND YET, THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND MEDIA THAT COMMUNICATE THE EU POSITIVELY MAY RAISE EU SUPPORT AND EU POLITICISATION. THE DYNAMIC IS CONTRARY TO THE ONE IN THE PESSIMIST TOP-DOWN MODEL. (3) IN A PESSIMIST DYNAMIC MODEL , THE PROCESSES ARE SIMILAR TO THE OPTI MIST DYNAMIC MODEL. CITIZENS AND ACTIVISTS POLITICISE THE EU BUT ENGAGE WITH THE EU IN A SYSTEM-CRITICAL WAY. WE NOTICE BOTTOM-UP ACTIVITIES AND POLITICISATION, BUT THESE ACTIVITIES DO NOT CREATE EU SUPPORT, AND THEY MAY BE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC. (4) IN THE PESSIMIST TOP-DOWN MODEL , A DICHOTOMY OF POLITICAL ELITES THAT DRIVE INTEGRATION AND SILENT CITIZENS THAT ACCEPT IT IS COUPLED WITH A TELEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION CONCEPT. EU INTEGRATION IS DRIVEN BY ELITES AS LONG AS PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS CARRIES ON AND INTEGRATION IS NOT POLITICISED. IF THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS ENDS AND POLITICISATION SETS IN, INTEGRATION IS SEVERELY HINDERED. 4 PARTIES AND EU POLITICISATION DESPITE THESE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES AND PATHWAYS IN THE POLITICISATION OF INTEGRATION, MOST CONTRIBUTORS IN CURRENT EU POLITICISATION RESEARCH PUT AN EMPHASIS ON A SYSTEMS-CENTRED TOP-DOWN MODEL OF POLITICISATION AND ALSO ON POLITICAL PARTIES (SEE E.G. HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ; HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ). A FOCUS IS SET ON PARTIES TAKING UP ISSUES THAT ARE RAISED IN THE PUBLIC AND BY INTEREST GROUPS OUT OF STRATEGIC REASONS. THIS IS OF COURSE A DECISIVE PART OF THE EXPLANATION OF WHY AN ISSUE IS ENTERING PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT, AS I WILL ARGUE, THERE ARE ALSO OTHER DYNAMICS THAT MOVE A PARTY TO TAKE UP AN ISSUE AND POLITICISE IT WITHIN THE SYSTEM. WHY DOES A PARTY CHOOSE SOMETHING AS AN EU ISSUE? AND WHO DOES THE CHOOSING? A MAJOR ARGUMENT IN THE EU POLITICISATION LITERATURE IS THAT PARTIES TAKE ON CITIZENS' INTERESTS AND POLITICISE ISSUES OUT OF STRATEGIC REASONS (E.G. GREEN-PEDERSEN, 2012 ). IN SHORT, THIS MEANS THAT THE INCEN TIVE FOR POLITICAL PARTIES TO POLITICISE AN ISSUE IS THE STRATEGIC INTEREST AND 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM
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|a AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 31 THE PRESUMPTION THAT THEY WILL GAIN VOTES WITH THIS MOVE. SOME AUTHORS ESPECIALLY HIGHLIGHT THE ROLE OF POLICY ENTREPRENEURS THAT TAKE UP AN ISSUE THAT IS OF POLITICAL INTEREST AND POLITICISE IT (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 , P. 13). A CRUCIAL ROLE IN PARTY-POLITICAL POLITICISATION LITERATURE IS ASCRIBED TO PARTIES ON THE MARGINS, CHALLENGER OR EXTREME PARTIES, WHICH SEVERAL AUTHORS REGARD AS DRIVERS OF EU POLITICISATION (SEE E.G. THE DISCUSSION IN GREEN-PEDERSEN, 2012 ; HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ; HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ). IN ADDITION TO THESE EXPLANATORY DIMENSIONS, I ARGUE THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER FACTORS MAY POSSIBLY INTERVENE IN THE PROCESSES OF PARTY-POLITICAL EU POLITICISATION. THIS IS IN LINE WITH QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH THAT SUGGESTS THAT STRATEGIC CONSTELLATIONS ABOUT ISSUES ARE COMPLEX AND MULTIDIRECTIONAL (E.G. CARMINES & STIMSON, 1990 ; HOBOLT & VRIES, 2015 ). FIRST, IT NEEDS TO BE EMPHASISED THAT A PARTY CONSISTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND PARTY MEMBERS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS, WE CANNOT MERELY ASSUME THAT ONLY PARTY LEADERS DECIDE IF AN ISSUE IS TO BE POLITICISED OR NOT. ONE KEY EXAMPLE HERE IS THE GERMAN MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION, PETER GAUWEILER, WHO NOTORIOUSLY CRITICISED CORE STEPS OF EU INTEGRATION. HE REGULARLY AND SUCCESSFULLY RAISED POLITICAL DEBATES RELATED TO INTEGRATION STEPS, SUCH AS THE INTRODUCTION OF A COMMON CURRENCY, AND HE ALSO UNDERTOOK SEVERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS IN GERMANY, AMONG OTHERS AGAINST THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY. WHILE HE REACHED CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC SALIENCE WITH THESE POLITICISATIONS, HE WAS NEVER SUCCESSFUL IN THE INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS (SEE IN DETAIL WIESNER, 2014 , PP. 361-364). THUS, IT MUST BE CONSIDERED HOW A PARTY WORKS INTERNALLY, SEEING THAT INTRA-PARTY POWER RELATIONS CAN HELP EXPLAINING WHY A PARTY POLITICISES AN ISSUE OR NOT, OR ONE ISSUE AND NOT ANOTHER. SECOND, THE RESPECTIVE NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURES AND DOMINANT EU
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|a NARRATIVES ARE EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR UNDERSTANDING WHY A PARTY SUCCESS FULLY POLITICISES AN ISSUE OR NOT (SEE IN DETAIL WIESNER, 2014 , PP. 410-414). THE CASE OF THE GERMAN ALTERNATIV FUER DEUTSCHLAND (AFD) IS INSTRUCTIVE IN THAT RESPECT. AFD IS A PARTY THAT ORIGINALLY WAS FOUNDED BECAUSE OF THE EU, OR, MORE EXACTLY, DUE TO EUROCRITICISM. THE ORIGINS OF AFD LIE IN THE OPPOSITION AGAINST FINANCIAL AID FOR GREECE IN THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS. IN 2015 GERMANY EXPERIENCED A HUGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES ENTERING THE COUNTRY. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF INTRA-PARTY POWER CONFLICTS, THE IMPOR TANCE OF THE ISSUES OF THE EURO, MONETARY STABILITY, AND FINANCIAL AID WERE DECISIVELY REDUCED. AFD ADOPTED A STRONGLY MIGRATION-CRITICAL STANCE IN THE COURSE OF BECOMING MORE RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST IN ITS PARTY PROFILE. IN 32 C. WIESNER THE SAME VEIN, AFD MASSIVELY GAINED IN ELECTORAL SUPPORT AND ENTERED THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 2017 (IN 2013, IT DID NOT PASS THE 5% THRESHOLD). ALL THIS SPEAKS IN FAVOUR OF THE EU-RELATED ISSUES BEING DROPPED BECAUSE THEY DID NOT BRING ENOUGH ELECTORAL SUCCESS, AND THE ISSUE OF MIGRATION AND REFUGEES BEING STRATEGICALLY MUCH MORE PROMISING IN THAT RESPECT. THIS INDICATES THAT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TO WIN FOR AFD WITH EU-RELATED ISSUES-QUITE IN CONTRAST TO MOST OTHER EXTREME-RIGHT OR RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES IN OTHER EU COUNTRIES (SEE KAUPPI'S CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME). THUS, THE GERMAN AFD CASE SHOWS A PARTY THAT DID EVERY THING 'BY THE BOOK' IN TERMS OF HOOGHE AND MARKS' ( 2009 ) ACCOUNT ON PARTY-POLITICAL POLITICISATION. THE AFD, AS A TRUE CHALLENGER PARTY, MADE THE EU AN ISSUE AND POLITICISED IT BUT THEN DROPPED IT, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF ANOTHER ISSUE, NAMELY IMMIGRATION, WAS MORE PROMISING FOR THEIR POLIT ICAL PURPOSES. THIS EXAMPLE UNDERLINES THAT WE SHOULD NOT ONLY ASK WHY (AND HOW) AN ISSUE BECOMES A TOPIC OR A PART OF PARTY POLITICAL CONFLICT, BUT ALSO WHY A TOPIC, AND ESPECIALLY THE EU, FAILS TO DO SO, I.E. WHY IT DOES
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|a NOT BECOME A TOPIC OF CONFLICT. THIRD, CURRENT ACCOUNTS ON PARTY POLITICAL POLITICISATION DO NOT SYSTEM ATICALLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT HAPPENS IN A CASE WHEN POLITICAL PARTIES DO NOT WANT TO POLITICISE AN ISSUE, BUT OTHER ACTORS, SUCH AS NGOS, WANT TO POLITICISE IT. AGAIN, A GERMAN EXAMPLE IS INSTRUCTIVE HERE. THE CASE OF THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (' NEUE SOZIALE BEWEGUNGEN ') OF THE 1970S, NAMELY THE ENVIRONMENTAL, THE PEACE AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, WHICH ALL RAISED ISSUES LARGELY NEGLECTED BY THE DOMINANT POLITICAL PARTIES IN GERMANY. IN A NUTSHELL, THE DOMINANT PARTIES DID NOT WANT TO POLITICISE THESE ISSUES, BUT THE NGOS DID. AND THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN THE END, AND WE CAN SEE THE EFFECTS BOTH IN PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIONAND IN THE GREAT NUMBER OF MULTI-COLOURED WASTE BINS WE CURRENTLY USE IN OUR EVERYDAY LIFE. IN OTHER WORDS, PARTIES THAT TAKE UP AN ISSUE ARE NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR ITS POLITICISATION. THERE ARE ALSO BOTTOM-UP DYNAMICS AT WORK. ESPE CIALLY IN THE PUBLIC SPACE, NGOS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND EVEN INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISTS CAN OBTAIN SALIENCE FOR VARIOUS REASONS, AS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEXT SECTION REGARDING THE FRENCH EU REFERENDUM DEBATE IN 2005. THIS FITS WITH SEVERAL RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CURRENT DISCUSSION IN POLITICISATION RESEARCH THAT HAVE INDICATED THAT WE EITHER NEED TO STUDY THESE DIFFERENT PATHWAYS AND/OR A SET OF ACTORS GOING BEYOND POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL ELITES, AND THE MEDIA (SEE EXPLICITLY STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 , 2014 ; ZUERN, 2015 ). 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 33 FOURTH, IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT PARTIES ARE NOT ONLY DRIVERS OF POLITICI SATION, BUT ALSO GATEKEEPERS-WHICH MEANS IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR A SINGLE EXTREMIST PARTY TO POLITICISE AN ISSUE IF THE REST OF THE PARTY SYSTEM REFUSES TO ENTER THE DEBATE. MASS MEDIA ARE ALSO GATEKEEPERS OF POLITICISATION IN THAT SENSE. THERE ARE VARIOUS FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE HOW THIS GATEKEEPING FUNCTION IS CARRIED OUT AND WHICH
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|a ISSUES ARE KEPT AT BAY (OR NOT). PARTIES HAVE STRATEGIC INTERESTS TO POLITICISE ISSUES-BUT THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT A PARTY WILL POLITICISE ANY ISSUE SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS STRATEGICALLY RELEVANT, AS THERE MAY VERY WELL BE INTRA-PARTY INTERESTS, CONFLICTS, OR TRADITIONS THAT SPEAK AGAINST IT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY EVIDENT IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, IN WHICH CONTEXT A PRO-EUROPEAN STANCE IS THE TRADITION OF MOST MAINSTREAM PARTIES. THIS MEANS THAT THE UNDER LYING DYNAMICS ARE MORE CHARACTERISED BY OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBABILITIES OF POLITICISING AN ISSUE SUCCESSFULLY, IN THE SENSE OF GAINING VOTES OR WINNING INTRA-PARTY COMPETITIONS, THAN BY CLEAR CAUSAL EFFECTS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS NOT MERELY THAT THE MORE PARTIES TAKE UP AN ISSUE THE MORE THERE WILL BE POLITICISATION, BUT IT CAN ALSO HAPPEN THAT EXTREME PARTIES POLITICISE AN ISSUE IN THE PUBLIC OR IN SOCIAL MEDIA EVEN IF MAINSTREAM PARTIES KEEP SILENT ABOUT IT. IN SUM, THE ABOVE PRESENTED ARGUMENTS UNDERLINE THAT THE TOP-DOWN MODEL OF POLITICISATION AND THE ROLE IT ASSIGNS TO POLITICAL PARTIES NEEDS TO BE REVISED. THE MORE PARTIES WANT TO POLITICISE AN ISSUE, THE MORE PROBABLE IT IS THAT IT WILL BE SUCCESSFULLY POLITICISED IN THE MAINSTREAM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE END, AND THE LESS PARTIES WANT TO POLITICISE AN ISSUE THE LESS PROBABLE IT IS THAT IT IS SUCCESSFULLY POLITICISED. BUT, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO POLITICISE AN ISSUE AGAINST THE DOMINANT POLITICAL PARTIES, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE ISSUE IS TAKEN UP BY THE MEDIA . IN OTHER WORDS, PARTIES THAT TAKE UP AN ISSUE ARE NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR ITS POLITICISATION, BUT THERE ARE ALSO BOTTOM-UP DYNAMICS AT WORK. AND ESPECIALLY IN THE PUBLIC SPACE, NGOS, MOVEMENTS AND EVEN INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISTS CAN OBTAIN SALIENCE. 5 BOTTOM-UP POLITICISATION THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED SO FAR INDICATE THAT WHAT CAN BE TERMED BOTTOM UP POLITICISATION, NEEDS TO BE BETTER AND MORE SIGNIFICANTLY INCLUDED INTO RESEARCH ON EU POLITICISATION. THIS IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY IN THEORETICA
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|a AND CONCEPTUAL BUT ALSO IN ANALYTICAL TERMS. IN THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL TERMS, IT IS ARGUED IN THIS SECTION THAT AN UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICISATION 34 C. WIESNER AS THE ACT OF MARKING AN ISSUE AS POLITICAL IS CRUCIAL FOR OPENING UP A PATH OF ANALYSIS THAT INCLUDES BOTTOM-UP POLITICISATION. TO ILLUSTRATE THIS CLAIM, I WILL DISCUSS TWO EXAMPLES, NAMELY THE FRENCH REFERENDUM DEBATE ON THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY IN 2005 AND THE EP ELECTIONS IN 2019. IN AN UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICISATION AS MARKING AN ISSUE AS POLITICAL, POLITICISATION INDEED BEGINS AT THE BOTTOM LEVEL, SUCH AS IN PRIVATE CONVER SATIONS. THESE PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS CAN BE A DECISIVE BASE FOR POLITISICING AN ISSUE UP INTO THE PUBLIC SPACE AND THE ELECTORAL ARENA. IT IS ANOTHER QUESTION HOW THESE BOTTOM-UP DYNAMICS OF POLITICISATION CAN BE EMPIRI CALLY GRASPED. IN THE CASE OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, THIS IS RELATIVELY EASY, AS WE HAVE OPINION POLLS: THE FRENCH EU REFERENDUM DEBATE IN 2005 LED TO A MASSIVE INCREASE IN PEOPLE'S INTEREST INTO THE EU. IT BECAME THE MOST IMPORTANT TOPIC IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS IN THREE MONTHS (ROZES, 2005 )- AND, WHAT WAS DEBATED HAD A LASTING EFFECT ON THE VOTE AS WELL, AS THE WINNING ARGUMENTS IN THE REFERENDUM DISCOURSE CAME FROM THE CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY AND WERE DIRECTLY MIRRORED BY THE MOST DECISIVE REASONS FOR VOTING 'NO' (SEE IN DETAIL WIESNER, 2014 , 2015 ). MEDIA ARE ALREADY MORE COMPLICATED AS A SOURCE DUE TO THEIR GATE KEEPING FUNCTION: MEDIA ONLY REPORT WHEN THEY CHOOSE TO DO SO. THIS MEANS THAT, IF AN ISSUE IS DEBATED IN THE MEDIA, IT HAS ALREADY PASSED A 'MAINSTREAM THRESHOLD'. IN MY ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH REFERENDUM DISCOURSE IN 2005, I STUDIED MEDIA ARTICLES IN FOUR NEWSPAPERS THAT IN THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION RANGED FROM THE LEFT TO CENTRE RIGHT ( L'HU MANITE , LIBERATION , LE MONDE AND LE FIGARO ). WHAT I FOUND WAS THAT THE WINNING ARGUMENTS IN THE DISCOURSE-THOSE THAT CRITICISED THE EU AS BEING TOO
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|a NEOLIBERAL-NOT ONLY WERE DIRECTLY REFLECTED IN THE REASONS BEHIND THE VOTES, BUT THEY WERE ALSO COINED AND PUT FORWARD BY ACTORS AND ORGAN ISATIONS ON THE MARGINS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND OUTSIDERS TO THE PARTY SYSTEM, I.E. BY LEFT-WING PARTIES, TRADE UNIONS, NGOS, AND A GROUP OF ACTORS THAT ARE RARELY MENTIONED IN CURRENT POLITICISATION ACCOUNTS: INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISTS. THE WINNING ARGUMENTS APPEARED ONLY, OR MAINLY, IN LEFT-ORIENTED MEDIA ( L'HUMANITE AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, LIBERATION ) DURING THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF THE DISCOURSE. ONLY WHEN THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF BIG DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROTESTS, AND THE PUBLIC OPINION BEGAN TO CHANGE AGAINST THE TREATY, AS THE POLLS UNDERLINED, THE TWO JOURNALS IN THE POLIT ICAL CENTRE ( LE MONDE AND LE FIGARO ) TOOK UP THE ARGUMENTS. THE CRITICAL, AND ULTIMATELY DISCOURSE- AND VOTE-WINNING, ARGUMENTS HAD PASSED THE MAINSTREAM THRESHOLD (WIESNER, 2014 , PP. 196-200; 2015 ). THIS FINDING 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 35 SPEAKS AGAINST USING JUST ONE NEWSPAPER PER COUNTRY IN ORDER TO ANALYSE MEDIATED DISCOURSE. A FURTHER QUESTION IS HOW TO GRASP THINGS BEFORE THEY PASS THIS 'MAINSTREAM THRESHOLD'. THE CASE OF THE 2019 EP ELECTIONS IS INSTRUCTIVE WHEN IT COMES TO DISCUSSING THE LINKS BETWEEN BOTTOM-UP AND TOP-DOWN POLITICISATION AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES. THESE ELECTIONS INTRODUCED AT LEAST THREE CHANGES COMPARED TO THE ESTABLISHED ACCOUNTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND EU STUDIES ON THE SECOND-ORDER ROLE (REIF & SCHMITT, 1980 )O FE PEL EC - TIONS AND PARTIES. THIS UNDERLINES THAT THE POLITICS OF EU POLITICISATION ARE AT LEAST AS COMPLEX AS THE POLITICS OF POLITICISATION IN A NATION STATE, INCLUDING BOTTOM-UP DYNAMICS, CITIZENS' INITIATIVES, THEIR ORIENTATIONS, AND THEIR SOCIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS. FIRST, EP ELECTIONS ARE NOT SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS ANYMORE . AS KAUPPI IN THIS VOLUME ARGUES, EVEN BEFORE 2019 EP ELECTIONS HAD FIRST-ORDER FUNC TIONS FOR NON-CARTEL PARTIES,
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|a ESPECIALLY IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS FRANCE WHICH OPERATED A MAJORITY VOTING SYSTEM IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, BUT A PROPOR TIONAL VOTING SYSTEM FOR THE EP ELECTIONS. THE FRENCH CASE UNDERLINES HOW THIS HAS HELPED PUSH THE FORMER FRONT NATIONAL (TODAY'S RASSEMBLE MENT NATIONAL ) TO THE CENTRE OF NATIONAL POLITICS. WHAT WE SAW IN 2019, HOWEVER, IS ALSO A DECISIVE CHANGE AFFECTING THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM. THREE ARGUMENTS SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT EP ELECTIONS ARE NO LONGER SECOND ORDER (SEE VEGA RUBIO ET AL., 2021 ). FIRST, IN 2019 ELECTIONS, WE NOTICED A MAJOR INCREASE IN ELECTORAL TURNOUT. AFTER MANY SUCCESSIVE DECLINES, EU-WIDE TURNOUT HAD FALLEN TO ONLY 42.6% IN 2014. IN 2019, EU-WIDE TURNOUT WAS AT 50.6% (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2019 , P. 19). SECOND, WE ALSO SAW THAT THE MOBILISING THEMES IN THESE ELECTIONS NO LONGER WERE MAINLY NATIONAL BUT SHOWED A CLEAR ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE EU AS A POLITY. ACCORDING TO THE EUROBAROMETER POST-ELECTION SURVEY, A MAJORITY OF VOTERS SAID THEY MADE THEIR CHOICE FOR A PARTY BECAUSE IT WAS CLOSEST TO THEIR IDEAS OR VALUES IN EU-RELATED ISSUES (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2019 , P. 43). RESPON DENTS WHO VOTED IN THE RECENT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS WERE ASKED WHAT WERE THE ISSUES THAT MADE THEM VOTE. FIVE ISSUES WERE MENTIONED BY AT LEAST A THIRD OF RESPONDENTS: ECONOMY AND GROWTH (44%), COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (37%), PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (37%), THE WAY THE EU SHOULD BE WORKING IN THE FUTURE (36%) AND IMMIGRATION (34%) (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2019 , P. 19). THESE ISSUES, BESIDES THE CLASSICAL TOPICS OF ECONOMY AND GROWTH, ARE CLEARLY RELATED TO THE EU AT A POLICY LEVEL. 36 C. WIESNER THIRD, THE ANALYSIS IN THE POST-ELECTION SURVEY ALSO UNDERLINES THAT EP ELECTION VOTES ARE STRUCTURED AS ACCORDING TO SIMILAR PATTERNS AS OTHER 'FIRST-ORDER' ELECTIONS ARE. ALL WELL-KNOWN SOCIO-STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATIONS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN THESE EP ELECTIONS, WITH THE ADDITIONAL LAYER OF NATIONAL
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|a BACKGROUND INTERVENING. INDEED, THE NATIONAL BACKGROUND PROVED DECISIVE. COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRON MENT WAS THE ISSUE THAT RANKED SECOND IN THE EU28 AS A REASON FOR VOTING (CHOSEN BY 37% OF RESPONDENTS IN THE EU28). WHILE IT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR VOTING IN DENMARK (70%), SWEDEN (68%) AND THE NETHERLANDS (62%), IN BULGARIA (16%), GREECE (19%) AND LATVIA (21%), IT WAS MUCH LESS SO (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2019 , P. 53). IN THE EU28 OVERALL, 34% OF ALL RESPONDENTS SAY THAT IMMIGRATION WAS AN ISSUE THAT MADE THEM VOTE IN THE EP ELECTIONS. IMMIGRATION WAS MENTIONED AS IMPORTANT MAINLY IN MALTA (50%), ITALY (50%) AND THE NETHERLANDS (47%), WHILE IN PORTUGAL (10%), LATVIA (18%), AS WELL AS CYPRUS, POLAND AND ROMANIA (ALL 20%), IT WAS MUCH LESS DECISIVE (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2019 , P. 53). IN SUM, IN THE WEALTHIER NORTHERN STATES, A MAJORITY HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, WHEREAS IMMIGRATION WAS A DECISIVE ISSUE IN TWO OF THE COUNTRIES MOST HIT BY THE MIGRATION SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. FURTHERMORE, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS IN THE PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIOUS ISSUES OCCURRED IN RELATION TO SEVERAL CHARACTERISTICS, SUCH AS GENDER, AGE, AND EDUCATION. MEN WERE MORE LIKELY THAN WOMEN TO SAY THAT THE ECONOMY AND GROWTH WAS AN ISSUE THAT MADE THEM VOTE (47% COMPARED WITH 41%), AND MEN WERE ALSO MORE LIKELY THAN WOMEN TO SAY THAT THEY WERE MOVED BY THE QUESTION OF HOW THE EU SHOULD BE WORKING IN THE FUTURE (38% COMPARED WITH 34%). HOWEVER, WOMEN WERE MORE LIKELY THAN MEN TO SAY THAT PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE (39% COMPARED WITH 34%). YOUNGER VOTERS WERE MORE LIKELY TO SAY THAT COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT WAS AN ISSUE THAT MADE THEM VOTE (45% OF THOSE AGED UNDER 25 COMPARED WITH 34% OF THOSE AGED 55 OR OVER). THEY WERE ALSO MORE LIKELY TO MENTION THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (44% OF THOSE AGED UNDER 25 COMPAR
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|a WITH 34% OF THOSE AGED 55 OR OVER). RESPONDENTS AGED 25-39 WERE MOST LIKELY TO SAY THAT THEY WERE INFLUENCED BY THE WAY THE EU SHOULD BE WORKING IN THE FUTURE (42%). IMMIGRATION WAS LESS LIKELY TO BE MENTIONED BY THOSE AGED UNDER 25 (29%) THAN THOSE IN THE OLDER AGE GROUPS (34-35%), WHILE OLDER RESPONDENTS WERE MORE LIKELY TO MENTION THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 37 AS A REASON FOR VOTING (29% OF THOSE AGED 55 OR OVER COMPARED WITH 21% OF THOSE AGED UNDER 25). VARIATIONS WERE MORE IMPORTANT DEPENDING ON THE AGE OF LEAVING EDUCATION, AS IT SHOWED THAT THOSE WHO FINISHED THEIR EDUCATION LATER ARE MORE LIKELY TO MENTION A NUMBER OF ISSUES: COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (44% AMONG THOSE WHO LEFT EDUCATION AT THE AGE OF 20 OR ABOVE, COMPARED WITH 27% OF THOSE WHO LEFT SCHOOL AT THE AGE OF 15 OR BELOW), PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (42% COMPARED WITH 28% RESPECTIVELY) AND THE WAY THE EU SHOULD BE WORKING IN THE FUTURE (41% COMPARED WITH 24% RESPECTIVELY). RESPONDENTS WHO PLACED THEMSELVES ON THE LEFT OF THE POLITICAL SPEC TRUM WERE MORE LIKELY THAN THOSE IN THE CENTRE OR ON THE RIGHT TO MENTION THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (47% AMONG THOSE ON THE LEFT, 39% AMONG THOSE IN THE CENTRE AND 26% AMONG THOSE ON THE RIGHT), PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (46%, 36%, AND 27% RESPECTIVELY) AND THE SOCIAL PROTECTION OF EU CITIZENS (36%, 29%, AND 22% RESPECTIVELY). THOSE WHO PLACED THEM SELVES ON THE RIGHT WERE MORE LIKELY THAN THOSE IN THE CENTRE OR ON THE LEFT TO MENTION IMMIGRATION (43% COMPARED WITH 32% AND 29% RESPEC TIVELY) AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (33% COMPARED WITH 28% AND 21% RESPECTIVELY). FINALLY, IT WAS IMPORTANT HOW VOTERS JUDGED DEMOCRACY IN THE EU AND ALSO THEIR PERSONAL ROLE. RESPONDENTS WHO FELT THAT THEIR VOICE COUNTS IN THE EU WERE MORE LIKELY TO MENTION MANY OF THE ISSUES. IMMIGRATION WAS AN EXCEPTION HERE, AS IT WAS
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|a MENTIONED BY 32% OF THOSE WHO AGREE THAT THEIR VOICE COUNTS IN THE EU, BUT BY 39% OF THOSE WHO DISAGREE THAT THEIR VOICE COUNTS. ON THIS BASIS, WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT THE ISSUES THAT DROVE VOTERS TO PARTICIPATE SPEAK IN FAVOUR OF GENERALISED EU POLITY CONTESTATION LOSING IN IMPORTANCE, AND ISSUE-BASED VOTING, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE EU AS A LEVEL OF POLITICAL AGENCY, BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT. CLEARLY, THE MOST DECISIVE TOPICS IN THIS ELECTION WERE NOT NATION STATE CENTRED AS IN THE SECOND ORDER MODEL, BUT RATHER DIRECTED TO THE EU AS A POLITY AN DANA G EN TFO R POLICY-MAKING. THE INSTANCES IN WHICH POLITY CONTESTATION AND NATIONAL ISSUES WERE THE ONLY DRIVING FORCES OF EP ELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY OVER. WE ALSO NOTICED AN INCREASING POLITICISATION OF EU-RELATED TOPICS AND ISSUES THAT ARE HANDLED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION: CLIMATE CHANGE HAS BEEN ONE DECISIVELY POLITICISED TOPIC-BUT ALSO MIGRATION. 38 C. WIESNER ALL THIS UNDERLINES IMPORTANT ASPECTS THAT SPEAK IN FAVOUR OF INCLUDING BOTTOM-UP RELATED DIMENSIONS, SUCH AS VOTERS' ORIENTATIONS, THEIR SOCIO CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS, AND THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, RATHER THAN MERELY CONCENTRATING ON PARTY-POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN A SECOND-ORDER MODEL. CLEARLY, TOPICS WERE POLITICISED DIFFERENTLY IN DIFFERENT SOCIO CULTURAL STRATA. THERE ARE SOUND INDICATORS FOR A 'GRETA EFFECT' BECAUSE YOUNGER, BETTER EDUCATED AND WEALTHIER PEOPLE WERE TO A MUCH LARGER DEGREE MOVED BY THE ISSUE OF CLIMATE CHANGE THAN OLDER, POORER AND LESS EDUCATED VOTERS. AS 2019 WAS THE FIRST YEAR OF THE 'FRIDAYS FOR FUTURE' INITIATIVE, IT IS EASY TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS BOTTOM-UP MOVEMENT OF PUPILS AND STUDENTS, WHICH ORIGINATED AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE POLITICS OF MAIN STREAM PARTIES, HAD AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM BECAUSE IT QUITE APPARENTLY INFLUENCED THE ELECTION OUTCOME DECISIVELY. SECOND, THESE TENDENCIES GIVE SUPPORT TO THE IDEA THAT AN OPPOSITION OF COMMUNITARIANISM VERSUS COSMOPOLITANISM CLEAVAGE (SEE E.G. DE WILDE
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|a ET AL., 2019 ) IS GAINING IMPACT IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE REASONS BEHIND THE VOTES THAT WERE JUST DISCUSSED GIVE SUPPORT TO THIS CLAIM, AS CLIMATE CHANGE WAS HELD AS AN ISSUE BY WELL-EDUCATED AND YOUNGER VOTERS THAT FIT WITH THE LABEL OF COSMOPOLITANS, AND MIGRATION BY LESS WELL-EDUCATED, OLDER VOTERS THAT FIT WITH THE LABEL OF COMMUNITARIANS. MOREOVER, THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS DISCUSSED HERE WERE NOT ONLY DRIVEN BY THE ISSUES MENTIONED ABOVE, BUT ALSO BY WHAT CAN BE TERMED A PRO EU ESTABLISHMENT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND ANTI-EU CHALLENGERS, ON THE OTHER. WHILE IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS GERMANY, FAMILY ENTERPRISES, UNIVERSITY RECTORS AND NGOS, LIKE PULSE OF EUROPE, AND THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES, CAMPAIGNED IN FAVOUR OF PARTICIPATION IN THE EP ELECTIONS, RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES ALL ACROSS EUROPE USED THE 2019 EP ELECTIONS AS A MEANS TO SPREAD EU CRITICISM. THEIR AIM WAS TO CONSTRUCT AN OPPOSITION BETWEEN 'A EUROPE-OF-THE-PEOPLE VERSUS A EUROPE-OF-THE-ESTABLISHMENT'. THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE SOCIAL GROUPS FOR WHOM CLIMATE CHANGE WAS AN ISSUE-YOUNGER, BETTER EDUCATED, AND WEALTHIER PARTS OF THE EU POPU LATION WHICH WERE OFTEN FOUND IN THE NORTHERN MEMBER STATES-AND THOSE WHO WERE TRIGGERED BY THE ISSUE OF MIGRATION-OLDER, LESS WELL-EDUCATED, LESS WEALTHY AND MORE LIKELY FOUND IN SOUTHERN MEMBER STATES-IS VERY INSTRUCTIVE IN THIS RESPECT. THIRD, THIS POLARISATION BETWEEN COMMUNITARIANS AND COSMOPOLITANS APPARENTLY HAS NOW ALSO ARRIVED TO THE EP (FOR ALL NUMBERS, SEE THE OVERVIEW IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2021). THE LONGSTANDING GRAND COALI TION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (EPP, 24.57% OF THE SEATS) 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 39 AND SOCIALISTS AND DEMOCRATS (S & D, 19.32% OF THE SEATS) NO LONGER HOLDS A MAJORITY OF SEATS IN THE EP. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A MAJORITY IN THE EP, AT LEAST ONE MORE GROUP IS NEEDED. THE LIBERAL GROUP, RENEW EUROPE (12,88% OF THE SEATS), IS NOW NECESSARY IN A COALITION IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A MAJORITY, OR THEN,
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|a ALTERNATIVELY, THE GREEN GROUP (8.88% OF THE SEATS)- THE LEFT GROUP (4.99%) ALONE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO MAKE EPP AND S & D GAIN A MAJORITY. AND, THE WEIGHT OF EU-CRITICAL, NATIONALIST AND SOVEREIGNTIST MEPS HAS INCREASED AT THE SAME TIME: 9.99% OF THE SEATS ARE HELD BY THE RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST IDENTITY AND DEMOCRACY GROUP, AND 8.02% BY THE EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVES AND REFORMISTS. THE REMAINING SEATS (3.81%) BELONG TO INDEPENDENT MEPS. THIS MEANS THAT THE EP IS NO LONGER A UNITARY ACTOR (IF IT EVER WAS), AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE MUST FOCUS MORE CLOSELY ON THE MICRO-POLITICS WITHIN THE EP, THE INTERNAL CONFLICTS, COALITIONS AND INTERESTS WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE POLITICAL GROUPS (WIESNER, 2018 ). 6 TOWARDS A MULTI-STAGE (AND MULTI-LEVEL?) MODEL OF POLITICISATION TO CONCLUDE, EU POLITICISATION SHOULD BE ANALYSED AS A MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPT, LINKING A MACRO OR THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE LEVEL TO A MESO LEVEL OF CONCEPTUALISATION AND OPERATIONALISATION AND A MICRO LEVEL OF EMPIR ICAL ANALYSIS OR MEASUREMENT (SEE ALSO WIESNER, 2021A , 2021B ). IT HAS BEEN ARGUED ABOVE THAT TO THEORISE POLITICISATION AS THE ACT OF MARKING AN ISSUE AS POLITICAL OPENS UP BROADER PATHS FOR ANALYSIS (SEE ALSO THE DISCUS SION IN WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ). ACCORDINGLY, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RETHINK AND BROADEN EXISTING MODELS AND CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF POLITICISATION. THIS BRINGS ME TO SUGGESTING A STAGE MODEL OF POLITICISATION THAT MIRRORS THE BOTTOM-UP DYNAMICS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING: (1) ON THE THEORETICAL OR MACRO LEVEL, POLITICS IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN ACTIVITY AND POLITICISATION AS THE ACTIVITY THAT MARKS AN ISSUE AS POLITICAL. (2) ON THE MESO AND MICRO LEVEL, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MODEL INVOLVES A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT STAGES THAT REFER TO THE DISCUSSION ABOVE: (A) A FIRST STAGE IS THE FACT THAT AN ISSUE IS MARKED AS POLITICAL, WHENEVER, AND WHOEVER DOES SO. 40 C. WIESNER (B) A SECOND STAGE IS A FIRST DEGREE OF PUBLIC RESONANCE, OR SALIENCE. THE ISSUE ENTERS PUBLIC OR SEMI-PUBLIC ARENAS,
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|a THROUGH THE MEDIA, SOCIAL MEDIA, PROTESTS, OR CAMPAIGNS. SOCIAL MEDIA IN THIS CONTEXT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED AN INTERMEDIATE FORM OF PUBLIC ARENA BECAUSE THEY ARE SEMI-PUBLIC, AND ALSO A KIND OF LIMITED AND PRE-SELECTED PUBLIC. (C) THIRD, AND LINKED BY DIFFERENT CHANNELS TO THOSE PUBLIC OR SEMI PUBLIC ARENAS, THERE IS THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN AN EASTONIAN SENSE, AND THE WAYS IN WHICH ISSUES ENTER INTO IT FROM THE DIFFERENT ARENAS-BY THE ISSUES TAKEN UP BY PARTY OR OTHER ACTORS, BY NEW PARTIES FORMING AND ENTERING THE SYSTEM, BY THE ISSUES BECOMING A MATTER OF INSTITUTIONALISED POLITICAL CONFLICT AND BY FINALLY DECISIONS BEING TAKEN ON THEM. WHAT FOLLOWS FROM THIS STAGE MODEL IS A MORE CONCRETE IDEA OF THE POINT IN A POLITICISATION PROCESS THAT ALLOWS TO EMPIRICALLY MEASURE POLITICISATION. AT THE MOMENT WHEN WE CAN CONCRETELY MEASURE SALIENCE, POLARISATION, ETC., THE POLITICISATION PROCESS HAS ALREADY REACHED THE MAINSTREAM ARENAS AND/OR THE INNER SYSTEM STRUCTURES. THIS MEANS THAT EMPIRICAL MEASURE MENT OF POLITICISATION VIA INDICATORS SUCH AS PUBLIC SALIENCE CAN DOCUMENT STAGE THREE OF A POLITICISATION PROCESS. SO FAR, MOST EMPIRICAL ACCOUNTS ON EU POLITICISATION TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SURFACE AND THE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE STAGES OF PUBLIC SALIENCE AND RESONANCE IN THE EASTONIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (PHASES TWO AND THREE), BUT NOT SO MUCH THE CHANNELS FROM THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF POLITICISATION (PHASE ONE) TO PUBLIC SALIENCE (PHASE TWO) AND IMPACT IN THE SYSTEM (PHASE THREE), OR THE SIDEWAYS PERSPECTIVES, OR THE WAYS BY WHICH SOMETHING PASSES FROM ONE PHASE TO ANOTHER, OR THE WAYS SOMETHING IS MARKED AS POLITICAL, AND THUS DOES NOT REACH PUBLIC SALIENCE OF RESONANCE IN THE SYSTEM. THIS LEADS TO A NUMBER OF CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE CONCRETE OPERATIONALISATION OF POLITICISATION AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN. THE ARENAS, ACTORS, AND PHASES THAT WERE BRIEFLY SKETCHED-FROM THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF POLITICISATION (PHASE ONE) TO PUBLIC SALIENCE (PHASE TWO) AND IMPA
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|a IN THE SYSTEM (PHASE THREE)-ARE TO BE SITUATED ON THE MEDIUM OR MESO LEVEL OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION. THE NEXT CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THEIR OPERATIONALISATION ON THE MICRO LEVEL. HERE, RESEARCH MATERIAL SHOULD BE SELECTED IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR STUDYING TOP-DOWN AS WELL AS BOTTOM-UP AND SIDEWAYS DYNAMICS, AND IT SHOULD BE SELECTED IN ORDER TO REFLECT WHAT 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 41 WE KNOW ABOUT THE DIFFERENT PUBLICS-E.G. WELL-EDUCATED PEOPLE USUALLY HAVE A BETTER OPINION OF EU AND READ QUALITY PRESS, WHEREAS LESS WELL EDUCATED PEOPLE TEND TO READ TABLOIDS AND HAVE A MORE CRITICAL OPINION OF THE EU. ACCORDINGLY, IT WILL GIVE A MORE POSITIVE IMAGE OF THE EU TO ANALYSE ONLY THE QUALITY PRESS RATHER THAN TABLOIDS. IT IS ALSO WORTHWHILE TO CONCEPTUALISE AND RESEARCH UPON POLITICISING ACTIONS, SUCH AS SPEECH ACTS, AND THE RELATED MICRO-POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND PROCESSES OF POLITICISING AN ISSUE (WIESNER, 2018 ). OTHER POSSIBLE METHODS OF ANALYSIS ARE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS, MONITORING SOCIAL MEDIA, PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION WITH NGOS, THE STUDY OF LOCAL MEDIA AND THE ANALYSIS OF OPINION POLLS. BUT, IN ANY CASE, THE EARLIER IN A POLITICISATION PROCESS WE CONDUCT RESEARCH, THE MORE DIFFI CULT THINGS GET. IF WE DECIDE THAT WE JUST NEED TO LOOK FOR PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS, WE WILL ALSO FIND THAT THE ISSUES THAT ARE A MATTER OF PUBLIC PROTEST WILL VARY IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES. IT THEN BECOMES DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT IS IT THAT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH: EU POLITICISATION WHEN THE PROTESTS AGAINST TTIP ONLY TAKE PLACE IN GERMANY? THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICISATION NOT ONLY LEADS INTO A DIFFUSE FIELD OF ANAL YSIS THAT IS DIFFICULT TO RESEARCH. IT IS ALSO A FIELD THAT INVITES, OR EVEN REQUIRES, RESEARCH WITH MIXED METHODS THAT COMBINE BOTH QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA. OBVIOUSLY, THIS ALSO MEANS TO RECONCILE THE UNDERLYING ONTOLOGIES AND METHODOLOGIES IN A METHODOLOGICAL AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED PLURALISM. FURTHERMORE, IT IS TO BE RECOMMENDED TO
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|a SEPARATE, BUT ALSO FRUITFULLY RELATE, NORMATIVE AND ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENTS ON POLITICISATION. POLITICISATION IS NOT 'GOOD' OR 'BAD' PER SE, NEITHER ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL NOR ON THE EU LEVEL. IT IS, HENCE, USEFUL TO DISTINGUISH POLITICISATION AS A PROCESS, THE (INTERMEDIATE) OUTCOMES OF POLITICISATION PROCESSES, AND A NORMATIVE JUDGEMENT OF THEIR EFFECTS. REFERENCES BOUZA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87-104. CARMINES, E. G., & STIMSON, J. A. (1990). ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS . PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. DE WILDE, P. (2011). NO POLITY FOR OLD POLITICS? A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 33 (5), 559-575. 42 C. WIESNER DE WILDE, P., LEUPOLD, A., & SCHMIDTKE, H. (2015). INTRODUCTION: THE DIFFER ENTIATED POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 3-22. DE WILDE, P., STRIJBIS, O., MERKEL, W., KOOPMANY, R., & ZUERN, M. (EDS.). (2019). THE STRUGGLE OVER BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. DE WILDE, P., & ZUERN, M. (2012). CAN THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BE REVERSED? JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 50 (1), 137-153. EASTON, D. (1953). THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE . KNOPF. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. (2019). THE 2019 POST-ELECTORAL SURVEY . HAVE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS ENTERED A NEW DIMENSION? EUROBAROMETER SURVEY 91.5 OF THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT. RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUR OPA.EU/AT-YOUR-SERVICE/FILES/BE-HEARD/EUROBAROMETER/2019/POST-ELECTION SURVEY-2019-COMPLETE-RESULTS/REPORT/EN-POST-ELECTION-SURVEY-2019-REPORT. PDF . EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. (2021). INTERACTIVE SEATING PLAN OF THE
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|a HEMICYCLE OF THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT . RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUR OPA.EU/ERPL-PUBLIC/HEMICYCLE/INDEX.HTM?LANG=EN&LOC=BRU . GREEN-PEDERSEN, C. (2012). A GIANT FAST ASLEEP? PARTY INCENTIVES AND THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. POLITICAL STUDIES, 60 (1), 115-130. HAAS, E. B. (1968). THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 (REISSUED) . STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. HOBOLT, S. B., & DE VRIES, C. E. (2015). ISSUE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MULTIPARTY COMPETITION. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 48 (9), 1159-1185. HOEGLINGER, D. (2015). THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN DOMESTIC ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 44-63. HOEGLINGER, D. (2016). POLITICIZING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: STRUGGLING WITH THE AWAKENING GIANT . CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. HUTTER, S., GRANDE, E., & KRIESI, H. (EDS.). (2016). POLITICISING EUROPE: INTEGRATION AND MASS POLITICS . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. KAUPPI, N. (2018). TOWARD A REFLEXIVE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIELDS, INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICIANS . PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. KAUPPI, N., PALONEN, K., & WIESNER, C. (2016). THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITICI SATION OF THE EU. REDESCRIPTIONS, 19 (1), 72-90. KAUPPI, N., & WIESNER, C. (2018). EXIT POLITICS, ENTER POLITICIZATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 40 (2), 1-7. 2 BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM: RETHINKING EU YY 43 LINDBERG, L. N., & SCHEINGOLD, S. A. (1970). EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY . PRENTICE-HALL. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.
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|a PALONEN, K. (2003). FOUR TIMES OF POLITICS: POLICY, POLITY, POLITICKING, AND POLITICIZATION. ALTERNATIVES, 28 , 171-186. REIF, K., & SCHMITT, H. (1980). NINE SECOND-ORDER NATIONAL ELECTIONS: A CONCEP TUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION RESULTS. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 8 (1), 3-44. ROZES, S. (2005). LA RENATIONALISATION DU DEBAT EUROPEEN. LE DEBAT, 136 , 29-43. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E. (1957). INTENSITY, VISIBILITY, DIRECTION AND SCOPE. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 51 (4), 933-942. SCHMITTER, P. C. (1969). THREE NEO-FUNCTIONAL HYPOTHESES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 23 (1), 161-166. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2013). THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPE: CONTESTING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE MASS MEDIA. ROUTLEDGE STUDIES ON DEMOCRATISING EUROPE . ROUTLEDGE. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2014). UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF EU POLITI CIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE EUROZONE CRISIS. COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 13 (3), 287-306. VEGA RUBIO, R., OLEART, A., & RAUBE, K. (2021). PARTIES IN THE 'TWILIGHT ZONE': BEYOND FIRST AND SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS IN THE SPANISH 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 17 (3), 349-368. WIESNER, C. (2014). DEMOKRATISIERUNG DER EU DURCH NATIONALE EUROPADISKURSE? STRUKTUREN UND PROZESSE EUROPAEISCHER IDENTITAETSBILDUNG IM DEUTSCH-FRANZOESISCHEN VERGLEICH . NOMOS. WIESNER, C. (2015). THE FRENCH EU REFERENDUM DISCOURSE IN 2005: HOW IS MEDIATED DISCOURSE LINKED TO VOTING INTENTIONS, VOTING BEHAVIOR, AND SUPPORT? IN J. GRIMM, L. HUDDY, P. SCHMIDT, & J. SEETHALER (EDS.), ROUTLEDGE ADVANCES IN SOCIOLOGY. DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: MEDIA AND SOCIETAL FACTORS OF WHAT WE ARE (PP. 334-349). ROUTLEDGE. WIESNER, C. (2018). INTERINSTITUTIONAL MICROPOLITICS AND PARLIAMENTARY POWERS. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT STRATEGIES FOR EXPANDING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE EU INSTITU TIONAL SYSTEM. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION , 40(4), 375-391.
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|a WIESNER, C. (2019A). INVENTING THE EU AS A DEMOCRATIC POLITY: CONCEPTS, ACTORS AND CONTROVERSIES . PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C. (2019B). RETHINKING POLITICISATION AS A MULTI-STAGE AND MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPT. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY, 18 (2), 255-259. WIESNER, C. (ED.). (2019C). RETHINKING POLITICIZATION. CRITICAL EXCHANGES [SPECIAL ISSUE]. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY , 18 (2), 248-281. 44 C. WIESNER WIESNER, C. (2020). POLITISIERUNG, POLITIK UND DEMOKRATIE. ZU THEORIE UND KONZEPTION EINES KOMPLEXEN POLITIKWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN BEGRIFFSGEFUEGES. IN A. SCHAEFER & D. MEIERING (EDS.), (ENT-)POLITISIERUNG? DIE DEMOKRATISCHE GESELLSCHAFT DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS. LEVIATHAN-SONDERHEFT (PP. 39-64). NOMOS. WIESNER, C. (2021A). CONCLUSION: RETHINKING POLITICISATION: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? IN C. WIESNER (ED.), RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (PP. 267-276). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C. (2021B). INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN C. WIESNER (ED.), RETHINKING POLITICSATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (PP. 1-15). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C. (2021C). POLITICISATION, POLITICS, AND DEMOCRACY. IN C. WIESNER (ED.), RETHINKING POLITICSATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C. (ED.). (2021D). RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C., HAAPALA, T. & PALONEN, K. (2017). DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION: PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS . RHETORIC, POLITICS AND SOCIETY. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WOOD, M. (2015). POLITICISATION, DEPOLITICISATION AND ANTI-POLITICS: TOWARDS A MULTILEVEL RESEARCH AGENDA. POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW, 14 (4), 521-533. ZUERN, M. (2015). OPENING UP EUROPE: NEXT STEPS IN POLITICISATION RESEARCH. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 164-182. CHAPTER 3
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|a CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SCHOLARSHIP: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON EU POLITICISATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DISCOURSE ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN 1 INTRODUCTION: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT SINCE ITS INCEPTION, THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) HAS FACED CRITICISMS IN THE LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FOR ITS SUPPOSED LACK OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. THESE CRITICISMS HAVE BEEN BASED ON VERY DIFFERENT SCHOLARLY ANALYSES, DEPENDENT ON EACH AUTHOR'S (NORMATIVE) VISION OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. 1 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT FURTHER DEPENDS ON THE FIELD OF SPECIALISATION OF THE ACADEMIC MAKING THE 1 FOR A SIMILAR ARGUMENT ABOUT SCHOLARLY POSITIONS WHEN THEORISING ABOUT THE EU, SEE KARI PALONEN'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK. E. GARCIA-GUITIAN ( B ) UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: ELENA.GARCIA@UAM.ES THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_3 45 46 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN CRITIQUE. THE CRITICISMS AND PROPOSALS TO SOLVE THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT RELY ON IDEAS OR MODELS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EU THAT CAN BE TRACED IN PARALLEL WITH THOSE TAKING PLACE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. THEY HAVE ALSO EVOLVED OVER TIME, INFLUENCING THE INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTRODUCED. THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE SCHOLARLY DISCUSSION ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EU IS THE SPECIFIC ROLE ATTRIBUTED TO CITIZENS IN THE DIVERSE EMBODIMENTS IN WHICH THEY ARE REPRESENTED: DEFERENTIAL, ACTIVE, EXPERT, ACTIVISTS, AND SO ON. THESE REPRESENTATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIFFERENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE AND ARE REFLECTED IN THE ACADEMIC SUGGESTIONS TO SOLVE THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. THE CRITICISMS OF THE EURO PEAN PROJECT FROM A DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE HAVE ALSO FOCUSED ON A NUMBER OF
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|a DIFFERENT ASPECTS: THE IMBALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN A STRONG EXECU TIVE AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP); THE ABSENCE OF TRUE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS DUE TO THE LACK OF EUROPEAN PARTIES; THE NONEXISTENCE OF A EURO PEAN DEMOS; THE DETACHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS FROM ORDINARY CITIZENS WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THEIR COMPLEXITY AND PROCEDURES; OR THE IMPOSITION OF A NEO-LIBERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (HOERETH, 1998 ). THESE DIAGNOSES HAVE CHANGED DURING THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE EU, BUT THEY ARE ALL DEPENDENT ON A WIDER NORMATIVE VISION ABOUT WHAT THE EUROPEAN PROJECT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD BECOME (FOSSUM, 2016 , P. 216). THE LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS BEEN A POWERFUL ANALYT ICAL TOOL IN EXPLAINING THE PROBLEMS OF THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EU (FOR AN OVERVIEW OF ITS CURRENTS AND MAIN REPRESENTATIVES, SEE HOOGHE &M A R KS , 2019 ). THERE IS AN IMPORTANT COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACT THAT THE EUROPEAN PROJECT STARTED AS A SUBORDINATE DIMENSION OF NATIONAL ONES. IT ADOPTED THE FORM OF A TRANSNATIONAL POLITY, CREATED THROUGH THE AGREEMENTS OF STATES THAT WERE DESIGNED TO OPERATE THROUGH AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MODEL. SCHOLARS SEEM TO GENERALLY AGREE ON THE ESSENTIALS OF THE TRANSFORMA TION OF THE EU, FIRST OCCURRING WITH THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT (1986) AND FINALISED BY THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (1993) (E.G. HOOGHE & MARKS, 2001 , PP. 8-9; NORRIS, 1997 , P. 276). THE INTRODUCTION OF QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, THEREBY EXPANDING ITS SCOPE, AND THE PROGRESSIVE REINFORCEMENT OF THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THROUGH THE GRANTING OF CO-DECISION COMPETENCES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF VETOING SOME LEGISLATION, BROUGHT ABOUT A FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATURE OF THE UNION. THESE CHANGES WERE ALSO THE PRODUCT OF THE EU'S 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 47 PROGRESSIVE ENLARGEMENT AND THE INTEGRATION OF SEVERAL NEW MEMBER STATES ALONG THE WAY. NEVERTHELESS, THE ANALYSIS OF THIS
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|a COMPLEX EVOLUTION IN THE LITERATURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS TENDED TO ASSUME A DISCOURSE BASED ON THE PROGRESSIVE POLITICISATION OF THE EU PROJECT AS A KEY ELEMENT. LINKED TO IT, THE PROJECT'S DEMOCRATIC QUALITY HAS BEEN TIED TO A DEMOCRATIC ASSESSMENT DERIVED FROM THE MEANING AND ROLE ATTRIBUTED TO THE SO-CALLED 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS. THE EXISTENCE AND EXPRESSION OF WHAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED A GENERAL ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF EUROPE'S CITIZENS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE WAY POLITICS IS CONDUCTED IN THE EU, INVOLVING A SPECIFIC POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE ELITES, HAS ALSO STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE WAYS IN WHICH ANALYSTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF THE UNION HAVE PERCEIVED IT. MORE RECENTLY POPULARISED BY THE WORKS OF HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ), THE CONCEPT OF 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' HAS BEEN GENERALLY ADOPTED BY SCHOLARS APPROACHING THESE TOPICS, FOCUSING ON SOME OF THE EU'S KEY ELEMENTS TO ASSESS ITS DEMOCRATIC QUALITY: GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC SPHERE, AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. IT HAS BEEN A STARTING POINT TO REFLECT ON THE QUESTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE EU 2 AND THE NATURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AS WELL AS TO ASSESS SPECIFIC POLITICAL DECISIONS, SUCH AS THE TREATY REFORMS AND POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES. THE CONNECTION OF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO A VARIETY OF DEMOCRATIC QUALITY INDI CATORS COMPELS A RECONSIDERATION OF ITS ROLE IN THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF EU POLITICISATION, AS WELL AS THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT OVERALL. THE NEXT SECTION ADDRESSES THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS THAT ARE USED TO DESCRIBE EU POLITICISATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS. IT WILL BE ARGUED THAT THE BINARY MODEL OF POLITICISATION VS DEPOLITICISATION IN THE EU CONTEXT PROVIDES A SPECIFIC MEANING FOR CITIZENS' PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS AND HOW IT IS USED TO SUSTAIN A PROJECT DETACHED FROM CITIZENS AND MANIPULATED BY POLITICAL ELITES. IT THEREFORE INVOLVES A NEGA
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|a TIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF A EUROPEAN PROJECT BASED 2 THE LEGITIMACY OF POWER (BEETHAM, 1997 ) RELIES ON: (A) CONFORMITY TO MORAL AND POLITICAL NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES; (B) LEGAL VALIDITY; (C) CONSENT PROVEN BY THE FACTS. TO ASSESS THIS LEGITIMACY, HOWEVER, THERE IS A STRONG TENDENCY TO FOCUS ON THE THIRD DIMENSION-THE PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZENS-AND THE LOW SUPPORT FOR THE EU IS TAKEN AS PROOF OF ITS LACK OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, WHEREAS THE NORMATIVE PROPOSALS TO SOLVE THIS DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OFTEN RUN COUNTER TO CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS. 48 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN ON DEVALUATED CITIZENS' SUPPORT. THE FOLLOWING SECTION REFLECTS ON THE USE OF THE POLITICISATION/DEPOLITICISATION DICHOTOMY IN THE SCHOLARLY LITER ATURE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR CITIZENS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNION AND THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF INTEGRATION: ITS BACKGROUND AND CREATION, THE IMPACT OF CHANGES TO ITS INSTITUTIONAL EMBODIMENTS AND POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES (I.E. NORMAL POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK), AND THE POLY-CRISIS PERIOD. CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE RELEVANCE OF THIS CONCEPT TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC PEDIGREE OF THE EU. THE CONCLUDING REMARKS STRESS THE LIMITATION OF THE STANDARD DESCRIPTION OF THE PERMIS SIVE CONSENSUS AND DEFEND A MORE COMPLEX THEORETICAL APPROACH, FOCUSING ON THE MULTILEVEL SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION. THE CONCLUSIONS HIGHLIGHT THE NEED TO ASSESS THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NORMATIVE DEFINITIONS AND TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EU'S MULTILEVEL CHARACTER, THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCES AND THE VARIOUS FORMS OF CITIZEN REPRESENTATION. 2 EU POLITICISATION AND THE END OF THE CITIZENS ' PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS MUCH OF THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE RELATING TO EU POLITICISATION (E.G. DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 ) TAKES AS ITS STARTING POINT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT, SINCE ITS CREATION IN THE 1950S, THE EUROPEAN PROJECT WAS INTENTIONALLY
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|a DEPOLITICISED BY THE POLITICAL ELITES, THEREBY CREATING A MODE OF POLITICS DETACHED FROM THE CITIZENS. THESE SAME CITIZENS SEEM TO HAVE ACCEPTED THIS SITUATION WITH COMPLIANCE, GIVING WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED THEIR 'PERMIS SIVE CONSENSUS'. NEVERTHELESS, THIS SCENARIO CHANGED IN THE 1980S, WHEN THE ELITES WERE UNABLE TO CONTINUE AS BEFORE, DUE TO THE INCREASED POLITI CISATION OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT FOLLOWING CRUCIAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES, SUCH AS THE CREATION OF THE COMMON MARKET AND THE NEW POWERS GIVEN TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, AS WELL AS THE CONTROVERSIAL APPROVAL OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY'S INNOVATIONS. HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ) HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN INTRODUCING INTO THE CURRENT EU POLITICISATION LITERATURE A SPECIFIC MEANING FOR THE CONCEPT OF 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS', FIRST ENUNCIATED BY LINDBERG AND SCHEINGOLD IN 1970. IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM, INTENDED BY LINDBERG AND SHEINGOLD ( 1970 ), THE CONCEPT DESCRIBED THE NORMAL OPERATIONS OF EUROPEAN POLI TICS. HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ) AGREED THAT THE EUROPEAN PROJECT INVOLVED KEY POLITICAL DECISIONS RELATING TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THEY 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 49 CONTENDED THAT ORDINARY POLITICS WERE DEPOLITICISED, INCLUDING LEGAL REGU LATION FOCUSING ON SECTORIAL MATTERS RELATED TO ITS (AT THAT TIME) LIMITED COMPETENCES, MOBILISED FRAGMENTED ACTORS (I.E. THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THESE POLICIES) WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF PUBLIC OPINION. IN THIS NARRATIVE, THERE IS A DISTINCTIVE VISION OF POLITICS AND THE ROLE ATTRIBUTED TO THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACIES. THEIR CONCLUSION WAS THAT EUROPEAN POLITICS WAS 'PRAGMATICALLY ORIENTED RATHER THAN POLITICISED', BASED ON SECTORIAL DEALS WITH SOME ACTORS (I.E. FARMERS, COAL MINERS, STEEL WORKERS) AND YET 'INSULATED FROM PUBLIC PRESSURES' (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2001 , PP. 6-9). THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE DEPICTED IN THIS DESCRIPTION IS THAT OF A EUROPE
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|a OF THE FEW, CONSISTING OF ECONOMI CALLY HOMOGENEOUS STATES (I.E. THE SIX FOUNDING MEMBER STATES), REACHING AGREEMENTS ON SOME SECTORIAL TOPICS OF NO INTEREST TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. IT FURTHER IMPLIES A VIEW OF POLITICS BASED ON A WIDE CITIZENS' CONSENSUS ABOUT THE NATURE AND LIMITED ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT INSIDE THESE COUNTRIES; IN OTHER WORDS, DEPOLITICISED POLITICS. 3 THIS VISION DERIVES FROM A NORMATIVE POSITION THAT IMPLIES AN ASSESSMENT OF DEMOCRATIC QUALITY THAT IS OPERATIONALISED THROUGH THE ATTRIBUTION OF A SPECIFIC MEANING TO THE CONCEPT OF EU POLITICISATION. HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 , P. 5) DESCRIBED THE FIRST DECADES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS BEING DETERMINED BY PRACTICAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, DECIDED BY AN ISOLATED POLITICAL ELITE. ACCORDING TO THEIR ANALYSIS, THIS WAS THE NATURE OF THE FIRST THREE DECADES OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, WHICH, FROM A DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE, WERE CHARACTERISED BY THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS OF EUROPE'S CITIZENS. THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE PROJECT WAS PURSUED FROM AN ELITE-CENTRIC VIEW, DRIVEN BY ECONOMIC INTERESTS, FOLLOWING AN INTENTIONAL STRATEGY THAT CONTINUED EVEN AFTER THE CREATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND DIRECT ELECTIONS IN 1979. THE NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THIS ANALYSIS WAS BASED ON THE LACK OF POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS, A TERM THAT IMPLICITLY INCORPORATES AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE ROLE OF CITIZENS IN POLITICS. IT IS USEFUL TO REFLECT ON THIS IN LIGHT OF SCHMITTER'S DESCRIPTION OF POLITICISATION, PROPOSED AS EARLY AS 1969, WHICH INSPIRED THEIR ANALYSIS. SCHMITTER ( 1969 ) ARGUED THAT THE SCOPE AND LEVEL OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION WOULD BE DETERMINED BY ITS POLITICISATION, UNDERSTOOD AS THE INCREASING CONTROVERSIALITY OF JOINT DECISION-MAKING, GENERATED BY THE INCREASED NUMBER OF ISSUES INVOLVED. HIS HYPOTHESIS WAS THAT A GROWTH OF CONTROVERSIALITY WOULD ALSO EXPAND 3 FOR A DISCUSSION, SEE CLAUDIA WIESNER'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK. 50 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN THE NUMBER OF ACTORS INVOLVED
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|a IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WHICH WOULD IN TURN GENERATE A FUNDAMENTAL REDEFINITION OF COMMON OBJECTIVES AND A SHIFT IN SCOPE FROM MORE ECONOMIC TO MORE POLITICAL GOALS, WHILE ALSO AFFECTING THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT. IN SHORT, POLITICISATION, DUE TO THE INCREASED NUMBER ISSUES AND THEIR CONTROVERSIALITY, WOULD HAVE A WIDER IMPACT ON THE AUDIENCE, WHICH COULD GENERATE MORE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. UNLIKE SCHMITTER, HOOGHE AND MARKS ARGUED THAT, EVEN WITH THE CREATION OF THE EP AND DIRECT ELECTIONS IN 1979, POLITICISATION CONTINUED TO BE ELITE-DRIVEN. THIS MEANT THAT EUROPEAN ELECTIONS BECAME A TEST FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS' POPULARITY AT HOME, WITH ISSUES OF LOW SALIENCE IN NATIONAL CONTEXTS, SUPPORTED BY A PUBLIC MAINTAINING VERY SUPERFICIAL ATTI TUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN MATTERS. IN THEIR ANALYSIS, A TURNING POINT IN THIS SITUATION OCCURRED IN THE 1990S, WHEN A STRUCTURED PUBLIC OPINION STARTED TO OPERATE IN EUROPE THAT ALSO AFFECTED MEMBER STATES' INTERNAL POLITICS, DUE TO CONNECTIONS WITH THEIR STRUCTURES OF CONTESTATION. THIS CHANGE WAS ALREADY VISIBLE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE MAASTRICHT TREATY IN 1992, WHICH INAUGURATED A PERIOD OF GROWING CONTROVERSIALITY RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATION, PRODUCED BY PARTY COMPETITION AND REFER ENDA, AS EVIDENCED BY THE REJECTION OF THE TREATY IN DENMARK AND THE LOW SUPPORT FOR IT IN FRANCE. IN EARLIER LITERATURE, THE NORMAL OPERATIONS OF POLITICS, BASED ON A MIXTURE OF LACK OF INTEREST AND BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNITY'S WIDELY SHARED GOALS, WERE ACCEPTED AS AUTHORITATIVE AND LEGITIMATE, AND WERE SEEN AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTILEVEL SYSTEM (HURREL MANN, 2007 ). WITH THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS NEW TREATIES, THE CONSENSUS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PROJECT BECAME MORE PROBLEMATIC. NEVER THELESS, IT WAS CLAIMED THAT IT CONTINUED TO BE REFLECTED IN NORMAL POLITICAL OPERATIONS, CHARACTERISED BY THE LOW SALIENCE OF EU POLICY, WHICH FAILING TO MOBILISE LARGE-SCALE
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|a PUBLIC INTEREST. CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR THE PROJECT WAS BASED ON ASSUMED TRUST IN THE POLITICAL ELITES, INCLUDING MAINSTREAM PARTIES AND THE EXECUTIVES IN POWER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE DEBATES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WERE CONNECTED TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO THE NEED FOR EFFICIENCY, BUT ALSO TO THE QUESTION OF SELF-RULE. THE THESIS OF HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 , P. 2) IS THAT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WAS 'TRIGGERED BY A MISMATCH BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY'. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BECAME PART OF A SYSTEM OF MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE, 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 51 FACILITATING SOCIAL INTERACTION ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, INCREASING IMMI GRATION, AND UNDERMINING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. FOR THEM, THE GROWING POLITICISATION OF THE EU EXPLAINS THE INCREASED CONCERN FOR ITS DEMO CRATIC PEDIGREE AND THE FOCUS ON THE SO-CALLED LEGITIMACY DEFICIT. IT IMPLIES A CONVERSION OF THE ISSUE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION INTO A NEW TRANSNA TIONAL CLEAVAGE AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL, INSPIRED BY CHANGES IN INTERNAL PARTY COMPETITION AND CONNECTED WITH PUBLIC OPINION AND A MORE EUROSCEPTIC PUBLIC. THEIR CONCLUSION IS THAT, ON A RANGE OF VITAL ISSUES, LEGITIMATE DECISION-MAKING HAS SHIFTED FROM AN 'INSULATE ELITE' TO 'MASS POLITICS'. TO UNDERSTAND THE USE OF THE TERM 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION, IT IS HELPFUL TO CLARIFY ITS CONNECTION WITH THE MEANINGS ATTRIBUTED TO EU POLITICISATION. THIS INVOLVES NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE ORIGINAL PROJECT, AS WELL AS THE DIFFERENT INSTI TUTIONAL EMBODIMENTS IT ADOPTED DURING ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION. IN EACH OF THESE DEFINITIONS, THE KEY POINT IS THE ROLE PLAYED BY CITIZENS: AS SPECTA TORS, ACTIVISTS, COMPLIERS WITH PUBLIC OPINION, OR PARTICIPANTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE. THIS RAISES SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
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|a INVOLVING NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS THAT INFLUENCE THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A. THE CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN 'POLITICAL' AND 'POLITICISA TION' (EXPLORED IN THE CHAPTERS BY WIESNER, PALONEN AND KAUPPI IN THIS BOOK). 'POLITICISATION' CAN BE EXPLAINED BY INVOLVING DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS, DEPENDING ON THE AUTHORS IN QUESTION, BUT CAN INCLUDE SALIENCE, AWARENESS AND MOBILISATION, WHEREAS 'DEPOLITICISATION' CAN ACTUALLY OBSCURE THE MEANING OF THE 'POLITICAL' (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). THERE IS CONFUSION BETWEEN THE SALIENCE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF POLI CIES; AWARENESS, AS WELL AS LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPACITY; AND SPECIFIC NORMATIVE EVALUATIONS ABOUT THE ACTORS THAT ARE MOBILISED. B. THE DELIMITATION OF WHO BELONGS TO 'THE ELITE', AS OPPOSED TO THE DESCRIPTION OF 'THE CITIZENS'. IN THE CREATION OF THE EU TREATIES, THE REFERENCES TO THE ELITE INCLUDE SUPRANATIONAL AS WELL AS NATIONAL LEADERS, NOT MERELY THE EXECUTIVES BUT ALSO POLITICIANS FROM MAIN STREAM PARTIES WHO WERE ABLE TO REACH A WIDE LEVEL OF AGREEMENT ON VARIOUS ISSUES. THIS COMPOSITION OF THE ELITE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE IDENTIFIED WITH THE 'BRUSSELS TECHNOCRATS' OR WITH OTHER GROUPS, INCLUDING NON-MAINSTREAM POLITICIANS, INTEREST GROUPS, CIVIL 52 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN SOCIETY, SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS OR EU EXPERTS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT INCLUDES ALMOST EVERYONE EXCEPT THE SO-CALLED ORDINARY CITIZENS. THE REFERENCES TO THE DIFFERENT EMBODIMENTS OF CITIZENS CARRY IMPLICIT MEANINGS OF 'POLITICISATION', VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS: INTERESTED AUDI ENCE; OTHER DOMESTIC ACTORS; MASS POLITICS; WIDER PUBLIC; PUBLIC SPHERE; CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT. ALL THESE CATEGORIES, WITH SPECIFIC ARTIC ULATIONS OF THE ELITE/CITIZENS DICHOTOMY, HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. C. THE MEANING OF THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' AND THE SUBSEQUENT
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|a 'CON STRAINING DISSENSUS'. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH A CLEAR MEANING IN THE VARIOUS PERIODS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION; ITS IMPACT ON THE INTEGRATION PROCESS; AND ITS EFFECT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITU TIONS AND CONCRETE POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES. THE INITIAL 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TENDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS THE (NEGATIVE) OUTCOME OF AN ELITE STRATEGY THAT INTENTIONALLY HID EUROPEAN POLITICS FROM THE PUBLIC EYE, ACHIEVING CITIZEN COMPLIANCE AND THEREBY NEGLECTING BOTTOM-UP POLITICS. ALTHOUGH IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS CONSENSUS DISAPPEARED IN THE 1990S, TO BE REPLACED BY A 'CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS', IT IS ONLY VAGUELY EQUATED WITH THE GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF THE PUBLIC IN EUROPEAN ISSUES IN A MORE POLITICISED ENVIRONMENT, MAINLY DUE TO THE INCORPORATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION INTO DOMESTIC CONFLICTS, WHERE IT WAS USED BY PARTY ELITES IN THEIR FIGHT FOR NATIONAL POWER. THIS INVOLVES AN ASSUMPTION THAT, WITHOUT EXPLICIT CONSENT ON THE PART OF THE CITIZENS, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. BOTH THESE ATTITUDES OF THE PUBLIC-THE CONSENSUS AND THE DISSENSUS-THEREFORE SEEM TO COHABIT, ALTHOUGH THEORETICALLY THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE. HOWEVER, THIS BECOMES POSSIBLE WHEN EQUATING THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO AN ATTITUDE OF THE EXECUTIVES (I.E. THE ELITE) AIMED AT DEPOLITICISING ISSUES AND OFFERING AN EXECUTIVE-DRIVEN SOLUTION, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO VERY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN 2009. THESE ISSUES REQUIRE CLARIFICATION IN RELATION TO THE MEANINGS OF THE CONCEPTS USED, AS WELL AS TO THE SPECIFIC NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS THAT GUIDE THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN SCHOLARLY LITERATURE. IN THE NEXT SECTION, AN OUTLINE WILL BE GIVEN OF A MORE DETAILED CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE DIFFERENT PERIODS OF INTEGRATION AND HOW THE ABOVE ISSUES WERE LINKED WITH DIFFERENT VIEWS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE LITERATURE DEALING WITH THAT INTEGRA TION, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ELITES
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|a AND THE CITIZENS, AS WELL AS THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCES OF THE MULTILEVEL SYSTEM. 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 53 3 THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS IN ORDINARY POLITICS FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AS EMPHASISED IN OTHER CHAPTERS OF THIS BOOK, ESPECIALLY IN THOSE BY WIESNER, KAUPPI, AND PALONEN, THE EUROPEAN PROJECT HAS INVOLVED DIFFERENT PERIODS, ARENAS, ISSUES, ACTORS, AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LEVELS OF ACTION. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER THAT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AND WHAT CONSTITUTES NORMAL POLITICS IN EUROPE, IS CONDUCTED THROUGH DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS. AS WASSEMBERG ( 2020 ) STRESSES, TO NORMATIVELY ASSESS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS DEMO CRATIC CHARACTER, WE MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF THE CHANGES EXPERIENCED BY THE EUROPEAN PROJECT THROUGH THE APPROVAL OF TREATIES, HISTORICAL CONTINGEN CIES (E.G. INCREASED GLOBALISATION, TRANSFORMATION OF WELFARE STATES) AND THE PROGRESSIVE ENLARGEMENT THAT HAS TRANSFORMED THE WHOLE PROJECT. FOLLOWING THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVES OF THE LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WE CAN IDENTIFY TWO BROAD PERIODS. FIRST, THE INITIAL THREE DECADES OF A LIMITED PROJECT BASED ON THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS OF EUROPE'S CITIZENS; SECOND, AN ALREADY POLITICISED PROJECT THAT STARTED IN THE 1980S, MARKED BY A CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. HOWEVER, FOR MANY OF THE SCHOLARS THAT USE THIS CATEGORISATION (E.G. CRUM, 2013 ; DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 ;M AI R , 2005 ), IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH A THIRD PERIOD, CHAR ACTERISED BY DEEP POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND INCREASED POLITICISATION, IN WHICH THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS STILL SEEMS TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE. THIS THIRD STAGE STARTED WITH THE REJECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY IN THE MID 2000S, WAS CONSOLIDATED DURING THE EUROZONE CRISIS, AND SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AS A RESULT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC. IN TERMS OF THE FOUNDING MOMENT OF THE FIRST EUROPEAN PROJECT, THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS SHOWS A PROCESS OF ENORMOUS
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|a COMPLEXITY, HARD NEGO TIATIONS, AND CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONAL DEBATES CONDUCTED IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE (SLATER, 1982 ; WASSEMBERG, 2020 ). NEVERTHELESS, THE NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF MANY SCHOLARS CONCLUDES THAT IT WAS A CONSCIOUSLY DEPOLITI CISED ELITE PROJECT (E.G., DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 ; HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ; STERNBERG, 2016 ). THUS DEFINED, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION IS AT THE CENTRE OF THE ANALYSES, IN WHICH THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT ARE LARGELY DEEMED AS NON POLITICAL, LINKED TO THE IDEA THAT THEY WERE DETERMINED BY AN ISOLATED ELITE, BASED ON TECHNOCRATIC OR SPECIFIC INTEREST-DRIVEN CONSIDERATIONS. IN REALITY, THE EUROPEAN PROJECT ORIGINATED IN A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT CONTEXT FROM TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS. RELEVANT POLITICAL DEBATES TOOK PLACE IN 54 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ABOUT THE CREATION OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT (SEE HAAPALA, FORTHCOMING), IN A COMPLEX POST-WAR CONTEXT CHARACTERISED BY THE COLD WAR AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT. THE DEBATES REFLECTED THE EXISTING CONTENTIOUS POSITIONS RELATING TO AN ABSTRACT PROJECT, DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF NATIONAL NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS. AS A RESULT, IT WAS EVENTUALLY POSSIBLE TO REACH A WIDE CONSENSUS ON A SPECIFIC PROJECT LIMITED TO JUST THE SIX INITIAL MEMBERS. OTHER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, DECIDED NOT TO BE PART OF IT (EINHORN, 2002 ). AS WASSEMBERG ( 2020 , P. 58) HIGHLIGHTS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT INTO CONSIDERATION. PAST ANALYSES HAVE REVEALED THE COMPLEXITY OF THE POLITICAL DEBATES THAT TOOK PLACE IN DIFFERENT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE FAILED ATTEMPTS TO MOBILISE CITIZENS, AND THE FAILURES OF SOME OF THE INITIAL PROPOSALS (FEATHERSTONE, 1994 ;S L AT ER , 1982 ). BUT THEY ALSO QUESTION THE STANDARD VIEW OF A PROJECT BASED ON A PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC, RESULTING FROM AN INTENTIONAL PROCESS OF DEPOLITICISATION DRIVEN BY POLITICAL
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|a ELITES. THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS DURING THE FIRST PERIOD OF INTEGRATION WAS ACHIEVED POLITICALLY WITHOUT EXCLUDING THE PUBLIC, BUT WITHIN DEMOCRATIC (AT THAT TIME, DOMESTIC) INSTITUTIONAL ARENAS. WITH THE COMING OF NEW MEMBER STATES, ADDITIONAL COMPETENCES FOR EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND A RENEWED INSISTENCE ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRACIES, THE WORRIES ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE UNION WERE TRANSLATED INTO THE CREATION AND DIRECT ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 1979. FOR SOME, THIS CHANGED THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC PEDI GREE, BECAUSE IT GAVE CITIZENS OF THE MEMBER STATES THE POSSIBILITY TO DIRECTLY EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS IN A PLURAL MANNER. THE ENLARGEMENT CONTINUED WITH GREECE IN 1981 AND SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN 1986, WHICH FURTHER INCREASED THE UNION'S PLURAL CHARACTER AND COMPLEXITY. IN THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD, IT SEEMS INCREASINGLY UNTENABLE TO REGARD THE UNION AS AN ELITE PROJECT, DEVELOPED AWAY FROM THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC AND INTENTIONALLY DEPOLITICISED. WHILE SCHMITTER ACKNOWLEDGED THE INCREASING POLITICISATION OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT IN TERMS OF GROWING PUBLIC INTEREST AS LONG AGO AS 1969, HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AS AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF EURO PEAN ISSUES AND THEIR CONTROVERSIALITY. IN CONTRAST, HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ) CONSIDER THAT THE CRUCIAL CHANGE TOOK PLACE WITH THE MAASTRICHT TREATY THIRTY DECADES LATER, WHEN THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS EVOLVED INTO A CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS, AS A RESULT OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICISATION ACHIEVED. 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 55 WHAT THIS ARGUMENT FAILS TO STRESS, HOWEVER, IS THAT EUROPE WAS ALREADY A DIFFERENT POLITICAL PROJECT, GIVING RISE TO DIFFERENT PUBLIC ALLEGIANCES. APPROACHED FROM A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE THAT ASSUMES A DELIBERATIVE STANCE, THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE BECOMES CRUCIAL. IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE TO ADOPT THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION, FOSSUM AND TRENZ ( 2006 ) ARGUED THAT THE REAL NOVELTY OF POLITICISATION WAS THE NEW ROLE
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|a ASSIGNED TO IT IN THE DEBATE ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE(S) GENERATED BY THE RATIFICATION PROCESSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY, (REJECTED IN THE REFERENDUM IN DENMARK). THIS DEMONSTRATED THE DISCONNECTION BETWEEN EUROPE'S CITIZENS AND ITS ELITES. HOWEVER, THE 'ELITES' IN THIS CASE INCLUDED NGOS, CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE MAJORITIES REFLECTED IN THE EUROBAROMETER FOR A PROJECT THAT WAS INTENDED TO IMPROVE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND INCREASE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (FOSSUM & TRENZ, 2006 ,P .5 ) . IN THEIR VIEW (FOSSUM & TRENZ, 2006 , PP. 15-18), THE PUBLIC DEBATES SURROUNDING THE RATIFICATION PROCESS GENERATED 'PATTERNS OF DECONTEXTU ALISED COMMUNICATION' ABOUT THE EU, WITH THE ACTUAL PUBLIC DISCOURSE BECOMING AN EMOTIONAL AND CHAOTIC STRUGGLE FOR ATTENTION. THE AUTHORS REGRETTED THAT 'THE EUROPEAN ELITES' ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE SILENT MAJORITY POLITICALLY ACTIVE BY INJECTING THEM WITH INFORMATION OF A "RATIONAL" "SERI OUS" TYPE RISKS TO FAIL SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC'S INDIFFERENCE'. THIS GIVES YET ANOTHER DIFFERENT MEANING TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE EURO PEAN ELITE AND TO ITS ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE'S CITIZENS, ATTRIBUTING A LESS IDEALISED ROLE TO THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN A DEMOCRACY. THE EUROPEAN PROJECT WAS POLITICAL FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, BUT ITS DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER WAS ASSESSED AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL, WHERE ITS CITIZENS HAD THEIR TRUSTED NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. IT WAS NOT CREATED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, BUT THROUGH REPRESENTATIVE CHANNELS AND INSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, AS WELL AS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE. ALTHOUGH THE PERSPECTIVES ON BOTH INTE GRATION AND ORDINARY POLITICS IN EUROPE ARE INEXTRICABLY MIXED WITH THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICISATION AND ITS DEMOCRATIC EFFECTS, THEY GENERATE DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION, THE FOCUS WILL BE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF ORDINARY POLITICS, THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS AND THE INTERCONNECTION OF THE
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|a MULTILEVEL DIMENSIONS, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY EMBODY DEMO CRATIC PRINCIPLES, WHOSE ASSESSMENT AS A WAY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROPER ROLE OF CITIZENS HAS CHANGED OVER TIME. 56 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN 4 THE UNDERLYING NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS THE CLAIM FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION LITERATURE IMPLIES UNDERLYING NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE EU'S EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND ABOUT WHAT IS CALLED 'ORDINARY POLITICS' IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT. IN THE FIRST DECADES OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS, ONCE THE EUROPEAN PROJECT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH THE FOUNDING OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (ECSC), THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE CONNECTED THIS PROCESS WITH THE IDEA OF POLICIES BEING DECIDED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS BY A SELF-INTERESTED ELITE, BASED ON THE LOBBYING OF LARGE ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS (HOOGHE &M A R KS , 2009 , P. 9). THE RELEVANT INTERACTIONS TOOK PLACE IN A CONTEXT WHERE NATIONAL EXECUTIVES REPRESENTED NATIONAL INTERESTS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL. THE CRITIQUES OF THAT FIRST MODEL WERE FOCUSED ON POLICY-MAKING MATTERS AND THE SCANT ATTENTION PAID BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO THE TOPICS AT ISSUE, BUT ALSO ON THE ROLE PLAYED BY ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS. SUCH CRITIQUES GENERALLY LACK A DISCUSSION OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY TRADE UNIONS AS REPRESENTATIVE CIVIC ORGANISATIONS IN MEMBER STATES THAT, TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, HAD ADOPTED A NEO-CORPORATIST MODEL. AS FEATH ERSTONE ( 1994 , P. 155) INDICATES, THIS CORPORATISM WAS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE ROLE ATTRIBUTED TO THE INITIAL HIGH AUTHORITY DEFENDED BY JEAN MONNET, BASED ON A CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE TECHNOCRATS AND THE CORPORATE PARTNERS, STRESSING THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF ORGANISED LABOUR. MOREOVER, THE VARIOUS ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED DEVELOPED NETWORKS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL THAT HAD AN IMPACT ON BOTH THE UNION'S POLITICS AND ITS INTEGRATION. IT WAS A MODEL OF INTERACTION INVOLVING
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|a SOCIAL ACTORS WHO TENDED TO BE VERY SIMILAR TO THE NATIONAL ONES AT THAT TIME, WHOSE NATURE HAD BEEN PREVI OUSLY ARTICULATED INSIDE THE MEMBER STATES AND WAS THEN COORDINATED AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL THROUGH THE ACTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVES. HOWEVER, THIS WAS NEVER SIMPLY A QUESTION OF FUNCTIONAL POLITICS ALONE: THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY WAS ALWAYS THERE AS WELL. THE REINFORCED ROLE OF THESE VARIOUS IDENTITIES IN THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AFTER THE 1980S WAS STRESSED BY HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ). THIS CONNECTED EUROPEAN POLITICS WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT, BUT ALSO RAISED NEW QUESTIONS OF SELF-RULE AND SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. HURRELMANN ( 2007 ) POINTED OUT THE UNDERLYING PARADOX: 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 57 THE ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER THROUGH TREATY CHANGES SEEMED TO HAVE PRODUCED A REACTION AGAINST IT ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC. IN HIS OPINION, THIS CONFIRMED THE CITIZENS' ACCEPTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT BASED ON OPAQUENESS, DEPOLITICISATION, AMBIGUITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, AND DEMOBILISA TION (HURRELMANN, 2007 , P. 354). IT MEANT THAT POLITICAL COMPETITION WAS ORGANISED IN NATIONAL TERMS AND CLOSELY RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF MAINTAINING STATE SOVEREIGNTY. A CLEAR HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF THIS IS DE GAULLE'S EMPTY CHAIR CRISIS IN 1965, WHEN FRANCE DECIDED TO BOYCOTT THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS INFLUENCE AND PROTECT ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN MATTERS RELATING TO COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP) DECISIONS. THIS 'NATIONALIST' ATTITUDE RESULTED IN THE LUXEMBOURG COMPRO MISE OF 1966, WHICH GUARANTEED THE RIGHT OF VETO AND THEREBY REAFFIRMED STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. STERNBERG ( 2016 ) DESCRIBES THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THIS STRATEGY BY THE 'EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL ELITES' TO TRY AND COUNTERBALANCE THE DEMO CRATIC DEFICIT DISCOURSE. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
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|a WITH EUROPE'S CITIZENS, AS SHOWN IN THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE BRUSSELS' ELITE, REFLECTS THE DIFFERENT THEORIES ABOUT CITIZEN PARTICIPA TION, EXPRESSED IN THEORETICAL DISPUTES THAT WERE ALREADY IN PLACE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (PARKER, 2019 ). THEY CONFIRM A PROGRESSIVE CHANGE, STARTING IN THE 1970S AND 1980S, WHICH PLACED THE FOCUS ON THE CONCERN OF THE ELITES WITH CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS. IT FORCED THE EUROPEAN ACTORS TO BE SENSI TIVE TO CITIZENS' ATTITUDES, NOT SIMPLY BY FOLLOWING PUBLIC OPINION, BUT THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER STRATEGIES INTENDED TO CLOSE THE GAP WITH 'THE PEOPLE', BASED ON PROPOSALS THAT WERE BECOMING MAINSTREAM IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY. FOR STERNBERG, THESE CHANGES IN THE DISCOURSE WERE STRATEGIES TO MAIN TAIN THE CONTROL OF THE ELITES AND TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF GROWING POLITICISATION. AS SHE POINTS OUT, THEY DO NOT REFLECT A REAL CONCERN WITH 'INPUT LEGITIMACY', WHICH IS DEFINED AS CITIZENS BEING IN CONTROL OF GOVER NANCE AND POLITICAL CHOICES THAT REFLECT AUTHENTIC PREFERENCES (STERNBERG, 2016 ). 4 THEY LACK BOTTOM-UP PREFERENCES AND GENUINE CITIZENS' OPINIONS, WITH THE SOLE AIM OF MAINTAINING ACCEPTANCE OF THE STORY OF ITS FOUNDATION. 4 THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE LANGUAGE OF SYSTEMS THEORY THANKS TO SCHARPF ( 2009 ), WHO DIFFERENTIATED TWO SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: OUTPUT (JUDGED BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICIES) AND INPUT (RESPONSIVENESS TO CITIZEN CONCERNS AS THE RESULT OF PARTICIPATION BY THE PEOPLE). INPUT LEGITIMACY REFERS TO THE PARTICIPATORY QUALITY OF THE 58 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN THIS, HOWEVER, IS ONLY A PARTIAL VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION. AS A RESULT OF IMPORTANT CHANGES RELATING TO COMPETENCES, GOALS, SCOPE AND MEMBER SHIP, THE INITIAL MODEL EVOLVED TOWARDS A COMPLEX MULTILEVEL SYSTEM THAT NEEDS TO BE ANALYSED IN KEEPING WITH THE DIFFERING PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATISA TION (ERIKSEN & FOSSUM, 2012 , P. 3). CONCERNS ABOUT ITS DEMOCRATIC CHAR ACTER BECAME PART
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|a OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, EXPRESSED IN THE WARNINGS ABOUT ITS LEGITIMACY DEFICIT, WHICH WAS EQUATED WITH A DEMO CRATIC DEFICIT. THE DIAGNOSES OF THE SPECIFIC WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFICIT HAVE BEEN DIVERSE, AS HAVE THE CHALLENGES TO THE EXISTENCE OF THAT DEFICIT (E.G. HIX & FOELLESDAL, 2006 ; MAJONE, 1998 ; MORAVCSIK, 2002 ). THE DEBATE HAS FOCUSED ON THE INSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE EP, THE COMMIS SION AND THE COUNCIL; THE APPLICATION AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL OF STANDARD DEMOCRATIC EXIGENCIES, SUCH AS PARTY COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF NEUTRAL INSTITUTIONS; AND THE IMPACT OF THESE MATTERS ON THE MEMBER STATES' OWN DEMOCRACIES. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE LEVEL AND THE INSTITUTION THAT HAS THE FINAL SAY, AND ITS CONNECTION WITH CITIZENS IN THEIR DIFFERENT ROLES. IN TERMS OF THE VOCABULARY OF THE THEORY OF REPRESENTA TION, THIS IS RELATED TO WHICH REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS ARE PRIORITISED WITHIN THE COMPLEX SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION THUS ARTICULATED (SAWARD, 2010 ). THE DISCOURSE OF EU POLITICISATION REFLECTS THE EVOLUTION OF ITS THREE MAIN ELEMENTS: (A) THE INCREASE AND SALIENCE OF ISSUES; (B) THE NATURE OF PUBLIC INTEREST; (C) THE ACTORS OF MOBILISATION: PARTIES, MEDIA, CIVIL SOCIETY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, INTEREST GROUPS, ETC. SOME AUTHORS HAVE ALSO FOCUSED ON A FOURTH ELEMENT: THE DEGREE OF POLARISATION (DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 , P. 140). THIS DISCOURSE DOES NOT, HOWEVER, TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE IMPORTANT MODIFICATIONS THE MODEL HAS UNDERGONE WITH REGARD TO INSTITU TIONAL CHANGES AND INTERACTIONS IN THE MULTILEVEL POLITY. IN THIS SENSE, IT IS ONLY A PARTIAL APPROACH TO THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE, WHICH DOES NOT OFFER EXPLANATIONS AND DIAGNOSES THAT FORM THE CORE OF OTHER NARRATIVES AND STRESS DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC MODEL. IT UNDERLINES THE CHANGES IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS EU INTEGRATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AT ITS DIFFERENT STAGES, EMPHASISING THE COMPLEX PROCESS, LEADING TO LAWS
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|a AND RULES AS ENSURED BY THE 'MAJORITARIAN' INSTITUTIONS OF ELEC TORAL REPRESENTATION. OUTPUT IS CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM-SOLVING QUALITY OF THE LAWS AND RULES, AND HAS A RANGE OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS TO ENSURE IT. MORE RECENTLY, V. SCHMIDT ( 2013 ) ADDED A THIRD NORMATIVE CRITERION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF LEGITIMACY; NAMELY, THROUGHPUT LEGITIMACY, WHICH IS JUDGED IN TERMS OF THE EFFICACY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THE EU'S GOVERNANCE PROCESSES, ALONG WITH THEIR INCLUSIVENESS AND OPENNESS TO CONSULTATION WITH THE PEOPLE. 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 59 RELATIONSHIP OF THE ELITES WITH THE PUBLIC, BUT FAILING TO CONSIDER OTHER NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS, SUCH AS THE IMPACT OF A GROWING AND MORE COMPLEX EUROPEAN DIMENSION ON THE DEMOCRACIES OF THE MEMBER STATES, WHETHER IN TERMS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND DEMOCRATIC QUALITY (WEILER, 2014 ) OR THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MODEL (MENENDEZ, 2013 ;O F F E, 2013 ; WIESNER, 2019A ). MOREOVER, THIS EXPLANATION ALSO FAILS TO REFLECT ON HOW CHANGES IN DEMOCRATIC MODELS AND INSTITUTIONS WERE ALREADY TAKING PLACE IN THE MEMBER STATES, SUPPORTED BY SCHOLARS WILLING TO DEFEND DEMOCRATIC PRINCI PLES AND IDEALS. AS A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THIS EVOLUTION SHOWS (KOHLER-KOCH & RITTBERGER, 2006 ;PA R K E R , 2019 ), NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS HAVE REACTED TO CRITICISMS ABOUT THEIR 'DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT' IN MANY WAYS DURING RECENT DECADES, FOLLOWING THE ADVICE OF ACADEMIC EXPERTS WHO ASSUME AN INTERPRETATION FOCUSED ON THE NEED FOR INCREASED CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT (SAURUGGER, 2010 ). AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL, THE APPEAL TO GOVERNANCE FIRST OCCURRED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 2000S, WITH THE REORGANISATION OF PROCEDURES AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW MECHANISMS FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION THROUGH THE PROMOTION OF DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS. THE OUTCOME OF THE IMPLE MENTATION OF THESE NEW FORMS OF DIRECT CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN THE CONSOLIDATION OF
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|a A FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF REPRESENTATION, IN WHICH ORGANI SATIONS SOMETIMES TAKE ON THE ROLE OF ORDINARY CITIZENS (BOUZA GARCIA, 2015 ). THIS CASTS DOUBT ON THE ROLE THAT CIVIL SOCIETY CAN PLAY AS AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF EU LEGITIMACY (KOHLER-KOCH, 2009 ). WHILE SOME SCHOLARS CELEBRATE THIS AS A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ITS DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER, OTHERS DENOUNCE IT AS ALTERING THE CORRECT CHAIN OF REPRESENTATION, PROPERLY LOCATED IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE ONE HAND SOME AUTHORS THINK IT IS SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE UNION FROM A CONTROVERSIAL FUNCTIONALIST VIEWPOINT (MAJONE, 1998 ), WHICH CONSIDERS IT TO BE A SEPARATE DEPOLITI CISED LEVEL THAT CAN BE LEGITIMISED FROM AN 'OUTPUT PERSPECTIVE'. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT CONTINUES TO BE HEAVILY CRITICISED FROM THE VIEWPOINT THAT STRESSES THE STANDARD BASIC TRAITS OF DEMOCRACY AND CONSIDERS THE EUROPEAN UNION TO BE A POLITICAL PROJECT (HIX & FOELLESDAL, 2006 ). OTHER ACADEMICS FOCUS ON THE KEY ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FOR FULFILLING THE DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONS OF REPRESENTING CITIZENS, CONTROLLING THE EXECUTIVES AND ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME STRESSING THE PECULIARITIES OF THE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM (HUTTER & GRANDE, 2014 ), THE IMBALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOUR OF THE EXECUTIVES (CRUM, 2013 )AN D 60 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN THE DEFICITS OF PARLIAMENTARIAN CONTROL (HIX & LORD, 1997 ). ALTHOUGH SOME AUTHORS (E.G. MORAVCSIK, 2008 ) CONSIDER THAT ALL THE REQUIRED DEMO CRATIC COMPONENTS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED OVER THE YEARS, SO THAT IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN RELATION TO THE EU AS SUCH, CRITICS USING THE TRADITIONAL VOCABULARY OF DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT ARE STILL PRESENT AND HAVE RAISED THEIR VOICES INCREASINGLY DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE POST-2008 ECONOMIC CRISIS. ANALYSING THIS PERIOD, RITTBERGER ( 2014 ) HAS SHOWN HOW THE EU HAS SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE DEMOCRATIC PEDIGREE OF ITS MANAGEMENT OF
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|a THE CRISIS THROUGH THE USE OF NEW ECONOMIC AND FISCAL GOVERNANCE INSTRU MENTS (I.E. THE ESM AND THE FISCAL COMPACT), WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY INTERGOVERNMENTAL TREATIES, BY VIRTUE OF THE SUPPORT IT RECEIVED IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS. TAKING A DIFFERENT VIEW, SOME MEPS CONSIDER THAT THE DEMO CRATIC DEFICIT STILL EXISTS AND IS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE'S LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY, STRESSING THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EMS AND THE TROIKA, AS REFLECTED IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE (RITTBERGER, 2014 , P. 181). OTHER AUTHORS (E.G., MENENDEZ, 2013 ) ALSO WARN ABOUT THE THREAT TO THE DEMOCRACIES OF THE MEMBER STATES POSED BY THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AS A WHOLE, SINCE IT UNDERMINES THEIR FOUNDATIONS BY IMPOSING AN EXTERIOR LEGAL/POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SYSTEM, AS WAS CLEAR DURING THE CRISIS. AS WIESNER ( 2019B ) COMMENTS, THE EUROPEAN PROJECT GUARANTEES THE DOMINANCE OF A MARKET-ORIENTED FORM OF CAPITALISM THAT IS A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, SINCE IT FAVOURS FREE TRADE AT THE COST OF SOCIAL STANDARDS. THIS TENSION HAS PRODUCED A DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION DURING THE MANAGE MENT OF THE CRISIS, AS THE SUPERVISION AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONS CREATED BY IT HAVE ERODED THE COMPETENCES OF BOTH THE NATIONAL AND THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATURES (CRUM, 2013 ;O F F E, 2013 ). INTEGRATION THEORIES STRESS THE LACK OF CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR THE EURO PEAN PROJECT AND TEND TO DEPICT THE PROBLEM AS ONE OF DEMOBILISATION, PROMOTED BY THE ELITES (IDENTIFIED WITH THE EXECUTIVES OR MAINSTREAM PARTIES). THE PROPONENTS OF THESE THEORIES INSIST ON THE KEY ROLE PLAYED BY THE PUBLIC SPHERES TO CREATE A FULLY FLEDGED DEMOCRACY AND REGARD THE ABSENCE OF MOBILISATION AS A MAIN TRAIT OF THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EU. INSPIRED BY THE RELEVANCE ATTRIBUTED TO IT IN THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL THEORIES AND RECOGNISING ITS MEDIATION THROUGH THE MEDIA, THEY HAVE FAVOURED PROMOTING THE AWARENESS OF EUROPE'S CITIZENS WITH REGARD TO THE EUROPEAN PROJECT AND INCREASING THE SALIENCE OF EUROPEAN ISSUES AS AN
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|a INSTRUMENT TO FACILITATE THE MOBILISATION OF CITIZENS, ALL OF WHICH ARE ELEMENTS OF POLITICISATION (STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ). HOWEVER, THEY 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 61 ARGUE THAT THE VEHICLE FOR THIS INCREASED POLITICISATION HAS BEEN THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PARTIES THAT ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS BELONGING TO THE ELITE. THIS IS ALSO STRESSED BY HUTTER AND KRIESI ( 2019 , P. 999), SINCE THEY AFFIRM THAT MAINSTREAM PRO-EUROPE PARTIES HAVE DEPOLITICISED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY CONTROLLING TREATY CHANGES TO AVOID REFERENDA, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO TECHNOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS THAT USE REGU LATORY MEASURES TO FURTHER THE INTEGRATION PROCESS. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY CONSIDER THAT THE INCREASE OF POLITICISATION IS DUE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. TO CONCLUDE, THE PERSPECTIVE THAT FOCUSES ON THE DEGREE OF POLITICI SATION IN THE EU DOES NOT OFFER ANY CRITERIA TO JUDGE THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF THE UNION, UNLESS THEY ARE RELATED TO A DIAGNOSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. PREVIOUS SCHOLARLY CRITICISM HAS FOCUSED ON DENOUNCING THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE UNION'S POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES, AS WELL AS ON THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. AS FAR AS THE EUROPEAN MULTILEVEL SYSTEM IS CONCERNED, AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCREASING EMPHASIS TO GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO THE EP AS THE UNION'S REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTION, THE INCREASED POWER GRANTED TO THE EXECUTIVES (IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMISSION) DURING THE RECENT PERIOD OF CRISIS HAS REINFORCED THE FEELING THAT THERE IS STILL A DEFICIT OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. 5 CONCLUSION: EU POLITICISATION, REPRESENTATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THE AIM OF THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN TO SHOW THAT THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE PLAYS A PART IN PROVIDING MEANINGS FOR USE IN WIDER DEBATES ABOUT EUROPE AND MAY EVEN END UP DELEGITIMISING DECISIONS
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|a AND POLITICS AT THE EU LEVEL THAT ARE BASED ON TRUST IN REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS REACHING A BROAD CONSENSUS. AS FOSSUM ( 2016 ) POINTS OUT, THERE HAS NEVER BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT ABOUT THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. WHILE MANY OF THE AUTHORS DISCUSSED ABOVE HAVE INCORPORATED THE VOCABULARY OF EU POLITICISATION AND THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS INTO THEIR THEORIES ABOUT THIS DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, PLACING THEIR FOCUS FAIRLY AND SQUARELY ON GROWING EU POLITICISATION, THE DEFICIT IS NEVERTHELESS MOST COMMONLY LINKED TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE ELITIST CHARACTER OF A PROJECT WHICH, AT THE END OF THE DAY, IS DISCONNECTED FROM CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPER REPRESENTATION. 62 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN IN REALITY, THE EU IS A COMPOUND FORM OF REPRESENTATION, COMPRISING DIFFERENT MODES OF REPRESENTATION IN ADDITION TO THE TRADITIONAL MODE OF PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION. THESE ADDITIONAL MODES INCLUDE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPRESENTATION, REPRESENTATION BY CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AND NGOS, AND REPRESENTATION BY TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL ACTORS, CRISS CROSSED BY FUNCTIONAL, TERRITORIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF ORGANISATION (PIATTONI, 2017 ). THIS, HOWEVER, RAISES THE PROBLEM OF WHAT LORD AND POLLACK ( 2013 ) CALL THE 'FALLACY OF COMPOSITION': TAKING FOR GRANTED THE LUMPING TOGETHER OF MULTIPLE CHANNELS OF REPRESENTATION IN THIS WAY AND THEN FURTHER DEDUCING THAT THIS ADDS UP TO 'GOOD REPRESENTATION' OR EVEN TO A 'SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION' PER SE. CRITICISING THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER AND PROPOSING INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO PROMOTE GREATER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT ASSUMES THE NEED TO CHALLENGE A CERTAIN MODEL OF REPRESENTATION, WHICH IS ENVI SIONED IN VARIOUS FORMS, DEPENDENT ON THE DEMOCRATIC MODEL ADOPTED BY THE ANALYSTS CONCERNED. AS WE HAVE SEEN, OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE ELITES AND MASS POLITICS IS A CONSTANT IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF THE EU (IN FACT, OF ANY DEMOCRATIC STATE). BUT THE WAY IN
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|a WHICH THE ELITES ARE DEPICTED IS NOT CONSISTENT. SOMETIMES, THEY ARE EQUATED WITH THE EXECUTIVES IN POWER. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, THEY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE EUROPEAN AUTHORITIES AND OFFICIALS. HOWEVER, WE ALSO FIND GENERIC REFER ENCES TO THOSE INVOLVED IN POLITICS PROFESSIONALLY (POLITICAL PARTIES, ACTIVISTS, IG LEADERS, ETC.), WHO ARE THUS ALSO DIFFERENTIATED FROM COMMON CITI ZENS. AS A WHOLE, THE NARRATIVES SHOW A LACK OF CLARITY RELATING TO THE ROLE OF REPRESENTATION IN ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT. AS DE WILDE ( 2011 ) POINTED OUT, THE IMPORTANT THING, WHEN VIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EU POLITICISATION, IS TO ANALYSE THE COMPETING REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE THAT POTENTIALLY CHALLENGE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU POLITY AND INTEGRATION. THIS IMPLIES ADOPTING A VIEW OF REPRESENTATION THAT ENVISIONS IT AS A SYSTEM (MANSBRIDGE, 2003 ; SAWARD, 2010 ), AND NOT AS SOMETHING GENERATED BY A 'CHAIN OF DELEGATION' (STROEM, 2000 ) ARISING FROM PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS THAT ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON CITIZENS' VOTES. A MULTILEVEL POLITY REQUIRES A MORE COMPLEX READING OF LEGITIMACY THAN THE ONE PROVIDED BY THE PROCESS OF EU POLITICISATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS NARRATIVE. THE EU'S VARIOUS CRISES HAVE EACH ALTERED THE NATURE OF ITS DEMO CRATIC LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, THERE IS STILL A TENDENCY TO PERCEIVE THE EU LEVEL AS AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT TAKING INTO 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 63 CONSIDERATION THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACIES AS A WHOLE. ALL THE DIFFERENT LEVELS-SUPRANATIONAL, NATIONAL, SUB-NATIONAL, AND SO ON-HAVE EACH ALTERED THE 'STANDARD' MODEL FOR DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE IN RECENT TIMES. DEMOCRATIC ANALYSIS AND THE CRITIQUE OF A COMPLEX PROJECT LIKE THE EUROPEAN PROJECT REQUIRE A NEW BLUEPRINT THAT WILL HOPEFULLY INSPIRE FUTURE SCHOLARLY DIAGNOSES AND INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, INCLUDING A DETAILED
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|a ARTIC ULATION OF ITS COMPLEX FORMS OF REPRESENTATION. AT PRESENT, THE CURRENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE DEGREE OF EU POLITICISATION DO NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INSTRUMENTS TO ASSESS ITS DEMOCRATIC QUALITY. THIS APPLIES EQUALLY TO THE RHETORICAL PERSUASIVENESS OF CERTAIN ELITES IN THEIR EFFORT TO DEPOLITICISE THE PROJECT, BY STILL APPEALING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS ON THE PART OF EUROPE'S CITIZENS. BIBLIOGRAPHY BEETHAM, D. (1997). THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BOUZA, L. (2015). PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EU: AGENDA SETTING AND INSTITUTIONALISATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. CRUM, B. (2013). SAVING THE EURO AT THE COST OF DEMOCRACY? JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 51 (4), 614-630. DE WILDE, P. (2011). NO POLITY FOR OLD POLITICS? A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 33 (5), 559-575. DE WILDE, P., & ZUERN, M. (2012). CAN THE POLITICIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BE REVERSED? JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKETS STUDIES, 50 (1), 137-153. EINHORN, E. (2002). JUST ENOUGH ("LAGOM") EUROPEANIZATION: THE NORDIC STATES AND EUROPE. SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES, 74 (3), 265-286. ERIKSEN, E. O., & FOSSUM, J. E. (2007). EUROPE IN TRANSFORMATION. HOW TO RECON STITUTE DEMOCRACY? (RECON ONLINE WORKING PAPER, 2007/01). RETRIEVED MAY 26, 2021, FROM HTTP://WWW.RECONPROJECT.EU/MAIN.PHP/RECON_WP_0701. PDF?FILEITEM=50511926 . ERIKSEN, E. O., & FOSSUM, J. E. (EDS.). (2012). RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND THE EU . ROUTLEDGE. FEATHERSTONE, K. (1994). JEAN MONNET AND THE "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT" IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKETS STUDIES, 32 (2), 149-170. FOSSUM, J. E. (2016). DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EU: CHAL LENGES AND OPTIONS (ARENA WORKING PAPER, 1/2016). RETRIEVED MAY 26, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.SV.UIO.NO/ARENA/ENGLISH/RESEARCH/PUBLICATI ONS/ARENA-WORKING-PAPERS/2016/WP-1-16.PDF . 64 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN FOSSUM, J. E., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2006).
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|a WHEN THE PEOPLE COME IN: CONSTITUTION MAKING AND THE BELATED POLITICISATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS (EUROGOV NO. C-06-03). RETRIEVED MAY 26, 2021, FROM HTTP://EDOC.VIFAPOL.DE/OPUS/VOLLTEXTE/2011/2462/PDF/EGP_CONNEX_ C_06_03.PDF . HAAPALA, T. (FORTHCOMING). SAVING EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY: BRITISH DEBATES ON EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1948-49. IN N. KAUPPI & K. PALONEN (EDS.), THE POLITICAL MIND IN ACTION: BRICOLAGE AND CHANCE IN EUROPEAN POLITICS AND BEYOND . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. HIX, S., & FOELLESDAL, A. (2006). WHY IS THERE A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EU? A RESPONSE TO MAJONE AND MORAVCSIK. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 44 (3), 533-562. HIX, S., & LORD, C. (1997). POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION . MACMILLAN EDUCATION. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2001). INTRODUCTION. IN L. HOOGHE & G. MARKS (EDS.), MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (PP. 1-32). ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2019). GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (8), 1113-1133. HOERETH, M. (1998). THE TRILEMMA OF LEGITIMACY. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY (ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER, C 11). RETRIEVED MAY 26, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.ZEI.UNI-BONN.DE/DATEIEN/DISCUSSION-PAPER/DP_ C11_HOERETH.PDF . HURRELMANN, A. (2007). EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY, THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE EU CONSTITUTION. EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 13 , 343-359. HUTTER, S., & GRANDE, E. (2014). POLITICIZING EUROPE IN THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL ARENA. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 52 , 1002-1018. HUTTER, S., & KRIESI, H. (2019). POLITICIZING EUROPE IN TIMES OF CRISIS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (7), 996-1017. KAUPPI, N., PALONEN, K., &
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|a WIESNER, C. (2016). THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITICI SATION OF THE EU. REDESCRIPTIONS, 19 (1), 72-90. KOHLER-KOCH, B. (2009). THE THREE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY-WHAT ROLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY FOR WHAT KIND OF EUROPE? POLICY AND SOCIETY, 28 (1), 47-57. KOHLER-KOCH, B., & RITTBERGER, B. (2006). THE 'GOVERNANCE TURN' IN EU STUDIES. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 44 , 27-49. LINDBERG, L. N., & SCHEINGOLD, S. A. (1970). EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY . ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J.: PRENTICE-HALL. LORD, C., & POLLACK, J. (2013). THE PITFALLS OF REPRESENTATION AS CLAIMS-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 35 (5), 517-530. 3 CITIZENS' 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION YY 65 MAIR, P. (2005). POPULAR DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION POLITY, EURO PEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS (EUROGOV), NO. C-05-03. HTTP://WWW.CONNEX NETWORK.ORG/EUROGOV/PDF/EGP-CONNEX-C-05-03.PDF . MAJONE, G. (1998). EUROPE'S "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT": THE QUESTION OF STANDARDS. EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 4 (1), 5-28. MANSBRIDGE, J. (2003). RETHINKING REPRESENTATION. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 97 (4), 515-528. MENENDEZ, A. (2013). THE EXISTENTIAL CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 14 (5), 453-526. MICHAILIDOU, A., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2013). MEDIATIZED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS AUDIENCE DEMOCRACY? JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 20 (2), 260-277. MORAVCSIK, A. (2002). IN DEFENCE OF THE "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT": REASSESSING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 40 (4), 603-634. MORAVCSIK, A. (2008). THE MYTH OF EUROPE'S "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT." INTERECO NOMICS, 43 (6), 331-340. NORRIS, P. (1997). REPRESENTATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 32 , 273-282. OFFE, C. (2013). EUROPE ENTRAPPED. EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 19 , 595-611. PARKER, O. (2019). A
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|a GENEALOGY OF EU DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE: BEYOND STATES AND MARKETS? PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 97 , 741-753. PIATTONI, S. (2017). THE EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND 'SHARED AND RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY': THE HAPTIC POTENTIAL OF THE EMU'S INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE (THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION /LEONARD SCHAPIRO LECTURE, 2016). GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION, 52 (3), 385-411. RITTBERGER, B. (2014). INTEGRATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION? THE EUROPEAN PARLIA MENT AND THE REFORM OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EU. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 52 (6), 1174-1183. SAURUGGER, S. (2010). THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PARTICIPATORY TURN: THE EMERGENCE OF A NORM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 49 (4), 471-495. SAWARD, M. (2010). THE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. SCHARPF, F. W. (2009). LEGITIMACY IN THE MULTILEVEL EUROPEAN POLITY. EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1 (2), 173-204. SCHIMMELFENNIG, F. (2010). THE NORMATIVE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATIONALIST THEORY OF DEMOCRATIZATION. EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2 (2), 211-213. SCHMIDT, V. A. (2013). DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION REVISITED: INPUT, OUTPUT AND THROUGHPUT. POLITICAL STUDIES, 61 , 2-22. SCHMITTER, P. (1969). THREE NEO-FUNCTIONAL HYPOTHESES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 23 (1), 161-166. 66 E. GARCIA-GUITIAN SLATER, M. (1982). POLITICAL ELITES, POPULAR INDIFFERENCE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 21 (1), 69-93. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2013). HOW EUROPEAN UNION POLITICIZATION CAN EMERGE THROUGH CONTESTATION: THE CONSTITUTION CASE. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 51 (5), 965-980. STERNBERG, C. S. (2016). PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EU INSTITUTIONS' DISCOURSES ON EU LEGITIMACY FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF INTEGRATION TO TODAY. POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE, 54 , 24-56. STROEM, K. (2000). DELEGATION AND
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|a ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 37 , 261-289. WASSEMBERG, B. (2020). CHALLENGING THE ORIGINS OF EUROSCEPTICISM. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. HISTORIA Y POLITICA, 44 , 55-79. WEILER, J. H. H. (2014). VAN GEND EN LOOS: THE INDIVIDUAL AS SUBJECT AND OBJECT AND THE DILEMMA OF EUROPEAN LEGITIMACY. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12 (1), 94-103. WIESNER, C. (2019A). INVENTING THE EU AS A DEMOCRATIC POLITY: CONCEPTS, ACTIONS AND CONTROVERSIES . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C. (2019B). TRADE-OFFS IN THE POLITICAL REALM: HOW IMPORTANT ARE TRADE OFFS IN THE POLITICAL REALM. POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE, 7 (4), 291-300. CHAPTER 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING POLITICISATION IN PARLIAMENTARY PLENARY DEBATES KARI PALONEN 1 POLITICISATION IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS AS A SPEECH ACT, POLITICISATION MARKS A CHANGE IN RELATION TO POLITICS. POLITI CISATION MEANS A BREAK WITH A STABLE ORDER OF A POLITY AND OPENS UP A SPECTRUM OF OPPORTUNITIES 1 FOR POLITICKING. IN THIS SENSE, OTHER 'ISE'-TYPE NOUNS, SUCH AS DEMOCRATISATION, PARLIAMENTARISATION, AND EUROPEANISATION, CAN ALSO BE USED AS OPPORTUNITIES TO POLITICISE. THIS REQUIRES AN INTERPRE TATION OF THE NEW POSSIBILITIES IN THE SITUATION, AS WELL AS A RESPONSE TO THE 1 THIS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS A TRANSLATION FOR MAX WEBER'S CHANCEN (IN PLURAL), WITH THE EMPHASIS THAT WHAT POLITICISATION OPENS UP ARE NOT SINGLE OPPORTUNITIES BUT AN ENTIRE SPECTRUM OR HORIZON OF THEM. FOR THE TRANSLATION OF CHANCE , SEE TRIBE, 2019 , PP. 460 AND 464. K. PALONEN ( B ) UNIVERSITY OF JYVAESKYLAE, JYVAESKYLAE, FINLAND E-MAIL: KARI.I.PALONEN@JYU.FI THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_4 67 68 K. PALONEN POTENTIAL CHANGE(S) INHERENT IN THESE
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|a POSSIBILITIES. MOMENTS OF POLITICISA TION CAN BE RELATED TO WHAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED, IS STILL ONGOING, OR IS PROJECTED TO TAKE PLACE. BY FOCUSING ON THE ACTUAL USES OF POLITICISATION IN PARLIAMENTARY CONTEXTS, WE CAN ILLUSTRATE IMPORTANT WAYS OF TALKING ABOUT POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. TO UNDERSTAND THE REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING POLITI CISATION, THERE ARE NO BETTER SOURCES THAN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (SEE PALONEN, 2017 ; WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ). IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, THE USE OF THE 'POLITICS VOCABULARY' IS EVERYWHERE, AND THE SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF ACTORS IN PARLIAMENTS AS POLITICIANS IS MORE LIKELY TO BE EXPECTED THAN ELSE WHERE, ALTHOUGH SOME PARLIAMENTARIANS MAY TRY TO DENY THIS FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES. QUENTIN SKINNER WROTE IN THE PREFACE TO HIS THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT : 'FOR I TAKE IT THAT POLITICAL LIFE ITSELF SETS THE MAIN PROB LEMS FOR THE POLITICAL THEORIST, CAUSING A CERTAIN RANGE OF ISSUES TO APPEAR PROBLEMATIC, AND A CORRESPONDING RANGE OF QUESTIONS TO BECOME THE LEADING SUBJECT OF DEBATE' (SKINNER, 1978 ,I ,P .XI ) .F O L L O W I N GH I SA D VI C E,I WILL ANALYSE THE USES OF POLITICISATION IN PARLIAMENTARY PLENARY DEBATES AND EXAMINE HOW THEY REFER TO THE PARLIAMENTARIANS' UNDERSTANDING OF POLI TICS. I WISH TO AVOID COMMON ACADEMIC PATRONISATION ABOUT THE LANGUAGE AND ACTION OF POLITICIANS, PREFERRING TO DISCUSS THE RICH VARIETY OF THE POLITICISATION VOCABULARY FOUND IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES AS A BASIS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SET OF RHETORICAL TOPOI AROUND POLITICISATION. WITH THIS ARTICLE IT IS POSSIBLE TO SITUATE POLITICISATION STUDIES AMONG EU SCHOLARS IN RELATION TO WIDER DEBATES AND PRACTICES. EVEN WHEN ANALYSING THE ACADEMIC USES OF EU POLITICISATION, AS MOST OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS VOLUME DO, THE ANALYSTS SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO LOOK AT THE PARLIA MENTARIANS' USE OF THE VOCABULARY IN THE WIDER HISTORICAL, CONCEPTUAL, AND RHETORICAL CONTEXTS. ALL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE
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|a ACADEMIC DEBATES CAN BE REGARDED AS 'THEORY POLITICIANS' (IN THE SENSE OF PALONEN, 2005 ), WHO HAVE A RESEARCH AGENDA OF THEIR OWN, WITH REGARD TO BOTH EU STUDIES AND THE EU ITSELF. 2 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR DISCUSSING POLITICISATION MY POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION CAN BE FORMULATED IN THE THESIS: NO PHENOMENA ARE POLITICAL BY THEIR 'NATURE' BUT ONLY BECOME POLITICAL WHEN THE ACTOR OR SOMEONE IN THE AUDIENCE INTERPRET THEM AS 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 69 POLITICAL. NO PHENOMENA CAN BE PROTECTED FROM POLITICS. IF SOMEONE CLAIMS THAT A PHENOMENON 'IS NOT POLITICAL', IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT, ESPE CIALLY FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, TO INVENT EXAMPLES THAT PROVE TO THE CONTRARY, MARKING THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PHENOMENON IN QUESTION. A HALF CENTURY AGO, THE WEATHER WAS PRESENTED AS AN EXEMPLARY SUBJECT HAVING NO POLITICAL DIMENSION. TODAY, EVEN HARDCORE CLIMATE CHANGE DENIALISTS WOULD PROBABLY NO LONGER SAY THAT-OR, IF THEY DO, THEY STILL MAKE WEATHER THE VERY CORE OF THEIR POLITICS. HISTORICALLY, IT IS INTERESTING TO ANALYSE PRACTICES AND CONTEXTS THAT SEEK TO TRANSCEND THE LIMITS OF IMAGINING SOMETHING AS POLITICAL. EVERY SPEECH ACT THAT REFERS TO THE PRESENCE OF THE POLITICAL ASPECT EFFECTIVELY POLITICISES A QUESTION AND CHANGES ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITY OF POLITICS; NAMELY, TO POLITY, POLITICKING, AND POLICY (SEE PALONEN, 2003 ). TALKING ABOUT POLITICISATION HAS A HISTORY OF ITS OWN. THE WORD POLI TISIERUNG WAS COINED IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY BY GERMAN LITERATI, ACTIVISTS, AND SCHOLARS, REFERRING TO THE OPENING UP OF POLITICS TO WIDER CONTEXTS (SEE PALONEN, 1985 , PP. 57-67, 1989 , 2006 , ESP. PP. 205- 208, 2019 ). FROM THE 1930S ONWARDS, HOWEVER, THE POLITICISATION OF PHENOMENA WAS DENOUNCED AMONG BOTH SCHOLARS AND POLITICIANS, IN RESPONSE TO THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE NAZIS AND THE COMMUNISTS. BUT IN THE 1960S, THE CONCEPT WAS REHABILITATED BY
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|a ACTIVISTS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. IT IS AGAINST THIS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND THAT I WILL STUDY THE PARLIAMENTARY USE OF POLITICISATION IN BRITAIN AND (WEST) GERMANY, AS WELL AS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. IN THIS CHAPTER, I SHALL ANALYSE SPEECH ACTS OF POLITICISATION AS RHETOR ICAL MOVES ADDRESSED TO A PARLIAMENTARY AUDIENCE. THIS IS AN AUDIENCE IN WHICH ADVERSARIES ARE ALSO PRESENT, SO THAT OPPOSITION TO THE MOVES CAN BE EXPECTED. THE SPEECH ACTS ARE NOT 'TRUE' OR 'FALSE', BUT ARE JUDGED IN TERMS OF THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES BY THE AUDIENCE, WHO THE ACTORS ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE TO ACCEPT THE MOVES. A SPEECH ACT OF POLITICISA TION CAN, HOWEVER, BE ALSO BE USED TO INITIATE A BROADER SET OF DIFFERENT MOVES, AND I WANT TO SKETCH A REPERTOIRE FOR A NUMBER OF IDEAL-TYPICAL WAYS OF SPEAKING ABOUT POLITICISATION. WE MUST ASK WHO, WHEN, IN WHICH CONTEXT AND TO WHAT PURPOSE SOMEONE SPEAKS OF POLITICISATION, AS WELL AS WHAT CAN , SHOULD ,O R HAS BEEN DONE WITH THE POLITICISATION IN QUESTION? FOR DISCUSSING THE RHETORICAL QUALITY OF POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT, WE CAN USE THE RHETORICAL SCHEME OF PARADIASTOLE. THIS RHETORICAL SCHEME IS CONCERNED WITH THE NORMATIVE TONE OF A NOTION AND CAN CONTAIN THE DEVALUATION OF VIRTUES, THE EXTENUATION OF VICES, OR THE NEUTRALISATION OF 70 K. PALONEN BOTH (SEE SKINNER, 1996 , 2007 ). THE NEUTRALISATION OF VICES AND VIRTUES MIGHT INCLUDE BOTH CLAIMING THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICISATION ARE NOT AS BAD AS THEY HAVE BEEN MADE TO LOOK, AS WELL AS WARNING THAT THE EXPECTATION OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICKING ARE UNLIKELY TO BE REALISED. THE DEVALUATION OF VIRTUES MIGHT INSIST THAT IMPARTIAL JUDGEMENTS BEYOND POLITICS MIGHT BE NEITHER OBTAINABLE NOR DESIRABLE. TURNING A VICE INTO A VIRTUE COULD CONSIST OF ARGUING THAT THE INSIGHT OF POLITICIANS MIGHT BE BETTER THAN THAT OF OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS IN DEBATING THE PROS AND CONS OF A PHENOMENON (SEE PALONEN, 2010 ; WEBER, 1918 , PP. 235-237). THE RHETORICAL
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|a QUALITIES CAN BE THEN USED FOR CREATING CONCEPTUAL LINKS TO A WIDER DEBATE ON POLITICS AS A CONCEPT. FOR THE RE-CONCEPTUALISING OF POLITICS, WE CAN DISTINGUISH SEVERAL LEVELS OF THE ACTUAL SPEECH ACT OF POLITICISING: (1) WHO IS SPEAKING OF POLITICISATION: THE PARTICIPANTS OR THE SPECTATORS, SUCH AS SCHOLARS OR JOURNALISTS? IN ADDITION, SPEAKING OF POLITICISATION HISTORICALLY HAS TWO INDE PENDENT ASPECTS: (A) THE POLITICISATION OF WHAT? (B) THE POLITICISATION OF WHOM? (2) TO WHOM OR WHAT IS THE POLITICISATION ATTRIBUTED: TO IMPERSONAL FORCES, TO THE CONTINGENT RESULT OF ACTIONS, TO THE ACTIONS OF ADVERSARIES, OR TO THE SPEAKER'S ACTIONS? THE POLITICISATION OF QUESTIONS, TOPICS, ASPECTS OF PHENOMENA, AND PERSONS, EITHER AS ACTORS OR AS VICTIMS OF POLITICISATION, REFERS TO DIFFERENT SPEECH ACTS. PRAISE OR BLAME FOR THE POLITICISATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS IS ALSO POSSIBLE WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF THE POLITY, WHEREAS THE POLITICI SATION OF PHENOMENA CONTESTS THE LIMITS FOR POLITICKING THAT THE EXISTING POLITY SETS. 3 POLITICISATION IN THE DEBATES OF THREE PARLIAMENTS IN ORDER TO ANALYSE THE USE OF POLITICISATION IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, THE DIGITISED PLENARY DEBATES IN THE POST-WAR BRITISH PARLIAMENT, THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PROVIDE INTERESTING PRIMARY 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 71 SOURCES TO DISCUSS THE RELEVANT TOPOI .T H EGE R M A N POLITISIERUNG AND THE BRITISH POLITICISATION HAVE DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL HISTORIES (SEE PALONEN, 2006 , 2019 ). WHEREAS IN THE BUNDESTAG POLITISIERUNG WAS COMMONLY USED FROM THE PARLIAMENT'S BEGINNINGS IN 1949, IN WESTMINSTER IT BEGAN AROUND 1970. FOR THE EP, THE DIGITISED DEBATES ARE ONLY AVAILABLE FROM 1996 ONWARDS. NEVERTHELESS, CERTAIN COMPARISONS ARE STILL POSSIBLE. IN MY ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH ACTS OF POLITICISATION, I HAVE ADAPTED THE RANGE OF THINKABLE CASES TO THOSE WHICH I FOUND TO BE BEST REPRESENTED IN THE SOURCES. USING THE RHETORIC OF TOPOI MEANS
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|a THAT I DO NOT DEFINE THEM IN ADVANCE BUT ELABORATE DIFFERENT, EVEN PARTLY OPPOSED VERSIONS OF THE SAME TOPOS. I PROCEED FROM THE COMMON DENUNCIATIONS OF POLITICISATION, THROUGH THE MORE AMBIGUOUS VIEWS AND THE QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF IT, TO THE VOICES OF THOSE CELEBRATING POLITICISATION. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, I DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FIVE MAIN TOPOI OF POLITICISATION AS A PRODUCT OF (1) ADVERSARIES, (2) ANONYMOUS FORCES, (3) A MATTER OF DISPUTE, (4) AN OBJECT OF DEFENCE, OR (5) AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOMETHING NEW. 3.1 POLITICISATION BY ADVERSARIES THE BAD REPUTATION OF POLITICS, ALSO IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES (SEE PALONEN, 2012B ), WAS FORMULATED BY CARL SCHMITT AS AN ASYMMETRY: IT IS COMMON TO ATTRIBUTE THE POLITICAL QUALITY TO OTHERS AND TO DENY IT FOR ONESELF 2 (SCHMITT, 1932 , P. 21). THIS IS A COMMON MOVE, ALSO IN PARLIA MENTS, EVEN WHEN THE MEMBERS USING IT KNOW THAT THEY ARE ALSO 'DOING POLITICS'. AN EXTREME EXAMPLE OF THIS PRACTICE IS THAT OF THE BRITISH UKIP MEMBERS IN THE EP: '[I]T IS NOT FOR THE EU TO WEAPONISE AND POLITI CISE ITS TRADE POLICIES TO TRY AND FORCE COUNTRIES WHICH DISAGREE WITH IT ON THE PRACTISE TO STOP CAPITAL PUNISHMENT'. BY REPEATING THIS FORMULA, TEN UKIP MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) OBSTRUCTED THE DEBATE AND MANIFESTED THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE EU AS A POLITICISING POWER (EP, 27 OCTOBER 2015). THIS IS A STRIKING CASE AGAINST THE CLAIM THAT IT IS THE POPULISTS WHO HAVE POLITICISED THE EU (FOR CRITICAL STUDIES ON EU POLITICISATION, SEE WIESNER, 2019 , 2021 ). 2 'IN WAHRHEIT IST ES YY EINE TYPISCHE UND BESONDERS INTENSIVE ART UND WEISE, POLITIK ZU TREIBEN, DASS MAN DEN GEGNER ALS POLITISCH, SICH SELBST ALS UNPOLITISCH (D.H. HIER: WISSENSCHAFTLICH, GERECHT, OBJEKTIV, UNPARTEIISCH USW.) HINSTELLT' (SCHMIDT, 1932 [ 1979 ], 21N]. 72 K. PALONEN DECADES EARLIER, THE THATCHERITE KEITH JOSEPH (CONS.) ACCUSED TRADE UNIONS OF POLITICISATION: 'THE FIFTH OBSTACLE THAT STANDS BETWEEN A SOCIETY AND FULL
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|a EMPLOYMENT AND RISING STANDARDS OF LIVING IS POLITICISED TO A GREAT EXTENT BY A LUDDITE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT' (UK HOUSE OF COMMONS, 21 MAY 1979). IN GERMANY, THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION THAT THE ADENAUER GOVERNMENT PROPOSED FOR THE CO-DETERMINATION ( MITBESTIM MUNG ) OF THE COAL AND STEEL INDUSTRY WAS CONDEMNED BY THE SPD MEMBERS AS POLITICISING WORKERS' REPRESENTATION (KARL BERGMANN, 16 JUNE 1952 AND 17 JULY 1956). FOR JOSEPH, 'POLITICAL' REFERS TO STATE INTERVEN TION; FOR BERGMANN, IT REFERS TO A PARTY-BASED SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION. JOSEPH ALLUDES TO AN ONGOING PROCESS OF POLITICISATION, WHEREAS BERGMANN REFERS TO THE EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM. THE DOMINANT PARADIGM IN THE BRITISH DEBATES IS TO BE FOUND IN REPEATED REFERENCES AGAINST THE POLITICISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE BY PARTY APPOINTMENTS. 3 SIMILAR ASYMMETRY CAN BE DETECTED IN THE BUNDESTAG, IN PARTICULAR FOR THE TWO FIRST DECADES, BUT LATER THE VARIETY OF DIFFERENT VIEWS INCREASED. IN THE EP, FERNAND HERMAN (EPP) COMMENTED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF EU OFFICIALS: 'IN PARTICULAR, ANYTHING TO DO WITH STAFF RECRUITMENT, PROMOTION AND MOTIVATION HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY A GROWING RENATIONALISATION AND POLITICISATION' (14 APRIL 1999), THEREBY BRANDING MEMBER STATE INTERESTS IN THIS RESPECT AS PARTISAN (SEE ALSO OTHMAR KARAS, EPP, 25 NOVEMBER 2009). IN THE EP, THE RIGHT-WING ECR MEMBERS SPOKE, FOR EXAMPLE, AGAINST THE POLITICISATION OF SPORT, THE JUDICIARY, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (E.G. JAMES NICHOLSON, 2 FEBRUARY 2012; CHARLES TANNOCK, 29 APRIL 2015; DEREK RONALD, 19 MAY 2010) AND SAW THIS AS A WORK OF THEIR POLITICAL ADVERSARIES OR OF THE EU. TERESA ZABELL (EPP) SIMILARLY DECLARED THAT 'SPORT SHOULD NOT BE POLITICISED' (25 FEBRUARY 2004). THESE SPEAKERS THEREFORE OPPOSED EXTENDING THE RANGE OF POLITICS, WITH ZABELL FURTHER ARGUING AGAINST THE USE OF SPORT FOR PARTISAN ADVANTAGE. BRANDING POLITICISATION AS PARTISANSHIP IS A COMMON TOPOS
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|a USED TO ACCUSE NON-EU COUNTRIES OF THE POLITICISING OF THEIR JUDICIARY, STATE ADMINISTRA TION, AND SO ON. BERNDT POSSELT (EPP) SPOKE OF THE 'POLITICISATION OF GAZPROM BY PRESIDENT PUTIN' (16 MAY 2006). EVEN APPEALING TO HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF PROMOTING POLITICISATION. TUNNE KELAM (EPP) CLAIMED: 'THE EU LEADERS SHOULD IN PRINCIPLE AVOID SUCH ATTEMPTS TO 3 SEE HTTPS://WWW.ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG/HANSARD/ . 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 73 POLITICISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES' (27 NOVEMBER 2007). SIMILARLY, KONRAD SZYMANSKI (ECR) CRITICISED THE EXTENSION OF THE EU'S POWERS WITH REFER ENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS (14 DECEMBER 2010). IN THE BUNDESTAG, CLAUDIA ROTH (GRUENE) SAW, ON THE CONTRARY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER AS A MEDIUM FOR POLITICISING AND DEMOCRATISING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 4 (18 MAY 2000). AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL, MANY EPP MEMBERS ALSO OPPOSED THE POLITICISATION OF THE UNION ITSELF. VALVERDE LOPEZ (EPP) DEFENDED THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND REDUCED PARLIAMENTARISATION TO NOTHING MORE THAN THE SUPREMACY OF PARTIES: 'IF PARLIAMENT AND THE POLITICAL GROUPS WERE TO NOMINATE THE COMMISSIONERS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION, THIS ESSENTIAL BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET AND THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS WOULD BE POLITICISED. THE TREATIES STIPULATE THAT IT MUST BE INDEPENDENT, NOT ONLY FROM THE GOVERNMENTS BUT ALSO FROM ANY POLITICAL GROUP' (13 JANUARY 1999). AGAIN, ON BEHALF OF THE EPP, GUNNAR HOEKMARK LIKEWISE OPPOSED THE POLITICISATION OF THE COMMISSION: 'THAT IS WHY WE NEED LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE RULE OF LAW, AND THAT IS WHY MY POLITICAL GROUP AND I ARE SCEPTICAL ABOUT NAMING AND SHAMING WITHIN THIS PARLIAMENT, OR POLITICISING HOW THE COMMISSION IMPLEMENTS THE COMPETITION RULES' (30 JANUARY 2019). IN THIS WAY, HE REPEATS THE OLD ARGUMENT THAT LAW GUARANTEES MARKET NEUTRALITY, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY LINKING POLITICS WITH ARBITRARY RULE (SEE ALSO SWEDISH EPP MEMBERS ON 10 JULY 2007). A SIMILAR
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|a ARGUMENT WAS USED BY THE SOCIALIST VITAL MOREIRA (24 NOVEMBER 2010). IN THE 1970S AND 1980S, IN BOTH THE BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN PARLIA MENTS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SUB-ORGANISATIONS FORMED A NEW TARGET FOR THE DENUNCIATION OF POLITICISATION. SIEGBERT ALBER (CDU) DISPUTED THE AUTHORITY OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO) AS AN EXAMPLE OF GROWING POLITICISATION (11 JUNE 1976; ALSO HANS V. HYUN, CSU, AND LENI FISCHER, CDU, BOTH 10 MARCH 1978). FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER (FDP) DECLARED ON BEHALF OF HELMUT KOHL'S GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO OVERCOME THE TREND TOWARDS POLITICISATION IN UN ORGANISATIONS (7 NOVEMBER 1985). IN ALBER'S CRITIQUE WE CAN SEE WARNING OF FUTURE CHANGES THAT WOULD FOLLOW ON FROM FURTHER SUPPORT FOR THE WHO, WHEREAS GENSCHER WANTED TO STOP AN ONGOING PROCESS, ALTHOUGH HE LEFT OPEN EXACTLY HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE. HANS APEL, THE SPD FINANCE MINISTER IN HELMUT SCHMIDT'S GOVERNMENT, WAS MORE NUANCED IN HIS 4 'GRUNDRECHTSCHARTA IST EIN ZENTRALES PROJEKT DER NOTWENDIGEN DEMOKRATISIERUNG UND POLITISIERUNG EUROPAS'. 74 K. PALONEN APPROACH, SUPPORTING THE POLITICISATION OF DEBATE BUT NOT OF DECISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) (23 JANUARY 1975). IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, MINISTER TIMOTHY RAISON (CONS.) STATED THAT 'UNESCO HAS BEEN BESET WITH PROBLEMS OF INEFFICIENCY, OVER POLITICISATION AND OBSCURE PROGRAMMING FOR A GREAT MANY YEARS' (22 NOVEMBER 1985). THE TARGET OF CRITICISM ABOUT 'OVER-POLITICISATION' WAS NOT JUST PARTISANSHIP, AS WAS THE CASE WITH GERMAN CRITIQUES, BUT ALSO THE STATE-INTERVENTIONIST STYLE OF UNESCO. HOWEVER, SUCH A STYLE COULD ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD AS THE DE-POLITICISATION OF AN INSTITUTION WITHOUT EFFICIENT PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL (SEE WEBER, 1918 , PP. 235-248). STRAIGHTFORWARD CONDEMNATIONS OF POLITICISATION CAN ALSO MEET OPPOSI TION. WHEN SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS OWN PARTY DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UK FROM UNESCO, THE FORMER PRIME
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|a MINISTER EDWARD HEATH (CONS.) ACCEPTED POLITICISATION AS BEING INHERENT IN AND THEREFORE APPRO PRIATE FOR THAT PARTICULAR ORGANISATION: THERE IS INDEED 'POLITICISATION', TO USE A WORD AS BAD AS 'PRIVATISATION', BUT WE OURSELVES POLITICISE. OF COURSE, WE DO. WHENEVER WE TAKE AN ATTITUDE TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS, WE POLITICISE. POLITICISATION EXISTS BECAUSE REPRE SENTATION IN UNESCO IS BY GOVERNMENTS, NOT BY INDIVIDUALS OR BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF LEARNED SOCIETIES. IF IT WERE, IT WOULD NOT BE POLITICISA TION, BUT WOULD MERELY BE A REPETITION OF THE ARGUMENTS IN SENIOR COMMON ROOMS UP AND DOWN THE COUNTRY, WHICH ARE FAR MORE BITTER AND UNPLEASANT. THEREFORE, I CANNOT ACCEPT THAT POLITICISATION IS AN ARGUMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO. (22 NOVEMBER 1985) HEATH DOES NOT CLEARLY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN POLITICISATION AND POLITICKING (PALONEN, 2003 ) BUT OFFERS US THE EXCELLENT INSIGHT THAT POLITICS DO NOT EXIST INDEPENDENTLY FROM AND PRIOR TO POLITICISATION: IT IS POLITICISATION THAT ENABLES POLITICKING. WE FIRST 'TAKE AN ATTITUDE TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS' AND THEN, AS A RESULT, 'WE POLITICISE' IT. HAVING THUS POLITICISED THE ISSUE AS A MATTER TO BE DEBATED, WE ENGAGE IN POLITICKING BY TAKING A STAND ON THAT ISSUE. WITH HIS 'WE POLITICISE' CLAIM, HEATH THEREFORE ALSO MAKES THE POINT THAT THOSE PREACHING AGAINST POLITICISATION ARE ACTUALLY POLITICKING, IN THE SENSE OF THE SCHMITT FORMULA. WITH HIS APPROVAL OF POLITICISATION, HEATH ALSO MARKS A DISSENT FROM THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT: HE IS PROUD OF SAYING 'WE POLITICISE'. 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 75 DURING HIS PERIOD AS AN EU COMMISSIONER, PETER MANDELSON OPPOSED THE DE-POLITICISATION OF POLICY QUESTIONS IN THE EU WITH AN ARGUMENT ANALOGOUS TO HEATH'S: AS FOR POLITICISATION-POLITICISATION OF THESE ISSUES IS ALMOST INEVITABLE. WHEN YOU HAVE EUROPEAN INDUSTRY NOW REPRESENTING DIFFERENT VIEWS AND COMPETING INTERESTS AND, FRANKLY,
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|a MAKING VERY DIFFERENT RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS TO WHETHER THEY WANT TRADE DEFENCE MEASURES ADOPTED, THAT IS BOUND TO BE REFLECTED IN THE POSITIONS OF OUR MEMBER STATES YY WHEN PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS, THOSE VIEWS HAVE TO BE DEBATED VERY BROADLY IN A POLITICAL WAY, THROUGH A POLITICAL PROCESS, AND THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS. (23 OCTOBER 2007) MANDELSON WELL UNDERSTANDS THAT THE COMMISSION POLITICISES THE QUES TIONS ON THE EU LEVEL BY BRINGING THEM TO THE AGENDA, WITHOUT EXPECTING THAT EITHER THE EP OR THE MEMBER STATES WOULD ACCEPT THEM BY ACCLAMA TION. THE GERMAN GREEN MP IMMA HILLERICH OPPOSED THE REACTION OF THE NEW CDU-FDP COALITION IN HESSEN TO POLITICISING CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL POLITICS. IN THE BUNDESTAG SHE CRITICISED THE COALITION, CLAIMING THAT IT HAD REPLACED SOCIAL STUDIES WITH A MORE TRADITIONAL TEACHING OF HISTORY AND THE SEPARATION OF DISCIPLINES, WITH THE AIM OF PREVENTING FURTHER POLITICISA TION IN SCHOOLS 5 (21 JANUARY 1988). HILLERICH UNDERSTOOD THAT ACTORS WHO HAVE BEEN POLITICISED CANNOT SIMPLY REVERT BACK TO A PRE-POLITICAL STATUS, WHEREAS THE NEW COALITION NEVERTHELESS WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE WITH ITS ATTEMPTS TO NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF PAST POLITICISATION. 3.2 ANONYMOUS POLITICISATION MUCH OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING POLITICISATION CONCERNS THE PASSIVE VOICE. IN OTHER WORDS, IT REFERS TO FORMS THAT ARE NOT CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEFINITE ACTORS BUT ARE THE RESULTS OF THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTIONS. THE GERMAN TERM VERPOLITISIERUNG REFERS PRECISELY TO THIS CASE, BUT IT WAS USED IN THE BUNDESTAG ONLY ONCE BY WALTER ALTHAMMER (CDU), WHO BEMOANED THE FACT THAT MORE AND MORE MATTER-OF-FACT ISSUES HAD BEEN POLITICISED ( SACHPROBLEME VERPOLITISIERT ) AND THEREBY SPOILED ( VERDORBEN ) (25 OCTOBER 1973). IN THIS INSTANCE, POLITICISATION OCCURS AS A 5 'EIN BEWAEHRTES MITTEL, UM POLITISIERUNG, DIE EINGESETZT HAT, WIEDER ZU NEUTRALISIEREN'. 76 K. PALONEN DISTURBANCE OF THE PROPER ORDER OF MATTERS, WHICH ALTHAMMER ATTRIBUTED TO
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|a THE GENERAL 'CLIMATE' OF THE TIME. IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, BRIAN MAWHINNEY (CONS.) SIMILARLY ILLUS TRATED HOW ANONYMOUS FORCES CAN POLITICISE MATTERS: 'THE IRISH LANGUAGE HAS, FOR WHATEVER REASONS, BECOME POLITICISED OVER THE YEARS. IT HAS BEEN TAKEN OUT OF ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT AND PUT INTO A POLITICAL CONTEXT' (14 MARCH 1991). MORE INTERESTING THAN MAWHINNEY'S SUPPOSITION OF THE SEPARATION OF CONTEXTS IS HIS ARGUMENT, RESEMBLING ALTHAMMER'S, THAT THIS HAS BEEN A LONG-LASTING PHENOMENON, THE POLITICISING EFFECTS OF WHICH HAVE ONLY SLOWLY BEEN NOTICED OVER TIME. WHEN POLITICIANS EMPHASISE THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THIS KIND OF POLITICISATION, AT THE SAME TIME THEY ALSO CREATE IT, IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SENSE OF ELEVATING THE ISSUE TO THE DEBATE AGENDA. THE WELSH LABOUR MP ALAN WILLIAMS REFERRED 'TO THE UNCONSCIOUS, UNINTENDED POLITICISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE THAT HAS INEVITABLY TAKEN PLACE THROUGH THE EROSIVE PERSISTENCE, FOR 15 YEARS, OF THE UNCHALLENGED "ONE OF US" PHILOSOPHY' (24 FEBRUARY 1994). HIS TARGET WAS THE CONSERVA TIVE GOVERNMENT THAT HAD BEEN IN OFFICE SINCE 1979 AND WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, HAD ALLOWED THE 'UNINTENDED POLITICISATION' TO TAKE PLACE. THIS IS A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION IN WESTMINSTER, WHO HAVE REGULARLY BEEN ACCUSING EACH OTHER OF POLITICISATION SINCE THE 1970S. ANOTHER COMMON CRITICISM RELATES TO THE POLITICISATION OF PERSONS. PATRICK THOMSON (CONS.) WAS 'PARTICULARLY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH OVER THE YEARS STUDENTS' UNIONS HAVE BEEN POLITICISED' (12 MARCH 1986). HE DID NOT ATTRIBUTE THIS CHANGE TO ANY PARTY GROUP BUT SAW IT AS AN UNINTENDED PRODUCT OF VARIOUS PRACTICES IN STUDENT POLITICS, RESULTING IN THE FACT THAT THE CONSERVATIVES HAD DE FACTO BEEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN STUDENT UNIONS. EVEN IF THOMSON SAYS SOMETHING OBVIOUS, HE STILL POLITI CISES THE QUESTION BY ATTEMPTING TO RAISE AND DEBATE
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|a THE MATTER IN THE HOUSE. GERMAN CDU MEMBERS WERE EQUALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POLITICISA TION OF STUDENT UNIONS; IN PARTICULAR, OVER THE QUESTION OF THEIR 'POLITICAL MANDATE' AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY TOOK STANDS ON EXTRA-UNIVERSITY QUESTIONS. THE CHAIR OF THE NATIONAL STUDENTS' UNION, VERBAND DEUTSCHER STUDENTENSCHAFTEN , HAD EXPLICITLY SUPPORTED SUCH A MANDATE, AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE QUESTION OF MANFRED WOERNER, CDU, AND THE ANSWER OF MINISTER OF JUSTICE ERNST BENDA, ALSO CDU (28 MARCH 1968). A FEW WEEKS LATER, BENDA QUOTED THE FAMOUS STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE'S DEMAND TO 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 77 POLITICISE THE OPPOSING POSITIONS 6 (30 APRIL 1968). IN THIS WAY, THE CDU MINISTER DEPICTED AS A WARNING SOMETHING THAT DUTSCHKE HAD EXPRESSED AS A HOPE. THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION FREE DEMOCRATS, WALTER SCHEEL, ACCEPTED THE POLITICISATION OF STUDENTS AS AN ORDINARY PART OF ACADEMIC LIFE 7 (30 APRIL 1968). HE EMPHASISED HOW POLITICISATION HAD TAKEN PLACE ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND HE WELCOMED THE STUDENTS' INCREASED INTEREST IN POLITICS, INCLUDING THE STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN HIS OWN PARTY. THE IMPORTANT POINT, HE CONTENDED, WAS TO SEE A GROWING MOMENTUM FOR A BREAK WITH THE RATHER PASSIVE STUDENT ATTITUDE OF THE WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER ERA. OTHER PARLIAMENTARY EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE THAT SOMETIMES MEMBERS WELCOMED UNINTENDED FORMS OF POLITICISATION AND EVEN SAW IN THEM AN OPPORTUNITY FOR OPENING UP SOMETHING NEW. THIS WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE BUNDESTAG BY HEDDA HAUSER (FDP), A MEDICAL DOCTOR WHO APPRE CIATED THAT HEALTH ISSUES HAD BEEN INCREASINGLY POLITICISED ( ZUNEHMEND POLITISIERT WORDEN ) BEFORE SHE BECAME A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. SHE WAS DELIGHTED WITH THIS SIGN OF A GROWING POPULAR INTEREST IN MATTERS RELATING TO HEALTH ( GESUNDHEIT ) (26 JUNE 1968). SHE STATED SOMETHING THAT IS QUITE OBVIOUS TO THE AUDIENCE, BUT BY USING THE WORD POLITISIERT APPROV INGLY SHE ALSO IDENTIFIED A MOMENTUM THAT COULD
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|a BE MORE CONSCIOUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY USED IN HEALTH POLICY FOR POLITICKING AS WELL. THE EU COMMISSIONER VIVIANE REDING SPOKE ABOUT POLITICISATION IN HER OWN FIELD, WITH REGARD TO THE REDISTRIBUTION OF RADIO FREQUENCIES: 'THE COMMISSION WELCOMES THE POLITICISATION OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE SPECTRUM ISSUE. THIS DEBATE GOES FAR BEYOND THE TECHNICAL LEVEL' (2 SEPTEMBER 2008; SEE ALSO ERIC BESSON, ACTING AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, ON THE SAME DATE). HOWEVER, OTHER COMMISSIONERS HAVE OPPOSED THE 'POLITICISATION' OF SPECIAL QUESTIONS-FOR EXAMPLE, DALIA GRYBAUSKAITE ON FOOD AID (16 DECEMBER 2004; BENITA FERRERO-WALDNER, 12 DECEMBER 2006 AND JOE BORG ON THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (25 APRIL 2007)-ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT PREVENT THEM FROM UNDERSTANDING THE COMMISSION AS A POLITICISING INSTITUTION. 6 'DIE SICHTBAREN UND UNMITTELBAREN WIDERSPRUECHE ZU VERTIEFEN UND ZU POLITISIEREN'. 7 'DAS SIND DOCH ZUSTAENDE, DIE ZU EINER POLITISIERUNG DER STUDENTEN GEFUEHRT HABEN, ZUNAECHST IM BEREICH DER HOCHSCHULPOLITIK. DANN IST DIESE POLITISIERUNG IN EINE ALLGEMEINE OPPOSITIONSHALTUNG UNTER DEN STUDENTEN UMGESCHLAGEN, DIE DURCH ALLE POLITISCHEN LAGER DER STUDENTEN GEHT. YY WER IN DIESER ENTWICKLUNG ETWAS UNNORMALES SIEHT, MUSS SELTSAME VORSTELLUNGEN VON POLITISCHER DENKARBEIT HABEN'. 78 K. PALONEN 3.3 DISPUTES ON POLITICISATION EXPLICIT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESON THE PRESENCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICI SATION ARE RARE, BUT THEY DESERVE SPECIAL ATTENTION, AS THEY REVEAL EXPLICIT CONCEPTUAL DISPUTES. IN WEST GERMANY, A BOARD OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS- DIE WIRTSCHAFTSWEISEN OFFERED AT REGULAR INTERVALS THEIR OPINIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. KARL SCHILLER (SPD), AN ECONOMICS PROFESSOR, WHO LATER BECAME MINISTER OF ECONOMICS IN THE KIESINGER-BRANDT COALITION, QUESTIONED THE AUTHORITY OF THESE EXPERTS IN A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. HE DID NOT CRITICISE THE EXPERTS' INTERVENTION FOR POLITICISATION BUT REGARDED IT AS SUCH AS A POLITICAL ACT 8 (16
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|a FEBRUARY 1966). THE GERMAN WORD POLI TIKUM INDICATES THE POLITICAL STATUS OF AN ISSUE, NOT AS 'PARTISAN' IN THE SENSE OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION, BUT 'POLITICAL' IN THE SENSE OF BEING CONTROVERSIAL IN PRINCIPLE. HALF A CENTURY LATER, HERMANN FAERBER'S (CDU) VIEWS ON THE HERBI CIDE GLYPHOSATE PROVOKED A SPONTANEOUS INTERJECTION FROM RENATE KUENAST (GRUENE) 9 (21 SEPTEMBER 2016). FAERBER SAID THAT DISPUTING THE EXPERT OPINIONS GIVEN FOR THE LEGALISATION OF THE HERBICIDE WAS AN 'ACT OF POLITICISA TION', AN ILLEGITIMATE INTERVENTION ON A FACTUAL ISSUE, AND HE CLAIMED IN HIS REPLY TO KUENAST THAT SUCH POLITICISATION ALWAYS LEADS TO ARBITRARY DECISIONS. THIS IS AN OLD ARGUMENT USED BY OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS TO PERSUADE PEOPLE TO SUPPORT FACTUAL ( SACHLICH ) MATTERS OF POLICY, IN THE FACE OF WHICH POLITI CIANS SHOULD SUPPOSEDLY KEEP SILENT. RENATE KUENAST, WHO WAS MINISTER OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND AGRICULTURE IN GERHARD SCHROEDER'S GOVERNMENT, MADE CLEAR IN HER INTERJECTION THAT SHE REGARDED THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF LEGAL ISATION AS A THOROUGHLY POLITICAL PROCESS. COMPARING THE GROUNDS FOR AND AGAINST THE LEGALISING OR THE PROHIBITION OF THE HERBICIDE IN A PARLIAMEN TARY DEBATEWOULD ALLOW CONTINGENT DECISIONS TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM ARBITRARY ONES . 8 'ES HAT NICHT DER POLITISIERUNG IN EINEM NEGATIVEN SINNE GEDIENT, HERR MINISTER, SONDERN ES IST ALS SOLCHES EIN POLITIKUM'. 9 HERMANN FAERBER YY IN DIESER GLYPHOSATDEBATTE IST EIN ERSCHWERENDER FAKTOR HINZUGEKOMMEN: DER ZULASSUNGSPROZESS WURDE POLITISIERT. (RENATE KUENAST YY: DER WAR IMMER POLITISCH! VOM ERSTEN TAG AN!). MIT DIESER POLITISIERUNG DES ZULASSUNGSPROZESSES NIMMT AUCH DIE WILLKUERLICHKEIT VON ENTSCHEIDUNGEN ZU. 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 79 IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, BOTH CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR MEMBERS HAVE REPEATEDLY ACCUSED EACH OTHER OF POLITICISING THE CIVIL SERVICE. PETER MANDELSON (LAB.) USED THE
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|a TERM 'CREEPING POLITICISATION' (13 JULY 1994). THE DEBATE ON THE THIRD REPORT FROM THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE ON POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS, AND THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE CONTAINS INTERESTING CONCEPTUAL CONTROVER SIES. THE COMMITTEE CHAIR WAS TONY WRIGHT (LAB.), A POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR (SEE ALSO HIS BOOK, DOING POLITICS , 2012 , ESP. PP. 148-190), WHO OPENED THE DEBATE BY PROBLEMATISING POLITICISATION: WE BEGAN OUR REPORT-THIS WAS ITS WHOLE PURPOSE-TO DISPATCH ONCE AND FOR ALL THE PERENNIAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER THE CIVIL SERVICE WAS BEING POLITICISED. THAT HAS BEEN SAID REPEATEDLY OVER THE YEARS. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT IT WAS HAPPENING UNDER THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND UNDER THIS GOVERNMENT. WE WANTED TO BE HELPFUL BY TRYING TO DISENTANGLE ALL THE THINGS THAT MIGHT BE MEANT BY 'POLITICISATION'. WE STRIPPED AWAY SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES SURROUNDING THE WORD AND ITS PEJORATIVE OVERTONES, AND TRIED TO SAY SOMETHING SENSIBLE ABOUT IT. (30 OCTOBER 2008) WRIGHT REPEATS THE COMMON ACCUSATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP BUT WANTS TO GET RID OF THE 'PEJORATIVE OVERTONES' AND TO LOOK FOR THE RANGE OF MEANINGS ATTRIBUTED TO 'POLITICISATION'. THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARY AMBITION, WITHOUT PARALLEL AMONG THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES THAT I HAVE HAD AT MY DISPOSAL. IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH, HOWEVER, HE SPEAKS OF POLITICISATION IN A RATHER AMBIVALENT SENSE: IT IS WORTH RECORDING THAT, IN SOME SENSE, THE CIVIL SERVICE IS NECESSARILY POLITICISED AND PARTIAL, BECAUSE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION IS TO SERVE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY. OF NECESSITY, IT IS NOT IMPARTIAL BETWEEN THE GOVERNING AND OTHER PARTIES, BECAUSE ITS JOB IS TO WORK FOR THE GOVERNING PARTY AND TO DELIVER THEIR PROGRAMME. THAT IS WHAT PROFESSOR COLIN TALBOT CALLS THE CIVIL SERVICE'S 'SERIAL MONOGAMY'. IN THAT SENSE, THERE IS A NECESSARY POLITICISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, BUT WE KNOW WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN WE IDENTIFY THE BITS
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|a THAT WE WORRY ABOUT. WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT POLITICIANS INTERFERING IN SUCH THINGS AS THE APPOINTMENT AND ADVANCEMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS WHEN IT CONTAMINATES THE PRINCIPLE OF APPOINTMENT ON MERIT. (30 OCTOBER 2008) 80 K. PALONEN WRIGHT DENIES THAT POLITICISATION IS A PRIORI NEGATIVE. AGAINST THE HEGELIAN IDEA OF OFFICIALS REPRESENTING THE GENERAL INTEREST AGAINST THE PARTISAN INTEREST OF PARLIAMENTS AND POLITICIANS, WRIGHT INSIST ON THE 'NECESSARY POLITICISATION' OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, IN THE SENSE THAT THE OFFICIALS HAVE A DUTY TO FOLLOW THE DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS, AS MAX WEBER ( 1918 , 1919 ) HAD EARLIER EMPHASISED. TO SUPPORT A COMMON PLACE IN SCHOLARSHIP, WRIGHT QUOTES AN ACADEMIC AUTHORITY AND ADMITS THAT EVERYDAY LANGUAGE OFFERS A NARROW AND PARTISAN VIEW OF POLITICISA TION, WHEREAS HE WANTS TO MAINTAIN MERIT-BASED APPOINTMENTS BUT INTENDS TO NEUTRALISE TALK OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS. THAT TAKES US TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRA TIVE SIDES OF GOVERNMENT, WHICH WE EXPLORED SOMEWHAT IN OUR INQUIRY. WE VISITED FINLAND AND SWEDEN BECAUSE, AMONG OTHER REASONS, THEY ARE TRADITIONALLY CITED IN ALL THE ANALYSES AS THE HOMES OF GOOD GOVERNMENT. UNIVERSALLY, FINLAND COMES TOP OF THE LEAGUE TABLES. IT IS INTERESTING THAT ONE FINDS FAR MORE POLITICISATION IN THOSE PLACES AND FAR MORE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THOSE RESPECTIVE ADMINISTRATIONS THAN HERE. (30 OCTOBER 2008) WRIGHT REFERRED TO FINLAND AS A COUNTRY IN WHICH THE FREQUENTLY PARTISAN APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS HAD NOT PREVENTED THE COUNTRY FROM REACHING THE TOP OF THE INTERNATIONAL RANKINGS IN 'GOOD GOVERNMENT'. HE CONTINUED WITH THE CONSOLING CONCLUSION 'THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR "POLITICISATION" IN THE SENSE OF INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CIVIL SERVICE DOES NOT STACK UP' EITHER UNDER THATCHER OR UNDER BLAIR AND THAT 'DESPITE THE REGULAR ACCUSATIONS OF POLITICISATION, BRITAINYYREMAINS SINGULARLY UNPOLITI CISED'
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|a (30 OCTOBER 2008). THE TERM 'SINGULARLY UNPOLITICISED' REFERS BACK TO THE CONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE OF PARTISAN APPOINTMENTS. WRIGHT JUSTIFIED THE VIEW: 'THAT IS BECAUSE WE HAVE AN IN-BUILT DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION AND POLI TICS. AS MY HONORABLE FRIEND INDICATED, THAT PROVIDES AN IN-BUILT PROBITY IN GOVERNMENT' (30 OCTOBER 2008). ANDREW TYRIE (CONS.) DOUBTED THE REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE CIVIL SERVICE BUT REDUCED THE QUESTION TO ONE OF 'PERCEPTION', TO SOMETHING THAT COULD BE EITHER 'TRUE' OR 'FALSE'. IN PARTICULAR, HE WONDERED WHY CIVIL SERVANTS' PERCEPTIONS DIFFERED FROM THOSE OF THE COMMITTEE (30 OCTOBER 2008). HE PROBABLY UNDERSTOOD THE DIVERSITY OF THE USES OF THE TERM 'POLITICISATION', BUT HE CONFINED HIMSELF 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 81 TO THE NARROW MEANING IN ORDER TO MAKE A POINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE. WRIGHT RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD ASKED FORMER CABINET SECRETARIES AND CIVIL SERVANTS 'TO GIVE US SOME CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGE OF POLITI CISATION AND, SIMPLY PUT, IT WAS NOT THERE. THE SAME OPINION HAS COME FROM OUTSIDE OBSERVERS' (30 OCTOBER 2008). FOR WRIGHT, THE POPULAR VIEW OF THE POLITICISATION OF APPOINTMENTS DOES NOT HOLD GOOD FOR THOSE INSIDE THE CIVIL SERVICE. IN A LATER INTERVENTION, WRIGHT AFFIRMED: 'WE NEED TO THINK OUR WAY THROUGH, WITHOUT SIMPLY MAKING KNEE-JERK CHARGES OF POLITICISATION EVERY TIME THE ISSUE IS RAISED' (IBID.). HE RECOMMENDED THAT MEMBERS DIRECT ATTENTION TO THE USE OF THE TERM 'POLITICISATION' IN THE SENSE OF ITS ACTUAL CONTEXT. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, CONVINCE NICK HURD (CONS.), WHO CONTINUED TO SPEAK OF 'A TREND TOWARDS THE DANGEROUS POLITI CISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE' (30 OCTOBER 2008), AS IF IT WAS MERELY A FACTUAL QUESTION, IN LINE WITH POPULAR PREJUDICES. 3.4 SUPPORT FOR POLITICISATION IN SEVERAL SPEECHES FROM EACH OF THE PARLIAMENTS ANALYSED
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|a HERE, POLITICISA TION IS ACCEPTED AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI , ITS STRENGTHS BEING JUDGED AS STRONGER THAN ITS WEAKNESSES, AT LEAST IN THE EXACT SENSE OF THE ISSUE TO WHICH ATTEN TION IS BEING DRAWN. ONE SUCH ISSUE IS THE POLITICISATION OF THE MILITARY. FINDING SUPPORT FOR THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AN ESPECIALLY HARD TASK. AS ONE OF THE MANY EXAMPLES AGAINST IT, EGON KLEBSCH (CDU) BLAMED THE SOCIAL-LIBERAL BRANDT GOVERNMENT FOR ' POLITISIERUNG DER BUNDESWEHR ' (4 FEBRUARY 1971). SOME WEEKS LATER, DEFENCE MINISTER HELMUT SCHMIDT (SPD) DEFENDED POLITICISATION IN A PERSONAL SENSE 10 (26 MARCH 1971), BY SHIFTING ATTENTION AWAY FROM PARTY APPOINTMENTS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF BUNDESWEHR SOLDIERS IN TAKING A POLITICAL STANDPOINT. IF THE MAIN DUTY OF SOLDIERS IS SEEN AS OBEDIENCE TO THEIR SUPERIORS, SCHMIDT'S MOVE WAS OXYMORONIC. THE FOUNDING OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE 1950S HAD, HOWEVER, TAKEN PLACE IN A CONTEXT WHERE THE AIM WAS-TO USE ANOTHER OXYMORON-TO 'CIVILISE' SOLDIERS, TRANSFORMING THEM INTO STAATSBUERGER IN UNIFORM . SCHMIDT ARGUED THAT EVEN BUNDESWEHR SOLDIERS SHOULD HAVE 10 'GEGEN EINE POLITISIERUNG DER BUNDESWEHR HABEN WIR DANN NICHTS EINZUWENDEN, WENN DARUNTER EINE STAERKERE AUSPRAEGUNG DER FAEHIGKEIT ZUM MITDENKEN UND ZUM URTEILEN IN POLITISCHEN ZUSAMMENHAENGEN GEMEINT IST. IN DIESE ZUSAMMENHAENGE SIND SOLDATEN UND ZIVILE BUERGER IN GLEICHER WEISE GESTELLT'. 82 K. PALONEN THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL JUDGEMENT, IN THE NAME OF EQUALITY WITH CIVILIANS. THIS WAS A MAJOR BREAK WITH GERMAN TRADI TION: THE REICHSWEHR SOLDIERS OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC WERE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS. IN THIS INSTANCE, SCHMIDT WAS ABLE TO MAKE THE 'POLITICISATION' OF THE BUNDESWEHR SOLDIERS, AT LEAST IN THIS SENSE, APPEAR AS A WIDELY SHARED PRINCIPLE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, MOST DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO POLITICISA TION DATE FROM THE 1970S, WHEN THE LABOUR GOVERNMENTS OF HAROLD WILSON AND JAMES CALLAGHAN WERE IN OFFICE.
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|a GOING AGAINST THE TIDE OF OPINION AT THE TIME, THE LABOUR LEFT-WINGER DENNIS SKINNER DARED TO SAY: 'ALTHOUGH FEW WOULD AGREE WITH ME, I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE A GREATER DEGREE OF POLITICISING IN THE CIVIL SERVICE BASED ON THE PARTY THAT COMES TO POWER' (15 MAY 1978). HERE HE IDENTIFIES POLITICISATION WITH THE NOTO RIOUS PARTISAN APPOINTMENTS MADE ON THE BASIS OF A PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY, SUCH AS WAS COMMONLY PRACTICED IN THE 1970S AMONG THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, WHO CONSIDERED THAT 'IMPARTIAL' OFFICIALS WOULD SIMPLY MAINTAIN A BOURGEOIS WAY OF THINKING. ANOTHER LABOUR LEFT WINGER, MARTIN FLANNERY, WANTED OPENLY TO POLITI CISE THE DEBATE ON NORTHERN IRELAND: 'I SHALL ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF THE DEBATE AND POLITICISE IT. ULSTER UNIONIST MEMBERS MAY GRIN, BUT THEY DO NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS' (6 DECEMBER 1978). POLITICISATION IN THIS CASE REFERS TO BREAKING OPEN THE DEADLOCK BETWEEN VESTED INTERESTS, REPRESENTED IN WESTMINSTER BY THE LOYALIST ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY. POLITICI SATION FOR FLANNERY THEREFORE MEANS NOTHING MORE THAN A WILLINGNESS TO SPECULATE WITH POSSIBILITIES THAT WOULD NOT ONLY FREEZE THE 'TROUBLES' BUT ALLOW A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ENTIRE POLITICAL CONSTELLATION. IN CONTRAST TO THOSE WHO REGARD NATIONALISATION WITHIN THE EU AS A FORM OF POLITICISATION, SEVERAL SPEAKERS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT HAVE CLAIMED THAT IT IS PRECISELY BY TRANSCENDING PARTISAN NATIONAL INTERESTS THAT POLITICISATION OF THE EU WILL OCCUR. ROBERTO GALTIERI (S&D) DEFENDED THE LINK BETWEEN EUROPEANISATION AND POLITICISATION: 'THE QUESTION HERE IS ONE OF DEMOCRATISATION AND POLITICISATION, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION AND, OVERALL, TO BUILD A MORE LEGITIMATE, STRONGER EURO PEAN UNION THAT IS CLOSER TO ITS CITIZENS' (22 NOVEMBER 2012). REINO PAASILINNA (S&D) ARGUED ALONG SIMILAR LINES: 'THE GREATEST PROBLEM IS A POLITICAL ONE: THEY DO NOT WANT TO TAX CAPITAL, BUT RAISE PERSONAL
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|a TAXATION INSTEAD. IN THE END, TAX WOULD POLITICISE THE GLOBAL, UNDEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POWER' (19 JANUARY 2000; ALSO SEE MICHAEL VAN HULTEN, S&D, 3 APRIL 2001). 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 83 SUPPORT FOR POLITICISATION COULD EVEN OCCASIONALLY BE FOUND WITHIN THE EPP FACTION. GEORGIOS PAPASTAMKOS (EPP) DEMANDED THE POLITICISATION OF CITIZENS BY MAKING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EU MORE OBVIOUS AS AN ANSWER TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 11 (15 FEBRUARY 2007). THE COMMISSION PRES IDENT JOSE MANUEL BARROSO ALSO ACCEPTED POLITICISATION IN THE SENSE OF 'A "COALITION" BETWEEN ALL THOSE WHO ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT' (27 OCTOBER 2004). PASQUALINA NAPOLETANO (S&D) SUPPORTED BARROSO FOR COMMISSION PRESIDENT AS A POLITICISING MOVE: 'THIS MEANS THAT, WITH YOUR CANDIDACY, YOU WISH TO HELP POLITICISE THE POLITICAL LIFE OF EUROPE. YOU STRONGLY AND REPEATEDLY STRESSED THIS NOTION, INCLUDING TODAY' (21 JULY 2007). FOR HIS PART, OTHMAR KARAS (EPP) REGARDED THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU AS A POLITICISING MOVE: 'WE MUST ACCORD THIS POLITICAL PROCESS THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE IT DESERVES AND ENTER INTO DISCUSSION WITH THE CITIZENS. WE NEED TO POLITICISE THE POLITICS OF THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS, IF WE ARE TO HAVE THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL CONVERSATION WITH THE CITIZENS' (3 OCTOBER 2002). FOR HIM, THE QUESTION WAS MERELY ONE OF INTENSIFYING THE EXISTING POLITICAL QUALITY OF THE ISSUE, WITHOUT MENTIONING THE RESPECTS IN WHICH THAT POLITICAL QUALITY WOULD BE STRENGTHENED OR INTENSIFIED. 3.5 POLITICISATION AS OPENING UP OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES AN EXCEPTIONAL CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTER OF POLITICISATION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WAS HUGH DYKES, WHO SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU PARLIAMENT ITSELF WITH HIS VIEWS ON THE EUROPEANISATION OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS: WORTHY AND HONOURABLE THOUGH THAT MAY BE, LET THE PARLIAMENT POLITI CISE ITSELF IN THE REAL PARTY-POLITICAL STRUCTURE
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|a SENSE. IF THE ENERGY AND WILL IS THERE, IF THE EDUCATIONAL EFFORT PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL, AND IF THE GOVERNMENT MACHINE IN THE PROPER SENSE OF THE TERM HAS BEEN SUPPORTING ALL THAT EFFORT TO EXPLAIN AND TO INFORM THE PUBLIC, THE PUBLIC WILL IDENTIFY MUCH MORE QUICKLY WITH THEIR NEW EURO PEAN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND WITH THEIR EUROPEAN CONSTITUENCY, EVEN IF IT BE A CONSTITUENCY OF 500,000 OR 600,000. (3 DECEMBER 1975) 11 'EIN AUSWEG AUS DER VERFASSUNGSKRISE MUSS ANZEICHEN EINES UMFASSENDEN INTE GRATIONSPROJEKTS AUFWEISEN, DAS DEN BUERGER "POLITISIERT" UND DIE GESAMTE-INNERE WIE AEUSSERE-AKTIVITAET DER UNION FUER IHN ERKENNBAR MACHT'. 84 K. PALONEN CONTRARY TO THE OLD BRITISH TRADITION OF REGARDING WESTMINSTER AS A FUNDA MENTAL PART OF THE ENGLISH NATIONAL IDENTITY, DYKES ARGUED FOR OPENING UP THE BRITISH POLITY TO THE MOMENTUM OF EUROPEANISATION, WHICH WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A POLITICISATION OF THE ELECTORATE, SO THAT THEY COULD LEARN TO THINK OF POLITICS IN EUROPEAN TERMS. DYKES LATER BECAME A LIBERAL DEMOCRAT. IN THE BUNDESTAG, DEMANDS FOR THE POLITICISATION OF ISSUES HAVE BEEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY PRESENTED BY GREEN MPS. ANALOGOUSLY TO DYKES' VIEW, CHRISTIAN STERZING (GRUENE) DEMANDED THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU 12 (12 DECEMBER 2001). STERZING ACTUALLY CONNECTED FOUR MOVEMENTS-PARLIA MENTARISATION, DEMOCRATISATION, POLITICISATION, AND DE-NATIONALISATION-IN ORDER BOTH TO SUPPORT AND TO CHANGE THE INSTITUTIONS OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION. IN HIS OPINION, THE DEMOCRATISATION AND PARLIAMENTARISATION OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS WAS INSTRUMENTAL FOR CONNECTING POLITICISATION AND DE NATIONALISATION, WHICH WOULD BE BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO LEARNING TO THINK POLITICALLY IN EUROPEAN TERMS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE RED-GREEN GOVERNMENT, JOSCHKA FISCHER (GRUENE), SUPPORTED OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICISATION IN THE EU WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PLANNED EU CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO EXPECTED THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS TO INITIATE A HIGHLY IMPORTANT
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|a PROCESS OF POLITICISATION IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES 13 (2 JULY 2004). FISCHER THEREFORE OPTED FOR A DUAL STRATEGY OF SUPPORTING BOTH THE SUPRA-NATIONALISATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS AND THE PARLIAMENTARISATION OF THE POLITICS OF THE PARTICIPATING MEMBER STATES. THIS ARGUMENT CONTENDED THAT EUROPEANISATION AND PARLIAMENTARISA TION WOULD INTENSIFY THE POLITICAL QUALITY OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND REQUIRE A RAISING OF POLITICAL AWARENESS TO A CONSISTENTLY EUROPEAN LEVEL. WILDFRIED TELKAEMPER (GRUENE) SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE BUDGET WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN (16 APRIL 1996) AND HEIDE RUEHLE (GRUENE) IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTENDING THE EU TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE, ALSO IN RELATION TO BUDGETARY QUESTIONS 14 (14 DECEMBER 1999). CARLOS BOTOPOULOS (S&D) COMMENTED SIMILARLY: 12 'DIE WESENTLICHEN STICHWORTE YY SIND ZUM EINEN PARLAMENTARISIERUNG, ALSO DEMOKRATISIERUNG DES INTEGRATIONSPROZESSES INSBESONDERE DURCH EINEN PARLAMEN TARISIERUNGSPROZESS, ABER AUCH POLITISIERUNG UND ENTNATIONALISIERUNG DER DEBATTE'. 13 'DASS AUCH AUS DEM NATIONALEN PARLAMENT HERAUS EIN POLITISIERUNGSPROZESS STATTFINDEN KANN, DER VON EMINENTER BEDEUTUNG IST'. 14 'DASS DIESES EUROPAEISCHE PARLAMENT IN DIESEN HAUSHALTSFRAGEN IN DER VERANTWORTUNG GEWACHSEN IST UND SICH AUCH IN DIESEN FRAGEN POLITISIERT HAT'. 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 85 'TODAY'S DEBATE YY REPRESENTS A FIRST ESSENTIAL STEP TOWARDS THE POLITICI SATION OF THE BUDGET PROCEDURE' (21 APRIL 2008) AND THE LEADING SOCIAL DEMOCRAT MARTIN SCHULZ SUPPORTED THE POLITICISATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE BUDGET AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 15 (14 DECEMBER 2010). A THOROUGH DEBATE OF THE BUDGET IS A CLASSICAL PARLIAMENTARY ANSWER TO CLAIMS OF ARBI TRARINESS, BY INSTITUTING A PROCEDURE FOR THE DEBATING OF ITEMS PRO ET CONTRA IN SEVERAL ROUNDS IN THE PLENUM AND IN COMMITTEES. AMONG THE EPP MEMBERS, MARIA DA ASSUNCAO ESTEVES CONTENDED:
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|a 'HAVING MANY GROUPS CAN HELP PARLIAMENT POLITICISE BUREAUCRATIC EUROPE, BECAUSE A DEMOCRACY IS A DEMOCRACY AND NOT AN ORDER' (7 JULY 2008). HERE SHE SEES THE DECISIVE CONTEST AS BEING BETWEEN THE BUREAUCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIC WAYS OF DOING POLITICS. ELMAR BROK (EPP) EQUALLY SUPPORTED THE POLITICISATION OF EU SUMMITS AS A WAY TO LIMIT THE IMPACT OF TECHNOCRATIC TENDENCIES (3 JULY 1996; 19 DECEMBER 1997; 4 JULY 2001). CLAUDIA ROTH (GRUENE) PRAISED THE RESIGNING EP PRESIDENT KLAUS HAENSCH (S&D) FOR HAVING POLITICISED DEBATE IN THE EP 16 (12 DECEMBER 1996). STRENGTHENING THE PARLIAMENTARY STYLE OF CONTROVERSIAL DEBATE IS, FOR ROTH, THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE AGAINST JACQUES SANTER'S COMMIS SION, CLAUDE DELCROIX (S&D) EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO DEMAND THE PARLIAMENTARISATION OF THE EU COMMISSION AS A POLITICISING MOVE: MY THIRD POINT CONCERNS THE DESIRE TO BETTER POLITICISE RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND THE COMMISSION AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, TO REDUCE THE UNION'S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE THAT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT YY IS CALLED ON SO LITTLE WHEN IT COMES TO APPOINTING THE COMMISSION AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION. THIS GOES AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES OF OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. WHAT IS MORE, PARLIA MENT'S DEMOCRATIC CREDIBILITY WILL ONLY BE TRULY STRENGTHENED WHEN, AS OUR DECLARATION REQUESTS, 'A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION (ARE) CHOSEN FROM AMONG SITTING MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'. (13 JANUARY 1999) 15 'ICH MOECHTE MICH AN ALL DIEJENIGEN KOLLEGINNEN UND KOLLEGEN AUS DEM HAUSHALTSAUSS CHUSS WENDEN, DIE SICH DARUEBER BEKLAGT HABEN, DASS ES EINE POLITISIERUNG DIESER DEBATTE GEGEBEN HAT. ICH WILL IHNEN SAGEN, DAS IST DIE LOGIK AUS DEM NEUEN VERFAHREN, DASS WIR UEBER EINE HAUSHALTSTECHNIK HINAUSGEHEN UND UEBER EINE WIRKLICHE HAUSHALTSPOLITIK REDEN MUESSEN'. 16 'SIE HABEN ES
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|a GESCHAFFT, DIE DEBATTE HIER IM HAUSE ZU POLITISIEREN'. 86 K. PALONEN THIS LATTER DEMAND WAS A REACTIVATION OF EARLIER DEBATES ABOUT THE WESTMINSTER-STYLE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF BOTH PARLIAMENTARY AND COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP (SEE SELINGER, 2019 ). THIS PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN NARROWLY REJECTED IN 1960 IN FAVOUR OF INCOMPATIBILITY IN THE NAME OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (SEE THE 1969 CASE , ALSO DISCUSSED IN PALONEN, FORTHCOMING). ON A FEW RARE OCCASIONS, THERE HAVE EVEN BEEN DEMANDS FOR THE POLITICISATION OF MATTERS THAT WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY CONTROVERSIAL. SOME GERMAN GREENS MOVED FOR THE POLITICISING OF CERTAIN LIFESTYLE QUESTIONS, AS HANNELORE SAIBOLD (GRUENE) ARGUED FOR CONSUMPTION 17 (6 MAY 1987). SHE NOT ONLY WANTED TO POLITICISE SOMETHING 'PRIVATE', IN LINE WITH THE SLOGAN 'THE PRIVATE/THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL', BUT ALSO TO CIRCUMVENT THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE OF PUBLIC REGULATION. WITH THIS IN MIND, SHE FAVOURED A VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION OF CONSUMERS AS A MEANS OF POLITICISATION. PETER SELLIN (GRUENE) PRESENTED A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TYPE OF DEMAND 18 (23 NOVEMBER 1988). HE ASSERTED THAT POLITICISATION SHOULD TRANSCEND THE MINIMALIST VIEW OF MAXIMISATION OR OPTIMISATION OF 'INDUSTRIAL POLICY'. FOR SELLIN, THIS WAS NOT MERELY A POLICY QUESTION BUT IMPLIED THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND POLITICISING DEBATE ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVES FOR INDUSTRY. THESE DEBATES COULD EITHER OPEN UP CONTROVERSIES FOR POLITICKING WITHIN THE INDUSTRY OR ELSE CONNECT INDUSTRIAL QUESTIONS MORE CLOSELY WITH THE POLITY, AS THE FREQUENT REFERENCE TO DEMOCRACY IN SELLIN'S SPEECH SUGGESTS. 4 THE RHETORIC OF POLITICISATION FOR REINHART KOSELLECK ( 1972 ), DEMOCRATISATION AND POLITICISATION ARE CENTRAL HYPOTHESES OF THE CONCEPTUAL CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT LEAST IN THE GERMAN-SPEAKING PARTS OF EUROPE FROM THE SATTELZEIT (1770- 1850) ONWARDS. IN CONTEMPORARY PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, DEMOCRACY HAS FOR DECADES BEEN A
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|a DESCRIPTIVE-NORMATIVE CONCEPT. THE USE OF IT IS EQUAL TO DEMANDING IT, AS QUENTIN SKINNER HAS SAID ( 1973 , 1974 ). ON THE CONTRARY, TO TALKING OF SOMETHING BEING 'POLITICISED' APPEARS, TO MANY SPEAKERS, TO BE SUFFICIENT PER SE TO CONDEMN THE CHANGE. IN PART, THIS IS RELATED TO 17 'ALLES TUN, UM EINE POLITISIERUNG DES KONSUMS ZU ERREICHEN, D. H. EINEN GEZIELTEN EINSATZ DES PRIVATEN GELDES; DENN DIE ANGEBLICHE OHNMACHT DER VERBRAUCHER MUSS IN MACHT VERWANDELT WARDEN'. 18 'DEMOKRATIE VERLANGT GERADEZU DIE POLITISIERUNG INDUSTRIEPOLITISCHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN'. 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 87 THE USE OF POLITICISATION (AS KOSELLECK DOES) IN THE SENSE OF PARTISANSHIP, EITHER IN FAVOUR OF ONE PARTY OR DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN PARTIES (SEE PALONEN, 2012A ). HARDLY ANY PARLIAMENTARIAN IS WILLING TO DO AWAY WITH POLITICS AS SUCH. EVEN THE THATCHERITE KEITH JOSEPH ONLY WANTED TO 'KEEP POLITICS IN ITS PLACE'. THE FIERCEST ADVERSARIES OF POLITICISATION ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE RANGE OF THE CONCEPT TO POLICIES THAT A PRIORI FAVOUR THEIR ADVER SARIES, ALTHOUGH FOR THE UKIP MEPS ALL EU POLITICS WAS WORTHY OF CONDEMNATION. IN BRITAIN, POLITICISING TENDS TO BE REGARDED AS HIGHLY PEJORATIVE. FOR JOHN BIFFEN (CONS.) POLITICISATION WAS AN 'UGLY WORD' (12 JUNE 1974) AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAMES CALLAGHAN (LAB.) REFERRED TO IT AS 'THAT AWFUL WORD' (11 JULY 1983). IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BRITISH RIGHT-WING MEMBERS ASSUMED THAT BY SPEAKING OF 'POLITICISATION' THEY COULD SILENCE THEIR OPPONENTS OR REDUCE THE QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION TO A CONTEST OF WHOSE 'FACTS' WERE MORE PLAUSIBLE. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF ITS OVERALL PROFILE THE EP, WITH SEVERAL PRO-POLITICISATION SPEECHES, EVEN FROM MEMBERS OF THE EPP FACTION, IS CLOSER TO THE BUNDESTAG THAN TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. AN ALTERNATIVE RHETORICAL STRATEGY COMBINES THE PRACTICES OF A RE EVALUATION OF THE NORMATIVE TONE WITH A CHANGE TO
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|a THE CORE MEANING OR THE RANGE OF REFERENCE OF THE TERM (SEE SKINNER, 1979 , 1996 ). I HAVE DISCUSSED EXAMPLES OF SUCH PARADIASTOLIC MOVES TO TRANSFORM POLITICISATION, WITH CERTAIN CONDITIONS, FROM A DEPRECIATED TO AN APPRECIATED CONCEPT. MOST OF THOSE EXAMPLES, FROM WALTER SCHEEL AND HELMUT SCHMIDT, THROUGH EDWARD HEATH AND TONY WRIGHT, TO ROBERTO GALTIERI AND MARTIN SCHULZ, EMPHASISE THAT POLITICISATION IS LESS DANGEROUS THAN WHAT IS COMMONLY THOUGHT AND ALSO CONTAINS VALUABLE AND WIDELY ACCEPTED DIMENSIONS OF ACTION. ANOTHER OF THESE PROPONENTS, DENNIS SKINNER, ASSUMED THAT WITH THE POLITICISATION OF APPOINTMENTS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE PATTERNS OF UNDERREPRESENTATION IN THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE. HEDDA HAUSER'S ACCEP TANCE OF AN ACHIEVED POLITICISATION MADE VISIBLE THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF A PHENOMENON THAT WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY RECOGNISED. BOTH ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL QUALITY IN THE PHENOMENA. DYKES, FISCHER, AND STERZING, AS WELL AS DELCROIX, ROTH, AND BOTOPOULOS IN THE EP, ARE WILLING TO REGARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS SOMETHING MORE VALUABLE THAN THEIR ADVERSARIES. TO ASSIST THIS INTEGRATION, THEY REQUIRE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN FAVOUR OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE PROCEDURES FOR AGENDA-SETTING IN EU INSTITUTIONS, IN ORDER TO SECURE MORE 88 K. PALONEN OPENLY POLITICAL, PARLIAMENTARY-STYLE DEBATES AS AN AIM IN ITSELF, WITHOUT EXPECTING ANY GUARANTEES THAT POLITICISATION WOULD FAVOUR THEIR OWN SIDE. IDENTIFYING SOMETHING AS POLITICAL THAT HAD NOT BEEN INTERPRETED AS SUCH BEFORE WAS THE COMMON FACTOR IN THE DEMANDS FOR POLITICISATION MADE BY THE GREEN POLITICIANS SAIBOLD, SELLIN, AND ROTH. TELKAEMPER AND RUEHLE IN THE EP PLACED A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT NUANCE. THEIR MAIN INTEN TION WAS TO STIMULATE CONTROVERSY ON TOPICS IN THE PARLIAMENTARY AGENDA, WHICH, IN A SENSE, HAD NOT ARISEN AS AN ISSUE BEFORE. THEY WANTED TO GIVE A NEW MOMENTUM TO THE EXISTING DEBATE AND THEREBY 'PARLIAMENTARISE' QUESTIONS, AS WELL AS
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|a ALTERING THE PROFILE OF ITEMS TO BE DEBATED ON THE PARLIAMENTARY AGENDA. IN THE DISPUTES ON POLITICISATION, WE CAN FURTHER IDENTIFY TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS. FOR THOSE WHO ADHERE TO THE PARTY PARADIGM, POLITICISATION MARKS A VICTORY FOR EITHER THEIR OWN SIDE OR THE OPPOSITION. FOR THOSE WHO REGARD POLITICISATION AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE RATHER THAN RESULTS, THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT IS THE SETTING OF QUES TIONS ON THE AGENDA, FOLLOWED BY A FAIR AND THOROUGH DEBATE. IN THIS PERSPECTIVE, THERE IS WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE MEMBERS TO CHANGE THE CONSTELLATION OF VOTING IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT. IN THIS REGARD, POLITICISATION MARKS THE OPEN RECOGNITION OF POLITICS AS A CONTINGENT AND CONTROVERSIAL ACTIVITY. AS FAR AS THE FOCUS ON THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICIANS AS THE PRIMARY ACTORS IS CONCERNED, I HAVE ILLUSTRATED NOT ONLY HOW THE RHETORICAL USES OF POLITI CISATION DIFFER CONSIDERABLY BUT ALSO HOW THE CONCEPT OF POLITICS SHOWS A REMARKABLE RANGE OF INTERPRETATIONS. IN SO FAR AS MY TYPOLOGY HAS A REFER ENCE TO EXISTING PRACTICES IN ITS FORMULATION, I CONCUR WITH THE SENSE OF WHAT QUENTIN SKINNER ( 1974 ) WRITES WHEN HE REFERS TO THE 'INNOVATING IDEOLOGIST'. LIKE SUCH IDEOLOGISTS, THOSE PARLIAMENTARIANS WHO ACCEPT, SUPPORT OR DEMAND POLITICISATION DO SO BY EXTENDING ITS USAGE FROM CONTEXTS IN WHICH IT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO OTHERS. IN THIS WAY, THEY OPEN UP ASPECTS OF CONTINGENCY AND CONTROVERSY, THEREBY CREATING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICKING AND FOR THEIR LEGITIMISATION WITH THE POLITIES IN QUESTION. 4 POLITICISATION AS A SPEECH ACT: A REPERTOIRE FOR ANALYSING YY 89 REFERENCES PARLIMENTARY SOURCES THE 1969 CASE. THE CASE FOR ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. SELECTED DOCUMENTS . HTTP://AEI.PITT.EDU/33744/1/A305. PDF . DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHEN UND PLENARPROTOKOLLE . HTTPS://PDOK.BUNDES TAG.DE/ . EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, PLENARY, DEBATES AND VIDEOS.
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|a HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA. EU/PLENARY/EN/DEBATES-VIDEO.HTML . THE HANSARD CORPUS . HTTPS://WWW.ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG/HANSARD/L . UK PARLIAMENT, HANSARD, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES . HTTPS:// HANSARD.PARLIAMENT.UK . UK PARLIAMENT, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRA TION: MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07. HTTPS://PUB LICATIONS.PARLIAMENT.UK/PA/CM200607/CMSELECT/CMPUBADM/122/122I.PDF . LITERATURE KOSELLECK, R. (1972). EINLEITUNG. IN O. BRUNNER, W. CONZE & R. KOSELLECK (EDS.), GESCHICHTLICHE GRUNDBEGRIFFE (PP. XIII-XXVII). KLETT. PALONEN, K. (1985). POLITIK ALS HANDLUNGSBEGRIFF. HORIZONTWANDEL DES POLITIKBE GRIFFS IN DEUTSCHLAND 1890-1933 . SOCIETAS SCIENTIARUM FENNICA. PALONEN, K. (1989). KORREKTUREN ZUR GESCHICHTE VON 'POLITISIERUNG.' ARCHIV FUER BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE, 30 , 215-224. PALONEN, K. (2003). FOUR TIMES OF POLITICS: POLICY, POLITY, POLITICKING AND POLITICIZATION. ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL LOCAL, POLITICAL, 28 , 171-186. PALONEN, K. (2005). POLITICAL THEORIZING AS A DIMENSION OF POLITICAL LIFE. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL THEORY, 4 , 351-367. PALONEN, K. (2006). THE STRUGGLE WITH TIME. A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF 'POLITICS' AS AN ACTIVITY. LIT. PALONEN, K. (2010). "OBJEKTIVITAET" ALS FAIRES SPIEL. WISSENSCHAFT ALS POLITIK BEI MAX WEBER . NOMOS. PALONEN, K. (2012A). REINHART KOSELLECK ON TRANSLATION, ANACHRONISM AND CONCEP TUAL CHANGE. IN M. BURKE & M. RICHTER (EDS.), WHY CONCEPTS MATTER? (220 PP.). BRILL. PALONEN, K. (2012B). RHETORIK DES UNBELIEBTEN. LOBREDEN AUF POLITIKER IM ZEITALTER DER DEMOKRATIE . NOMOS. PALONEN, K. (2017). CONCEPTS AND DEBATES: RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONCEP TUAL CHANGE. IN W. STEINMETZ, M. FREEDEN & J. FERNANDEZ SEBASTIAN (EDS.), CONCEPTUAL HISTORY IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE (PP. 96-117). BERGHAHN. 90 K. PALONEN PALONEN, K. (2019). POLITICISATION-DISORDER OR CHANCE. FROM LITERARY TO PARLIA MENTARY DEBATES. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
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|a THEORY, 18 , 249-254. PALONEN, K. (2021). PARLIAMENTARISATION AS POLITICISATION. IN C. WIESNER (ED.), RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (PP. 63-85). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. PALONEN, K. (FORTHCOMING). A LOST OPPORTUNITY TO PARLIAMENTARISE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION-BAGEHOT, WEBER AND A DEBATE IN 1960. HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT . SCHMITT, C. (1932 [1979]). DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN . DUNCKER &HUMBLOT. SELINGER, W. (2019). PARLIAMENTARISM FROM BURKE TO WEBER . CAMBRIDGE UNIVER SITY PRESS. SKINNER, Q. (1973). EMPIRICAL THEORISTS OF DEMOCRACY AND THEIR CRITICS: A PLAGUE IN BOTH HOUSES. POLITICAL THEORY, 1 , 287-304. SKINNER, Q. (1974). SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTION. POLITICAL THEORY, 2 , 277-303. SKINNER, Q. (1978). THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (VOLS. I-III). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. SKINNER, Q. (1979). THE IDEA OF A CULTURAL LEXICON. ESSAYS IN CRITICISM, 29 , 205- 224. SKINNER, Q. (1996). REASON AND RHETORIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. SKINNER, Q. (2007). PARADIASTOLE: REDESCRIBING THE VICES AS VIRTUES. IN S. ADAMSON, G. ALEXANDER, & K. ETTENHUBER (EDS.), RENAISSANCE FIGURES OF SPEECH (PP. 147-163). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. TRIBE, K. (2019). TRANSLATION APPENDIX. IN M. WEBER (ED.), ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. A NEW TRANSLATION (520 PP.). HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS. WEBER, M. (1918 [1988]). PARLAMENT UND REGIERUNG IM NEUGEORDNETEN DEUTSCHLAND. IN W. J. MOMMSEN (ED.), MAX-WEBER-STUDIENAUSGABE I/15 (PP. 202-302). MOHR. WEBER, M. (1919 [1994]). POLITIK ALS BERUF. IN W. J. MOMMSEN & W. SCHLUCHTER (EDS.), MAX-WEBER-STUDIENAUSGABE I/17 (PP. 35-88). MOHR. WIESNER, C. (ED.). (2019). RETHINKING POLITICISATION. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY , 18(SPECIAL ISSUE), 249-284. WIESNER, C. (ED.). (2021). RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C., HAAPALA, T., & PALONEN, K. (2017).
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|a DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION. PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WRIGHT, T. (2012). DOING POLITICS . BITEBACK. CHAPTER 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL : FROM THE FRINGES TOWARDS THE CENTRE OF NATIONAL POLITICS THROUGH EU POLITICISATION NIILO KAUPPI 'THE FRONT NATIONAL , THE MOST EUROPHILE OF EUROPHOBE POLITICAL PARTIES'. (ALBERTINI, 2019) 1 INTRODUCTION MAINSTREAM APPROACHES TO THE EU HAVE IN COMMON A NORMATIVE STANCE IN WHICH THE EU IS SEEN AS AN IMPERFECT PROJECTION OF NATION STATE LEVEL PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS. IN SOME WAYS THIS IS TRUE, AS THE EU HAS EARLIER VERSIONS OF THIS PAPER WERE PRESENTED AT THE CES CONFERENCE IN MADRID IN 2019 AND AT THE DES-ECSA CONFERENCE IN AARHUS IN 2019. THANK YOU TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS AND THE EDITORS OF THIS VOLUME TARU HAAPALA AND ALVARO OLEART FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS. N. KAUPPI ( B ) CNRS, SCIENCES PO STRASBOURG, STRASBOURG, FRANCE E-MAIL: NKAUPPI@UNISTRA.FR THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_5 91 92 N. KAUPPI BECOME, AFTER 70 YEARS OF INTEGRATION, THE GREATEST ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN NATION STATE. IT HAS ITS FLAG, AN ANTHEM, AND EUROPEAN INSTITU TIONS THAT MIMIC NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. IN THIS STORY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN FAMOUSLY LABELLED AS SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS (REIF & SCHMITT, 1980 ), THAT IS SECONDARY TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS WHERE 'REAL' POLITICAL POWER LIES. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THIS STORY WOULD BE A POLITICAL SCIENCE DISCOURSE THAT TAKES POLITICAL ACTION AS THE MAIN UNIT OF ANALYSIS (CF. FOR INSTANCE HAAPALA, 2016 ; KAUPPI, 2005 , 2018 ; KAUPPI & PALONEN, FORTHCOMING; KAUPPI & TRENZ, 2021 ; KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ; KUNZ, 2013 ; LANDORFF, 2019 ; OLEART & BOUZA, 2018 ; PALONEN, 2018 ; REUNGOAT, 2015
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|a ; WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ). THIS POLITICISING APPROACH WOULD NOT FOCUS ON THE EU'S POLITY DEFICIT COMPARED TO NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY'S IDEALISED MODEL, BUT RATHER ON THE PRACTICAL USES OF INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE EP AND THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AGENTS ENGAGED IN THIS SPACE OF ACTION. ANOTHER WAY TO FRAME THIS IS TO SAY THAT WHAT IS OF SCHOLARLY INTEREST IS HOW POLIT ICAL AGENTS MANIPULATE AND BYPASS THIS EUROPEAN NORMATIVE ORDER FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. THIS PERSPECTIVE REDIRECTS SCHOLARLY ATTENTION TO POLITICAL STRATEGY, CAPITAL, RHETORIC, AND CAREERS AWAY FROM DEPOLITICISED, STATIC, AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES. LET'S TALK POLITICS! THE MAIN POINT OF THIS CHAPTER IS THAT EP ELECTIONS ARE NOT SECOND ORDER ELECTIONS FOR POLITICAL UNDERDOGS LIKE FRONT NATIONAL (OR UKIP). FOR THEM AND SIMILAR PARTIES, THE EP ELECTIONS ARE FIRST-ORDER ELECTIONS THAT HAVE ENABLED POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND PROVIDED A VENUE FOR GROWING INFLUENCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS. AFTER PRESENTING A FEW PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGICAL POINTS, I WILL DISCUSS THE FRONT NATIONAL' S USES OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS THAT PREVENTED ITS INSTITUTIONALISATION IN FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FINISH WITH ANALYSIS OF THE PARTY'S CONVERSIONS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN ITS METAMORPHOSIS INTO WHAT WE NOW KNOW AS THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL . 2 THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES: THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION SOCIOLOGICALLY SPEAKING, THE USE AND EXCHANGE VALUE OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN RELATION TO NATIONAL POLITICAL CAPITAL HAS INCREASED. POLITICAL SOCIOLOGIST DANIEL GAXIE ( 2003 , P. 16) DIVIDES THE AREA OF DEMO CRATIC COMPETITION INTO TWO POLITICAL FIELDS, THE CENTRAL POLITICAL AND THE PERIPHERIC POLITICAL FIELDS. THE FIRST ONE INCLUDES POSITIONS OF POWER IN 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 93 NATION STATES, WHILE THE SECOND ONE INVOLVES POSITIONS AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS. GAXIE
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|a DESCRIBES THE LATTER AS SPECIFIC SPACES OF DEMOCRATIC COMPETI TION THAT ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE CENTRAL POLITICAL FIELD. NEARLY 20 YEARS AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF GAXIE'S SEMINAL STUDY, THE POLITICAL GAME HAS CHANGED AS POLITICAL AUTHORITY HAS, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, SHIFTED FROM NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL LEVELS TO SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (CF. HOOGHE & MARKS, 2001 ). IT IS THEN NECESSARY TO ADD A THIRD POLITICAL FIELD, THE EUROPEAN ONE, TO THE TWO PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED. THESE THREE FIELDS, OR RATHER SUBFIELDS, OVERLAP TO VARYING DEGREES AND ARE IN AN INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE ANOTHER (CF. KUNZ, 2013 ; LANDORFF, 2019 ). METHODOLOGICALLY, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SEPARATE THEM FROM ONE ANOTHER. I WILL CALL THIS LARGER UNIT OF INTERACTION A MULTILEVELLED POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (KAUPPI, 2005 , FORTHCOMING) THAT INCLUDES THREE POLITICAL SUBSPACES, THE EUROPEAN, THE NATIONAL (WHICH IS STILL IN MANY RESPECTS THE CENTRAL POLITICAL SUBFIELD), AND THE REGIONAL/LOCAL. THESE ALL HAVE THEIR OWN LOGICS OF POLITICAL COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AS WELL AS RULES OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION. THE INTERFACES BETWEEN THESE FIELDS HAVE TO DO WITH THE USES OF THESE SPECIFIC CAPITAL IN OTHER SUBFIELDS, AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL, THE LEVEL OF POLICIES, AND THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL AGENTS, PARTIES, AND INDIVIDUALS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND PARTIES' POLITICAL STRATEGIES AT ONE LEVEL WITHOUT PUTTING THEM IN RELATION TO LOGICS IN OTHER FIELDS. THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS CHANGED THE HORIZON OF POLITICAL ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL GROUPS SUCH AS PARTIES BUT ALSO NGOS. IT OFFERS NUMEROUS MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL RESOURCES OR CAPITAL. FOR ESTABLISHED CARTEL PARTIES (KATZ & MAIR, 1995 ), THAT IS, PARTIES THAT USE STATE RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND DOMINATE BOTH NATIONAL AND REGIONAL/LOCAL POLITICAL SUBFIELDS, THE EUROPEAN SUBFIELD IS AN EXTENSION OF
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|a NATIONAL POLITICS. IT IS PART OF THE POLITICAL REWARD SYSTEM (BAILEY, 1969 ) WITH POSITION IN THE EP AND THE EUROPEAN BUREAUCRACY. FOR POLITICIANS MARGINALISED IN THEIR OWN PARTIES, MEMBERS OF SMALL OR NEW POLITICAL PARTIES THAT DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO NATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL, ITS FUNDING, AND ITS NETWORKS, THE EP HAS BEEN A LIFE SAVER (HIX & LORD, 1997 , P. 90; REUNGOAT, 2015 ). AT THE OUTSET, THIS RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE PRESUPPOSES TAKING A HOLISTIC AND DYNAMIC VIEW TO THE EU AS A POLITY. THIS CONCEPTUAL PRECISION PROVIDES A STARTING POINT FOR A 'PHENOMENOLOGICAL' APPROACH TO EUROPEAN POLITICS THAT EXPLORES AGENTS AND GROUPS, THEIR STRATEGIES, CONSTRAINTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AS THE KEY ISSUES OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. INTERESTING RESEARCH 94 N. KAUPPI QUESTIONS WOULD BE FOR INSTANCE HOW EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CAPITAL ARE ACCUMULATED AND CONVERTED, HOW DO POLITICIANS CIRCULATE BETWEEN THESE SUBFIELDS (CAREER MOBILITY), OR HOW POLITICAL ISSUES AND AGENDAS ARE TRANSLATED FROM ONE SUBFIELD TO ANOTHER? FOR POLITICAL AGENTS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN POLITICAL SUBFIELD MEANS NEW POWER RESOURCES. EUROPEAN CAPITAL REFERS TO CAPITAL ACCUMU LATED AT THE TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL. POLITICAL CAPITAL REFERS TO THE SYMBOLIC CREDIT OR LEGITIMACY AGENTS SUCCEED IN ACCUMULATING IN THE POLITICAL FIELD (CF. BENIT-GBAFFOU & KATSAURA, 2014 ; BENNISTER & WORTHY, 2012 ; CASEY, 2008 ; CF. ALSO GAXIE, 1973 ; KAUPPI, 2005 ), MOST NOTABLY IN THE ELECTORAL MARKET BY WINNING A SEAT IN FOR EXAMPLE THE EP ELECTIONS OR BY BEING NOMINATED TO A POLITICAL POSITION SUCH AS THAT OF EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER. THE FIRST TYPE OF POLITICAL CAPITAL COULD BE CALLED LEGISLATIVE EUROPEAN POLIT ICAL CAPITAL WHILE THE SECOND TYPE IS A FORM OF EXECUTIVE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CAPITAL. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CAPITAL HAVE DIFFERENT PROPERTIES. WHILE THE FIRST ONE IS ACCESSED VIA AN ELECTION TO THE EP, THE SECOND ONE IS REACHED VIA A POLITICAL APPOINTMENT. WHILE THE
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|a FIRST ONE IS CONVERTED WITH DIFFICULTY TO THE SECOND, THE REVERSE IS EASIER. IN CONTRAST TO THE WEAK CORRELATION OF LEGISLATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CAPITAL WITH NATIONAL POLITICAL CAPITAL, EXECUTIVE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CAPITAL CORRELATES POSITIVELY WITH HIGH LEVELS OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POLITICAL CAPITAL SUCH AS MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE. WITH THESE THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES IN MIND, IN THIS CHAPTER I WILL ANALYSE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL SUBFIELD AND ITS POLITICISING STRATEGIES IN THE EU ELECTIONS. THE MOST COMMON RESPONSE IN THE VARIOUS NATIONAL POLITICAL SUBFIELDS TO THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT HAS BEEN THE REJECTION BY THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT (E.G. THE CASES OF THE DANISH DANSKE FOLKEPARTI, THE FINNISH PERUSSUO MALAISET ,TH ES W ED I S H SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA ,TH EF R EN C H FRONT NATIONAL , THE BRITISH UKIP YY ). WHILE THIS PRACTICE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MOST NATIONAL POLITICAL FIELDS UNTIL NOW, THE IMPACT OF THE RISE OF EXTREME RIGHT MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES SINCE THE 1980S IN ALL SUBFIELDS HAS BEEN CONSIDER ABLE. THE PRESSURE TO INTEGRATE THESE PARTIES IS STRONGER THAN EVER, CARTEL PARTIES ADOPTING THE RHETORIC AND GOALS OF THE EXTREME RIGHT. BREXIT IS AN EXTREME EXAMPLE OF NATIONAL FIELD RESPONSES TO THESE PRESSURES FROM NON CARTEL PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, EXPLAINING HOW THE FRONT NATIONAL IS TODAY A MAJOR POLITICAL FORCE WITH 23 MEPS, 8 DEPUTIES IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND 358 REGIONAL COUNCILLORS, AND THAT LE PEN IS, WITH MACRON, THE ONLY SERIOUS CANDIDATE FOR THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY IN 2022, REQUIRES ANALYSING 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 95 THE PARTY IN A COMPLEX SET OF EVOLVING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS IN A DYNAMIC POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SPACE OF CREATIVE POLITICAL ACTION AND TRANSACTION. SIMILAR PARTIES IN OTHER EU MEMBER STATES INCLUDE FOR INSTANCE THE SWEDISH SVERIGEDEMOKRA TERNA WITH 2 MEPS DURING THE 2014-2019 TERM AND 3 MEPS IN THE CURRENT TERM
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|a BEGINNING FROM 2019, OR THE FLEMISH VLAAMS BELANG WITH 3 MEPS. 3 THE CASE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL THE FRENCH ELECTORAL TWO-ROUND SYSTEM AND THE STRATEGY OF CARTEL PARTIES OF 'USEFUL VOTE', WHICH CONSISTS IN RALLYING AGAINST THE EXTREME RIGHT CANDI DATE IN CASE THERE WAS ONE IN THE SECOND ROUND OF THE LOCAL/REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS, HAS FAVOURED CARTEL PARTIES AND PREVENTED SMALLER PARTIES FROM ACCUMULATING ELECTORAL POLITICAL CAPITAL AND, DE FACTO, BLOCKING CHANCES OF SOLID INSTITUTIONALISATION IN THE LOCAL/REGIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICAL SUBFIELDS. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE IN THE FRENCH CASE INCLUDE THE PRESIDENTIAL AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, BOTH ELECTIONS IN WHICH THE EXTREME RIGHT HAS TRADITIONALLY HAD SOME SUCCESS. WITH THE PROPORTIONAL VOTING SYSTEM TO THE EP AND THE GENEROUS (AND UNTIL NOW RELATIVELY UNCONTROLLED FUNDING), THE EUROPEAN SUBFIELD HAS PROVIDED A DETOUR PATH OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALISATION FOR THESE POLITICAL CHALLENGERS. FOR SOME TIME, DISCUSSION AMONG EXPERTS HAS BEEN ONGOING CONCERNING THE MODALITIES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU INTO A MORE DEMOCRATIC DIREC TION. FOR MANY, THE EP PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. WITH THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION, THE EP HAS BECOME A MAJOR SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTION THAT CARRIES MAJOR POLITICAL WEIGHT. RESEARCH SHOWS THAT IT IS NO LONGER A RETIREMENT VENUE FOR POLITICIANS ON DESCENDING POLITICAL CAREERS BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, A PLATFORM FOR VARIOUS ASCENDANT POLITICAL CAREERS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE EP HAS CHANGED FROM A SOURCE OF MOSTLY NEGATIVE POLITICAL CAPITAL (DESCENDING POLITICAL CAREERS) INTO A SOURCE OF POSITIVE POLITICAL CAPITAL (ASCENDANT POLITICAL CAREERS). THE POSITIVE USERS INCLUDE SMALLER PARTIES LIKE THE FRONT NATIONAL , REGIONAL/LOCAL POLITICIANS WHO DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AND ITS NETWORKS AND FEMALE POLITICIANS WHO HAVE BEEN MARGINALISED IN MALE-DOMINATED POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS (SEE BEAUVALLET & MICHON, 2010 ; KAUPPI, 2005 ;
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|a FOR A FULLER ANALYSIS OF THE PARTY, SEE FOR INSTANCE DELWIT, 2012 ; MAYER, 2018 ). MORE RECENT RESEARCH SHOWS THAT ESPECIALLY SMALLER FRINGE PARTIES ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT HAVE USED THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AS A 96 N. KAUPPI SPACE FOR POLITICAL ACTION THAT IS CONNECTED IN TERMS OF BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL TO DOMESTIC POLITICS. SOCIOLOGICALLY SPEAKING, THE EP HAS BEEN THE OBJECT OF POSITIVE USES IN WHICH THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE POLIT ICAL CAPITAL IT PRODUCES HAS BEEN ACCUMULATED AND CONVERTED INTO NATIONAL POLITICAL CAPITAL WHICH HAS ENABLED CONTINUED DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACTION. POLITICAL PARTIES AND INDIVIDUAL POLITICIANS MAKE DIVERSIFIED USES OF THE EUROPEAN LEVEL. PARTIES ARE ORGANISED IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. WHILE TRANSNATIONAL LISTS FOR EP ELECTIONS DO NOT EXIST YET, SEVERAL LEADING POLITI CIANS SUCH AS EMMANUEL MACRON SUPPORT THEM. EUROPEAN CAPITAL REFERS TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATED IN THIS POLITICAL SUBFIELD. IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE, BY ECONOMIC CAPITAL IS MEANT THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, ECONOMIC CAPITAL IS THE MOST IMPORTANT SECONDARY CAPITAL. BY SECONDARY CAPITAL IS MEANT A CAPITAL THAT CAN BE USED OUTSIDE ITS PRIMARY FIELD, IN THIS CASE THE ECONOMIC FIELD, AND CONVERTED INTO SOME OTHER TYPE OF CAPITAL, HERE POLITICAL CAPITAL. ECONOMIC CAPITAL CAN BE BROUGHT INTO USE IN THE POLITICAL FIELD BY FINANCING ONE'S OWN POLIT ICAL ACTIVITIES, OR IT CAN BE GENERATED IN THE POLITICAL FIELD ITSELF. IT CAN BE INDIVIDUAL, THAT IS TIED TO AN INDIVIDUAL AGENT AND AVAILABLE FOR HER USE, OR COLLECTIVE, THAT IS USED AMONG AND IN A GROUP OF PEOPLE SUCH AS A POLITICAL PARTY OR SOME OTHER KIND OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, FIELD-GENERATED ECONOMIC CAPITAL INCLUDES INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC CAPITAL LIKE SALARIES AND PERKS, BUT ALSO COLLECTIVE ASSETS MANAGED BY POLITICAL GROUPS FOR INSTANCE THOSE THAT CAN BE USED FOR HIRING ASSISTANTS AND OTHER POLITICAL PERSONNEL OR TO COVER
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|a PARTY CAMPAIGN EXPENSES. THE LATTER CAN BE PUBLIC MONEY WHEN WE ARE LOOKING AT THE PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY. BUT, IT CAN ALSO BE PRIVATE ECONOMIC CAPITAL FROM DONORS, 'SUPPORTERS', OR PARTY MEMBERS IN FRANCE OR ABROAD. ALTHOUGH THE USES OF COLLECTIVE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CAPITAL ARE IN THEORY LEGALLY AND SOCIALLY REGULATED, POLITICAL AGENTS SPEND CONSIDER ABLE ENERGY IN DEVISING STRATEGIES TO BYPASS THESE RULES AND CONVENTIONS. THE STRATEGY IS TO TRANSFORM THIS EUROPEAN, PUBLIC ECONOMIC CAPITAL INTO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CAPITAL. THESE STRATEGIES HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY VISIBLE IN THE CASE OF SEVERAL SMALLER FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES, THE LIBERAL-RIGHT-WING MODEM , THE EXTREME LEFTIST LA FRANCE INSOUMISE , AND THE EXTREME RIGHTIST FRONT NATIONAL . NUMEROUS LAWSUITS HAVE BEEN FILED AGAINST THESE UNDER FUNDED PARTIES OVER MISUSES OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC FUNDS. ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN THE FORM OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES IS NECESSARY TO ACCESS POLITICAL CAPITAL, INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE, AND TO ACCUMULATE MORE ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN THE FORM OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC CAPITAL. WE 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 97 ARE TALKING ABOUT RELATIVELY LARGE SUMS. IN THE CASE OF MARINE LE PEN'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 2017 IT WAS ESTIMATED AT 8 MILLION EUROS. THE FRONT NATIONAL WAS ABLE TO ACCUMULATE EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE POLIT ICAL CAPITAL THANKS TO ITS SUCCESS IN EP ELECTIONS WHICH WAS DUE TO THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MORE BROADLY. THIS ANTI-EU POLITICAL POSITIONING DISTINGUISHED IT FROM THE FRENCH CARTEL PARTIES AND THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM. 4 THE POLITICISATION OF EP ELECTIONS AS FIRST-ORDER ELECTIONS THE RESULT OF THE LATEST EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN 2019 IS RELATIVELY CLEAR. THE BIG WINNERS WERE THE GREENS, CHALLENGING ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE LEFT, AND ON THE RIGHT, THE EXTREME RIGHT OR RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES. THE SUCCESS OF THE GREENS AND THE EXTREME RIGHT AS CHALLENGERS OF MAINSTREAM LEFT-WING
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|a AND RIGHT-WING CARTEL PARTIES HAD BEEN IN THE WORKS IN NATIONAL SUBFIELDS FOR SOME TIME AND HAD BEEN BUBBLING ALSO IN THE EUROPEAN SUBFIELD IN PREVIOUS EP ELECTIONS (MUDDE, 2007 ; PAPPAS, 2016 ). SOME LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENTS EXPLAIN THE 2019 OUTCOME: THE DISENCHANTMENT IN POLITICS OF LARGE PARTS OF THE ELECTORATE, THE 'BOWLING ALONE SYNDROME' WHICH CONSISTS OF A WITHDRAWAL FROM COMMUNITY ACTIV ITIES, UNIFORM ECONOMIC NEOLIBERAL POLICIES PROMOTED BY LEFTISTS AND RIGHTIST GOVERNMENTS ALIKE, POLITICAL SCANDALS AND CORRUPTION, DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN EUROPEAN POPULATIONS, AND THE ENSUING ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND POLARISATION. IN THE 2019 EP ELECTIONS, WHAT WE DID SEE FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1979, WAS A CLEAR EUROPEANISATION AND POLITICISATION OF CAMPAIGN ISSUES. CAMPAIGNS WERE NOT JUST ABOUT DOMESTIC ISSUES BUT ABOUT EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL ISSUES SUCH AS CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMMIGRATION. HOWEVER, THIS EUROPEANISATION AND POLITICISATION OF EU POLITICS IS NOT TOTALLY NEW EITHER. IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL SUBFIELD, THE CRASH OF ESTABLISHED CONSERVATIVES ( LES REPUBLICAINS ) AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY ( PARTI SOCIALISTE ) WAS ALREADY CLEAR IN THE VICTORY OF EMMANUEL MACRON TO THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY IN MAY 2017, AND IN THE ENSUING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN JUNE 2017. IN REALITY, WE WITNESSED A LITERAL REVOLUTION IN THE PARTY-POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, WHERE THE 'NEITHER LEFT NOR RIGHT' LA REPUBLIQUE EN MARCHE GOT NEARLY 60% OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS. MACRON'S VICTORY WAS ALSO A VICTORY FOR FAR RIGHT LEADER MARINE LE PEN (CF. BOUZA AND OLEART'S CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME), HIS ADVERSARY IN THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 2017, NOW 98 N. KAUPPI THE ONLY CREDIBLE COUNTERFORCE TO MACRON'S RE-ELECTION IN THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 2022. MACRON'S SUCCESS WAS, HOWEVER, MITIGATED BY THE FACT THAT MANY VOTED FOR HIM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT LE PEN TO GET ELECTED. HOWEVER, MACRON'S 'CENTRIST'
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|a MOVEMENT SOON REVEALED ITS TRUE COLOURS, SOLIDLY ON THE RIGHT, LEADING TO THE SURGE OF THE GILETS JAUNES MOVEMENT THAT HAS SINCE 2018 UNDERMINED MACRON'S AUTHORITY AND THE WHOLE POLITICAL ORDER, EUROPEAN SUBFIELD INCLUDED. DESPITE SOME CONCESSIONS HE WAS FORCED TO MAKE, TO THIS DAY MACRON HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY DEFUSE THIS SYSTEM POLITICISATION. THE CRASH OF ESTAB LISHED MODERATE RIGHT AND SOCIALIST/SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES LED IN THE LAST PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 2017 TO A SURGE OF EMMANUEL MACRON'S 'CENTRIST' POLITICAL MOVEMENT EN MARCHE . WHILE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS FOR 'FIRST ORDER' POLITICAL PARTIES, FOR SMALLER, NON-CARTEL PARTIES, EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF DIRECT ELECTIONS IN 1979, FIRST-ORDER ELEC TIONS THAT HAVE ENABLED THE ACCUMULATION OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE POLITICAL CAPITAL, WHICH HAS PROVIDED THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO SURVIVE POLITICALLY. THE EXAMPLE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL DEMONSTRATES THIS, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIA MENT AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (TABLE 1 ) . THE HISTORY OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL FIELD HAS BEEN COLOURFUL, INVOLVING BETRAYALS, SCISSIONS, AND CONSTANT HAGGLING OVER ELECTION LISTS, POLITICAL PRIORITIES, AND FINANCES. ALREADY FOR THE FIRST DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EP IN 1979, THE 6-YEAR-OLD FRONT NATIONAL WAS POISED TO BE ON THE SAME LIST WITH ANOTHER EXTREME RIGHT PARTY, THE PARTI DES FORCES NOUVELLES ( PFN ). FOLLOWING DISPUTES OVER MONEY, PFN RAN ALONE, GETTING A MEAGRE 1.3% OF THE VOTE. FIVE YEARS LATER, IN 1984, THE SITUATION WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. FOLLOWING A MODEST BUT IMPORTANT SUCCESS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, AT CANTONAL ELECTIONS IN 1982 AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS THE FOLLOWING YEAR, THE FRONT NATIONAL MADE ITS BREAKTHROUGH INTO ELECTORAL POLITICS. ALREADY IN 1982, JEAN-MARIE LE PEN, A FORMER POUJADIST DEPUTY AND SUPPORTER OF FRENCH ALGERIA, HAD COMMUNICATED
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|a WITH THE FRENCH PRESI DENT OF THE REPUBLIC FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, COMPLAINING ABOUT THE WEAK VISIBILITY OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA. PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF THIS DISCUSSION, AND TO THE SURPRISE OF MANY OUTRAGED CITIZENS, ON 13 FEBRUARY 1984, LE PEN WAS THE MAIN GUEST ON THE MOST IMPOR TANT POLITICAL TELEVISION PROGRAMME OF THE TIME, L'HEURE DE VERITE .I NTH I S PROGRAMME, THE JOURNALISTS PRESENTED LE PEN AND HIS PARTY AS 'HAVING AN ELECTORAL EXISTENCE YY (AND) BEING PART OF FRENCH POLITICS' (LE PEN, 1984 ). 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 99 TABLE 1 THE FRONT NATIONAL IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, NUMBER OF SEATS. IN 1986, THE 35 SEATS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WERE DUE TO THE TEMPORARY TRANSFORMATION OF VOTING TO A PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM EP/NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 1984/1986 1989/1988 1994/1993 1999/1997 2004/2002 2009/2007 2014/2012 2019/2018 SEATS 10/35 10/1 11/- 5/1 7/- 3/- 24/2 23/8 SOURCE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 100 N. KAUPPI AT THIS MOMENT IN TIME, THE FRONT NATIONAL WAS AN 'ATLANTICIST' POLITICAL MOVEMENT THAT WAS NOT ANTI-EUROPEAN, AS LE PEN SAW EUROPE AS FORMING A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE PARTY WAS MAINLY KNOWN FOR ITS ANTI-SEMITISM. IN THIS RESPECT, THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAD NOT YET BEEN FULLY DEVELOPED. FOR THE FRONT NATIONAL , THE 1984 EP ELECTIONS WERE A BREAKTHROUGH . IT GOT 10.95% OF THE VOTES AND 10 MEPS. JEAN-MARIE LE PEN WOULD REMAIN AN MEP UNTIL 2019, A RECORD-BREAKING 34 YEARS OF NEARLY UNINTERRUPTED MANDATE. DURING THIS TIME, LE PEN LOST HIS MEP SEAT FOR SLIGHTLY OVER A YEAR DUE TO AN ASSAULT ON SOCIALIST CANDIDATE ANNETTE PEULVAST-BERGEAL DURING THE 1997 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION. THE REASON FOR THIS ALMOST UNINTER RUPTED CONTINUITY WAS NOT LE PEN'S PRO-INTEGRATION OR EUROPEAN POLITICAL OUTLOOK, BUT RATHER THAT ALL OTHER POLITICAL DOORS WERE CLOSED, EXCEPT THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. ESTABLISHED PARTIES REGULARLY CHANGED
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|a THE VOTING SYSTEM IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE EXTREME RIGHT FROM GETTING A FOOTHOLD IN THE SYSTEM (CF. FOR INSTANCE DELWIT, 2012 ). THANKS TO THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND THE PROPORTIONAL VOTE, THE FRONT NATIONAL WAS ABLE TO STABILISE ITS POSITION AS A POLITICAL PARTY BY ACCUMULATING BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL: JEAN-MARIE LE PEN COULD START LIVING OF POLITICS. IN THE FOLLOWING EUROPEAN ELECTIONS FIVE YEARS LATER, IN 1989, THE SUCCESS WAS NOT AS CLEAR, BUT THE FRONT NATIONAL MANAGED TO MAINTAIN 10 MEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THE RELATIVE SETBACK WAS PARTLY DUE TO THE NEW, COMPETING LIST OF THE LEFT-WING ENERGIE RADICALE LED BY FORMER SOCIALIST MINISTER BERNARD TAPIE. ADDITIONALLY, WHILE JEAN-MARIE LE PEN WAS FOR THE MOMENT THE UNDISPUTABLE LEADER OF THE PARTY, A POTENTIAL CHAL LENGER EMERGED, BRUNO MEGRET. IN 1999, THE FRONT NATIONAL WAS SPLIT BETWEEN LE PEN'S FOLLOWERS AND THOSE OF BRUNO MEGRET, WHO LAUNCHED HIS OWN PARTY, THE MOUVEMENT NATIONAL . UNSUCCESSFULLY, MEGRET TRIED TO GET A HOLD OF THE 'WAR CHEST' OF THE FRONT NATIONAL . THIS DISPUTE HAD A DISASTROUS EFFECT ON BOTH POLITICAL MOVEMENTS. THE FRONT NATIONAL GOT ONLY 5.7% OF THE VOTES AND THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE EP CUT IN HALF, BUT AT LEAST IT SUCCEEDED IN COVERING ITS CAMPAIGN EXPENSES (5% OF THE VOTE BEING THE LIMIT FOR PUBLIC REIMBURSEMENT), WHEREAS MEGRET WITH 3.3% OF THE VOTES WERE WIPED OFF THE FRENCH POLITICAL MAP. MEGRET HAD WANTED TO TURN THE PARTY INTO A ' PARTI DE GOUVERNEMENT ', SOMETHING WITH WHICH MARINE LE PEN WOULD LATER ENGAGE. 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 101 IN 2002, A DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR CONSEQUENCES TOOK PLACE: JEAN-MARIE LE PEN GOT TO THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. WHILE HE CLEARLY LOST TO JACQUES CHIRAC WITH THE BIGGEST LANDSLIDE IN FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HISTORY (82% OF THE VOTE TO CHIRAC), THIS DUEL OF GLAD IATORIAL DIMENSIONS WAS A REAL SHOCK TO A LARGE PART OF THE ELECTORATE AND THE MEDIA, AS FROM NOW ON
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|a AN EXTREME RIGHTIST PRESIDENT WAS NOT JUST A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY. IT ALSO PROVED THAT THE FRONT NATIONAL AND ITS OPENLY ANTI-SEMITIC, PRO-NAZI POLITICAL IDEOLOGY WAS NOW A REAL THREAT TO ESTABLISHED CARTEL PARTIES . HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS IN THE COMING EP ELECTIONS. IN 2004, THE PARTY GOT A MEAGRE 4 SEATS, AND IN 2009, 3 SEATS, AN ALL-TIME LOW. THE NEXT MAJOR EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF THE FRONT NATIONAL WAS THE CHANGE OF GUARD AT THE TOP, MARINE LE PEN FOLLOWING HER FATHER JEAN MARIE LE PEN AS LEADER OF THE PARTY IN 2011. UNTIL 2017, SHE KEPT GROSSO MODO TO HER FATHER'S POLITICAL STRATEGY THAT FOCUSED ON ANTI-IMMIGRATION. IN 2014, THREE YEARS AFTER SUCCEEDING HIS FATHER, MARINE LE PEN, MEP FROM 2004 TO 2017, WAS THE ARCHITECT OF THE VICTORY OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IN THE EP ELECTIONS WITH A RECORD QUARTER OF THE VOTES AND 23 MEPS. ' PREMIER PARTI DE FRANCE ', SHE DECLARED. HER ADVISOR WAS THE EUROPHOBE FLORIAN PHILIPPOT, WHO WOULD LATER BREAK OFF FROM LE PEN'S PARTY AND CREATE HIS OWN POLITICAL MOVEMENT LES PATRIOTES . THE ESSENCE OF MARINE LE PEN'S POLITICISING STRATEGY WAS A FAMILIAR ONE: FRANCE SHOULD LEAVE THE EU AND THE EURO. AFTER NEW CONTROVERSIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM JEAN MARIE LE PEN, MARINE LE PEN FIRED HIM FROM THE PARTY IN 2015, EVEN THOUGH JEAN-MARIE LE PEN REMAINED AN MEP UNTIL 2019. IN 2017, MARINE LE PEN SUCCEEDED IN GETTING, LIKE HER FATHER IN 2002, TO THE SECOND ROUND IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT CLEARLY LOST TO MACRON. IN THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS THE MAIN POLITICAL TREASURE THAT ENABLES POLITICAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND CONVERSION. IN THIS ELECTION, THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IS MINIMAL. JEAN-MARIE LE PEN WAS CANDIDATE FIVE TIMES, REACHING THE SECOND ROUND TWICE, AND MARINE LE PEN HAS EQUALLY BEEN A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TWICE, REACHING THE SECOND ROUND ONCE. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 2022 IS MARINE LE PEN'S MAIN POLITICAL GOAL. A POLITICAL
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|a VICTORY WOULD ALSO BE A FINANCIAL SUCCESS, AS THE CAMPAIGN COSTS WOULD BE COVERED BY PUBLIC FUNDS, AND IN OFFICE MARINE LE PEN COULD FURTHER THE NOW RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL 'S POLITICAL AGENDA. BUT, WITHOUT ECONOMIC CAPITAL, THERE IS NO POLITICAL CAPITAL, AND FOR THE MOMENT, HER PARTY IS SERIOUSLY UNDERFUNDED COMPARED TO ITS MAIN COMPETITOR, EMMANUEL MACRON AND HIS PARTY LA REPUBLIQUE EN MARCHE . 102 N. KAUPPI 5 THEC ON VE RS I ONOFE U ROP EA NCA P I TA L THE USES OF ECONOMIC CAPITAL TO FURTHER POLITICAL STRATEGIES ARE A NEGLECTED BUT ABSOLUTELY CENTRAL ISSUE IN POLITICS. ALTHOUGH THE USE OF COLLECTIVE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CAPITAL IS LEGALLY AND SOCIALLY REGULATED, POLITICAL AGENTS SPEND CONSIDERABLE ENERGY IN DEVISING STRATEGIES TO BYPASS THESE RULES AND CONVENTIONS TO USE THIS ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN DOMESTIC POLITICS, WHICH UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN EASY, TURNING THESE RESOURCES INTO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CAPITAL, A MORE COMPLICATED EXERCISE. THESE STRATEGIES HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY VISIBLE IN THE CASE OF THE LIBERAL-RIGHT-WING MODEM , THE EXTREME LEFTIST LA FRANCE INSOUMISE AND THE FRONT NATIONAL . NUMEROUS LAWSUITS HAVE BEEN FILED AGAINST THESE PARTIES OVER MISUSES OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC FUNDS. THE ECONOMIC CAPITAL PROVIDED BY THE EP HAS CONSISTED OF A GROSS MONTHLY SALARY OF 8757.70 E , A GENERAL MONTHLY EXPENDITURE ALLOWANCE OF 4513 E , A DAILY ALLOWANCE OF 320 E FOR COSTS RELATIVE TO OFFICIAL BUSINESS IN BRUSSELS OR STRASBOURG, AND TRAVEL EXPENSES AND OF A GENEROUS ENVE LOPE (IN 2019, IT WAS 24,943 E /MONTH) FOR HIRING PERSONAL ASSISTANTS (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2019 ). THE LATTER STAFF ALLOWANCE FUNDS ARE NOT PAID DIRECTLY TO THE MEPS BUT ARE MANAGED BY THE EP'S ADMINISTRATION. THESE RESOURCES CAN ALSO BE USED TO BUY SERVICES SUCH AS EXPERT STUDIES. AT LEAST A QUARTER OF THIS BUDGET MUST GO TOWARDS HIRING UP TO FOUR ACCRED ITED PERSONAL ASSISTANTS IN BRUSSELS. UP TO 75% OF THE MONTHLY BUDGET CAN BE USED TO HIRE LOCAL ASSISTANTS IN THE MEP'S MEMBER STATE. SINCE 2009,
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|a MEPS ARE NO LONGER ALLOWED TO EMPLOY CLOSE RELATIVES SUCH AS SPOUSES OR CHILDREN. ONCE THE MEP LEAVES THE EP, SHE RECEIVES A TRANSITION ALLOWANCE OF UP TO 206,664 E , DEPENDING ON THE LENGTH OF HER SERVICE. UNTIL NOW, THE CONTROL OF THIS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CAPITAL HAS BEEN LAX, MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO USE THE FUNDS BY THE ABOVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN NATIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. AS FOR THE CASE INVOLVING THE FRONT NATIONAL , THE GENERAL COURT OF THE EU, THE BLOC'S SECOND-HIGHEST TRIBUNAL, 'CONFIRMS THE DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO RECOVER FROM MARINE LE PEN, MEP, ALMOST 300,000 E ($347,000) FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF A PARLIAMENTARY ASSISTANT, ON THE GROUND THAT SHE DID NOT PROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THAT ASSISTANT'S WORK' ( FRANCE24 , 2018 ). ACCUSED OF SCAMS ( ESCROQUERIES ) AND CONCEAL MENT OF MISUSE OF CORPORATE ASSETS, LE PEN HAD HIRED TWO AIDES IN PARIS. CHARGED OF USING EU FUNDS FOR FICTITIOUS EMPLOYMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY ASSISTANTS, THREE MODEM POLITICIANS, INCLUDING THE LEADER OF THE PARTY 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 103 FRANCOIS BAYROU, AND FUTURE EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER CANDIDATE SYLVIE GOULARD, HAD TO RESIGN FROM EDOUARD PHILIPPE'S GOVERNMENT IN 2017. THE FUNDING OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IS NOT JUST BASED ON PUBLIC FUNDS. CERTAIN WEALTHY BACKERS AND ORGANISATIONS HAVE BEEN CRITICAL IN FINANCING THE PARTY'S ACTIVITIES. THESE INCLUDE ACTIVISTS AROUND EXTREME RIGHT ORGANI SATIONS, SUCH AS GUD ( GROUPE UNION DEFENSE ), LED BY FREDERIC CHATILLON, A LAWYER AND FELLOW LAW STUDENT OF MARINE LE PEN'S AT THE UNIVER SITY PARIS II-ASSAS, ALSO LE PEN'S SENIOR'S ALMA MATER IN THE 1980S. IT SEEMS THAT THE GUD AND WEALTHY BUSINESSMEN AND UNOFFICIAL ADVISORS LIKE PHILIPPE PENINQUE, STARTING FROM WHEN MARINE LE PEN TOOK OVER THE FRONT NATIONAL FROM HIS FATHER IN 2011, HAVE TAKEN OVER THE MANAGE MENT OF THE PARTY'S FUNDS WITH VARIOUS PR COMPANIES LIKE JEANNE, CREATED IN 2010, RIWAL AND UNANIME (CF. DESTAL
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|a & TURCHI, 2017 ; SOULLIER, 2019 ). CHATILLON AND HIS FELLOW 'GUDARDS' SEEM TO HAVE MONOPOLISED THE FRONT NATIONAL 'S COMMUNICATION. CAMPAIGN FINANCING IS NECESSARY TO ACCESS INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE AND TO ACCUMULATE MORE COLLECTIVE (PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLIT ICAL ACTIVITY) ECONOMIC CAPITAL. FOR INSTANCE, IN 2019, THE PARTY RECEIVED PUBLIC FUNDING TO COVER CAMPAIGN EXPENSES AND A YEARLY SUBVENTION OF 5.5 MILLION E . THE COST OF MARINE LE PEN'S FAILED PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 2017 WAS AN ESTIMATED 8 MILLION E . THE ONGOING LEGAL BATTLES CONCERNING THE MISUSES OF EUROPEAN FUNDS AIMED AT JEAN-LUC MELENCHON, LEADER OF EXTREME LEFTIST LA FRANCE INSOUMISE , FRANCOIS BAYROU, LEADER OF THE LIBERAL MODEM AND MARINE LE PEN INDICATE THE DEPENDENCY OF THESE SMALLER PARTIES ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL FUNDING. MARINE LE PEN INITIALLY APPROACHED FRENCH BANKS, ALL OF WHICH REFUSED TO GIVE HER A LOAN. SHE SUCCEEDED IN SECURING A LOAN OF 9.4 MILLION E FROM THE FIRST CZECH-RUSSIAN BANK (FCRB) AT AN INTEREST RATE OF 6% THAT COULD BE PART OF A MUCH LARGER FUNDING PACKAGE, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL UNCLEAR IF THIS IS A LOAN OR A DONA TION (DUPARC, 2017 ). THE BANK WENT BANKRUPT IN 2016. LE PEN MADE A HIGHLY PUBLICISED VISIT TO MEET PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN IN MOSCOW, CONFIRMING THAT RUSSIA IS AN ACTIVE PLAYER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EURO PEAN EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES. AVAAZ, AN NGO, CONFIRMED IN ITS STUDY THIS POLARISING INFLUENCE: RT [ RUSSIA TODAY , NK] FRANCE'S OVERWHELMING DOMINANCE OF THE FRENCH DEBATE ABOUT THE YELLOW VESTS ON YOUTUBE: RESEARCH FOCUSING ON THE 500 TOP YOUTUBE RESULTS SHOWS THAT RUSSIA'S STATE MEDIA WAS THE MOST VIEWED CHANNEL FOR VIDEOS RELATED TO THE YELLOW VEST MOVEMENT IN FRANCE. 104 N. KAUPPI MOREOVER, WHEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL VIDEOS RELATED TO YELLOW VESTS (AS MEASURED BY WHETHER THE TERM YELLOW VESTS WAS MENTIONED IN EITHER THE VIDEO TITLE OR DESCRIPTION), RT FRANCE ACCUMULATED MORE VIEWS THAN LE MONDE , L'OBS , LE
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|a HUFFINGTON POST, LE FIGARO AND FRANCE 24 COMBINED (30M COMPARED TO 24M). (AVAAZ, 2019 ) THE ACTIVITIES OF FRONT NATIONAL MEPS DURING THE 2009-2014 TERM FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THE PARTY'S USE OF THE EP. ACCORDING TO VOTEWATCH ( 2014 ), AN NGO FOLLOWING PARLIAMENTARY WORK IN THE EP FUNDED PARTLY BY THE SOROS FOUNDATION, THE THREE FRONT NATIONAL MEPS DID NOT PARTIC IPATE AT ALL IN THE REGULAR COMMISSION WORK IN THE EP. INSTEAD, THEY WERE PRESENT IN THE PLENARY SESSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE ONCE A MONTH IN STRASBOURG, FRANCE, IN CONTRAST TO THE REGULAR COMMISSION WORK IN BRUS SELS, BELGIUM, WHERE DECISIONS ARE PREPARED. ACCORDING TO THE STATISTICS OF VOTEWATCH, MARINE LE PEN HAS BEEN QUITE INACTIVE IN HER EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY WORK. SHE WAS PRESENT IN 65.6% OF PLENARY VOTES, WHILE THE AVERAGE IS 83.3% FOR ALL FRENCH MEPS. THIS IS A SCORE THAT ALLOWED HER TO STAY ABOVE THE 50% THRESHOLD BELOW WHICH MEPS LOSE HALF THEIR DAILY ATTENDANCE ALLOWANCE. AMONG PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITIES, MARINE LE PEN WROTE 3 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS AND INTERVENED 44 TIMES IN PLENARY SESSIONS DURING THIS TERM. SHE DID NOT PRODUCE A SINGLE RESOLUTION, REPORT, OR WRITTEN STATEMENT (BARBIERE, 2014 ). MARINE LE PEN HAS USED THE POSI TION OF MEP AS A EUROPEAN POWER BASE FOR CONTINUING ACTIVITY AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS. THIS POLITICAL STRATEGY WAS REWARDED AT THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN 2014, MAKING OUT OF THE FRONT NATIONAL THE MOST POPULAR PARTY IN FRANCE. IN REGIONAL COUNCILS, CARTEL PARTIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TOTALLY BLOCK THE RISE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL : FROM 137/1880 SEATS IN 1986 TO 358/1722 SEATS IN 2015. MARINE LE PEN'S SUCCESS IN THE 2017 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS: DEFECTIONS, (PERENNIAL) FINANCIAL ISSUES, STRATEGIC DEAD-ENDS. A MAJOR CLASH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN LE PEN AND FLORIAN PHILIPPOT, A TOP FIGURE OF THE PARTY. SIGNIFICANTLY, AFTER HER LOSS TO MACRON, LE PEN CONSIDERED NOW LEAVING THE EU AND THE EURO 'UNREALISTIC'. THE
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|a FOLLOWING YEAR, THE NAME OF THE PARTY CHANGED TO A MORE CONSENSUAL RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL . THIS POLITICAL TRANSMUTATION IS THE RESULT OF HER LONGER-TERM POLITICAL STRATEGY TO 'DEDIABOLISE' THE PARTY AND TO TRY TO ATTRACT VOTERS NOT JUST FROM THE LEFT (DISAPPOINTED IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY) BUT ALSO FROM THE MODERATE RIGHT, MACRON'S BACKBONE. IN THE 2019 ELEC TION CAMPAIGNS TO THE EP, LE PEN DID NOT DEMAND THAT FRANCE EXIT THE 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 105 EU. SHE HAS RETURNED TO A LESS ANGRY MESSAGE, TRYING TO CAPTURE THE MODERATE VOTES. NOW SHE WAS THE CHAMPION OF A GAULLEAN EUROPE OF NATIONS, WHICH IS THE DEFAULT POSITION OF OFFICIAL FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY, AND OF LIBERTY OF EXPRESSION. SHE DECLARED BEING AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM AND NAZISM-A CLEAR BREAK FROM HER FATHER'S CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS. WHILE JEAN MARIE LE PEN'S ACTIVITIES IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SUBFIELD WERE, CONSCIOUSLY, LITERALLY INEXISTENT, AS WERE MARINE LE PEN'S AND HER FOLLOWERS FOR A LONG TIME, STARTING FROM THE AUTUMN OF 2019 ALL NEWLY APPOINTED RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL MEPS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE EP (COMP. MEP RANKING, 2014 ). ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALL EUROSCEPTIC TO VARYING DEGREES, THIS ATTITUDE TRANSFORMATION IS MEANT AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK IN THE GROUPS, COMMITTEES, AND INTERGROUPS. THIS STRATEGY IS IN LINE WITH MARINE LE PEN'S STRATEGY OF WORKING IN THE EP TO CREATE A PARTY THAT IS NOT EXTREME RIGHTIST, XENOPHOBIC, AND ANTI-SEMITIC, BUT RATHER POPULIST, WORKING IN COLLABORATION WITH HOMOLOGOUS PARTIES IN OTHER EU MEMBER STATES, AND PRESENTING HERSELF AS A EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADER. 'NORMALISATION' SEEMS TO HAVE WORKED (JOHANNES, 2021 ), ALTHOUGH OTHER EUROPEAN EXTREME RIGHT PARTY LEADER ARE STILL SUSPICIOUS OF HER. FOR THE FRENCH EXTREME RIGHT, 'NORMALISATION' HAS MEANT ACCEPTING THE RULES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. THIS IS A STEP THAT REMAINS TO BE TAKEN BY THE FRENCH EXTREME LEFT AND ITS LEADER
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|a JEAN-LUC MELENCHON, ANOTHER RECORD ABSENTEE. FOR INSTANCE, DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY YEAR 2013-2014, MELENCHON DID NOT TAKE PART IN ANY MEETINGS OF THE EU'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THAT MEETS IN BRUSSELS, OF WHICH HE IS A VICE-PRESIDENT (LAURENT & LECHENET, 2014 ). HIS MOST VISIBLE MODE OF PARTICIPATION IN PARLIA MENTARY WORK WAS SENDING EMAILS AS WRITTEN INTERVENTIONS AFTER PLENARY DISCUSSIONS IN STRASBOURG. MELENCHON USED THE SAME POLITICISATION STRATEGY AS THE LE PENS: PARLIAMENTARY WORK IN THE EP WAS NON-EXISTENT, A PARA DOXICAL STRATEGY THAT UNDERMINES THE LEGITIMACY OF EU PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY THAT HAS ENABLED THE PARTY'S POLITICAL EXISTENCE IN FRANCE. 6 CONCLUSION THIS ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONT NATIONAL INTO RASSEMBLE MENT NATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS THE FACT THAT THE GROWTH OF THE FRENCH EXTREME RIGHT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS POLITICAL STRATEGIES AS WELL AS THE TARGETS OF ITS POLITICISATION STRATEGIES (THE EU, INSECURITY, ISLAM, AND SO ON) ARE DEPENDENT ON THE STRUCTURAL OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY A POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT ENCOMPASSES LOCAL/REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND 106 N. KAUPPI EUROPEAN SUBFIELDS. THE INSTITUTIONAL, NORMATIVE APPROACH THAT CONSIDERS EP ELECTIONS AS PERMANENT SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS IS UNABLE TO ANALYSE THE TRANSFORMATION OF POPULIST EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES AND MOVEMENT IN EUROPE FROM THE FRINGE TOWARDS THE CENTRE OF THE POLITICAL BOARD. GETTING A GRIP ON THEIR POLITICAL DYNAMICS REQUIRES TAKING BOTH A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EMERGING POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE THAT FOCUSES ON POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND TRANSACTIONS (CF. GARCIA-GUITIAN'S CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME). THIS CHAPTER HAS ARGUED THAT BECAUSE OF THE RULES OF THE POLITICAL GAME IN THE LOCAL/REGIONAL AND NATIONAL SUBFIELDS, THE FRONT NATIONAL COULD DEVELOP ONLY IN THE EUROPEAN SUBFIELD. BUT ONCE IT WAS ABLE TO ACCUMULATE SUFFICIENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL, PARTLY BY ILLEGALLY USING
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|a EURO PEAN FUNDS IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL/REGIONAL SUBFIELDS, AND THROUGH MARINE LE PEN'S MAINSTREAMING OF THE PARTY'S POLITICAL MESSAGE, IT SUCCEEDED IN PRESENTING ITSELF TO A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE FRENCH ELECTORATE AS A RESPECTABLE POLITICAL PARTY, CULMINATING IN THE TRANSMUTATION OF THE PARTY FROM FRONT NATIONAL TO RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL . THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY'S POLITICAL LOGIC IS CLEARLY VISIBLE ONCE WE ENGAGE IN A RELATIONAL AND TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN THE THREE SUBFIELDS. THE FRONT NATIONAL WAS ABLE TO SECURE SEATS IN THE EP AND REMAIN ON THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SCENE THANKS TO ITS POLITICISATION OF THE EU AND MORE GENERALLY EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. BECAUSE OF LAX SOCIAL CONTROL OF CAPITAL CONVERSION, THE FRONT NATIONAL HAS SUCCEEDED IN USING EUROPEAN POLIT ICAL CAPITAL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL THROUGH (MIS)USES OF FUNDS PROVIDED BY THE EP AND CONVERTING THESE FUNDS INTO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CAPITAL THROUGH (LIMITED) SUCCESSES IN PRESIDENTIAL, NATIONAL, AND REGIONAL/LOCAL ELECTIONS. WITH INCREASING LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL, THIS USE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CAPITAL IS GOING TO BECOME MORE DIFFICULT, CREATING FINANCIAL PRESSURES THAT CAN RESULT IN LOANS FROM FOREIGN BANKS AND POLITICAL ORGANISA TIONS OR DONATIONS FROM WEALTHY DOMESTIC BACKERS LIKE FREDERIC CHATILLON AND GUD. WITHOUT THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL , ITS METAMOR PHOSIS INTO THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. THIS RESCUE ALSO EXPLAINS WHY, TWO YEARS AFTER THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELEC TION OF 2017 AND IN ANTICIPATION OF THE 2022 ELECTION, 30% OF GILETS JAUNES DEMONSTRATORS THOUGHT MARINE LE PEN WOULD MAKE 'UNE BONNE PRESI DENTE DE LA REPUBLIQUE' ( KANTAR , 2019 ). THE DANGER FOR FRENCH POLITICS IS OBVIOUSLY THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE FRENCH ELECTORATE AND POLITICAL PARTIES 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 107 REMAIN DIVIDED AND THE CURRENT PRESIDENT MACRON FINDS HIMSELF UNABLE TO
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|a REPRESENT A UNIFIED, DEMOCRATIC FRONT. THE ELECTION OF MARINE LE PEN WOULD HAVE A DISASTROUS EFFECT IN OTHER NATIONAL POLITICAL FIELDS AS WELL AS IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SUBFIELD. BIBLIOGRAPHY ALBERTINI, D. (2019, MAY 7). FRONT NATIONAL : LE PLUS EUROPHILE DES PARTIS EUROPHOBES. LIBERATION . RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.LIBERA TION.FR/FRANCE/2019/05/07/FRONT-NATIONAL-LE-PLUS-EUROPHILE-DES-PARTIS-EUR OPHOBES_1725505/ . AVAAZ. (2019, MARCH 15). YELLOW VESTS FLOODED BY FAKE NEWS. OVER 10M VIEWS OF DISINFORMATION ON FACEBOOK. AVAAZ REPORT . RETRIEVED FEBRUARY 24, 2021, FROM HTTPS://AVAAZIMAGES.AVAAZ.ORG/REPORT%20YELLOW%20VESTS%20F INAL.PDF . BAILEY, F. G. (1969). STRATAGEMS AND SPOILS. A SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF POLITICS . ROUTLEDGE. BARBIERE, C. (2014, APRIL 15). LES POLITIQUES ATTAQUENT MARINE LE PEN SUR SON ABSENTEISME. EURACTIV . RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EURACTIV. FR/SECTION/ALL/NEWS/LES-POLITIQUES-ATTAQUENT-MARINE-LE-PEN-SUR-SON-ABSENT EISME/ . BEAUVALLET, W., & MICHON, S. (2010). PROFESSIONALIZATION AND SOCIALIZATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. FRENCH POLITICS, 8 (2), 145-165. BENIT-GBAFFOU, C., & KATSAURA, O. (2014). COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: UNPACKING BOURDIEU'S "POLITICAL CAPITAL" IN POST-APARTHEID JOHANNESBURG. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, 38 (5), 1807-1832. BENNISTER, M. & WORTHY, B. (2012, APRIL 12). GETTING IT, SPENDING IT, LOSING IT: EXPLORING POLITICAL CAPITAL . PAPER PRESENTED AT THE POLITICAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONFERENCE. RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://PAPERS.SSRN.COM/ SOL3/PAPERS.CFM?ABSTRACT_ID=2480548 . CASEY, K. L. (2008, APRIL 4). DEFINING POLITICAL CAPITAL: A RECONSIDERATION OF BOUR DIEU'S INTERCONVERTIBILITY THEORY . PAPER PRESENTED AT THE ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE FOR STUDENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, NORMAL, IL. DELWIT, P. (2012). LES ETAPES DU FRONT NATIONAL, 1972-2011 . RETRIEVED
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|a FROM HTTPS://DIPOT.ULB.AC.BE . ACCESSED MARCH 11, 2021. DESTAL, M., & TURCHI, M. (2017). "MARINE EST AU COURANT DE TOUTYY" ARGENT SECRET, FINANCEMENTS ET HOMMES DE L'OMBRE. UNE ENQUETE SUR MARINE LE PEN . FLAMMARION. DUPARC, A. (2017). LE PRET RUSSE DU FN RECUPERE PAR UNE SOCIETE AERONAUTIQUE ACTIVE EN SYRIE. MEDIAPART . RETRIEVED MARCH 4, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW. MEDIAPART.FR/JOURNAL/INTERNATIONAL/090817/LE-PRET-RUSSE-DU-FN-RECUPERE PAR-UNE-SOCIETE-AERONAUTIQUE-ACTIVE-EN-SYRIE . 108 N. KAUPPI EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. (2019). HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/NEWS/EN/FAQ/ 13/SALARIES-AND-PENSIONS . ACCESSED OCTOBER 29, 2019. FRANCE 24 . (2018, JUNE 19). EU COURT CONFIRMS MARINE LE PEN MUST REPAY E 300,000 TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT . RETRIEVED OCTOBER 29, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.FRANCE24.COM/EN/20180619-EU-COURT-ORDERS-MARINE-LE PEN-REPAY-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT-FUNDS . GAXIE, D. (1973). LES PROFESSIONNELS DE LA POLITIQUE . P.U.F. GAXIE, D. (2003). LA DEMOCRATIE REPRESENTATIVE . MONTCHRETIEN. HAAPALA, T. (2016). POLITICAL RHETORIC IN THE OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIONS, 1830- 1870 . STUDIES IN MODERN HISTORY. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. HIX, S., & LORD, C. (1997). POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION . ST. MARTIN'S PRESS. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (EDS.). (2001). MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD. JOHANNES, F. (2021, FEBRUARY 26). LA "NORMALISATION" PERMANENTE DE MARINE LE PEN, 10 . LE MONDE . KANTAR. (2019, FEBRUARY 21-25). BAROMETRE D'IMAGE DU RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL (2019). AVAILABLE HERE: HTTPS://WWW.KANTAR.COM/FR/INSPIRATIONS/ POLITIQUE-ET-OPINION/2019-BAROMETRE-RASSEMBLEMENT-NATIONAL . KATZ, R., & MAIR, P. (1995). CHANGING MODELS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PARTY DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF THE CARTEL PARTY. PARTY POLITICS, 1 , 5-28. KAUPPI, N. (FORTHCOMING). THE POLITICAL FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. IN S. BUETTNER, M. EIGMUELLER, & S. WORSCHECH (EDS.), SOCIOLOGY OF EUROPEANIZATION . DE
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|a GRUYTER. KAUPPI, N. (2005). DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL RESOURCES AND POLITICAL POWER IN THE EUROPEAN UNION . MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS. KAUPPI, N. (2018). TOWARD A REFLEXIVE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION . PALGRAVE. KAUPPI, N. & PALONEN, K. EDS. (FORTHCOMING). THE POLITICAL MIND IN ACTION: BRICOLAGE AND CHANCE IN EUROPEAN POLITICS AND BEYOND . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. KAUPPI, N., PALONEN, K., & WIESNER, C. (2016). THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITICI SATION OF THE EU. REDESCRIPTIONS , 19 (1), 72-90. KAUPPI, N., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2021). NOTES ON THE 'POLITICS' OF EU POLITICIZA TION (ARENA EU3D RESEARCH PAPERS NO. 5). UNIVERSITY OF OSLO. RETRIEVED FEBRUARY 21, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EU3D.UIO.NO/PUBLICATIONS/EU3D-RES EARCH-PAPERS/2021/RESEARCH-PAPER-05-TRENZ-KAUPPI.HTML . KUNZ, Y. S. (2013). THE "BACK DOOR" TO NATIONAL POLITICS: THE FRENCH GREENS AND THE 2009 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. IN B. CRUM & J. E. FOSSUM (EDS.), PRACTICES OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COORDINATION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (PP. 161-174). ECPR PRESS. LANDORFF, L. (2019). INSIDE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. 5 THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL YY 109 LAURENT, S. & LECHENET, A. (2014). LES ASTUCES DE MELENCHON POUR PARAITRE ASSIDU AU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN. LE MONDE , APRIL 22, 2014. HTTPS://WWW. LEMONDE.FR/LES-DECODEURS/ARTICLE/2014/04/16/LES-ASTUCES-DE-M-MELENC HON-POUR-PARAITRE-ASSIDU-AU-PARLEMENT-EUROPEEN_4402075_4355770.HTML . ACCESSED MAY 6, 2021. LE PEN, J.-M. (1984, FEBRUARY 18). JEAN-MARIE LE PEN DANS L'HEURE DE VERITE. ARCHIVE INA . RETRIEVED FROM HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=6TBMDT RN5ZI . ACCESSED MARCH 3, 2021. MAYER, N. (2018). THE RADICAL RIGHT IN FRANCE. IN J. RYDGREN (ED.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (PP. 433-451). OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. MEP RANKING. (2014). RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.MEPRANKING.EU/ . ACCESSED JUNE 25, 2015. MILWARD, A. S. (1992). THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE
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|a NATION-STATE . ROUTLEDGE. MUDDE, C. (2007). POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. OLEART, A. & BOUZA, L. (2018). DEMOCRACY AT STAKE: MULTIPOSITIONAL ACTORS AND POLITICIZATION IN THE EU CIVIL SOCIETY FIELD. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 56 (4), 870-887. PALONEN, K. (2018). A POLITICAL STYLE OF THINKING: ESSAYS ON MAX WEBER .E CP R PRESS. PAPPAS, T. (2016). MODERN POPULISM: RESEARCH ADVANCES, CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PITFALLS, AND THE MINIMAL DEFINITION. OXFORD RESEARCH ENCY CLOPEDIA OF POLITICS . RETRIEVED FROM HTTPS://OXFORDRE.COM/POLITICS/VIEW/10. 1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.001.0001/ACREFORE-9780190228637-E-17 . ACCESSED NOVEMBER 1, 2019. REIF, K., & SCHMITT, K. (1980). NINE SECOND-ORDER NATIONAL ELECTIONS: A CONCEP TUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION RESULTS. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 8 , 3-44. REUNGOAT, E. (2015). MOBILIZING EUROPE IN NATIONAL COMPETITION: THE CASE OF THE FRENCH FRONT NATIONAL. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 36 (3), 296 310. SCHULTE-CLOOS, J. (2018). DO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FOSTER CHALLENGER PARTIES' SUCCESS ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL? EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 19 (3), 408- 426. SOULLIER, L. (2019, NOVEMBER 6). COMPRENDRE LE PROCES DU FINANCEMENT DES CAMPAGNES DU FRONT NATIONAL, QUI S'OUVRE MERCREDI. LE MONDE . RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.LEMONDE.FR/POLICE-JUSTICE/ARTICLE/2019/ 11/06/AU-C-UR-DU-PROCES-SUR-LE-FINANCEMENT-DES-CAMPAGNES-DU-FN-DEUX-STR UCTURES-LIEES-A-MARINE-LE-PEN_6018160_1653578.HTML . VOTEWATCH. (2014). RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.VOTEWATCH.EU/ .AC C E S S E DJ U N E 25, 2020. WIESNER, C., HAAPALA, T., & PALONEN, K. (2017). DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION: PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. PART II SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU CHAPTER 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE: RETHINKING THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES WITH THE RISE
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|a OF SOCIAL MEDIA TARU HAAPALA 1 INTRODUCTION IN RECENT DECADES, THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EURO PEAN UNION (EU) HAS BEEN PERCEIVED AS A NEW AND EXCITING TOOL FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND EUROPEANISATION (HAENSKA & BAUCHOWITZ, 2019 ). SOCIAL MEDIA IS SEEN AS AN INCREASINGLY RELEVANT PLATFORM SHAPING POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN EUROPE (BARISIONE & MICHAILIDOU, 2017 ). THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IS FURTHER CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT THE EUROPEAN T. HAAPALA ( B ) UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: TARU.HAAPALA@UAM.ES THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_6 113 114 T. HAAPALA COMMISSION HAS PRESENTED AN INITIATIVE 1 TO REGULATE ONLINE PLATFORMS IN THE WAY THEY OPERATE AND AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EU. IN THIS CHAPTER, I EXAMINE THE INCREASINGLY INTERTWINED EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS AND THE SO-CALLED TWITTERSPHERE 2 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICISATION AND DEMOCRACY, WHILE ALSO REFLECTING ON HOW THE TWITTERSPHERE CAN RAISE ISSUES ON THE AGENDA OF THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT. SOCIAL MEDIA OFFERS CITIZENS THE CHANCE TO VOICE THEIR OPINIONS AND EXPRESS DEMANDS IN THE PUBLIC. IN CONTRAST, THE PARLIAMEN TARY FORM OF GOVERNMENTHAS BEEN BLAMED FOR ITS INABILITY TO ADAPT TO DEMOCRATIC DEMANDS (CF. URBINATI, 2016 ). THERE ARE, HOWEVER, FUNDA MENTAL DIFFERENCES IN THE WAYS IN WHICH PRIVATELY OWNED ONLINE PLATFORMS PROVIDE SERVICE IN THE NAME OF FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF OPINION (SEE E.G. RONE, 2021 ) COMPARED TO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES THAT HAVE BEEN MEANT TO PROTECT FAIR PROCEEDINGS AND TO ALLOW FOR PUBLIC DELIBERATION ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH POLITICAL MAJORITIES THROUGH VOTING. THE INTERMINGLING OF POLITICAL DEBATES IN EUROPE CAN BE APPROACHED AS THE RESULT OF 'DELIBERATIVE
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|a SUPRANATIONALISM' (CF. ERIKSEN, 1999 )I N WHICH NEW FORMS OF COMMUNICATION EXPAND POTENTIAL PUBLICS BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ALWAYS CLEAR WHETHER THE SUGGESTED TRANSNATIONALISM VIA SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT ENGAGES THE OPPOSING SIDES IN GENUINE DEBATE AND WHAT EXACTLY THE POLITICAL EFFECTS ARE. UNLIKE ERIKSEN, THIS CHAPTER DOES NOT FOCUS ON THE QUALITY OF DISCUR SIVE PROCESSES BUT RATHER ON THE WAYS IN WHICH PROCEDURES OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATE COULD BE IMPROVED TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY THROUGH APPLYING THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURAL MODEL OF ACTING POLITICALLY (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ). IT COULD BE CLAIMED THAT THE TWITTERSPHERE HAS BOTH VICES AND VIRTUES (CF. SKINNER, 2007 ). THIS HAS BEEN NOTED BY PARLIAMENTARIANS WHO 1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON A SINGLE MARKET FOR DIGITAL SERVICES (DIGITAL SERVICES ACT) AND AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC , 15 DECEMBER 2020. 2 FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICISATION OF TWITTERSPHERE, SEE THE CHAPTER BY STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS AND LUCIANO MORGANTI IN THIS BOOK. ALSO, FOR A CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES' ELECTION MANIFESTOS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF TWITTERSPHERE, SEE THE CHAPTER OF LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND JORGE TUNON NAVARRO. 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 115 INCREASINGLY ENGAGE IN DEBATES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA (E.G. GRAHAM ET AL., 2016 ). PARLIAMENTARIANS AND POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE REALISED THE BENEFITS OF CONVEYING THEIR MESSAGE TO POTENTIAL VOTERS VIA SOCIAL MEDIA AND, AT THE SAME TIME, CITIZENS ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS ON POLICIES AND ISSUES THROUGH THE ONLINE PLATFORMS. BUT, WHILE FOSTERING FREE SPEECH, TWITTER CAN SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDE A PLATFORM FOR HATE SPEECH AND ABUSE. 3 NON PARLIAMENTARY ARENAS OF PUBLIC DEBATE ARE NOT AS CONSTRAINED BY RULES AND PROCEDURES AS PARLIAMENTS, WHICH GIVES SOCIAL MEDIA CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, BUT IT ALSO SHOWS ITS CHALLENGES WHICH I WILL DISCUSS IN THIS CHAPTER. IN SOCIAL
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|a MEDIA, THERE ARE RHETORICAL STRATEGIES AT PLAY BY A VARIETY OF ACTORS THAT OFFER A MULTITUDE OF REDESCRIPTIONS 4 OF EUROPEAN POLITICS, OFTEN AT THE SAME TIME, TO A MYRIAD OF AUDIENCES. THIS MIXING OF DEBATING ACTORS WITH DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS AND KNOWLEDGE OF RULES OF DEBATE CREATES ANOTHER LAYER OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES. IN THIS CHAPTER, POLITICISATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY ARE UNDERSTOOD FROM A SPECIFIC ANGLE. THE PARADIGMATIC POLITICAL ACTOR IS A PARLIAMENTARIAN WHO HAS BEEN DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED TO A POSITION IN A POLITICAL SPHERE THAT IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD AS BEING RESERVED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY, I.E. A PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, THERE CAN BE POLITICAL ACTORS THAT ARE NON-PARLIAMENTARIANS, BUT PARLIAMENTARIANS' SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS ARGUABLY MORE PRONOUNCED THAN IS THE CASE WITH OTHER ACTORS. 5 ITEMS ARE PUT ON THE PARLIAMENTARY AGENDA PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED AS POLITICAL, OR IN OTHER WORDS, CONTROVERSIAL AND IN NEED OF A JOINT DECISION. HOWEVER, NON-PARLIAMENTARY ACTORS CAN ACT POLITICALLY AS WELL, IF THE ACTIVITY IS INTERPRETED AS SUCH (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , PP. 10- 11). THE STARTING POINT FOR INTERPRETING POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS TO LOOK FOR THE WAYS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN WHICH ISSUES ARE POLITICISED, OR BROUGHT INTO NEW LIGHT BY CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BOUNDARIES, OR WAYS OF ACTING. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, 'POLITICISATION' HAS A BROADER INTERPRETATIVE VALUE THAN INCREASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION OR INTEREST. 3 SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CASE OF ONLINE ABUSE AGAINST THE FINNISH ALL-FEMALE LED COALI TION GOVERNMENT: HTTPS://WWW.POLITICO.EU/ARTICLE/SANNA-MARIN-FINLAND-ONLINE-HARASSMENT WOMEN-GOVERNMENT-TARGETED/ . 4 THE RE-DESCRIBING REFERS TO THE RHETORICAL STRATEGY OF PARADIASTOLE THAT IS PUT IN USE FOR CHANGING A VICE INTO A VIRTUE AND VICE VERSA. FOR A DISCUSSION, SEE SKINNER ( 2007 ). 5 KARI PALONEN'S CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME FOCUSING ON THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICISATION BY PARLIAMENTARIANS
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|a MAKES A SIMILAR ARGUMENT. 116 T. HAAPALA I ARGUE THAT USING TWITTER CAN COMPLEMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESON EUROPEAN ISSUES. WHILE FRAGMENTED AND DIVERSE, SOCIAL MEDIA SHOWS THE PLURALITY OF EUROPEAN PUBLICS WITH THE STRUGGLES OVER THE AGENDA-SETTING IN EUROPEAN POLITICS, WHICH CONSTITUTES AS POLITICISATION WITH DIFFERENT RULES AND PROCEDURES OF DEBATE THAN IN TRADITIONAL REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. I WILL ILLUSTRATE THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN CHALLENGES WITH THE PROCEDURES OF DEBATING THAT MUST BE SCRUTINISED AND COMPARED TO THE ONES THAT ARE INSTITUTIONALISED IN DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES. THE FOCUS HERE WILL THUS BE ON THE LIMITATIONS OR THE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THESE FRAG MENTED EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES OF THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SUPPORTIVE OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. TWITTER HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AS PROFOUNDLY AFFECTING POLITICAL COMMUNI CATION (E.G. JACKSON & LILLEKER, 2011 ; OTT, 2017 ). IN CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP, THE DIMENSION OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ONLINE HAS BEEN ALREADY WELL DEVEL OPED (CF. BOSSETTA ET AL., 2017 ). THE IMPACT OF USING TWITTER ON BUILDING A EUROPEAN DEMOS HAS BEEN ARGUED TO CONSTITUTE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, AND THUS IT HAS BEEN ASKED WHETHER COMMENTING ON TWITTER MAKES EUROPEAN POLITICS MORE EUROPEAN (RUIZ-SOLER ET AL., 2019 ). IN CONTRAST TO ASKING WHETHER TWITTER MAKES EUROPEAN POLITICS MORE EUROPEAN, I RATHER FOCUS ON WHETHER EXPANDING PUBLIC DEBATES VIA TWITTER MAKES EUROPEAN POLITICS MORE DEMOCRATIC. 6 DOES THE INCREASING USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSLATE INTO MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE EU? WHILE THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, THERE IS AN ADDED VALUE FOR MEPS TO USE SOCIAL MEDIA TO GAIN VISIBILITY AND INCREASE SUPPORT FROM EXTRA PARLIAMENTARY AUDIENCES, NOT ONLY COMING FROM THEIR OWN NATIONAL CONTEXTS. AS A MICROBLOGGING SITE, TWITTER IS OPEN TO ALL BY REGISTRATION AS USERS, WHERE PEOPLE POST BRIEF MESSAGES ('TWEETS')
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|a OF UP TO 280 CHAR ACTERS (SINCE 2017) AND CAN FOLLOW OTHER 'TWEETERS'. TO COMPARE WITH PARLIAMENTARY VOCABULARY, TWEETS CAN BE SEEN AS ANALOGOUS TO PETITIONS AMONG CITIZENS. UNLIKE PETITIONS, HOWEVER, TWEETS APPEAR ON ONLINE PLAT FORMS OWNED BY CORPORATIONS AND MUST BE TRANSFORMED INTO ITEMS ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA. IN THIS MANNER, THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' GENERATES OPINIONS AND ITEMS FOR DEBATE BUT DOES NOT NECESSARILY TURN THEM INTO MATTERS OF DECISION. 6 I UNDERSTAND DEMOCRACY AS A DESCRIPTIVE-NORMATIVE CONCEPT. FOR A DISCUSSION, SEE, E.G. SKINNER (1973); DUNN ( 2005 ). 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 117 WHILE ASKING WHO TAKES PART IN PUBLIC DEBATES IN EUROPE AND WHY ,I TI S EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER HOW THE DEBATES ARE CONDUCTED. THE IDEA OF DEBATE IS DIFFERENT FROM ORDINARY DIALOGUE OR DISCUSSION AS IT REFERS TO AN ACT OF INTERACTION FROM OPPOSITE POINTS OF VIEW, A CONCEPTUAL CONTROVERSY. DEBATES CONSTITUTE IMPORTANT LOCI FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICS. WHENEVER THERE IS DEBATE ABOUT AN ISSUE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY THE CONTROVERSIES EMBEDDED IN IT (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , P. 3). IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEADER OF THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY AND MEP NIGEL FARAGE WAS ABLE TO USE BOTH THE TRADITIONAL PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC AND TWITTER TO ACHIEVE A UNITED MINORITY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF BREXIT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHAT FARAGE WAS DOING WAS CREATING AN ANTI-EUROPEAN PROJECT THAT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE THEM. HE ALSO USED SOCIAL MEDIA TO ATTRACT A WIDER PUBLIC BEHIND BREXIT. TO EXAMINE HOW EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES ARE POLITICISED WITH THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, I WILL FIRST DISCUSS MORE IN DETAIL THE RULES AND PROCE DURES OF THE POLITICAL INTERACTION IN TWITTER COMPARED TO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES. I HAVE IDENTIFIED TWO AREAS, THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYAND AGENDA- SETTING, WHICH SHOW THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC AND THE TWITTERSPHERE. SECOND,
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|a I WILL DISCUSS THREE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL MEDIA, I.E. ANTI-DEBATES, PROLIFERATION OF OPINION AND INCREASED PACE AS WELL AS ANONYMITY OF DEBATING ACTORS, THAT I CONSIDER RELEVANT TO CONSIDER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYIN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES. THIRD, I EXAMINE THE INTERTWINING OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES THROUGH THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND AGENDA-SETTING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICISATION. FINALLY, I WILL CONCLUDE BY REFLECTING ON DEMOCRATIC POTENTIALS OF SOCIAL MEDIA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MY ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN SPRING 2021. 2 THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC AND THE ' TWITTERSPHERE ' EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES ARE INCREASINGLY CONFRONTED AND EVEN CHALLENGED BY PUBLIC DEBATES FROM OUTSIDE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES. RAISING ISSUES TO BE DEBATED IN SOCIAL MEDIA CAN BE SEEN AS A WAY OF GIVING A VOICE TO MINORITY ACTORS THAT ARE NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTED IN PARLIA MENTS, BUT IT CAN ALSO BE AN OUTLET FOR THOSE WHO INTRODUCE DEEP-SEATED PREJUDICES TO PUBLIC DISCUSSION. IN SOME CASES, THE DEBATES ARE ALSO DELIB ERATELY GENERATED IN SOCIAL MEDIA IN ORDER TO CREATE LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO SPHERES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION 118 T. HAAPALA CAMPAIGNS SHOW EFFORTS OF USING THE TWITTERSPHERE AS AN 'INTERMEDIARY' TO CONNECT BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES AND TWITTER. 7 THE DYNAMICS ALSO INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL AGENDAS OF PARLIAMENTS, AS REPRESENTATIVE ASSEM BLIES HAVE TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE CONFLICTS GENERATED BY THE DEBATES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA IN TERMS OF LEGISLATION AND/OR AS A RESPONSE TO EMERGENT ISSUES. A GOOD EXAMPLE IS THE LAW PROPOSAL BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO REGULATE ONLINE PLATFORMS (SEE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2020 ). WHAT THIS ILLUSTRATES IS THAT THE LOCUS OF POLITICAL DEBATE IS MORE EASILY SHIFTED FROM THE TRADITIONAL SPHERE OF
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|a POLITICS THAN BEFORE. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES ARE ORIGINALLY A EUROPEAN INVENTION. THEY WERE DESIGNED FOR PEACEFUL STRUGGLES OF DELIBERATION AND HOLDING THE EXEC UTIVE TO ACCOUNT IN A DESIGNATED PUBLIC SPACE. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL TRADITION OF PARLIAMENTARISM, THE PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SEEN AS A MEANS TO FIGHT ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER (SELINGER, 2019 ). BUT, SINCE THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS TO LEGITIMATE PARLIA MENTARY REPRESENTATION. RECENTLY, URBINATI ( 2016 ) HAS NOTED THAT, ALONG WITH THE CURRENT DISCOURSE ON THE 'CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY', THE INCREASING MISTRUST OF CITIZENS IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AS SUCH, BUT PRECISELY ON THE PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 8 URBINATI MAKES THE CLAIM THAT DEMOCRACY IS A GOVERNMENT OF CRISIS 'PAR EXCELLENCE AS ITS PROCEDURES PRESUME A PERMANENT OCCURRENCE OF DISAGREEMENT AND DISSENT, WHICH ARE NOT DEEMED A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY PER SE' (URBINATI, 2016 , P. 14). ULTIMATELY, A SENSE OF CRISIS IS A QUESTION OF PERCEPTION AMONG CITIZENS THAT THEY HAVE LOST POWER IN DETERMINING THE POLITICAL AGENDA AND SHAPING PUBLIC DEBATE. IN OTHER WORDS, SHE SUGGESTS THAT THE PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT SUFFERS FROM THE INHERENT ELEMENT OF CRISIS IN A DEMOCRACY BECAUSE IT CANNOT SEEM TO BE ABLE TO GOVERN IT. EVEN THOUGH GOVERNMENT BY DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION STILL SEEMS TO BE ONE OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF LEGITIMATE FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES, NEW EMERGING CHALLENGES CONFRONT PARLIAMENTS, SUCH AS THE SOCIAL MEDIA (CF. ILIE, 2016 ). THIS RESULTS IN INCREASING THE GAP BETWEEN 7 SEE THE CHAPTER BY LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND JORGE TUNON NAVARRO IN THIS BOOK. 8 IT COULD BE CLAIMED, HOWEVER, THAT ANTI-PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE FROM 1890 TO 1930S WERE EVEN MORE SEVERE. 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 119 VOTERS' ANTICIPATIONS AND THE
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|a OUTCOMES OF PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN ELECTION RHETORIC AND WHAT IS PRACTISED IN PARLIAMENTS AFTER THE ELECTIONS CREATES DISILLUSIONMENT AND DISTRUST ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES AS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I ARGUE THAT THE ISSUE ABOUT EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES AND DEMOCRACY RATHER LIES IN THE ASSUMED SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY, IN WHICH THE RULES OF DEBATE PLAY A KEY ROLE. PARLIAMENTS, WHICH WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED FOR FAIR POLIT ICAL DEBATE AND TO PROTECT THE PLURALITY OF OPINION THROUGH PRECEDENTS AND PROCEDURES, CAN POTENTIALLY FIND A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT FROM THE SO-CALLED TWITTERSPHERE. THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC AND THE TWITTERSPHERE WILL BE FIRST ILLUSTRATED BY TAKING A LOOK AT THE DIFFERENCES OF THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY ASSUMED IN BOTH CASES AND, SECOND, BY COMPARING THE AGENDA-SETTING MODES. 2.1 SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY DESPITE ALL ITS PERCEIVED FAULTS, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IS CONSIDERED MORE OR LESS LEGITIMATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR POLITICAL LIFE IN EURO PEAN COUNTRIES. LOOKING BACK TO THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTS, HOWEVER, THERE HAVE ALWAYS EXISTED RESERVATIONS AGAINST PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC, MOSTLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE HAVE ENOUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY WORK AND TRADITIONS. IT HAS BEEN CRITICISED AS BEING ELITIST AND DETACHED. HOWEVER, TWITTER HAS ALSO BEEN ACCUSED OF BEING MAINLY A SPACE FOR POLITICS BY ELITES (SEE GRAHAM ET AL., 2016 , P. 778). BUT, THIS CLAIM ALREADY PRESUPPOSES WHAT 'POLITICS' MEANS. THERE ARE CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE POLITICS PRACTISED IN THE TWITTERSPHERE COMPARED TO PARLIAMENTS, AND ONE OF THE MAJOR ONES IS THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY ITSELF. IN ITS CLASSICAL FORM, PARLIAMENTARISM CREATES A SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYIN DESIGNATED PUBLIC SPACES, I.E. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES, WITH CONVENTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND RULES OF DEBATE. THE FIELD OR SPHERE OF POLITICS IS AN OLD TOPOS IN THE WESTERN
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|a TRADITION (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , P. 6). THE ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN POLITICS IN ONE PLACE TO ENSURE FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY OF PEERS IS AN IDEA THAT LIES AT THE CORE OF THE LIBERAL TRADITION OF PARLIAMENTARISM. THE NOTION OF ONE DESIGNATED SPHERE OF POLITICS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN QUESTIONED ESPECIALLY BY FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORISTS. THEY HAVE RAISED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ISSUE OF POTENTIAL SIDELINING OF INTER VENTIONS BY SUBORDINATE GROUPS AND SUBTLE FORMS OF CONTROL (FRASER, 1990 , P. 64; SEE ALSO MANSBRIDGE, 1998 ). FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, THE 120 T. HAAPALA CREATION AND DEBATE OF POLITICAL ISSUES OUTSIDE PARLIAMENTS CAN BENEFIT THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE TRADITIONAL SPHERE OF POLITICS. THERE ARE HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESTHAT TOOK PARLIAMENTS AS THEIR MODELS. THE EXTENSION OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES TO ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES MADE PARLIAMENTS THE FOCAL POINTS OF EURO PEAN POLITICAL CULTURES FOR CENTURIES. IN MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BY THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES WERE THE SOURCE OF INSPI RATION FOR ASSOCIATIONS, CLUBS, AND SOCIETIES, WHICH EXTENDED THE DEBATING PRACTICES TO PLACES OUTSIDE PARLIAMENTS AND TO ACTORS WHO WERE DISEN FRANCHISED, ESPECIALLY WOMEN (CF. HAAPALA, 2016 ). THE INSPIRED IMITATIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS BECAME CRUCIAL FOR LEGITIMISING NATIONAL POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING AND FOR EMPOWERING OUTSIDERS. THE DEBATING SOCIETIES HELPED TO EDUCATE AND TRAIN THE GENERAL PUBLIC ON THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCE DURES AND RULES OF DEBATE WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, REPRODUCED DEBATES ON TOPICS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. IN COMPARISON, THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' IS GENERATED BY A FORM OF INTER ACTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR OPINIONS AND, ARGUABLY, THE MOST POPULAR USE OF TWITTER IS FOR SELF-PROMOTION (JACKSON & LILLEKER, 2011 , P. 87). THE TWITTERSPHERE SUGGESTS A SPACE IN WHICH OPINIONS CAN BE FREELY EXPRESSED AND THE AUDIENCE IS POTENTIALLY UNLIMITED (RUIZ-SOLER ET AL., 2019 , PP. 4-5). BUT, EXPRESSIONS OF
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|a OPINION DO NOT NECESSARILY CONSTI TUTE A POLITICAL SPHERE. GARRISON SMITH ( 2017 ) HAS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF POLITICISING DIGITAL SPACE, AND HE MAINTAINS THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REALM SHOULD BE UNDERLINED WHEN TALKING ABOUT DIGITAL PUBLIC SPACES. DRAWING FROM THE ARENDTIAN IDEA OF POLITICAL REALM AS A WEB OF RELATIONS, HE CONSIDERS ONLINE POLITICS AS AN ARTIFICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN ACTIVITY THAT DEPENDS ON COMMONALITY AND SEPARATION AS INDIVID UALS. A POLITICAL REALM, ACCORDING TO ARENDT, IS NOT A NATURAL PHENOMENON, BUT IT MUST BE CREATED AS THE COUNTERWEIGHT OF THE SOCIAL REALM. IT REQUIRES A PLACE OF APPEARANCE AND EQUALITY WHICH OFFERS THE CHANCE OF DISTIN GUISHING ONESELF AS AN INDIVIDUAL. AS OPPOSED TO SOCIAL REALM, IT ALSO MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE A SPACE FOR CONFLICTS AND DISSENSUS (GARRISON SMITH, 2017 , PP. 13-15). AS AN ONLINE PLATFORM, TWITTER ALLOWS FOR PUBLIC DEBATE ON CONTRO VERSIAL ISSUES TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, BUT IT HAS LIMITED CAPACITY TO REGULATE THE DEBATES. FURTHERMORE, IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT TWITTER'S ALGORITHM ACTUALLY AMPLIFIES POLITICAL RHETORIC. TWITTER HAS THE POLICY OF INSERTING WHAT IT CONSIDERS AS RELEVANT AND POPULAR TWEETS TO THE FEEDS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT SUBSCRIBED TO THE ACCOUNTS THAT POSTED THEM. IT MEANS 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 121 THAT TWITTER USERS MAY RECEIVE POSTS WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT. WHILE THE COMPANY ARGUES FOR THE BENEFITS OF EXPOSING ITS CUSTOMERS TO CONTENT THAT MAY BE OF THEIR INTEREST, THERE ARE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, ESPE CIALLY FOR POLITICAL CONTENT, IN THE BUSINESS MODEL OF SOCIAL MEDIA. THE USE OF THE ALGORITHM FOLLOWS THE LOGIC OF USER ENGAGEMENT, OF MAKING PROFIT OUT OF REACTIONS TO TWEETS. ULTIMATELY, THE FEATURE INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXPOSURE TO 'INFLAMMATORY POLITICAL RHETORIC' (DARCY, 2019 ). PARADOX ICALLY, WHILE TWITTER HAS BANNED SOME HIGH-PROFILE TWITTER USERS ON THE BASIS OF SPREADING LIES, SUCH AS FORMER US PRESIDENT
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|a DONALD TRUMP, ITS OWN ALGORITHM CONTAINS A SIMILAR FEATURE. ONE OF THE CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIAL MEDIA AND PARLIAMENTARY SPHERE OF POLITICS IS THAT TWITTER CAN BE USED AS A PLATFORM TO GENERATE CONTROVERSIES ON CURRENT POLITICS, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE PROCEDURES IN PLACE TO MAKE COMPROMISES OR RESOLUTIONS. PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC ORIGINATES FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF TRADITIONS AND CONVENTIONS OF DEBATE. IN OTHER WORDS, ITS LOCUS IS WELL-DEFINED AND FORMALISED. PARLIAMENTARY-STYLE ASSEM BLIES ARE ARENAS FOR POLITICAL DEBATES PAR EXCELLENCE AS POLITICS IS THE MAIN REASON WHY DEBATES TAKE PLACE AT ALL (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ,P .2 9 ) .M A T T ER S OF CONTENTION ARE PUT ON THE AGENDAOF PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES BECAUSE THEY ARE RECOGNISED AS BEING POLITICAL. WITH THE FREE MANDATE, PARLIAMENTARIANS HAVE THE PRIVILEGE OF ACTING AS INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKING, AND VOTING AS THEY SEE FIT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR OWN PARTY POLICIES. IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ARENA OF DEBATE, THIS IS WHAT CONSTITUTES THE EQUALITY BETWEEN PEERS. IN COMPARISON TO TWITTER, WHERE THE POSITIONS OF POWER ARE MORE AMBIGUOUS, YOU MIGHT CALL SOMEONE AN 'INFLUENCER' ON EU ISSUES WHO CAN BE SEEN AS A POLITICAL ACTOR BUT MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE A PARLIAMENTARIAN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LAWYER, SCHOLAR, AND ADVOCATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE EU, ALBERTO ALEMANNO, COULD BE IDENTIFIED AS ONE. DURING THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, HE HAS AROUND 24,000 FOLLOWERS IN HIS TWITTER ACCOUNT WHERE HE ENGAGES IN DEBATES ABOUT THE EU AND ITS INSTITUTIONS. HE HAS TWEETED ABOUT THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE PROVOKING DEBATE ABOUT THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE COUNCIL, AND THE PARLIAMENT. ALEMANNO IS A WELL-RESPECTED EXPERT WHICH GIVES HIM ETHOS TO ARGUE ON EU ISSUES. SOME MIGHT EVEN REGARD HIM AS A MEMBER OF EU SCHOLARS' ELITE. HE IS CLEARLY TRYING TO PROVOKE DEBATE ABOUT THE EU IN TWITTER, AND HE GENERATES AWARENESS FOR EU INSTITUTIONS AT THE SAME TIME. 122
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|a T. HAAPALA AS A SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY, TWITTER HAS MANY FLAWS. BUT IT HAS INTRODUCED A VARIETY OF ACTORS, BOTH NON-PARLIAMENTARIANS AND PARLIAMEN TARIANS, WHO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT EUROPEAN POLITICS AND CAN EVEN ENGAGE IN PUBLIC DEBATES ABOUT THE EU. THERE ARE SOME ACTORS, HOWEVER, WHO COULD POTENTIALLY MISUSE THEIR POSITION AS 'INFLUENCERS' AND PRODUCE INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU THAT IS MISLEADING, EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR NOT, WHICH CAN THEN CIRCULATE AMPLIFIED BY THE TWITTER ALGORITHM. FOR EXAMPLE, DISINFORMATION PRESENTED IN TWITTER BY CELEBRITIES CAN BECOME SOURCE FOR OPINIONS ABOUT EU POLITICS BEFORE ELECTIONS THAT CANNOT BE CONTROLLED (DARCY, 2019 ). 2.2 AGENDA-SETTING AS NEW ONLINE PLATFORMS OF COMMUNICATION ARE EMERGING, PARLIAMENTS AS ESTABLISHED SPHERES OF POLITICS ARE COMPETING FOR THE ATTENTION AND TIME OF CITIZENS. MOREOVER, THE INCREASING PACE OF RAISING ISSUES ON THE AGENDA OUTSIDE PARLIAMENTS DOES NOT FAVOUR PARLIAMENTARY DELIBERA TION WHICH COMMONLY TAKES SEVERAL PROCEDURAL STEPS. FURTHERMORE, THE DEBATES INDUCED BY AND DEVELOPED IN SOCIAL MEDIA CATCH THE ATTENTION OF WIDER AUDIENCES, EASILY SURPASSING THE ATTENTION TO PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES. TWITTER, IN PARTICULAR, PROMOTES IMPULSIVITY AND SIMPLICITY OF MESSAGES WHICH MAKES TWEETS EASILY 'DIGESTIBLE' (OTT, 2017 , PP. 60-61). PARLIAMENTS ARE INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH POLITICAL DEBATES ARE CONDUCTED PUBLICLY AND DECISIONS ARE TAKEN AFTER VOTES ON THE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE PARLIAMENTARY AGENDA. IT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE A FAILURE BY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IF THEY DO NOT REACH A DECISION ON THE AGENDA ITEMS. IMPORTANTLY, PARLIAMENTARIANS DO NOT, HOWEVER, ALWAYS END UP VOTING ACCORDING TO THE WISHES OF THE ELECTORATE. ONE OF THE REASONS IS THAT, IN PARLIAMENTS, OPINIONS HAVE TO BE FORMULATED IN TERMS OF THE ISSUES RAISED TO THE AGENDA. THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE DICTATES THAT A DEBATE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THE QUESTION TO BE DEBATED HAS BEEN PUT ON
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|a THE AGENDA. THE RHETOR ICAL ASPECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATEARE SHOWN PRECISELY IN THE WAY THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY HAVE TO COME UP WITH COMPELLING ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT THEIR SIDE OF THE QUESTION (ILIE, 2016 , P. 134). IN CLASSICAL RHETOR ICAL TERMS, IT IS CALLED THE INVENTION OF ARGUMENTS ( INVENTIO ). THE INVENTION OF ARGUMENTS HAS TO ADDRESS THE ITEM ON THE AGENDA IN THE PARLIAMEN TARY CONTEXT, WHICH MAKES IT HARDER TO MISLEAD AND REDIRECT DEBATES. IN 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 123 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESTIMING IS ALSO CRUCIAL. DUE TO THE PROCEDURAL RESTRIC TIONS, WHEN TO SAY SOMETHING AND HOW, BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN ELSEWHERE, AS THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANOTHER CHANCE TO MAKE ARGUMENTS ON THE MATTER AT HAND. THE PROCEDURES RESTRICT THE DEBATES, BUT THEY ALSO ALLOW TIME TO DELIBERATE AND TO INVENT ARGUMENTS THAT COULD SWAY THE OPINIONS OF THE OPPOSITE SIDE. THE POLITICS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES CAN TURN DEBATING A POLITICAL STRUGGLE OVER WHO IS THE MOST SKILLED AT USING THE PROCEDURE FOR THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. WHAT IT SHOWS IS THAT THE PROCE DURE, IN FACT, IS NOT 'FIXED' BUT MORE FLEXIBLE THAN IT FIRST MIGHT APPEAR. IT DOES NOT DICTATE POLITICS OR REDUCE IT TO A MERE TECHNICALITY. ITS APPARENT TRIVIALITY, HOWEVER, MIGHT HIDE POLITICAL STRUGGLES BEHIND IT. THE POLITICS OF AGENDA IS A TOOL FOR POLITICISATION OF ISSUES, ALSO IN EXTRA PARLIAMENTARY CONTEXTS (CF. HAAPALA, 2016 ). THE POLITICISING IS DONE BY NAMING OR THROUGH INTERPRETING SOMETHING AS POLITICAL TO OPEN UP NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR CONDUCTING POLITICS. 9 IT CAN OCCUR, FOR EXAMPLE, BY IDENTI FYING THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN AS SUCH (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , P. 11). ISSUES THAT BECOME POLITICISED OUTSIDE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES CAN BE USED AS SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL GOALS INSIDE PARLIAMENTS AS WELL. IT COULD BE CLAIMED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RAISING OF ISSUES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA CAN HAVE POLITICAL ASPECTS, AS WELL, ESPECIALLY AS THEY AFFECT
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|a THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF PARLIAMENTS. THE RHETORICAL ASPECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE MIGHT WELL BE ONE OF THE REASONS WHY PARLIAMENTS ATTRACT ATTENTION AT ALL (ILIE, 2016 , P. 133). THE CASE OF THE BREXIT DEBATES IN WESTMINSTER, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOWS THAT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES CAN STILL ATTRACT ATTENTION IF THE STAKES ARE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH. THE INCREASING PUBLICITY IN SOCIAL MEDIA ON THE ISSUE DEBATED ALSO SHAPES THE RHETORIC RELATED TO PARLIAMENTARY WORK, AND IT BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO ADAPT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES TO THE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. 10 TO SUM UP, PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC IS A TYPE OF POLITICAL PERSUASION THAT USUALLY HAS WELL-DEFINED AUDIENCES. PARLIAMENTARIANS ADDRESS EACH OTHER BUT ALSO THEIR POTENTIAL VOTERS. BUT, IF THE ROLES OF THE RHETORICIANS AND THEIR AUDIENCES BECOME CONFUSED, IT POSES A CHALLENGE FOR POLITICAL JUDGE MENT. FOR BEING FULLY INFORMED TO MAKE DECISIONS, THE INTENDED AUDIENCE HAS TO BE AWARE OF THE CONTEXT AND THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF THE RHETORICIAN IN ORDER TO MAKE AN ENLIGHTENED DECISION ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO FOLLOW 9 FOR A SIMILAR ARGUMENT, SEE PALONEN'S AND WIESNER'S CHAPTERS IN THIS BOOK. 10 I WILL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER IN SECT. 4 . 124 T. HAAPALA THE ADVICE. IT IS GETTING MORE DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, TO MAKE ENLIGHTENED DECI SIONS, FOR BOTH POLITICIANS AND VOTERS WITH THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA YOU CAN NEVER BE ENTIRELY CERTAIN WHO IS BEHIND THE POLIT ICAL ADVICE AND FOR WHAT REASONS. IN THAT SENSE, ONE MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE PROCEDURES OF PUBLIC DEBATES HAVE BECOME POLITICISED, MEANING THAT THE TWITTERSPHERE HAS MADE A NEW FORM OF POLITICKING POSSIBLE (CF. WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ,P .1 1 ) . 11 3 CHALLENGES OF THE ' TWITTERSPHERE ' FOR EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES I WILL HERE DISCUSS THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYIN TWITTER COMPARED TO PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS. THE KEY ISSUE ABOUT THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWIT TERSPHERE IS THAT THERE IS OBVIOUSLY NO CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR DEBATES IN THE
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|a SOCIAL MEDIA. EVEN SO, THERE IS NO DENYING THAT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESARE CURRENTLY STRUGGLING IN THEIR ROLE AS BEACONS OF PUBLIC LIFE IN EUROPE AND GLOBALLY. IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT, THE ONLINE PLATFORMS OFFER A SPACE FOR VOICE AND OPINION OF CITIZENS IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. FIRST, I ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE OF 'ANTI-DEBATES' AS OPPOSED TO PROCE DURAL DEBATING. UNLIKE TRADITIONAL REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES, SUCH AS PARLIAMENTS, TWITTER DOES NOT OPERATE WITH CONSTITUTIONALLY ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES AND RULES TO SAFEGUARD FAIR POLITICAL DEBATE AND COMPROMISE, TO LEAVE ROOM FOR DELIBERATION OF DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES AND ARGUMENTS. SECOND, I WILL LOOK AT THE PROLIFERATION OF POLITICAL OPINIONS IN TWITTER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR POLITICAL DEBATE IN PRACTICE. EVEN THOUGH SUSPI CIONS AGAINST REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY ARE NOTHING NEW IN EUROPE (E.G. CONWAY, 2012 ), THE ATTACKS ARE NOW LAUNCHED IN NEW ARENAS WHICH CAN VERY EASILY CREATE CONFUSION ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE OPINIONS (IF THEY ARE POSTED ANONYMOUSLY OR BEHIND AN ALIAS) AND THEIR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS, AS WELL AS REACH WIDER AUDIENCES MORE SPEEDILY THAN EVER BEFORE. THIRD, I WILL DISCUSS THE ANONYMITY OF ACTORS IN TWITTER AND HOW THE ANONYMITY PLAYS A ROLE IN THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC DEBATES IN SOCIAL MEDIA. 11 FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES OF POLITICKING IN THE EU CONTEXT, SEE ALSO, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHAPTER BY WIESNER IN THIS BOOK. 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 125 3.1 CHALLENGE 1: ANTI-DEBATES THE DEFINITION OF DEBATE IS THE PRACTICE OF SPEAKING FOR AND AGAINST ISSUES ON THE AGENDABETWEEN A PLURALITY OF AGENTS (DE MILLE, 1882 , P. 147; SEE ALSO WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , P. 14). CONVERSELY, ANTI-DEBATES ARE A FORM OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYWHICH ENGAGES IN POLITICAL RHETORIC BUT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FAIR PROCEDURAL SETTING, WHICH IS EMBEDDED IN THE PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS FOR EXPRESSING THE DIFFERING VIEWS. THE CHALLENGE OF THESE ANTI-DEBATES TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES IS THAT THEY
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|a CAN SPREAD OPINIONS WITHOUT ANY FILTERING AND MODERATION. IT PROVIDES A CONVENIENT OUTLET, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SPREADING EXTREMIST VIEWS BY PASSING PARLIAMENTARY DELIBERATION. THIS IS, OF COURSE, THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WHO HAVE PROPOSED NEW LEGISLATION TO REGULATE PUBLIC DEBATES (SEE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2020 ). BUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONLINE PLATFORMS AND REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES IS MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN THE COMMISSIONERS HAVE EXPRESSED. THE SPREAD OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE FORM OF DISINFORMA TION IS ONE THING. HOWEVER, THERE IS A NEED TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS AN OPINION AND WHAT IS A MATTER OF DEBATE. HISTORICALLY, THE PARLIAMENTARY SETTING HAS OFFERED A PLATFORM FOR DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS IN A PEACEFUL WAY. THE RULES AND PROCEDURES OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS INCLUDE PLURALISM AND FAIR DEBATE ON OPPOSING VIEWS, ENSURING THE PARTICIPATION OF MINORITIES INSIDE THE REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY. THE PLURALITY OF VIEWS, WHICH IS A KEY ASPECT OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, ARE EXPRESSED IN A CONTROLLED SETTING WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, TIME IS TAKEN TO DELIBERATE MATTERS AND SANCTIONS ON WHAT IS CALLED UNPARLIA MENTARY LANGUAGE CAN BE GIVEN. IN OTHER WORDS, THE POLITICAL ARENA IS MODERATED BY CONVENTIONS AND PROCEDURES, NOT BY LAWS OR REGULATION. 'ANTI-DEBATES', IN WHICH THE RULES AND PROCEDURES OF DEBATING ARE SECONDARY TO THE EXPRESSION OF OPINION, ARE BECOMING COMMON WITH THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. IN EFFECT, THERE ARE NO LIMITS TO THE ITEMS ON THE AGENDAIN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES. FOR EXAMPLE, TWITTER HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A PLATFORM FOR 'BREAKING NEWS' PROVIDING 'INSTANT ACCESS' TO WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE WORLD FOR THE 'USER-WITNESS'. IN FACEBOOK, WHICH IS MORE ORIENTED AS A DISCUSSION FORUM, THE INTERACTION IS ALSO LIMITED TO FEEDS BY ALGORITHMS (BOSSETTA ET AL., 2017 , P. 72). THE BENEFIT OF A FORUM SUCH AS TWITTER IS THAT THEY FOSTER THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PUBLIC TO PROPOSE ITEMS
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|a TO BE DISCUSSED AND DEBATED. BOSSETTA ET AL. ( 2017 ,P .5 7 ) HAVE FURTHER ILLUSTRATED THAT THERE ARE THREE PRIMARY STYLES OF ONLINE POLIT ICAL ENGAGEMENT FOR USERS: (1) THE FACTUAL STYLE OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH REFERS TO CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTENT, (2) THE PARTISAN STYLE WHICH COMES FROM 126 T. HAAPALA VOICING OPINIONS, OR (3) THE MORAL STYLE FOR TAKING A NORMATIVE STANCE. FROM THE VOTERS' PERSPECTIVE, THEY ARE MATCHED WITH THREE ROLES GIVEN TO CITIZENS: THE WITNESS, THE ADVOCATE, AND THE JUDGE. IN RHETORICAL TERMS, THE TWITTERSPHERE RESEMBLES A FORENSIC MODEL OF A COURT RATHER THAN THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL OF A PARLIAMENT. TO COMPARE THE TYPOLOGY PROVIDED BY BOSSETTA ET AL. ( 2017 ) TO DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT, IT SHOWS THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY OF DEBATING, THE ALTERATION OF OPINIONS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE SIDES OF A CONTROVERSY. DEBATING BASED ON PROCE DURES SETTLES CONTROVERSIES AND DISAGREEMENTS ON THE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN SET ON THE AGENDA THROUGH THE FINAL ACT OF VOTING. 'ANTI-DEBATING', IN TURN, DOES NOT SETTLE THE ISSUES IN THIS WAY. THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' HAS SOME RULES IN PLACE, FOR EXAMPLE, BANNING THOSE WHO ARE SEEN AS PROMOTERS OF LIES AND DISINFORMATION. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY DECISION-MAKING OR VOTING. THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE DICTATES THAT A DEBATE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THE QUESTION TO BE DEBATED HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY PUT ON THE AGENDA. ONLY THEN ARE THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ALLOWED TO SPEAK ON THE MATTER. THIS ASPECT GIVES STRUCTURE TO THE DEBATES AT HAND, AS THE PARTICIPANTS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DEVIATE FROM THE ISSUE. THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE CHAMBER INTER PRETS THE DEBATING PROCEDURE AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DISORDER AND CHAOS. THEREFORE, WE CAN THINK OF THE PERSON AS A 'REFEREE'. THE PARLIAMENTARISA TION OF THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' WOULD REQUIRE A REFEREE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY STYLE, OF KEEPING ORDER AND PROMOTING FAIR DEBATE THROUGH A SET OF PROCE DURES. EVEN THOUGH A REFEREE DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA
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|a SETTING, TECHNICALLY, THE FAIR TREATMENT OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES COULD BE INTRODUCED OUTSIDE PARLIAMENTS AS WELL. 3.2 CHALLENGE 2: THE PROLIFERATION OF OPINIONS AND INCREASED PACE OF POLITICAL DEBATE THE ONLINE PLATFORMS ARE CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVING, AND NEW ARENAS FOR POLIT ICAL DEBATE KEEP EMERGING AS A RESULT OF THEIR SUCCESS. ONE COULD SPECULATE THAT ONE OF THE INTERESTS TO DEBATE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ONLINE IS PARTLY THE RESULT OF THE RHETORIC OF THE WEAK ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. AS PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL LACKS IN AUTHORITY, 12 THERE ARE COMPETING ONLINE SPACES THAT PROVIDE A PUBLIC PLACE AS WELL AS A SENSE 12 THIS ASPECT IS MAINLY DUE TO THE VETO POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES WITHIN EU INSTITUTIONS, I.E. THE PRIORITY OF INTER-GOVERNMENTALISM OVER PARLIAMENTARISM. 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 127 OF AUTONOMY ON POLITICAL ISSUES TO CITIZENS. AS A CAUSE OF THAT, THE CREATION OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES TENDS TO DISPERSE OPINIONS, CREATING A TENDENCY FOR QUICK PACED AND EVOLVING DEBATES. THE CHALLENGE IS THAT DEBATES BECOME UNSETTLED AND CONFUSED FROM THE ORIGINAL AIMS AND CONTEXTS. THIS CONSTI TUTES SITUATIONS IN WHICH IT IS INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO CONTROL OR LIMIT THE DEBATES. THE UNCONTROLLABILITY OF POLITICAL RHETORIC IS AN OLD PHENOMENON IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. IN POLITICAL THEORY, THE QUESTION OF HOW DISAGREEMENTS ARE FRAMED IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS HAS BEEN RE-EMERGING. JEREMY WALDRON, IN PARTICULAR, HAS ARGUED THAT POLITICAL THEORISTS SHOULD MORE ACTIVELY ENGAGE WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FRAME THE CONTROVERSIES ON SOCIAL IDEAS AND SET THE AGENDA FOR POLICY CHANGE (WALDRON, 2013 , P. 14). IT IS RECOGNISED THAT THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS SHAPE THE QUESTIONS AND AIMS OF SOCIAL REFORM. HOWEVER, THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES ALLOW FOR COMPETING DEBATING SPACES THAT SHOW AGENDA-SETTING CAPACITIES AS WELL. ONE OF THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IS THAT PARLIAMENTARY
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|a DEBATESARE NOT THE FIRST POINT OF REFERENCE FOR MANY VOTERS ANY LONGER. TO CONSIDER THE HISTOR ICAL TRADITIONS AND THEORY OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE CAN OFFER US DISTANCE AND POINT OF REFLECTION TO THIS CURRENT PROBLEM. THE GROWING PUBLICITY WAS ALSO A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE TRANSFERS OF PARLIAMEN TARY RHETORIC TO OTHER ARENAS AND PLATFORMS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. AS A RESULT, PROCEDURAL MANUALS OF PARLIAMENTARY WORK WERE PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED IN BRITAIN. EQUALLY, HANDBOOKS ON HOW TO FORM DEBATING SOCI ETIES WERE WRITTEN AND CIRCULATED IN BRITAIN AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES SINCE THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY (SEE, E.G. PALGRAVE, 1869/1878 ; WILLETT, 1880 ). THE WIDER CIRCULATION OF REPORTING ON PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESAND CONSE QUENTLY GREATER INTEREST IN HOW POLITICS WAS CONDUCTED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS GRADUALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCREASED POPULAR KNOWLEDGE OF WESTMINSTER POLITICS. IN 1873 THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OXFORD UNION WAS REPORTED ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE TIMES . IN THE NEWSPAPER REPORT, THE DEBATING SOCIETY WAS EXPLICITLY CONNECTED WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY CULTURE OF THE TIME. IT WAS SAID THAT, DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE OXFORD UNION, THE NATION HAD BECOME 'A DEBATING, THAT IS, A PARLIAMENTARY PEOPLE' ( THE TIMES , 1873 , P. 1). IN OTHER WORDS, DEBATING WAS EXPLICITLY CONNECTED WITH IMITATIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES. THE WIDESPREAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESAND PRACTICES INCREASED THE VALUE OF PARLIAMENTARY DELIBERATION IN THE POLITICAL CULTURE. HOWEVER, THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT PREDATED DEMOCRACY AND MATURE PARTY 128 T. HAAPALA POLITICS IN THE NATION STATES. REFLECTING ON THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN UNION, ONE COULD ARGUE THAT THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXAMPLE SUITS WELL AS A POINT OF COMPARISON AS THE POLITY IS NOT FIXED AND LACKS MANY TRADITIONAL QUALITIES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. THE PUBLICITY OF PARLIA MENTARY DEBATESWAS FURTHER EXPANDED BY THE INCREASING CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE AND THE MASS
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|a ORGANISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. CURRENTLY, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES ARE FACED WITH INCREASING VISIBILITY, THE CULTURE OF APPEARANCE. IN SOME CASES, THIS IS REFERRED TO AS 'TRANSPARENCY', REFERRING TO THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC RECORDS AND LEGISLATION. WITH NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA, THE PLURALITY OF VOICES AND OPINIONS HAS CONSIDERABLY INCREASED. INSTEAD OF DEMANDING MORE 'TRANSPARENCY', IN THIS CASE, IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO FOCUS THE ATTENTION TO REFORMS IN TERMS OF CONTROLLING VISIBILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, IN A WAY THAT WOULD INCREASE THE PREDICTABILITY OF DEBATING IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA. THERE SEEMS TO BE A NEED FOR EXPERTISE THAT BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY WORK AND THE ELECTION RHETORIC. IN THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN CONTEXT, THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISSUES RAISED IN THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' INTO PETITIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COULD BE ONE ALTERNATIVE. THIS COULD BE A MEANS TO INCREASE THE ROLE OF THE PARLIA MENT IN TERMS OF HAVING A CENTRAL ROLE IN COLLECTING AND DELIBERATING ON THE EUROPEAN ISSUES RAISED IN SOCIAL MEDIA. 3.3 CHALLENGE 3: ANONYMITY OF ACTORS A MAJOR ASPECT OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IS THAT THE SPEECHES ARE CONDUCTED IN PUBLIC THROUGH RULES AND PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE BEEN HISTORICALLY DESIGNED TO PROTECT AGAINST ARBITRARY USE OF EXECUTIVE POWER. THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE HAS BEEN ON THE RISE IN MANY EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES. WHILE THE PUBLICITY OF DEBATES IS THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTIC AND SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY OF PARLIAMENTS, THE EU LEVEL DEBATES ARE STILL MORE LIKELY TO BE CONDUCTED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS THAN IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (CURTIN, 2014 , P. 23). AS LONG AS THE EP IS NOT THE MAIN PUBLIC DEBATING ARENA ON EUROPEAN ISSUES, IN TERMS OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, THERE IS A GAP TO BE FILLED WITH OTHER OPTIONS TO ENSURE SCRUTINY OF ISSUES AND A CHANCE FOR MINORITIES TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS. THIS GAP IS INCREASINGLY FILLED BY SOCIAL MEDIA.
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|a HOWEVER, THERE CAN BE CONFUSION ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE OPINIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS PRESENTED IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA. THIS IS A 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 129 RATHER NEW DILEMMA IN POLITICAL RHETORIC. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE IS NO CERTAINTY OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON, OR EVEN WHETHER THE PERSON EXISTS, WHILE TAKING PART IN DEBATES ONLINE. PARLIAMENTARIANS HAVE TO ACCEPT PUBLIC SCRUTINY AS AN INTRINSIC PART OF THEIR DUTIES AS REPRESENTATIVES AND ACTORS IN THE PUBLIC ARENA. THE RESULT OF BEING ELECTED TO AND ACCEPTING A REPRESENTATIVE POSITION IS THAT YOU BECOME AN OFFICIAL POLITICAL ACTOR WHO CANNOT ESCAPE THE 'PUBLIC EYE'. IT BOTH BENEFITS AND CONTROLS POLITICIANS. IN THE CONTEXT OF TWITTER, IN CONTRAST, IF ARGUMENTS ARE POSTED ANONYMOUSLY OR BEHIND AN ALIAS, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE OF THE ACTORS' IDENTITY. IN ONLINE PLATFORMS, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO TARGET ANYONE, WHICH CAN LEAD TO UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES. THE PHENOMENON OF TARGETING HAS BEEN USED IN ELECTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE OF UNDECIDED VOTERS. IN THE 2015 UK GENERAL ELECTIONS, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LAUNCHED A FACE BOOK CAMPAIGN WHICH RESULTED IN UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL COMPETITION. MOORE ( 2016 , PP. 428-429) NOTES THAT THE OPENNESS OF ELECTION COMMU NICATION WAS ALSO VIOLATED AS THE VOTERS COULD NOT ASSESS WHO WAS SAYING WHAT. FROM THE OPPOSITE SIDE, POLITICIANS CAN ALSO BE TARGETED AND ATTACKED IN SOCIAL MEDIA. ESPECIALLY THE REPRESENTATIVES WHO COME FROM MINORITY BACKGROUNDS ARE IN A MORE VULNERABLE POSITION. THE ANONYMITY OF ONLINE USERS, IN THIS SENSE, MIGHT BE VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL REPRESENTATIVES ARE CONSIDERED IN AN EQUAL POSITION. THE KEY ISSUE IN THE 'ANONYMITY CHALLENGE' OF ONLINE DEBATES IS THE UNEQUAL POSITIONS CREATED FOR BOTH VOTERS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS. IN THAT SENSE, IT IS AN UNSUSTAINABLE ELEMENT IN CURRENT DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. THE MORE SUSTAINABLE WAY OF APPROACHING DEBATING IN SOCIAL MEDIA WOULD BE
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|a THE INTRODUCTION OF VERIFICATION OF IDENTITY FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO BE ACTIVE IN DEBATES VIA ONLINE PLATFORMS. IT WOULD ENTAIL THE CREATION OF AN OFFI CIAL DEBATER STATUS AS A KIND OF POLITICAL PSEUDONYM, WHICH ONE OR MORE PERSONS COULD USE. THE STATUS WOULD BE AFFILIATED WITH AND PUBLICLY RECOG NISED BY A GROUP OF PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PETITION TO BE DEBATED AND FINALLY SENT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. SIMILAR TO EDITORS IN NEWSPAPERS WHO CAN WRITE IN THE NAME OF SEVERAL PERSONS TO REPRESENT THEIR PAPER, THESE VIRTUAL REPRESENTATIVES COULD WRITE AS PROXY TO THE SUPPORTERS OF THE PETITION. FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, THE 'VIRTUAL REPRESENTATIVE' FORMAT WOULD OFFER A NEW WAY TO WEIGH SUPPORT FOR IDEAS AND ARGUMENTS IN A DEMO CRATICALLY SUSTAINABLE WAY. AS TWITTER DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY TURN ISSUES TO THE POLITICAL AGENDA, IT COULD BE USED AS A LEGITIMATE WAY TO FIND OUT HOW THE ELECTORATE MIGHT REACT TO PROPOSALS. IT WOULD GIVE THE PARLIAMENTARIANS FURTHER CREDIBILITY AS EXPERTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SPHERE OF POLITICS WHO ARE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DEBATES ABOUT PETITIONS IN SOCIAL MEDIA. 130 T. HAAPALA 4 THE INTERTWINING OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES WITH THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: POLITICISING THE SPHERE OF ACTIVITY AND AGENDA-SETTING THE INTERTWINING OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYAND AGENDA-SETTING, IS DUE TO THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. IT HAS INVOLVED, AMONG OTHER ASPECTS, THE INCREASE OF VOICING OPINIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES, THE DIVERSITY OF ACTORS, AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF MEPS IN THE TWITTERSPHERE. IN MANY WAYS, AS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION, THE TWITTERSPHERE LACKS THE PROCEDURES AND RULES OF DEBATE THAT A PARLIAMENT HAS, WHICH DOES NOT MAKE IT A SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR REPLACING PARLIA MENTARY DEBATES. HOWEVER, THERE IS CERTAINLY A COMPLEMENTARY ASPECT OF SOCIAL MEDIA VIS-A-VIS PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, WHICH SHOWS IN THE WAYS IN WHICH THE TRADITIONAL SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYAND AGENDA-SETTING HAS BEEN
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|a POLITICISED. THE INTERTWINING OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY SHOWN IN THE WAYS IN WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, MEPS ENGAGE IN SOCIAL MEDIA TO GATHER SUPPORT OUTSIDE THE PARLIAMENTARY SPHERE OF ACTION. THIS CAN BE INTERPRETED AS POLITICISATION OF THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY WITH OPENING UP SPACE FOR POLITICKING (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , PP. 10-11). ONE CASE IN QUESTION IS THE ALREADY MENTIONED EXAMPLE OF NIGEL FARAGE AND THE UKIP PARTY'S APPEAL IN TWITTER FOR OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THE BREXIT. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE FRENCH MEP MANON AUBRY'S TWEET THAT TRIED TO INCITE A PROTEST GROUP, EXTINCTION REBELLION , TO OCCUPY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN OCTOBER 2019. AUBRY, THE CO-CHAIR OF THE LEFTIST GUE/NGL GROUP, WAS THREATENED WITH SANC TIONS BY THE EP PRESIDENT DAVID SASSOLI (SANCHEZ NICOLAS, 2019 ). SHE REACTED BY POSTING A LETTER FROM SASSOLI IN HER TWITTER ACCOUNT AND ACCUSED HIM OF UNDERMINING THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF MEPS. AUBRY, WHO HAD A PREVIOUS CAREER WORKING FOR AN NGO, ARGUED THAT THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS WAS 'TOTALLY DISPROPORTIONATE' AS THE ACTIVISTS WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. THE TWO EXAMPLES SHOW THAT THE TWITTERSPHERE OFFERS A NEW PLAYING FIELD FOR THE MEPS. ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO HAVE FOLLOWERS IN TWITTER AND ARE ACCUSTOMED TO ACTING IN BOTH SPHERES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYCAN PUSH THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PROCEDURES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, AS WAS THE CASE WITH AUBRY. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES CAN ALSO AFFECT THE TWITTERSPHERE INTRODUCING TOPICS OF DISCUSSION BY MEPS AS WELL AS NON-PARLIAMENTARY ACTORS WHO HAVE AN INTEREST OR STAKE IN 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 131 THE EU AFFAIRS. IN THIS LIGHT, POLITICISING CAN BE SEEN AS AN ACT OF INTRO DUCING NEW WAYS OF DOING POLITICS AND NEW ACTORS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL SPHERE AS WELL AS RAISING ITEMS ON THE AGENDA (WIESNER ET AL., 2017 , PP.
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|a 10-11). BY POLITICISING THE STATUS QUO , VARIOUS ACTORS CAN BRING ISSUES INTO A NEW LIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BY CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BOUNDARIES, OR WAYS OF ACTING. WHILE CONSIDERING THE INTERTWINING OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES, THE TWITTERSPHERE HAS AFFECTED SIGNS OF POLITICISATION ALSO IN THE EP DEBATES. WITH THE PROPOSED DIGITAL SERVICES ACT, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IS INTRODUCING IT FOR THE DEBATES OF THE EP WHILE AIMING AT TACKLING THE DILEMMAS OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA. IT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS THE COMMISSION'S WAY OF POLITICISING THE NEW SPHERE OF ACTION THAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAS ARGUED THAT, WITH THE LAW PROPOSAL, IT SEEKS TO ADDRESS THE DEMOCRATIC PROBLEMS THE SOCIAL MEDIA HAS HELPED TO PRODUCE. IT HAS PROPOSED CERTAIN GROUND RULES IN THE NEW LAW TO MODERATE DEBATES IN ONLINE PLATFORMS (EUROPEAN COMMIS SION, 2020 ). TO INTERPRET THIS IN RHETORICAL TERMS, THE COMMISSION HAS SEEN A VICE WHERE MOST OF THE OTHER ACTORS IN THE EU, INCLUDING SOME EU SCHOLARS, HAVE SEEN A VIRTUE. THE NEW LAW TRIES TO MITIGATE THE RISKS OF ALGORITHMS OF SOCIAL MEDIA POSED TO THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF THE EU. THE LAW PROPOSAL BEGINS WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSFORMING SOCIETY AND DIGITAL SERVICES, ILLUSTRATING THAT THEY 'HAVE ALSO BECOME THE SOURCE OF NEW RISKS AND CHALLENGES, BOTH FOR SOCIETY AS A WHOLE AND INDIVIDUALS USING THOSE SERVICES' (EURO PEAN COMMISSION, 2020 , P. 1). IT INDICATES THE NEED FOR IMPOSING RULES ON COMPANIES WHO PROVIDE ONLINE SERVICES, ESPECIALLY SOCIAL MEDIA AND MARKETPLACE PLATFORMS, 'TO IMPROVE USERS' SAFETY ONLINE ACROSS THE ENTIRE UNION AND IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS' (IBID., P. 2). IN PRACTICE, THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN THAT THE EURO PEAN UNION CAN INTERVENE IN THE MODERATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA OWNED BY PRIVATE COMPANIES. THE MODERATION WOULD ONLY APPLY TO 'VERY LARGE ONLINE PLATFORMS' THAT HAVE 'ACQUIRED A
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|a CENTRAL, SYSTEMIC ROLE IN FACILITATING THE PUBLIC DEBATE'. SMALL SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE EXEMPT. THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCES A LEGAL REPRE SENTATIVE WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO INTERVENE IN THE DIGITAL SERVICE PROVIDERS BASED OUTSIDE THE EU, WHICH IS CALLED 'A COOPERATION MECHANISM ACROSS MEMBER STATES WITH ENHANCED UNION LEVEL OVERSIGHT OF VERY LARGE ONLINE PLATFORMS' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2020 , P. 6). MORE CONCRETELY, THE MECHANISM WOULD ALLOW FOR THE MITIGATION OF 'RISKS OF ERRONEOUS OR UNJUS TIFIED BLOCKING SPEECH, ADDRESS THE CHILLING EFFECTS ON SPEECH, STIMULATE 132 T. HAAPALA THE FREEDOM TO RECEIVE INFORMATION AND HOLD OPINIONS, AS WELL AS REIN FORCE USERS' REDRESS POSSIBILITIES' (IBID., P. 12). THE PROPOSAL ESPECIALLY MENTIONS THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AS ONE OF THE CENTRAL AIMS OF THE LAW. IN THE LAW PROPOSAL, THE COMMISSION FOCUSES ON ISSUES OF THE SAFETY AND PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS. VYYERA JOUROVA, THE COMMISSIONER IN CHARGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC ACTION PLAN, UNDER WHICH THE LAW PROPOSAL HAS BEEN DRAFTED, DEFENDED THE INITIATIVE BY SAYING THAT MODERATION WILL ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC TRUST. JOUROVA CLARIFIED THAT IT WILL HELP TO 'MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF ELECTIONS, ENSURE A FREE AND PLURAL MEDIA, AND PROTECT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS FROM DISINFORMATION AND OTHER MANIPULA TION'. SHE FURTHER CLARIFIES THAT THE AIM OF THE NEW LEGISLATION IS TO ENHANCE EMANCIPATION AND FIGHT AGAINST MANIPULATION TO 'LIMIT THE MICROTARGETING AS A METHOD WHICH IS USED FOR THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL POWERS, POLITICAL PARTIES OR POLITICAL INDIVIDUALS' (IN LOMAS, 2020 ). IN THE SAME VEIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION, URSULA VON DER LEYEN, HAS EXPRESSED HER CONCERN OF PRIVATE COMPANIES' POWER OVER THE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE ONLINE PLATFORMS. IN A SPEECH DELIV ERED ON 26 JANUARY 2021 (AND POSTED ON TWITTER), SHE STATED THAT THE BUSINESSES OFFERING ONLINE PLATFORMS MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE 'FOR THE
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|a MANNER IN WHICH THEY DISSEMINATE, PROMOTE AND REMOVE CONTENT' THAT CAN BE DETRIMENTAL FOR DEMOCRACY. VON DER LEYEN ARGUES, SPECIFICALLY, FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF 'THIS IMMENSE POWER OF THE BIG DIGITAL COMPANIES' (VON DER LEYEN, 2021 ). THE STATEMENTS ILLUSTRATE THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE EU DEMANDS ACCOUNTABILITY BY POLITICISING THE ACTIVITIES OF 'VERY LARGE ONLINE PLATFORMS', SUCH AS TWITTER AND FACEBOOK. THIS POLITICISING STRATEGY IS EXPOSED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ONLINE PLATFORMS AS PLACES FOR MANIPULATION AND THE OPENING OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PRIVATE COMPANIES' VAST POWERS. THE AIM IS TO CONTAIN THE POWERS OF THE ONLINE PLATFORM SERVICE PROVIDERS WHICH CAN BE VIEWED AS AN EFFORT TO CONTROL PRIVATE COMPANIES. THE INTER VENTIONS BY A LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, HOWEVER, WOULD ONLY HELP TO SANCTION THE WRONG DOERS AFTER THE FACT. THE PREDICTABILITY OF DEBATING IN THE TWITTERSPHERE IS NOT EASILY ACHIEVED WITHOUT DRASTIC CHANGES FOR A MORE DEMOCRATICALLY SUSTAINABLE WAY OF FORMING DEBATES, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE MORE PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF DEBATES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA. THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY UNKNOWN SOURCES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYCOULD BE POTENTIALLY REMEDIED BY THE CREATION OF OFFICIAL DEBATER'S STATUS IN ONLINE PLATFORMS. IT WILL BE EITHER 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 133 ACHIEVED BY COLLABORATION WITH PRIVATE COMPANIES OR CREATION OF PUBLICLY CONTROLLED ONLINE PLATFORMS. 5 CONCLUSION THIS CHAPTER HAS REFLECTED ON HOW THE FORMS AND RULES OF DEBATING ARE TRANSFORMING IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES WITH THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. POLITICISATION HAS BEEN APPROACHED AS A WAY TO INTRODUCE NEW ACTORS, ISSUES, OR WAYS OF ACTING, THAT CAN CREATE WAYS TO QUESTION THE STATUS QUO. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, I SET OUT TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION: DOES THE INCREASING USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSLATE INTO MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE EU? WHILE THE EMERGING DEBATING ARENAS, SUCH AS THE TWITTERSPHERE, CAN
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|a CERTAINLY OFFER ACCESS TO MORE INDIVIDUALS TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS, THE AVAILABILITY OF SUCH SPACES DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY TRANSLATE INTO MORE DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE. THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWITTERSPHERE, I.E. ANTI DEBATES, PROLIFERATION OF OPINIONS, AND INCREASED PACE OF DEBATING AS WELL AS ANONYMITY OF ACTORS, WERE DISCUSSED IN COMPARISON WITH PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS TO ILLUSTRATE TO WHAT EXTENT SOCIAL MEDIA CAN PRODUCE A SPACE FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. WITH THE THREE CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES, MY AIM HAS BEEN TO HIGHLIGHT THAT, WHAT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS VICES OF THE TWITTERSPHERE, CAN ALSO BE SEEN AS ITS VIRTUES. DEPENDING ON THE POLITICAL CONTEXT, ACTORS, AND AIMS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER BOTH SIDES. TWITTER OFFERS A PLATFORM THAT IS MORE FLEXIBLE AND ACCOMMODATING TO VARIOUS ACTORS THAN PARLIAMENTS. THIS IS WHY IT SHOWS SUCH PROMISE OF DEMOCRATI SATION AND EUROPEANISATION. SIMULTANEOUSLY, HOWEVER, IT CAN FOSTER ONLINE ABUSE AND CREATE 'INFLAMMATORY POLITICAL RHETORIC'. THE MAIN ARGUMENT PROPOSED HERE IS THAT, WHILE IT CANNOT REPLACE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESENTIRELY, THE TWITTERSPHERE CAN CERTAINLY COMPLE MENT THEM TO SOME EXTENT BY OFFERING AN ALTERNATIVE SPACE FOR PUBLIC DEBATES ABOUT EU ISSUES. I IDENTIFIED TWO AREAS WHERE THE TWITTERSPHERE HAS INTRODUCED THE POSSIBILITY FOR A VARIETY OF ACTORS TO POLITICISE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES: THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYAND AGENDA-SETTING. IN OTHER WORDS, EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES CAN BE POLITICISED EITHER WAY DEPENDING ON THE POLITICAL GOALS OF AN ACTOR. WHILE BOTH NON-PARLIAMENTARY AND PARLIAMENTARY ACTORS CAN USE SOCIAL MEDIA FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES, THEY DO IT BY PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF EUROPEAN POLITICS IN TERMS OF SPACE OF DEBATING AND ISSUES UNDER DEBATE. 134 T. HAAPALA AT THE TIME OF WRITING, THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE HAS JUST BEEN LAUNCHED, WITH BOTH VIRTUAL AND IN-PERSON OPTIONS FOR ORGAN ISING PUBLIC DEBATES. 13 THE DIGITAL PLATFORM 14 OFFERED FOR VIRTUAL PUBLIC
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|a DEBATES IS BASED ON REGISTRATION OF PARTICIPANTS AND MODERATORS WHICH COMMITS THEM TO A CHARTER. IT OFFERS A POSSIBILITY TO FORM A MODERATED AND PUBLICLY OWNED SOCIAL MEDIA FOR THE EU. ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY THAT IT WILL COMPETE WITH TWITTER ANY TIME SOON, THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PLAT FORM SHOWS SIGNS OF ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND TACKLING THE CHALLENGES POSED BY SOCIAL MEDIA IN A SUSTAINABLE WAY. THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES ARE INCREASINGLY INTERTWINED IN THE TWIT TERSPHERE AND THE PARLIAMENTS IN THE SUPRANATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND REGIONAL LEVELS. THIS IS, FOR EXAMPLE, ILLUSTRATED BY THE WAY IN WHICH POLITICISING STRATEGIES VIS-A-VIS THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITYAND AGENDA-SETTING ARE ALSO TAKEN UP BY EU INSTITUTIONS, AS IS THE CASE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND ITS LAW PROPOSAL TO MODERATE ONLINE PLATFORMS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE COMMISSION, REGULATING THE POWERS OF ONLINE PLATFORMS AFFECTING PUBLIC OPINION WHICH ARE OWNED BY PRIVATE COMPA NIES WITH HEADQUARTERS OUTSIDE THE EU, OPENS A WAY FORWARD TO SAFEGUARD THE EU WITH ITS VALUES AND PRINCIPLES. THIS FORM OF POLITICISATION SHOWS THAT, WHILE THE ONLINE PLATFORMS WHERE EUROPEAN POLITICS ARE INCREASINGLY DEBATED OFFER A SPACE FOR VOICE AND OPINION OF CITIZENS IN THE PERCEIVED ABSENCE OF A STRONG EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, IT CAN ALSO ALLOW FOR POLITI CISATION MANOEUVRES BY EU INSTITUTIONS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER OR NOT THE DIGITAL PLATFORM OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CAN OFFER A BLUEPRINT FOR A MORE DEMOCRATICALLY SUSTAINABLE OPTION OF THE TWITTERSPHERE. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN WRITTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH DR. HAAPALA'S INTERTALENTUM-MARIE CURIE MSCA-COFUND PROJECT EURPLURAWORLD HOSTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MADRID. THE PROJECT HAS RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HORIZON 2020 RESEARCH AND INNOVATION PROGRAMME UNDER GRANT AGREEMENT NO. 713366. 13
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|a HTTPS://FUTUREU.EUROPA.EU/PAGES/ABOUT . 14 THE PLATFORM HAS BEEN DESIGNED BY DECIDIM.ORG, AN OPEN-SOURCE PROJECT BASED IN BARCELONA WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN CITIZEN CONSULTATIONS FOR CITY COUNCILS. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE HTTPS://DECIDIM.ORG/FAQS/ . 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 135 REFERENCES BARISIONE, M., & MICHAILIDOU, A. (EDS.). (2017). SOCIAL MEDIA AND EURO PEAN POLITICS: RETHINKING POWER AND LEGITIMACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BOSSETTA, M., DUTCEAC SEGESTEN, A., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2017). ENGAGING WITH EUROPEAN POLITICS THROUGH TWITTER AND FACEBOOK: PARTICIPATION BEYOND THE NATIONAL? IN M. BARISIONE & A. MICHAILIDOU (EDS.), SOCIAL MEDIA AND EURO PEAN POLITICS: RETHINKING POWER AND LEGITIMACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA (PP. 53-76). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. CONWAY, M. (2012). DEMOCRACY IN POSTWAR WESTERN EUROPE: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICAL MODEL. EUROPEAN HISTORY QUARTERLY, 32 (1), 59-84. CURTIN, D. (2014). CHALLENGING EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY. THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, 77 (1), 1-32. DARCY, O. (2019, MARCH 22). HOW TWITTER'S ALGORITHM IS AMPLIFYING EXTREME POLITICAL RHETORIC. CNN BUSINESS . RETRIEVED MARCH 23, 2021, FROM HTTPS:// EDITION.CNN.COM/2019/03/22/TECH/TWITTER-ALGORITHM-POLITICAL-RHETORIC/ INDEX.HTML . DE MILLE, J. (1882/1878). ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC . HARPERS. RETRIEVED MARCH 23, 2021, FROM HTTP://ARCHIVE.ORG/DETAILS/ELEMENTSRHETORI00MILLGOOG . DUNN, J. (2005). SETTING THE PEOPLE FREE: THE STORY OF DEMOCRACY . ATLANTIC BOOKS. ERIKSEN, E. O. (1999). THE QUESTION OF DELIBERATIVE SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE EU (ARENA WORKING PAPERS, WP 99/4). RETRIEVED MARCH 23, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.SV.UIO.NO/ARENA/ENGLISH/RESEARCH/PUBLICATIONS/ ARENA-WORKING-PAPERS/1994-2000/1999/WP99_4.HTM . EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2020, DECEMBER 15). PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON A SINGLE MARKET FOR DIGITAL SERVICES (DIGITAL SERVICES ACT) AND AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC . RETRIEVED
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|a MARCH 23, 2021, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/DIGITAL-SINGLE-MARKET/EN/NEWS/PRO POSAL-REGULATION-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT-AND-COUNCIL-SINGLE-MARKET-DIGITAL-SER VICES-DIGITAL . FRASER, N. (1990). RETHINKING THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF ACTUALLY EXISTING DEMOCRACY. SOCIAL TEXT, 25 (26), 56-80. GARRISON SMITH, T. (2017). POLITICIZING DIGITAL SPACE: THEORY, THE INTERNET AND RENEWING DEMOCRACY . UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER PRESS. RETRIEVED MARCH 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.JSTOR.ORG/STABLE/J.CTV5VDD75 . GRAHAM, T., JACKSON, D., & BROERSMA, M. (2016). NEW PLATFORM, OLD HABITS? CANDIDATES' USE OF TWITTER DURING THE 2010 BRITISH AND DUTCH GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY, 18 (5), 765-783. HAAPALA, T. (2016). POLITICAL RHETORIC IN THE OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIONS, 1830- 1870 . STUDIES IN MODERN HISTORY. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. 136 T. HAAPALA HAENSKA, M., & BAUCHOWITZ, S. (2019). CAN SOCIAL MEDIA FACILITATE A EURO PEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE EUROPEANIZATION OF TWITTER DURING THE EUROZONE CRISIS. SOCIAL MEDIA + SOCIETY , 5 (3), 1-14. ILIE, C. (2016). PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE AND DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC. IN P. IHALAINEN, C. ILIE, & K. PALONEN (EDS.), PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENTARISM: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF A EUROPEAN CONCEPT (PP. 133-145). BERGHAHN. JACKSON, N., & LILLEKER, D. (2011). MICROBLOGGING, CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: UK MPS AND THE USE OF TWITTER. THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES, 17 (1), 86-105. VON DER LEYEN, U. (2021, JANUARY 26). SPECIAL ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT VON DER LEYEN AT THE DAVOS AGENDA WEEK . RETRIEVED JUNE 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA. EU/COMMISSION/PRESSCORNER/DETAIL/EN/SPEECH_21_221 . LOMAS, N. (2020, DECEMBER 3). EUROPE TO PUT FORWARD RULES FOR POLITICAL ADS TRANSPARENCY AND BEEF UP ITS DISINFORMATION CODE NEXT YEAR. TECHCRUNCH . RETRIEVED MARCH 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://TECHCRUNCH.COM/2020/12/03/EUR
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|a OPE-TO-PUT-FORWARD-RULES-FOR-POLITICAL-ADS-TRANSPARENCY-AND-BEEF-UP-ITS-DISINF ORMATION-CODE-NEXT-YEAR/ . MANSBRIDGE, J. (1998). FEMINISM AND DEMOCRACY. IN A. PHILLIPS (ED.), FEMINISM AND POLITICS . OXFORD READINGS IN FEMINISM (PP. 142-158). OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. MOORE, M. (2016). FACEBOOK, THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE RISK OF FAIR AND OPEN ELECTIONS IN THE UK. THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, 87 (3), 424-430. OTT, B. L. (2017). THE AGE OF TWITTER: DONALD J. TRUMP AND THE POLITICS OF DEBASEMENT. CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA COMMUNICATION , 34 (1), 59-68. PALGRAVE, R. F. D. (1878/1869). THE CHAIRMAN'S HANDBOOK. SUGGESTIONS AND RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF CHAIRMEN OF PUBLIC AND OTHER MEETINGS, DRAWN FROM THE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE OF PARLIAMENT (THIRD AND REVISED ED.). KNIGHT. RONE, J. (2021, JANUARY 13). PUBLIC NETWORKS INSTEAD OF SOCIAL NETWORKS? POWER SWITCH. BLOG OF THE MINDEROO CENTRE FOR TECH AND DEMOCRACY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE . RETRIEVED MARCH 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS://POWERSWITCHORG.WOR DPRESS.COM/2021/01/13/PUBLIC-NETWORKS-INSTEAD-OF-SOCIAL-NETWORKS/ . RUIZ-SOLER, J., CURINI, L., & CERON, A. (2019). COMMENTING ON POLITICAL TOPICS THROUGH TWITTER: IS EUROPEAN POLITICS EUROPEAN? SOCIAL MEDIA + SOCIETY , 5 (4), 1-13. SANCHEZ NICOLAS, E. (2019, NOVEMBER 5). EP PRESIDENT THREATENS MEP WITH SANCTIONS OVER A TWEET. EUOBSERVER . RETRIEVED MARCH 3, 2021, FROM HTTPS:// EUOBSERVER.COM/ENVIRONMENT/146526 . SELINGER, W. (2019). PARLIAMENTARISM: FROM BURKE TO WEBER . CAMBRIDGE UNIVER SITY PRESS. SKINNER, Q. (1973). THE EMPIRICAL THEORISTS OF DEMOCRACY AND THEIR CRITICS: A PLAGUE ON BOTH THEIR HOUSES. POLITICAL THEORY, 1 (3), 287-306. 6 PARLIAMENTARY RHETORIC MEETS THE TWITTERSPHERE YY 137 SKINNER, Q. (2007). PARADIASTOLE: REDESCRIBING THE VICES AS VIRTUES. IN S. ADAMSON, G. ALEXANDER, & K. ETTENHUBER (EDS.), RENAISSANCE FIGURES OF SPEECH (PP. 149-164). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. THE TIMES . (1873, OCTOBER 23, THURSDAY). THE OXFORD UNION, P. 1. URBINATI, N. (2016).
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|a REFLECTIONS ON THE MEANING OF THE "CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY." DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 3 (1), 6-31. WALDRON, J. (2013). POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE. THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 21 (1), 1-23. WIESNER, C., HAAPALA, T., & PALONEN, K. (2017). DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION: PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS . RHETORIC, POLITICS AND SOCIETY. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WILLETT, C. (1880). RULES AND ORDERS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATING SOCIETIES, WITH LIST OF REQUISITE BOOKS, &C., CONNECTED THEREWITH . GEORGE PHILIP. CHAPTER 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU AND THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE: THE CASE OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS AND LUCIANO MORGANTI 1 INTRODUCTION THE INCREASE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS HAS CREATED NEW SPACES FOR TRANSNA TIONAL DELIBERATION, WITH SOCIAL MEDIA GAINING MORE AND MORE GROUND VIS-A-VIS TRADITIONAL MEDIA IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND CAMPAIGNING. THE FORMER IS LESS CENTRALISED AND STATIC THAN THE LATTER, PROVIDING USERS, WHO COMMUNICATE AMONG EACH OTHER IN A MULTI-WAY FORMAT, AN UNCONSTRAINED SPACE IN TERMS OF GEOGRAPHY AND LANGUAGE (HAENSKA & BAUCHOWITZ, 2019 ). SOCIAL MEDIA WAS FIRST INFLUENTIAL IN POLITICS DURING THE 2008 UNITED STATES ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND THEN SPREAD AROUND THE GLOBE AND FACILITATED COMMUNICATION, MOBILISING OPINIONS ACROSS BORDERS S. FOTOPOULOS ( B ) L. MORGANTI VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM E-MAIL: STERGIOS.FOTOPOULOS@VUB.BE L. MORGANTI E-MAIL: LUCIANO.MORGANTI@VUB.BE THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_7 139 140 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI (CASTELLS, 2008 ). SOCIAL MEDIA FOSTERS CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS, PLAYING A KEY ROLE IN AN EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE (CAMMAERTS &
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|a VAN AUDENHOVE, 2005 ). TWITTER ENABLES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW PUBLICS, INCLUDING GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS AND SELF-ORGANISING ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY (MICHAILIDOU, 2017 ). AHEAD OF THE 2014 AND 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLE 17(7) OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU), THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES NOMINATED THEIR LEAD CANDIDATES ( SPITZENKANDIDATEN )FO R THE COMMISSION PRESIDENCY. IN 2014, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER RAN AS THE SPITZENKANDIDAT FOR THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (EPP), WHILE THE PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS (PES) NOMINATED THE THEN PRESIDENT OF THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) MARTIN SCHULZ. FORMER BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER GUY VERHOFSTADT AND THE THEN LEADER OF SYRIZA, ALEXIS TSIPRAS, REPRESENTED THE ALLIANCE OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE (ALDE) AND THE EUROPEAN LEFT RESPECTIVELY. NOT LEAST, SKA KELLER AND JOSE BOVE RAN FOR THE EURO PEAN GREEN PARTY. FIVE YEARS AFTER THE FIRST POST-LISBON ELECTIONS, IN 2019, IT WAS THE TURN OF MANFRED WEBER (EPP), FRANS TIMMERMANS (PES), SKA KELLER AND BAS EICKHOUT (EUROPEAN GREEN PARTY), GUY VERHOFSTADT AND MARGRETHE VESTAGER 1 (ALDE), JAN ZAHRADIL (EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVES AND REFORMISTS), AND NICO CUE AND VIOLETA TOMIC (EUROPEAN LEFT) TO CAMPAIGN FOR THE COMMISSION PRESIDENCY. THIS CHAPTER EXPLORES TO WHAT EXTENT THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS IN 2014 AND 2019 INCREASED THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF TWITTER USE. THE CHAPTER IS DRIVEN BY SEVERAL RESEARCH QUES TIONS: ALTHOUGH ULTIMATELY DISCARDED IN 2019, FOLLOWING THE ELECTION OF URSULA VON DER LEYEN AS PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS BECOME A TREND ON TWITTER (SALIENCE) DURING THE ELECTIONS? (Q1) ON WHICH ISSUES DID TWITTER USERS FOCUS DURING THE CAMPAIGN? (Q2) TO WHAT EXTENT DID THEY GENERATE POLITICAL CONTESTATIONACROSS MEMBER STATES? (Q3) WHICH WAS THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TWITTER USERS AND TWEETS RELATED TO THE PROCESS? (Q4) THROUGH WHICH
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|a LANGUAGE DID TWITTER USERS MOSTLY COMMUNICATE? (Q5). A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF LITERATURE HAS IDENTIFIED THE SALIENCE OF EU ISSUES OR/AND THE LEVEL OF POLARISATION AS ESSENTIAL VARIABLES OF THE POLITI CISATION OF THE EU (E.G. GRANDE & HUTTER, 2016 ;R I S S E, 2014 ). FOR THE 1 AS MARGRETHE VESTAGER AND GUY VERHOFSTADT PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE ALDE'S CAMPAIGN, PARTICIPATING IN THE TELEVISED DEBATES HELD BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, THE ANALYSIS FOCUSES ON THEM, EXCLUDING THE REST OF THE CANDIDATES OF THE 'TEAM EUROPE'. 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 141 PURPOSES OF THIS CHAPTER, WE UNDERSTAND SALIENCE OF EU ISSUES TO BE THE INCREASE OF THE VISIBILITY OF EU ACTORS AND POLICIES IN THE TWITTERSPHERE. IN THIS CASE, TWITTER USERS' ATTENTION WOULD TURN FROM THE NATION STATE TO THE EU. IF TWITTER USERS FOCUSED ON THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND THE SPITZENKAN DIDATEN PROCESS WAS RESTRICTED TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, THEN IT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY SENSE TO SPEAK ABOUT THE PROCESS' EFFECT ON THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. WHEN IT COMES TO POLARISATION, IT IS CONSIDERED AS A DIVISIVE FORCE, WHICH STRENGTHENS POLITICAL CONTESTATIONON THE BASIS OF POLARISED ADDRESSES, TURNS-AT-TALK, SENTENCES, OR PROPOSITIONS (DOLEZAL ET AL., 2016 ). AT THE SAME TIME, THIS CHAPTER VIEWS EU POLITICISATION AS A DESIRABLE AND BENEFICIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EU POLITICS, WHICH ENHANCES DEMOCRACY (HABERMAS, 2016 ). THIS OCCURS AS LONG AS THERE IS A MINIMUM COMMON DENOMINATOR WHEN IT COMES TO THE NATURE OF THE EU'S FOUNDING COMMU NITY AND POLITY (DE WILDE ET AL., 2014 , P. 768). WE ARGUE THAT EU POLITICISATION CAN FURTHER ENHANCE THE BLOC'S DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, ADVANCING THE EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES (OLEART, 2021 ). THIS COULD ULTIMATELY BE A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF AN EMERGING EU DEMOS (RISSE, 2014 ). EU POLITICISATION REQUIRES EUROPEAN CITIZENS' EXPOSURE TO DIFFERENT VIEWS AND OPINIONS ABOUT THE EU AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ).
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|a PUBLIC CONTESTATION GOES BEYOND NATIONAL ACTORS AND POLI CIES, WITHOUT BYPASSING EUROPE THROUGH CONSTANTLY NEGATIVE CRITICISM AND SUPERFICIAL REFERENCES (KOOPMANS & STATHAM, 2010 , P. 43; RISSE, 2010 ). AMONG THE DEFICIENCIES THAT THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS WAS MEANT TO CURE, WERE THE DECREASED DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE EU AND THE TREND OF LOW TURNOUTS. IT SOUGHT TO OFFER THE LEAD CANDIDATES A STAGE TO PRESENT THEIR OPINIONS ON DIFFERENT ISSUES, COVERING A SPACE OF PUBLIC DELIBERATION (STRATULAT & EMMANOUILIDIS, 2013 ). AS A RESULT, EU CITIZENS WOULD BECOME MORE AWARE OF THE EU POLICIES THROUGH THE EXPOSURE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE AT EUROPEAN LEVEL (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018 ). THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WHEN CONSIDERING THAT THE EU HAS BEEN PERCEIVED THROUGHOUT DECADES AS APOLITICAL AND TECHNOCRATIC, LACKING POLITICAL CONTES TATION; HAVING POLICY WITHOUT POLITICS (FOELLESDAL & HIX, 2006 ; SCHMIDT, 2019 ). AN ABSENCE OF A CLASSIC PARTY COMPETITION ALONG THE LINES OF THAT WHICH EXISTS IN NATIONAL POLITICS HAS LED MANY SCHOLARS TO STRESS THE NEED FOR A SHIFT FROM A ' L'EUROPE DES PATRIES 'TOA' L'EUROPE DE PARTIS ' (MARQUAND, 1978 ). 142 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI IN THE FIRST PART OF THE CHAPTER, WE CONCEPTUALISE EU POLITICISATION, FOCUSING ON ITS POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO THE BLOC'S DEMOCRACY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DISCUSS THE ROLE OF TWITTER IN POLITICAL LIFE AND THE SPITZENKANDI DATEN PROCESS ITSELF. THE SECOND PART OF THE CHAPTER PRESENTS AND ANALYSES DATA VIA THE BRANDWATCH APPLICATION. BRANDWATCH ARCHIVES SOCIAL MEDIA DATA PROVIDING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ON THE ONLINE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT ENTITIES, WHILE ALLOWING RETRIEVAL OF ALL TWEETS FROM THE DATABASE THAT MATCH THE SEARCH QUERY. WE ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF VISIBILITY OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS IN THE TWITTERSPHERE, MAPPING HOW THE PROCESS UNFOLDED ACROSS MEMBER STATES. WE ALSO REFER TO THE SALIENCE OF THE CANDIDATES AND THE ISSUES THAT DROVE THE
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|a DEBATES AMONG TWITTER USERS. EXPLORING THE POLITICAL CONTESTATIONBROUGHT POTENTIALLY ABOUT, WE EMPLOY SENTIMENT ANALYSIS AS A PROXY INDICATOR. WHILE NEUTRAL OR POSI TIVE POSTS ARE LESS LIKELY TO RESULT IN POLARISATION, NEGATIVE WOULD INCREASE POLITICAL CONTESTATION. NOT LEAST, WE IDENTIFY THE MOST COMMON LINGUA FRANCA USED IN THE TWITTERSPHERE. THE PERIOD OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS STARTS FROM 7 MARCH TO 31 MAY IN BOTH YEARS OF EP ELECTIONS. WITH THE TIME FRAME ENDING ON 31 MAY 2014/2019, THE RESEARCH CAPTURES EVERY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSION CONDUCTED DURING PRE-ELECTION, ELEC TION, AND POST-ELECTION PERIOD. THE CHAPTER COMPLEMENTS EXISTING STUDIES ON THE EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE, TOWARDS PRINT, ONLINE, AND SOCIAL MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION BASED ON SURVEY DATA (E.G. HAENSKA & BAUCHOWITZ, 2019 ). 2 CONCEPTUALISING EU POLITICISATION IN THE WAKE OF THE RISE OF TWITTER AND THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN 2.1 EU POLITICISATION EU POLITICISATION IS DEFINED IN THIS CHAPTER AS THE PROCESS THROUGH WHICH EUROPEAN ISSUES ARE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND CONTESTATION (SCHMIDT, 2019 ). EU POLITICISATION CAN BE EMPIRICALLY OBSERVED IN (A) AN INCREASING SALIENCE OF EUROPEAN ISSUES, (B) POLARISATION ,AN D( C)AN EXPAN SION OF ACTORS AND AUDIENCES PARTICIPATING TO EU-RELATED DISCUSSIONS (DE WILDE ET AL., 2016 ; GRANDE & HUTTER, 2016 ,P .8 ) . 2 IT HAS BEEN CONSID ERED AS A PROCESS WHERE DECISION-MAKERS DISCUSS AND/OR LEGISLATE PUBLICLY, ENHANCING CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION (DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 ). 2 THE CHAPTER BY ANDGULADZE, BEYER, COMAN AND VANDER MEULEN IN THIS BOOK EXPLORES THE POLITICISATION OVER EU INTEGRATION ACROSS SEVEN MEMBER STATES THROUGH SALIENCE AND POLARISATION. 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 143 IT CLOSELY LINKS DECISIONS THAT ARE MADE AT EU LEVEL WITH NATIONAL POLITICS, BRIDGING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE EU AND ITS CONSTITUENCIES (HABERMAS, 2012 ; STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ). THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPOR TANT, CONSIDERING THAT NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
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|a SEEMED TO HAVE BLAMED 'BRUSSELS' FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNPOPULAR AND DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN THE PAST (SCHMITTER & LEFKOFRIDI, 2016 ). THE INTENSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DEBATES ON EU AFFAIRS WITHIN THE DOMESTIC SPHERES CAN HELP EUROPEAN CITI ZENS TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF EU GOVERNANCE (BOERZEL & RISSE, 2018 ). ONE MAY CONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THIS, WHEN EXAMINING THE NUMBER OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND SCHEMES ESTABLISHED SINCE THE EUROZONE CRISIS (DE WILDE ET AL., 2016 ). EUROPEAN POLITICS ARE BECOMING LESS TECHNOCRATIC AND DEPOLITICISED, INCREASINGLY RESEMBLING NATIONAL POLITICS (RISSE, 2015 , P. 15). RECENT EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT POLITICISATION HELPS PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL ELITES (BOUZA & OLEART, 2018 ). INSTEAD, LOW LEVELS OF POLITICISATION AND HIGH INVOLVEMENT OF BUSINESS LOBBYING MAY UNDERMINE PUBLIC INTERESTS (DE BRUYCKER, 2017 ). EU SCHOLARSHIP SEEMS TO AGREE THAT EU POLITICISATION CONSTITUTES A PROCESS BEING IN THE MAKING (RISSE, 2015 ; SEOANE PEREZ, 2013 ). THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CROSS-BORDER DEBATES OBSERVED DURING THE EUROZONE CRISIS SHOWED THAT 'THE SLEEPING GIANT [YY] IS GRADUALLY AWAKENING AND THAT EU ISSUES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY POLITICISED' (RISSE, 2015 ,P .1 5 ) . DURING THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, THE EU WAS MORE SALIENT THAN IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTIONS. THE CRISIS DOMINATED THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF THE DAY AND FORMULATED THE AGENDA IN THE RUN-UP TO THEM (HOBOLT, 2014 ). APART FROM THE ECONOMIC POLICY-RELATED ISSUES, THE CONSTITUTIVE ISSUES OF THE EU, SUCH AS THE ACCESSION/ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS OR BREXIT, HAVE ALSO TRIGGERED POLITICISATION (BRAUN ET AL., 2016 ). IN BRITAIN, DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP AND INTEGRATION INTENSIFIED POLITICAL CONTEST, AS ACCESSION TALKS BETWEEN THE EU AND THIRD COUNTRIES DID IN CERTAIN MEMBER STATES. HOWEVER, POLITICISATION DOES NOT OCCUR WITH THE SAME LEVEL AND DENSITY ACROSS MEMBER STATES NOR
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|a IN A SAME VEIN DURING DIFFERENT PERIODS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (GRANDE & HUTTER, 2016 ). IT DIFFERENTIATES DEPENDING ON INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS (DE WILDE ET AL., 2016 ). FOR EXAMPLE, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS DURING THE PRE-CONVENTION, DRAFTING, AND RATIFICATION PHASES INCREASED CONTESTA TION. IT LED TO INCREASED LEVELS OF POLITICISATION (STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ). 144 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE HELD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VOTE ON EU BUDGET CAN ALSO FOSTER POLITICAL CONTESTATION(DE WILDE, 2012 ). AS MORE COMPETENCES ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN LEVEL, THE EU DECISION-MAKING HAS BEEN CHANGED, FROM AN ELITE-DRIVEN PROCESS TO A MORE POLITICISED STRUCTURE (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ). EXPANDING ITS COMPE TENCES TO DRAFT, LEGISLATE, IMPLEMENT, AND AUDIT POLICIES IN DIFFERENT AREAS, THE EU RECEIVES A LOT OF INTEREST ACROSS PUBLICS AND MEDIA OUTLETS. EURO PEANS ARE WILLING TO FOLLOW EU NEWS, INCLUDING EU OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL LEADERS' ACTIVITIES. THE MORE INFLUENCE THE EU AND ITS INSTITUTIONS EXERT, THE MORE THEY EVOKE PUBLIC ATTENTION RESULTING IN SUPPORT OR COUNTER REACTIONS TOWARDS THEIR POLICIES (DE WILDE, 2012 ). 2.2 THE ROLE OF TWITTER IN POLITICAL LIFE AND THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS TWITTER HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY USED IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION DURING THE LAST DECADE. THIS HAS BEEN DONE EITHER TO DISSEMINATE POLITICAL MESSAGES DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (STIER ET AL., 2018 ) OR MOBILISE THE ELECTORATE TO PARTICIPATE (GAINOUS & WAGNER, 2014 ). TWITTER CAN DIFFUSE INFORMATION, PROVIDING ITS USERS A MEANS TO INTERACT WITH OTHERS THROUGH FLUID CONVER SATIONS. IT ALSO CREATES NETWORKED DISCUSSIONS, WHICH ARE NOT SUBJECT TO PHYSICAL (TIME AND SPACE) OR SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS (AUSSERHOFER & MAIREDER, 2013 ). INFORMATION EXCHANGE CAN BE BOTTOM-UP, TOP-DOWN, OR SIDE-BY SIDE (ITO, 2008 ). CONSIDERED AS THE 'SECOND MOST IMPORTANT SOCIAL
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|a MEDIA PLATFORM, AFTER FACEBOOK' (BRUNS, 2012 , P. 1323), TWITTER HAS CHANGED THE CHARACTER OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE (OTT, 2017 ). AS THE PROSPECT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ROBUST SUPRANATIONAL MEDIA OUTLETS SEEMS DISTANT, THE SOLE PUBLIC SPACE WHERE THE EU ACTORS AND INSTI TUTIONS CAN COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH EUROPEAN CITIZENS IS THE ONLINE SPACE (DUTTON, 2009 ; MICHAILIDOU, 2007 ). IN FACT, BOTH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, LEADING UP TO THE 2014 AND 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, DEVELOPED AND ROLLED OUT CAMPAIGNS ON TWITTER, WHICH AIMED TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO VOTE AND ENGAGE THEM IN THE EU AFFAIRS (E.G. 'THIS TIME I'M VOTING' AND 'ACT REACT IMPACT'). WHILE GRAHAM, JACKSON, AND BROERSMA ( 2016 ) HAVE ARGUED THAT THE DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL MESSAGES IN TWITTER IS MORE LIKELY TO ADDRESS EXPERTS AND JOURNALISTS RATHER THAN A LARGE NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES, THE PLATFORM HAS RAPIDLY CHANGED EUROPEAN POLITICS (BARISIONE & MICHAILIDOU, 2017 ). POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE ADAPTED THEIR STRATEGIES TO 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 145 REAP THE BENEFITS OF THIS NEW ONLINE SPACE, TARGETING AND REACHING POTEN TIAL VOTERS. 3 ON THEIR SIDE, USERS ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS ON DIFFERENT ISSUES INTERACTING WITH TWEETS, INCLUDING RETWEETS, REPLIES, FOLLOWS, AND LIKES, AMONG OTHER OPTIONS. TWITTER FOSTERS COMMUNICATION EXCHANGE AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL DEBATES (HAENSKA & BAUCHOWITZ, 2019 ). IT CAN STRUCTURALLY TRANSFORM NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES RENDERING THEM MORE INTER CONNECTED THAN TRADITIONAL MEDIA DO (BOSSETTA ET AL., 2017 ). CONSIDERING THAT THE ENHANCEMENT OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO TRANS PARENCY AND LEGITIMACY, IT IS LIKELY TO SAY THAT TWITTER OFFERS SOME SORT OF OPPORTUNITIES TO THE DEMOCRACY OF THE EU AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'PAN-EUROPEAN DEMOS' (RUIZ-SOLER ET AL., 2019 ,P .1 ) . YET, USERS' ENGAGEMENT VARIES IN TERMS OF INCLUSIVENESS (LIKE-MINDED
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|a COMMUNITIES/NON-HOMOGENOUS), ACTIVITIES (E.G. RETWEETS WITH OR WITHOUT COMMENTING), AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION (MICHAILIDOU, 2017 ). THUS, TWITTERSPHERE CONSISTS OF ECHO CHAMBERS AND OPEN FORUMS. WE SELECTED THIS PLATFORM SHARING THE VIEW THAT IT CONSTITUTES A POPULAR ONE FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, AND THE ACCESSIBILITY OF ITS DATA FACILITATES THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS. DEDICATED SOFTWARES FOR DATA ANALYSIS CAN HAVE ACCESS ONLY TO PUBLIC POSTS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CAPTURE LARGE-SCALE DATA ON FACEBOOK USERS' POSTS, EVEN IF THEY USE HASHTAGS, AS THEY ARE OFTEN SHARED PRIVATELY. THIS FEATURE ALONG WITH THE CAPACITY OF TWITTER TO ADVANCE CROSS-IDEOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS AND EXCHANGES, WHICH CAN FACIL ITATE OPEN, CROSS-PARTY, AND CROSS-IDEOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS (GRUZD & ROY, 2014 ), MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY TWITTER HAS BEEN MORE POPULAR THAN FACEBOOK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. TURNING TO THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS, FOTOPOULOS AND MORGANTI ( 2021 ) SHOWED THAT THE PROCESS MAY FURTHER EUROPEANISE NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES, FOCUSING ON THE LEAD CANDIDATES' VISIBILITY AND THE FRAMES USED BY A SAMPLE OF MEDIA OUTLETS FROM SEVEN MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. OTHER PERTINENT SCHOLARSHIP HAS FOCUSED ON THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THE PROCESS BROUGHT TO EU'S DEMOCRACY (E.G. BALDOLI ET AL., 2014 ; KASSIM ET AL., 2017 ), INCLUDING VOTER TURNOUT (SCHMITT ET AL., 2015 ). ELSEWHERE, STIER ET AL. ( 2020 ), FOCUSING ON THE ENGAGEMENT OF DIFFERENT EP CANDIDATES IN THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS WITHIN TWITTER, FOUND IMPORTANT VARIATIONS ACROSS MEMBER STATES. THESE WERE CONTINGENT 3 SEE ALSO CHAPTER OF TARU HAAPALA IN THIS BOOK. 146 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI ON THE POSITION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARDS THE EU (EUROSCEPTIC EUROPHILE), THE PARTIES' PARTICIPATION IN THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS ITSELF, AND THE CANDIDATES' SOCIALISATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THE PRESENT CHAPTER ATTEMPTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS LITERATURE BY ZOOMING IN THE
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|a ACTIVITIES OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN , EXPLORING THEIR PERFOR MANCE ON TWITTER IN TERMS OF VISIBILITY AND POLARISATION. 3 METHOD THE STUDY GATHERS AND ANALYSES 156,000 POSTS AND MENTIONS ON TWITTER IN 2014 AND 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE COLLECTION IS BASED ON KEYWORDS: SPITZENKANDIDAT AND THE LEAD CANDIDATES' NAMES, WITHOUT LIMITING THE STUDY TO HASHTAGS. ON THE TIME RANGE, WE PROCEED WITH A TWO-WAY COMPARISON OF THE 2014 AND 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. PREVIOUS ELECTIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS AS THERE WAS NO SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS BEFORE 2014. ADDITIONALLY, DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACTORS DOMINATED NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES ON THE PRE-LISBON ELECTIONS (DE VREESE ET AL., 2006 ). THE DATA COVERS THE PERIOD FROM 7 MARCH TO 31 MAY 2014 AND 2019. THE 7TH OF MARCH IS SELECTED AS A STARTING POINT AS THE DAY IN 2014 THE EPP NOMINATED JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER AS LEAD CANDIDATE IN DUBLIN. IN THAT DAY, THE NOMINATIONS FOR THE COMMISSION'S HIGHEST POST WERE COMPLETED. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THIS STARTING DATE SEEMS IRRELEVANT FOR 2019, IT WAS SELECTED FOR CONSISTENCY PURPOSES. THE TIME FRAME ENDS ON 31 MAY 2014 AND 2019, CAPTURING EVERY PERTINENT ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSION CONDUCTED DURING PRE-ELECTION, ELECTION, AND POST-ELECTION PERIOD. WE USE THE APPLICATION BRANDWATCH , WHICH ARCHIVES SOCIAL MEDIA DATA PROVIDING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ON THE ONLINE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT ENTITIES, WHILE ALLOWING RETRIEVAL OF ALL TWEETS FROM THE DATABASE THAT MATCH THE SEARCH QUERY. ACCESSING TO A LARGE NUMBER OF SOURCES AND INCLUDING BLOGS, NEWS SITES, FORUMS, AND SOCIAL NETWORKS AMONG OTHERS, USERS CAN RESEARCH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVEDATA THROUGH THE USE OF CHARTING, CATEGORISATION, LOCATION (LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE), LANGUAGE USE, SENTIMENT ANALYSIS, AND OTHER FEATURES. SENTIMENT ANALYSIS IS USED AS A PROXY INDICATOR FOR EXPLORING POLARISATION. WHILE NEUTRAL OR POSITIVE POSTS ARE LESS LIKELY TO RESULT IN POLARISATION, NEGATIVE WOULD INCREASE POLITICAL
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|a CONTESTATION. TO ENSURE RELIABILITY, WE SELECTED AND CROSS-CHECKED A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 500 TWITTER POSTS, REACHING MORE THAN 90 PER CENT OF CONFIDENCE LEVEL. 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 147 WHEN IT COMES TO THE LOCATION OF MENTIONS, THE APPLICATION BRANDWATCH CONDUCTS MULTIPLE TECHNIQUES TO DETERMINE IT, INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM GPS-ENABLED MOBILE DEVICES, PROFILE LOCATION, TIME ZONE, TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN, AND GEOIP. 4 WE ALSO CHECKED GEOSPATIAL RELIABILITY, SELECTING MANUALLY THE DATA PROVIDED BY THIS COMPUTER-BASED SOFTWARE THROUGH RECURRING TO A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 1000 TWEETS. DUE TO THE LARGE AMOUNT OF DATA, ONLY POSTS WITH THE MOST IMPRES SIONS 5 ARE PRESENTED, WITHOUT ENTAILING EVERY ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSION. A RELATIVE INCREASE OF VISIBILITY OF THE LEAD CANDIDATES ON TWITTER BETWEEN 2014 AND 2019 WILL BE ANALYSED PRO RATA AGAINST THE SURGE OF THE NUMBER OF SOCIAL MEDIA USERS. A LARGER NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO THE SPITZENKANDI DATEN IN 2019, COMPARING TO 2014, WILL NOT NECESSARILY MEAN AN INCREASE IN THE INTEREST OF SOCIAL MEDIA USERS TOWARDS THE PROCESS. INSTEAD, IT COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL INCREASE OF THE NUMBER OF TWITTERSPHERE'S PARTICIPANTS. 4 UNFOLDING TWITTER ACTIVITY IN THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS 4.1 VISIBILITY THE KEYWORDS SPITZENKANDIDAT , JUNCKER, SCHULZ, TSIPRAS, VERHOFSTADT, AND KELLER GENERATED MUCH TRAFFIC ON TWITTER IN 2014, WITH THE TOTAL MENTIONS STANDING AT 66,000. THIS AMOUNT, WHICH IS CONSIDERABLE GIVEN THAT SOME COMMENTS AND REPLIES TO THE POSTS ARE EXCLUDED, 6 CAN BE INTERPRETED AS ALMOST 800 POSTS PER DAY. THE DISTINCT AUTHORS WERE MORE THAN 32,000. IN 2019, THE TOTAL MENTIONS WERE INCREASED, AS THE NUMBER OF TWITTER USERS DID. THE LEAD CANDIDATES RECEIVED 80,000 MENTIONS BY 43,000 INDIVIDUAL USERS. THESE MENTIONS DO NOT COMPRISE POSTS CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAD CANDIDATES OUTSIDE OF THE CONTEXT OF THE SPITZENKAN DIDATEN PROCESS. ALMOST EVERY CANDIDATE WAS DOUBLE-HATTED HOLDING KEY 4
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|a HTTPS://WWW.BRANDWATCH.COM/BLOG/FAQ-HOW-DOES-BRANDWATCH-CLASSIFY-LOCATION/ . 5 A POTENTIAL IMPRESSION MEANS A POST ON SOCIAL MEDIA HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO AN ACCOUNT'S TIMELINE. TWITTER IMPRESSIONS INDICATE HOW MANY TIMES POSTS ON TWITTER HAVE SHOWN UP IN SOMEONE'S TIMELINE IN A GIVEN TIME. THE MORE IMPRESSIONS A TWITTER ACCOUNT HAS, THE BETTER CHANCES HER/HIS ACTIVITY RECEIVES ATTENTION BY SOCIAL MEDIA USERS. THUS, THERE IS A PROPORTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPRESSION AND THE NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS. 6 SOME POSTS DID NOT USE THE HASHTAG AND THE SYMBOL "@" WHEN THEY ELABORATED ON THE ISSUE, WHILE OTHER ONES PUBLISHED BY PRIVATE FACEBOOK PROFILES COULD NOT BE TRACKED. 148 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI POSITIONS IN THE EU INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP. FOR INSTANCE, FRANS TIMMERMANS WAS THE COMMISSION'S FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT AND MARGRETHE VESTAGER WAS IN CHARGE OF THE EU'S COMPETITION POLICY. TO STREAMLINE THE RESULTS AND FOCUS ON THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS, THE HASHTAGS #EUELECTIONS2019 AND #EPELECTIONS2019 WERE COMBINED WITH THE KEYWORDS OF THE LEAD CANDI DATES. THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF VISIBILITY IN THE TWITTERSPHERE. FIGURE 1 SHOWS ON WHICH PARTICULAR EVENTS TWITTER USERS FOCUSED. IN 2014, THE COMMISSION WAS GROWING THE MOST OVER THE TIME STUDIED ATTRACTING MORE THAN 30,000 MENTIONS, WHILE JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER WAS THE SPITZENKANDIDAT MOSTLY MENTIONED (25,387). HE WAS THE MOST MENTIONED TWEETER (@JUNCKEREU) AND THE TOP HASHTAG (#JUNCKER), RECEIVING EVEN MORE ATTENTION THAN THE OFFICIAL HASHTAG OF THE EURO PEAN ELECTIONS (#EP2014). THE PES CANDIDATE MARTIN SCHULZ FOLLOWED (17,579). AS FAR AS THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES IS CONCERNED, THE EPP HELD THE FIRST PLACE (14,476), WITH THE PES GATHERING SOME ATTEN TION (3618). ANOTHER INTERESTING FACT IS THAT CHANCELLOR MERKEL WAS MENTIONED 17,583 TIMES. ON 31 MAY, AN EDITORIAL HEADLINED 'ROW BREWS AS ANGELA MERKEL BACKS JUNCKER AS EU CHIEF' AND
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|a PUBLISHED BY BBC.COM FIG. 1 MOST POPULAR ISSUES IN THE SPITZENKANDIDAT RELATED TWITTERSPHERE ( SOURCE AUTHORS' OWN COMPILATION, BASED ON DATA FROM BRANDWATCH) 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 149 WAS RETWEETED 1906 TIMES. AS THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WOULD NOMINATE THE CANDIDATE FOR THE COMMISSION'S PRESIDENCY, CERTAIN NATIONAL ACTORS WERE VISIBLE ENOUGH IN THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN RELATED TWITTERSPHERE. IN 2019, MUCH OF THE TRENDING THEMES WERE RELATED TO BREXIT. ON 23 MAY, AROUND 6500 MENTIONS USED THE HASHTAG #DENIEDMYVOTE, CLAIMING THAT EU CITIZENS LIVING IN THE UK AND BRITISH NATIONALS ABROAD WERE DENIED A VOTE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. GUY VERHOFSTADT REPUBLISHED AN ARTICLE OF THE ONLINE EDITION OF THE GUARDIAN EXPRESSING HIS WORRY ABOUT IT AND CALLING FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THE POST WAS LIKED MORE THAN 10,500 TIMES AND RECEIVED 6885 RETWEETS AND REPLIES. MEANWHILE, GUY VERHOFSTADT'S CAMPAIGN TOUR IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS PICKED UP HIGHLY. THE FACT THAT HE WAS CHIEF BREXIT CO-ORDINATOR IN THE EP SEEMED TO HAVE INCREASED THE INTEREST OF TWITTER USERS IN HIS ACTIVITIES. 4.2 POLARISATION THE FACTUAL POSTS WERE THE MOST FREQUENT ACCOUNTING FOR 81% IN 2014 AND 72% IN 2019, AS FIG. 2 SHOWS. THE POSITIVE POSTS ARE SLIGHTLY MORE THAN THE NEGATIVE IN BOTH ELECTIONS. THE POSITIVE/NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS WERE CONDUCTED MOSTLY DURING THE TELEVISED DEBATES ORGANISED BETWEEN THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN , AS THEY ATTRACTED THE INTEREST OF SEVERAL USERS IN THE TWITTERSPHERE. THE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE TWITTERSPHERE REVOLVED AROUND CERTAIN ISSUES, INCLUDING THE EUROZONE CRISIS (2014), BREXIT, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND 10% 81% 9% 2014 POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE 16% 72% 12% 2019 POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE FIG. 2 SENTIMENT SHARE OF VOICE ( SOURCE AUTHORS' OWN COMPILATION, BASED ON DATA FROM BRANDWATCH) 150 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI YOUTH POLICIES AMONG OTHER ISSUES. DURING THE DEBATES, TWITTER USERS SEEMED TO HAVE FOCUSED ON THE SAME TOPICS. FOR INSTANCE,
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|a 'TIME FOR REAL ACTION' AND 'LET'S TALK ABOUT CLIMATE' WERE TRENDING PHRASES, APPEARING WIDELY ON USERS' POSTS IN 2019 MAASTRICHT DEBATE. ONE MAY SEE THIS ISSUE CONVERGENCE AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, CONSIDERING THAT NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES ARE LIKELY TO BE EUROPEANISED WHEN SIMULTANEOUS DISCUSSIONS OF THE SAME TOPICS TAKE PLACE ACROSS MEMBER STATES AND UNDER THE SAME CRITERIA OF RELEVANCE (EDER & KANTNER, 2000 ). YET, THE WIDE MAJORITY OF NEUTRAL POSTS LEAD US TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN RELATED TWITTERSPHERE SEEMS CLOSER TO AN ECHO CHAMBER RATHER THAN AN OPEN FORUM (FIG. 3 ). ANOTHER CASE THAT SEEMED TO HAVE RECEIVED CERTAIN POSITIVE/NEGATIVE COMMENTS FROM DIFFERENT USERS IS THE MAIN VOTING DAY AND THE DAYS AFTER THE ELECTIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, MANY USERS WERE POSITIVELY DISPOSED TOWARDS JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER TO BECOME THE COMMISSION'S PRESIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE FEW CRITICAL VOICES AGAINST HIM. THIS DIVI SION GAVE A POLITICISED FLAVOUR TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. IN 2019, THE POTENTIAL SPITZENKANDIDATEN EFFECT ON CERTAIN MEMBER STATES' ELECTION RESULTS AND THE 51% OVERALL TURNOUT WERE SUBJECTS TO SEVERAL COMMENTS. THE POWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE EU LEADERS FOR THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION'S PRESIDENT WAS REFLECTED IN THE TWITTERSPHERE IN 2014 AND 2019, DISPLAYING INSTANCES OF POLARISATION. FORMER PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON'S STRATEGIC CONNECTION OF THE ELECTION OF JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER IN THE COMMISSION PRESIDENCY TO THE UK'S REMAINING IN THE EU RECEIVED MUCH NEGATIVE CRITICISM, WHILE CONSIDERED AS A 'DISASTROUS TACTICAL ERROR'. FIG. 3 TRENDING TOPICS OF THE 2019 MAASTRICHT AND EUROVISION DEBATES ( SOURCE BRANDWATCH) 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 151 4.3 VOLUME BY COUNTRY AND LANGUAGE USED FIGURE 4 PRESENTS THE MENTIONS TO THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS IN EVERY MEMBER STATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COUNTRIES' TWITTER USERS. ALTHOUGH TWITTER POSTS CAME FROM ALL EU
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|a COUNTRIES, IN CERTAIN MEMBER STATES THE VISIBILITY OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS WAS MUCH MORE EVIDENT. IN 2014, GREEK, AUSTRIAN, BELGIAN, LUXEMBOURGISH, DUTCH, FRENCH, SPANISH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN USERS TWEETED THE MOST, WHILE IN ESTONIA, CROATIA, LATVIA, POLAND, SLOVENIA, AND SLOVAKIA, THERE WAS AN UTTER ABSENCE OF SPITZENKANDIDATEN RELATED POSTS. YET, IN 2019, THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION WAS SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WITH MOST OF THE POSTS CONDUCTED IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, SLOVENIA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE BIGGEST CHANGE CAN BE OBSERVED IN GREECE, WHERE THE USERS' MENTIONS DROPPED OFF REMARKABLY. IN A SIMILAR VEIN, THE LUXEMBOURGISH MENTIONS WERE DECREASED. IN CONTRAST TO THIS, THERE IS AN INCREASE OF GERMAN AND DUTCH USERS' MENTIONS, WHILE THE SHARE IN SLOVENIA ROCKETED WHEN COMPARING IT TO THE 2014 PRE- AND POST-ELECTION PERIOD. ONE MAY ARGUE THAT TWITTER USERS' PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS IS 0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 0.80% AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK 2014 2019 FIG. 4 MENTIONS BY COUNTRY DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER OF TWITTER USERS ( SOURCE AUTHORS' OWN COMPILATION, BASED ON DATA FROM BRANDWATCH) 152 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI LIKELY TO BE ASSOCIATED POSITIVELY WITH THE ORIGIN OF THE LEAD CANDIDATES. 7 BREXIT-RELATED ISSUES OVERWHELMED THE DISCUSSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE TELEVISED DEBATES OR THE CAMPAIGNS ALONG WITH THE REPORTED INCIDENT WITH THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE PREVAILED WITHOUT PLENTIFUL REFERENCES TO THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS PER SE. MULTILINGUAL COMMUNICATION IN TWITTERSPHERE FURTHERS INFORMATION EXCHANGE, AS IT ENABLES USERS TO DEBATE IN THEIR NATIVE LANGUAGES, ESTAB LISHING ONLINE, TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES. EVEN THOUGH ENGLISH IS CONSID ERED AS LINGUA FRANCA , POSTS ON OTHER LANGUAGES WERE SHARED AS WELL. WHILE 32.1% WAS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH, 57.9% OF THE TOTAL POSTS USED 7 LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ENGLISH, NOTABLY DUTCH, FRENCH, GERMAN,
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|a LUXEMBOURGISH, GREEK, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH. IN 2019, THE TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION WAS MORE DIVERSE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE USERS ENGAGED IN A MULTILINGUAL COMMUNICATION. 5 CONCLUSION THE MONITORING AND ANALYSIS OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN RELATED TWITTER SPHERE IN 2014 AND 2019 SHOWED THAT THE PROCESS DID NOT MANAGE TO ATTRACT THE INTEREST OF LARGE ONLINE COMMUNITIES (Q1). WHILE THE NUMBER OF TWITTER USERS THAT PAID ATTENTION TO THE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE NEGLECTED, THE EVIDENCE INDICATES ALREADY CERTAIN LIMITATIONS TOWARDS INCREASING EU POLITICISATION. YET, ONE MAY SEE THAT THERE WAS AN ISSUE CONVERGENCE WHEN IT COMES TO TWITTERSPHERE USERS' DISCUSSIONS (Q2). DISCUSSIONS REVOLVED AROUND CERTAIN EUROPEAN ISSUES, INCLUDING BREXIT, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND YOUTH POLICIES. THIS COULD BE SEEN AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, CONSIDERING EDER AND KANTNER ( 2000 ) CRITERIA. YET, THE WIDE MAJORITY OF NEUTRAL POSTS LEAD US TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN RELATED TWITTERSPHERE SEEMS CLOSER TO AN ECHO CHAMBER RATHER THAN AN OPEN FORUM, ACCORDING TO MICHAILIDOU'S ( 2017 ) CLASSIFICATION. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE INSTANCES OF POLARISATION, IN PARTICULAR WHEN TRACING THE NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS, THESE SHOULD BE SEEN AS RATHER LIMITED (Q3). AN ENCOURAGING POINT THAT EMERGES FROM THE 7 JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, LUXEMBOURGISH. MANFRED WEBER AND SKA KELLER, GERMAN. FRANS TIMMERMANS, DUTCH. ALEXIS TSIPRAS, GREEK. VIOLETA TOMIC, SLOVENIAN. 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 153 ANALYSIS PRESENTED HERE IS THAT CERTAIN EVENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN, IN PARTIC ULAR THE TELEVISED DEBATES, OFFERED THE POSSIBILITY TO CITIZENS TO ENGAGE IN THE CAMPAIGN, EVALUATING THE CANDIDATES' POSITIONS AND EXCHANGING INFORMATION. MEANWHILE, THE RESULTS HAVE INDICATED THAT IN SOME COUNTRIES SOCIAL MEDIA USERS' INTEREST IN THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS WAS PARTICULARLY VIVID. THE OLDER MEMBER STATES SEEMED TO HAVE OUTPERFORMED THE EU'S NEWER ENTRANTS. PREVIOUS STUDIES HAVE SHOWN THAT THE LEVEL OF POLITICI
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|a SATION VARIES BY COUNTRY AND INTEGRATION STEP (DE WILDE ET AL., 2014 ). AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN INDICATED THAT CERTAIN ISSUES, INCLUDING ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING (E.G. EU BUDGET AND EUROZONE CRISIS), BREXIT, OR ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE INCREASED EU POLITICISATION WITHIN OLDER MEMBER STATES (DE WILDE, 2012 ;GR A N D E&HU T T ER , 2016 ; RISSE, 2015 ). WHILE IT NEEDS TO BE TESTED WHETHER THESE ISSUES HAVE RESULTED IN SOME SORT OF POLITICISATION WITHIN NEWER MEMBER STATES, WE CAN SAY THAT USERS FROM OLDER MEMBER STATES WERE MORE FAMILIARISED AND INTERESTED ON THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS. FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE 2004 ENLARGEMENT ROUND, THE LOW LEVEL OF INTEREST ON THE SPITZENKAN DIDATEN PROCESS WENT HAND IN HAND WITH A LOW TURNOUT (BELOW 40%). THIS COULD ULTIMATELY RAISE QUESTIONS ON THEIR POSITION TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ITSELF. IN PRINCIPLE, THE LEAD CANDIDATES WERE MORE IDENTIFIABLE BY THEIR FELLOW NATIONAL CITIZENS WHO SEEMED MORE WILLING TO BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS THAN USERS FROM MEMBER STATES OF DIFFERENT ORIGIN WITH THE LEAD CANDI DATES (Q4). THIS REMINDS THE RESULTS SHOWN BY SIMILAR STUDIES THAT MEDIA OUTLETS ORIGINATING FROM A LEAD CANDIDATE'S COUNTRY REPORTED MORE ON THE PROCESS THAN THE REST (FOTOPOULOS & MORGANTI, 2021 ) AND NATIONAL POLIT ICAL PARTIES WHICH SHARE THE SAME ORIGIN WITH A SPITZENKANDIDAT PUT MORE EMPHASIS ON THE PROCESS (BRAUN & POPA, 2018 ; BRAUN & SCHWARZBOEZL, 2019 ). NOT LEAST, EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THE RELEVANT POSTS WERE CONDUCTED IN ENGLISH, OTHER LANGUAGES APPEARED AS WELL, INCLUDING DUTCH, FRENCH, GERMAN, LUXEMBOURGISH, GREEK, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH (Q5). POLITICISATION HAS BEEN INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO VISIBILITY AND POLARISATION. IT CAN FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE EU, MOBIL ISING EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND BRIDGING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THEM AND THE EU (HABERMAS, 2012 ; STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ), AND POLITICISATION IS LIKELY TO ADVANCE THE
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|a EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES (OLEART, 2021 ). THIS COULD ULTIMATELY BECOME A STEP FORWARD IN THE DIRECTION OF AN EMERGING EU DEMOS (RISSE, 2014 ). 154 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI THE SPITZENKANDIDAT SEEMS TO CARRY A POTENTIAL DYNAMISM TOWARDS INCREASING EU POLITICISATION, THOUGH LIMITED IN TERMS OF GEOGRAPHY AND INTENSITY. CERTAINLY, OUR STUDY IS ONE-OFF AND FOCUSES ON TWO TIME-LIMITED ELECTION PERIODS. THE EU IS NOT A STATE WITH A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY, CONDITIONS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTES TATIONAND PUBLIC SPHERE. ACCORDING TO SOME PUNDITS, A GAP BETWEEN EU POLITICS AND CITIZENS SEEMS TO EXIST (BIJSMANS & ALTIDES, 2007 ), WITH OTHERS PERCEIVING BRUSSELS AS KIND OF DISTANT IN GEOGRAPHICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TERMS (FOELLESDAL & HIX, 2006 ). IN THE MEANTIME, NEITHER THE LEVEL OF VISI BILITY NOR THE EXTENT OF POLARISATION OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS CAN BE COMPARED TO WHAT OCCURS DURING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. WOULD THE SAME OR BIGGER AMOUNT OF CROSS-BORDER INTERACTIONS BE OBSERVED DURING NON-ELECTION TIMES? COULD DIFFERENT EU POLITICAL ISSUES OR EVENTS LAUNCH VARIOUS PAN-EUROPEAN DEBATES ON TWITTER (E.G. COVID 19, BREXIT, RULE OF LAW, OR THE REFUGEE CRISIS)? CAN WE SAY THAT TODAY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH EU POLITICS IS A REGULAR OCCURRENCE ON SOCIAL MEDIA? TO CAPTURE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE, FUTURE RESEARCH SHOULD ADDRESS THESE QUESTIONS IN A LONGITUDINAL WAY. SOCIAL MEDIA ARE STRUCTURALLY TRANS FORMING NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES RENDERING THEM MORE INTERCONNECTED THAN TRADITIONAL MEDIA DO. THIS CHAPTER HAS CONTRIBUTED TO HOW THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS, DESPITE ITS LIMITATIONS, MIGHT FOSTER THE EURO PEAN TWITTERSPHERE BY PROMOTING ACTIVE EUROPEAN CITIZENRY, COLLECTIVE VOICE, AND PUBLIC DISCUSSION. REFERENCES AUSSERHOFER, J., & MAIREDER, A. (2013). NATIONAL POLITICS ON TWITTER: STRUCTURES AND TOPICS OF A NETWORKED PUBLIC SPHERE. INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY, 16 (3), 291-314. BALDOLI, R.,
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|a GAENZLE, S., & SHACKLETON M. (2014). OVERTHROWING SECRECY: THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN EXPERIMENT AND A NEW CHANCE FOR A EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM. CEPS COMMENTARY . 4 AUGUST 2014 [POLICY PAPER, 1-3]. BARISIONE, M., & MICHAILIDOU, A. (2017). DO WE NEED TO RETHINK EU POLITICS IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VOLUME. IN M. BARISIONE & A. MICHAILIDOU (EDS.), SOCIAL MEDIA AND EUROPEAN POLITICS: RETHINKING POWER AND LEGITIMACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA (PP. 1-24). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BIJSMANS, P., & ALTIDES, C. (2007). 'BRIDGING THE GAP' BETWEEN EU POLITICS AND CITIZENS? THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, NATIONAL MEDIA AND EU AFFAIRS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 29 (3), 323-340. 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 155 BOERZEL, T. A., & RISSE, T. (2018). FROM THE EURO TO THE SCHENGEN CRISES: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES, POLITICIZATION, AND IDENTITY POLITICS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 25 (1), 83-108. BOSSETTA, M., DUTCEAC SEGESTEN, A., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2017). ENGAGING WITH EURO PEAN POLITICS THROUGH TWITTER AND FACEBOOK: PARTICIPATION BEYOND THE NATIONAL? IN M. BARISIONE, & A. MICHAILIDOU (EDS.), SOCIAL MEDIA AND EUROPEAN POLI TICS: RETHINKING POWER AND LEGITIMACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA (PP. 53-75). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BOUZA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87-104. BRAUN, D., HUTTER, S., & KERSCHER, A. (2016). WHAT TYPE OF EUROPE? THE SALIENCE OF POLITY AND POLICY ISSUES IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 17 (4), 570-592. BRAUN, D., & POPA, S. A. (2018). THIS TIME IT WAS DIFFERENT? THE SALIENCE OF THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN SYSTEM AMONG EUROPEAN PARTIES. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 41 (5), 1125-1145. BRAUN, D., & SCHWARZBOEZL, T. (2019). PUT IN THE SPOTLIGHT OR LARGELY IGNORED? EMPHASIS
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|a ON THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN THEIR ONLINE CAMPAIGNS FOR EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (3), 428-445. BRUNS, A. (2012). HOW LONG IS A TWEET? MAPPING DYNAMIC CONVERSATION NETWORKS ON TWITTER USING GAWK AND GEPHI. INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY, 15 (9), 1323-1351. CAMMAERTS, B., & VAN AUDENHOVE, L. (2005). ONLINE POLITICAL DEBATE, UNBOUNDED CITIZENSHIP, AND THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 22 (2), 147-162. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/ 10.1080/10584600590933188 . CASTELLS, M. (2008). THE NEW PUBLIC SPHERE: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, 616 , 78-93. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1177/000271620731 1877 . DE BRUYCKER, I. (2017). POLITICIZATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: WHEN DO THE ELITES IN BRUSSELS ADDRESS PUBLIC INTERESTS IN EU POLICY DEBATES? EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 18 (4), 603-619. DE VREESE C. H., BANDUCCI S. A., SEMETKO H. A., & BOOMGAARDEN H. G. (2006). THE NEWS COVERAGE OF THE 2004 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN 25 COUNTRIES. EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 7 (4), 477-504. DE WILDE, P. (2010). HOW POLITICISATION AFFECTS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CONTESTING THE EU BUDGET IN THE MEDIA AND PARLIAMENTS OF THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK AND IRELAND (ARENA REPORT [6/10]). 156 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI DE WILDE, P. (2012). POLITICISATION OF THE EU BUDGET: CONFLICT AND THE CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 35 (5), 1075-1094. DE WILDE, P., LEUPOLD, A., & SCHMIDTKE, H. (2016). INTRODUCTION: THE DIFFER ENTIATED POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 3-22. DE WILDE, P., MICHAILIDOU, A., & TRENZ, H. J. (2014). CONVERGING ON EUROSCEP TICISM: ONLINE POLITY CONTESTATION DURING EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 53 (4), 766-783. DE WILDE, P., & ZUERN, M. (2012). CAN THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN
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|a INTEGRATION BE REVERSED? JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 50 (1), 137-153. DOLEZAL, M., GRANDE, E., HUTTER, S., & KRIESI, H. (2016). EXPLORING POLITICI SATION: DESIGN AND METHODS. IN S. HUTTER, E. GRANDE, & H. KRIESI (EDS.), POLITICISING EUROPE: INTEGRATION AND MASS POLITICS (PP. 32-60). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. DUTTON, W. H. (2009). THE FIFTH ESTATE EMERGING THROUGH THE NETWORK OF NETWORKS. PROMETHEUS, 27 (1), 1-15. EDER, K., & KANTNER, C. (2000). TRANSNATIONALE RESONANZSTRUKTUREN IN EUROPA. EINE KRITIK DER REDE VOM OEFFENTLICHKEITSDEFIZIT. IN M. BACH (ED.), DIE EUROPAEISIERUNG NATIONALER GESELLSCHAFTEN. SONDERHEFT 40 DER KOELNER ZEITSCHRIFT FUER SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE (PP. 306-331). WESTDEUTSCHER VERLAG. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2018). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL. A EUROPE THAT DELIVERS: INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR MAKING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S WORK MORE EFFICIENT. HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/COMMISSION/SITES/BETA-POLITICAL/FILES/COM MUNICATION-INSTITUTIONAL-OPTIONS-FOR-MAKING-THE-EUROPEAN-UNION-WORK-MORE EFFICIENT_EN.PDF . ACCESSED JUNE 20, 2020. FOLLESDAL, A., & HIX, S. (2006). WHY THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EU: A RESPONSE TO MAJONE AND MORAVCSIK. JOURNAL OF CUTANEOUS MEDICINE AND SURGERY: INCORPORATING MEDICAL AND SURGICAL DERMATOLOGY, 44 (3), 533-562. FOTOPOULOS, S., & MORGANTI, L. (2021). DOES PERSONALISATION FURTHER EUROPEANISE NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES? THE SPITZENKANDIDAT PROCESS IN THE 2014 AND 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY . HTTPS://DOI. ORG/10.1080/23745118.2020.1868848 . GAINOUS, J., & WAGNER, K. (2014). TWEETING TO POWER: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. GRAHAM, T., JACKSON, D., & BROERSMA, M. (2016). NEW PLATFORM, OLD HABITS? CANDIDATES' USE OF TWITTER DURING THE 2010 BRITISH AND DUTCH GENERAL ELEC TION CAMPAIGNS. NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY , 18 (5),
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|a 765-783. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10. 1177/1461444814546728 . GRANDE, E., & HUTTER, S. (2016). INTRODUCTION: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICIZATION. IN S. HUTTER, E. GRANDE, & H. KRIESI (EDS.), 7 THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 157 POLITICISING EUROPE-INTEGRATION AND MASS POLITICS (PP. 3-31). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. GRUZD, A., & ROY, J. (2014). INVESTIGATING POLITICAL POLARIZATION ON TWITTER: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE. POLICY & INTERNET, 6 (1), 28-45. HABERMAS, J. (2012). THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE LIGHT OF A CONSTI TUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 23 (2), 335-348. HABERMAS, J. (2016). TIME OF TRANSITIONS . JOHN WILEY & SONS. HAENSKA, M., & BAUCHOWITZ, S. (2019). CAN SOCIAL MEDIA FACILITATE A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? SOCIAL MEDIA + SOCIETY. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1177/205630511 9854686 . HOBOLT, S. B. (2014). A VOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT? THE ROLE OF SPITZENKANDIDATEN IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 21 (10), 1528-1540. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1080/13501763.2014.941148 . HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING CONSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 , 1-23. ITO, M. (2008). NETWORKED PUBLICS: INTRODUCTION IN VARNELIS, K, ED. 2005 . NETWORKED PUBLICS. KASSIM, H., CONNOLLY, S., DEHOUSSE, R., ROZENBERG, O., & BENDJABALLAH, S. (2017). MANAGING THE HOUSE: THE PRESIDENCY, AGENDA CONTROL AND POLICY ACTIVISM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY . HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1080/13501763.2016.1154590 . KOOPMANS, R., & STATHAM, P. (2010). THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND METHODS. IN R. KOOPMANS & P. STATHAM (EDS.), THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE (PP. 34-59). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. MARQUAND, D. (1978). TOWARDS A EUROPE OF THE PARTIES. THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, 49 (4), 425-445. MICHAILIDOU, A. (2007).
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|a EUROPEANISATION OF THE ELECTRONIC PUBLIC SPHERE: THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND ONLINE REALITY. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES EPRU 2007, 2 (4), 1-38. MICHAILIDOU, A. (2017). TWITTER, PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND THE EUROCRISIS: MORE THAN AN ECHO CHAMBER? IN M. BARISIONE & A. MICHAILIDOU (EDS.), SOCIAL MEDIA AND EUROPEAN POLITICS. PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN SPAIN, FRANCE AND THE UK: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. OTT, B. L. (2017). THE AGE OF TWITTER: DONALD J. TRUMP AND THE POLITICS OF DEBASEMENT. CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA COMMUNICATION , 34 (1), 59-68. SEOANE PEREZ, F. (2013). POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE: THE CULTURAL AND STRUCTURAL LIMITS OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. 158 S. FOTOPOULOS AND L. MORGANTI RISSE, T. (2010). A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES . CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS. RISSE, T. (2014). NO DEMOS? IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES IN THE EURO CRISIS. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES , 52 (6), 1207-1215. RISSE, T. (2015). EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: POLITICS IS BACK . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. RUIZ-SOLER, J., CURINI, L., & CERON, A. (2019). COMMENTING ON POLITICAL TOPICS THROUGH TWITTER: IS EUROPEAN POLITICS EUROPEAN? SOCIAL MEDIA+ SOCIETY , 5 (4). HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1177/2056305119890882 . SCHMIDT, A. V. (2019). POLITICIZATION IN THE EU: BETWEEN NATIONAL POLITICS AND EU POLITICAL DYNAMICS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (7), 1018-1036. SCHMITTER, P. C., & LEFKOFRIDI, Z. (2016). NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AS A THEORY OF DISINTEGRATION. CHINESE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1 (1), 1-29. SCHMITT, H., HOBOLT, S., & POPA, S. A. (2015). DOES PERSONALIZATION INCREASE TURNOUT? SPITZENKANDIDATEN IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 16 (3), 347-368. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2013). HOW EUROPEAN UNION POLITICIZATION CAN EMERGE THROUGH
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|a CONTESTATION: THE CONSTITUTION CASE. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 51 (5), 965-980. STIER, S., BLEIER, A., LIETZ, H., & STROHMAIER, M. (2018). ELECTION CAMPAIGNING ON SOCIAL MEDIA: POLITICIANS, AUDIENCES, AND THE MEDIATION OF POLITICAL COMMU NICATION ON FACEBOOK AND TWITTER. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 35 (1), 50-74. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1080/10584609.2017.1334728 . STIER, S., FROIO, C., & SCHUENEMANN, W. J. (2020). GOING TRANSNATIONAL? CANDI DATES' TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES ON TWITTER DURING THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS . HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1080/01402382.2020. 1812267 . STRATULAT, C., & EMMANOUILIDIS, J. A. (2013). THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 2014 WATERSHED OR, AGAIN, WASHED OUT? EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE (DISCUSSION PAPER, SEPTEMBER). CHAPTER 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER: THE PERSONALISATION OF EU POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EU ELECTION CAMPAIGNS LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND JORGE TUNON NAVARRO 1 INTRODUCTION THE EUROPEAN CRISES OF THE 2010S HAVE SHOWN THE FAILURE OF THE EU'S COMMUNICATION POLICY. THEY HAVE FORCED THE EU TO WORK ON MESSAGES TARGETED ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AUDIENCES AND TO ENGAGE WITH EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES, 1 ALBEIT AT A SLOW PACE. THE LACK OF 1 FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY CHANGES, SEE SOLDEVILA AND VANDER MEULEN'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK. L. BOUZA GARCIA ( B ) UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: LUIS.BOUZA@UAM.ES J. TUNON NAVARRO UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: JTUNON@HUM.UC3M.ES THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_8 159 160 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO COMMUNICATION BY EU INSTITUTIONS HAS BEEN FILLED BY OTHER ACTORS, SUCH AS CRITICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
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|a INCREASINGLY EUROPEANISED NATIONAL QUALITY MEDIA (OLEART, 2021 ; STATHAM, 2008 ) AND, MORE RECENTLY, POPULIST OR EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES CONTESTING THE EU (CAIANI & GUERRA, 2017 ). THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS MARKED A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE GENERAL PUBLIC'S RELATION WITH THE EU. NOT ONLY DID THESE ELECTIONS BREAK WITH A FORTY YEAR TREND IN THE DECLINE IN VOTER TURNOUT, BUT THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION RESULTS SEEMED TO MARK A STOP IN THE PROGRESS OF FAR-RIGHT EUROSCEPTIC FORCES. WHEREAS THE RESULT OF THESE PARTIES REMAINS THE BEST IN THEIR HISTORY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THEY ARRIVED SHORT OF THE EXPEC TATIONS, IN PARTICULAR, CONSIDERING THAT A FEW MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTION MIGRATION FEATURED AS THE KEY POLICY ON WHICH THE VOTE WAS LIKELY TO BE DECIDED. HOWEVER, SOME MIGHT HAVE ARGUED THAT THIS RESULT COULD HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED BY FOLLOWING THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN DEBATE ON TWITTER. THE ATTENTION THAT THIS EVENT RECEIVED IN THE EUROSPHERE REVEALS THE HOPES PLACED IN THE PERSONALISATION OF THE COMPETITION FOR EUROPEAN OFFICES AS A WAY OF LEGITIMATING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND FOSTERING THE EURO PEAN PUBLIC SPHERE (SEE FOTOPOULOS & MORGANTI IN THIS VOLUME). THE CAMPAIGNS' MARKED PERSONALISATION IS OBVIOUS AS WELL IN THE INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL LEADERS IN THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AS A WAY OF ANTICIPATING THE CAMPAIGN, CALLING INTO QUESTION THE SECOND-ORDER NATURE OF THE ELECTION IN SOME MEMBER STATES (SEE KAUPPI IN THIS VOLUME). IN THIS CHAPTER, WE ANALYSE TO WHAT EXTENT THE PERSONALISATION OF EURO PEAN POLITICSIS CONTRIBUTING TO THE TRANSNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICISATION OF THE EU. THE ASSUMPTION BEHIND OUR APPROACH IS THAT WITH THE TRANSFOR MATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS INTO A 'POLYCRISIS' (GUIRAUDON ET AL., 2016 ), AND THE STRONG ENTRY OF POPULIST EUROSCEPTIC FORCES IN THE EP WITH AN INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, POLITICAL ACTORS FAVOURABLE AND CONTRARY TO FURTHER EU INTEGRATION HAVE INCREASED
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|a THE STAKES OF THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. BOTH SIDES FRAMED THE ELECTIONS AS A DECISIVE MOMENT WHERE THE FUTURE OF THE CONTINENT WOULD BE IN THE HANDS OF THE CITIZENS. ADDITIONALLY, THE BREXIT HAS NOT ONLY CHANGED WHAT IS AT STAKE, BUT ALSO TRANSFORMED THE FRAMING, AS BOTH EUROPHILE AND EUROSCEPTIC ACTORS HAVE TRIED TO ARGUE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE ABOUT MODELS OF EUROPE. WE ANALYSE THE IMPACT AND RESONANCE OF THREE NATIONAL LEADERS', EMMANUEL MACRON (FRANCE), ANGELA MERKEL (GERMANY), AND PEDRO SANCHEZ (SPAIN), SPEECHES ON THE TRANSNATIONAL FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 161 BY COMBINING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES. ON THE QUALITA TIVE SIDE, WE ANALYSE THE NATIONAL LEADERS' SPEECHES IN DEPTH AND COMPARE THEM BETWEEN EACH OTHER AND WITH POLITICAL PARTY MANIFESTOS FOR THE 2019 ELECTIONS FOCUSING ON ISSUE OWNERSHIP AND APPEAL TO NATIONAL AND TRANSNA TIONAL PUBLICS. ON THE QUANTITATIVE SIDE, WE MEASURE THE IMPACT OF EACH OF THE THREE SPEECHES IN THE PAN-EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE. SOME WOULD ARGUE THAT TWITTER IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MEDIAN EUROPEAN, AND THAT THE PUBLIC OF THIS SOCIAL NETWORK IS A NICHE ONE, AND THUS IT IS NEITHER DECISIVE NOR REPRESENTATIVE OF OTHER TYPES OF VOTERS. WE DO NOT ARGUE THAT DEBATES ON TWITTER PROVIDE AN ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE. HOWEVER, WE CONCEIVE SOCIAL MEDIA AS A NEW KIND OF INTERMEDIARY IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION WHERE SPECIFIC BUT SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNICA TION EXCHANGES HAPPEN. ANALYSING THE RESONANCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATESIN TWITTER (SEE HAAPALA'S CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME) IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING SINCE IT IS OFTEN ASSUMED THAT INSTITUTIONAL DEBATES DO NOT REACH THE GENERAL PUBLICS. WITHOUT ASSUMING THAT TWITTER IS A GENERAL PUBLIC, IT IS A WAY OF MEASURING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE LEADERS AND PARTIES LEAKED BEYOND THE STRONG INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICS INTO THE FRAMES OF EUROPEAN INTERMEDIARY PUBLICS. 2 NATIONAL LEADERS
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|a ' CONTRIBUTION TO AGENDA SETTING ON 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AGENDA-SETTING ANALYSES ARE FAR FROM A NOVELTY IN EU STUDIES. THESE APPROACHES HAVE BEEN APPLIED SINCE THE ONSET OF THE ARGUMENTATIVE TURN IN THE 1990S AND THE NARRATIVE TURN MORE RECENTLY. HOWEVER, THESE STUDIES HAVE MOSTLY FOCUSED ON POLICY-MAKING AND THE ABILITY OF ACTORS TO FRAME AND PRIME THEIR PREFERRED ISSUES IN THE POLICY-MAKING AGENDA (PRINCEN, 2011 ;T H I EL&U CAR ER , 2014 ). BUT, IF THIS HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOPED IN POLICY STUDIES, THE CORRELATE OF THIS FOCUS HAS BEEN AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE EU POLITICAL GAME WAS EITHER TOO MEDIATED BY NATIONAL PARTIES, ELEC TIONS, AND LEADERSHIP, OR TOO DOMINATED BY BARGAINING LOGICS TO LEAVE ANY MARGIN OF INFLUENCE VIA PERSUASION AND MEDIUM-TERM FRAMING. THIS PAPER ANALYSES ONE ASPECT OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, NAMELY, THE LINK BETWEEN NATIONAL LEADERS' DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIA MENT (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, 2019 ) AND THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN ORDER TO ANALYSE COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN FORMS OF POLITICISATION, CIRCULATION OF FRAMES AND PERSONALISATION. AS OTHER 162 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO PAPERS IN THIS VOLUME, 2 BY DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WE UNDER STAND A SERIES OF DIFFERENT DEBATES ON THE ONTOLOGICAL CRISIS OF THE EU AFTER THE BREXIT REFERENDUM THAT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY EU INSTITUTIONS AS STREAMS CONVERGING ULTIMATELY IN THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE THAT WAS LAUNCHED IN SPRING 2021. THESE DEBATES ARE FORMED, FIRSTLY, BY NATIONAL CITIZENS' CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE EU ORGANISED BY MEMBER STATES ON THE INITIATIVE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON AND BY THE 2018 PAN-EUROPEAN CITIZENS' CONSULTATIONS ORGANISED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE WHITE PAPER THAT LED TO THE 2019 SIBIU SUMMIT. SECONDLY, THE DEBATES INCLUDE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S PLENARY DEBATES WITH SPEECHES BY NATIONAL LEADERS AND, THIRDLY, THE CAMPAIGNS FOR THE EUROPEAN
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|a ELECTION IN MAY 2019. THE QUESTION THIS CHAPTER ASKS IS WHETHER THE INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL LEADERS IN THE MULTI-STREAM DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCREASE IN THE PERSONALISATION AND POLITICAL FRAMING OF THE TWIT TERSPHERE DEBATES DURING THE EU ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 2019. THIS IMPLIES ASKING ABOUT THE ROLE OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENTS IN THE POLITICI SATION OF THE EU. THE APPROACH CHALLENGES THE TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT EU POLITICISATION CONCERNS ESSENTIALLY TRANSNATIONAL PROCESSES AND DECISION-MAKING WHEREAS NATIONAL LEADERS FOCUS ESSENTIALLY ON INTERNAL POLITICS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL BARGAINS. PIETER DE WILDE ( 2019 )H A S RECENTLY ARGUED THAT THE INCREASING ATTENTION OF EUROPEAN MEDIA-THAT IS, ESSENTIALLY NATIONAL ONES-TO EU ISSUES RESULTING FROM THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU CONTRIBUTES TO MORE, RATHER THAN LESS, INTERGOVERNMENTALISM. THIS IS BECAUSE THE NATIONAL MEDIA TENDS TO FOCUS ON MAIN CHARACTERS AND DRAMATIC EVENTS THAT ARE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL BARGAINS THAN IN THE DAY-TO-DAY DECISION-MAKING AMONG INSTITUTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THIS IS HAPPENING IN A CONTEXT WHERE INTERGOVERNMENTALISM IN THE EU IS CHANGING. AS POINTED OUT BY THEORISTS OF NEW INTERGOV ERNMENTALISM, BARGAINS AMONG NATIONAL LEADERS OCCUR IN THE WAKE OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN STATES WHERE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND LEADERS ARE INCREASINGLY RESPONSIVE TO EACH OTHER (BICKERTON, 2012 ). THESE EVOLUTIONS ARE, HOWEVER, INSUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED SO FAR BY THE LITERATURE ON THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. ONE OF THE MOST OBVIOUS GAPS OPENED BY THE PERSPECTIVE OF A MEDIA-BASED, POLITICISED INTERGOVERNMEN TALISM IS THAT MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE PERSONALISATION OF 2 SEE IN PARTICULAR BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA AND IONITA'S CHAPTER. 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 163 POLITICS. WHEREAS THIS IS A PHENOMENON THAT HAS BEEN MOSTLY LAMENTED BY POLITICAL SCIENTISTS SUCH AS MANIN ( 1997 )O RM A I R( 2013 )A SATR A N S - FORMATION
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|a OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES INTO AUDIENCE DEMOCRACIES AND THEIR HOLLOWING OUT, IT IS AN ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE STUDY OF EU POLITICS RELATIVELY RECENTLY IN RELATION TO THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS (GATTERMANN & DE VREESE, 2020 ; SCHMITT ET AL., 2015 ; STIER ET AL., 2020 ). HOWEVER, WE KNOW RELATIVELY LITTLE ABOUT THE ROLE OF NATIONAL LEADERS IN THE PERSONALISATION OF EU POLITICS. AS WE DO NOT HAVE SPACE TO FURTHER ELABORATE HERE ON THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PERSONALISATION FOR THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU, WE ASSUME IT HAS A POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE PROCESSES OF POLARISATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF ACTORS INVOLVED. 3 USES AND FUNCTIONS OF TWITTER IN THE PERSONALISATION OF EU POLITICS INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS' CAMPAIGNS CAN NO LONGER BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (BIMBER, 2014 ; LOPEZ-MERI ET AL., 2017 ). IN FACT, SOCIAL MEDIA SEEMS TO BE THE MOST EFFEC TIVE TOOL WHEN INTERACTING WITH YOUNGER AUDIENCES DUE TO THEIR ABILITY TO REDUCE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL BARRIERS THAT DISTANCE INSTITU TIONS. AMONG THEM, TWITTER HAS BEEN THE MOST SUCCESSFUL IN FOSTERING POLITICAL DEBATE. THE FEATURES OF TWITTER HAVE MADE IT THE PREFERRED SOCIAL NETWORK FOR DEBATE, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, AND FOR THE SOCIAL AND SCIEN TIFIC RESEARCH OF THESE FIELDS (CAMPOS-DOMINGUEZ, 2017 ; LOPEZ-MERI ET AL., 2017 ; STEWARD, 2017). PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP HAS IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF TWITTER ON THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: STRATEGICALLY TARGETED COMMUNICATION OF PARTIES AND CANDIDATES IN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS (PARMELEE & BICHARD, 2012 ); CAMPAIGN INFORMATION AND DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (JACKSON & LILLEKER, 2011 ); PROMOTION OF VOTER PARTICIPATION AND MOBILISATION (GAINOUS & WAGNER, 2014 ); PROMOTION AND SELF-REFERENCE IN RELATION TO THE CAMPAIGN ITSELF (JIVKOVA-SEMOVA ET AL., 2017 ). THERE IS, HOWEVER, A STRIKING SHORTAGE OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ADDRESSING THE EUROPEAN
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|a STRATEGIES IN SOCIAL MEDIA (RUIZ-SOLER, 2018 ). INDEED, TWITTER-BASED STUDIES ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BUT ONLY AT THE NATIONAL LEVELS OR WITH REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC NATIONAL TOPICS: AUSTRIAN TWITTER PUBLIC SPHERE (AUSSERHOFER & MAIREDER, 2013 ); GERMAN DISCUSSION OF #AUFSCHREI (OUTCRY) (MAIREDER & SCHLOEGL, 2014 ); THE NORWEGIAN TWITTERSPHERE (BRUNS & ENLI, 2018 ). CONVERSELY, 164 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO ONLY A FEW STUDIES HAVE ADDRESSED QUESTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN TWITTER SPHERE TRANSCENDING FROM THE NATIONAL LENS (BARISIONE & CERON, 2017 ; HAENSKA & BAUCHOWITZ, 2018 ;M AI R ED ERETAL . , 2014 ). AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER IS TO ANALYSE THE RESONANCE OF EU DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN 'TWITTERSPHERE'. WHEREAS WE FULLY ACCEPT THAT TWITTER IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC, IT REMAINS A RELEVANT ARENA FOR DISCUSSION. FIRSTLY, IT IS A RESONANCE CHAMBER FOR POLITICAL COMMUNICATORS WHERE POLITICAL ACTORS CAN INTERACT AND RECEIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE PUBLIC (WHETHER SINCERELY OR AS PART OF A REPUTATION BUILDING STRATEGY). SECONDLY, IT IS A EUROPEAN PUBLIC WHERE OTHER NATIONAL BARRIERS ARE LESS PREVALENT (ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY EXISTING). THIRDLY, IT IS A PUBLIC THAT INCLUDES COMMUNICATION INTERMEDIARIES, MEANING THAT RESO NANCE IN THIS SPHERE HAS A PARTICULAR POTENTIAL TO REACH OTHER PUBLICS. IN FACT, THERE IS A FEEDBACK LOOP BETWEEN THE USE OF TWITTER AND MEDIA VISI BILITY IN TRADITIONAL MEDIA, IN TWO SENSES. THE FREQUENCY OF USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA PEAKS DURING THE BROADCAST OF POLITICAL SPEECHES THROUGH TRADI TIONAL MEDIA (LARSSON & KALSNES, 2014 ), AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TWITTER EXPANDS AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE RESONANCE OF THE POLITICAL DISCOURSES THAT IT ADDRESSES (LOPEZ-MERI ET AL., 2017 ). OUR INTEREST IN TWITTER AS A RESONANCE CHAMBER FOR POLITICAL DISCOURSES ON THE FUTURE OF THE EU IS ESPECIALLY JUSTIFIED CONSIDERING THAT THIS SOCIAL NETWORK IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT
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|a FOR THE PERSONALISATION OF POLIT ICAL COMMUNICATION. THE PERSONALISATION OF POLITICS IMPLIES A DISCOURSE APPROACH FOCUSED ON PEOPLE, PUTTING THE INTRINSIC QUALITIES OF THE SPEAKERS OVER THE CONTENT OR THE IDEOLOGIES OF THEIR DISCOURSE (LOPEZ-MERI ET AL., 2017 ; SANCHEZ-MURILLO, 2005 ). IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE THE CANDI DATE'S ATTRIBUTES AND TO DOWNPLAY IDEOLOGY, REDUCING POLITICS TO A CLASH OF PERSONALITIES (SANCHEZ-MURILLO, 2005 ). TRADITIONALLY, PERSONALISATION HAS BEEN MUCH PROMOTED BY MAINSTREAM MEDIA (BLUMLER & KAVANAGH, 1999 ). MOREOVER, IT HAS BEEN PROVED A SIMPLIFICATION OF THE DISCOURSE OR POLITICS MEDIATISATION (MAZZOLENI & SCHULZ, 1999 ), DRIVING THE PERSONALISATION PROCESS (RODRIGUEZ VIRGILI ET AL., 2014 ). PERSONALISATION INVOLVES TWO DIMENSIONS: INDIVIDUALISATION (ARTICULATING THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AROUND THE CANDIDATE); AND PRIVACY (EMPHASISING THE CANDIDATE'S PERSONAL SIDE-APPEARANCE, FAMILY STATUS OR HOBBIES, AMONG OTHERS) (LOPEZ-MERI ET AL., 2017 ; VAN-AELST ET AL., 2012 ). OUR CHAPTER FOCUSES ESSENTIALLY ON THE FIRST DIMENSION, NAMELY APPEARANCE. SOCIAL NETWORKS ALLOW POLITICAL LEADERS NEW FORMS OF PERSONALISATION OF POLITICS. IN FACT, ONE OF THE POTENTIALS OF A SOCIAL NETWORK LIKE TWITTER IS 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 165 TO ALLOW IT TO APPROACH AND IMPACT ON THE AUDIENCES IN A MORE DIRECT WAY AND, THEREFORE, REACH MUCH CLOSER TO THEM (LOPEZ-GARCIA, 2016 ). PERSONALISATION HAS NOT BEEN INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EUROPEANISATION OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENT MACRON, 3 BUT IN FACT HAS ALSO ALLOWED HIM TO REACH BOTH THE FRENCH NATIONAL AUDIENCES AND THE EURO PEAN TRANSNATIONALS. IN THIS LINE OF THINKING, HABERMAS ( 2017 )A R G U E D THAT MACRON 'CALLS FOR UNDERSTANDING FOR THE FOUNDING FATHERS, WHO ESTAB LISHED EUROPE WITHOUT CITIZEN INPUT BECAUSE, HE SAYS, THEY BELONGED TO AN ENLIGHTENED AVANTGARDE. BUT HE NOW WANTS TO TRANSFORM THE ELITE PROJECT INTO A CITIZENS' PROJECT'.
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|a EVEN RECENT RESEARCH HAS SHOWN THAT MACRON IS A TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTOR IN EUROPE, WHOSE POLITICAL PERSONALISATION MAKES HIM CAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING THROUGH FRAGMENTED PUBLIC SPACES (BOUZA GARCIA & TUNON NAVARRO, 2018 ). 4 ANALYTICAL FRAME: METHODS AND EXPECTATIONS 4.1 COMBINING FRAMING AND NETWORK ANALYSIS THE PAPER RELIES ON A TWO-STEP METHODOLOGY. FIRST, IT ANALYSES THE SPEECHES IN DEPTH, FOCUSING ON THE PROCESSES OF FRAMING IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE MAIN ISSUES THAT THE NATIONAL LEADERS ATTEMPT TO SET AS EU PRIORITIES, AND COMPARES THESE SPEECHES AND INCLUDE OTHER LEADERS' SPEECHES AND THE MANIFESTOS OF THE MAIN INCUMBENT EP PARTY FAMILIES WITH TWO OBJECTIVES. COMPARISON IS AN IDEAL APPROACH, ON THE ONE HAND, TO UNDERSTAND THE EXTENT TO WHICH NATIONAL LEADERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO USE POLITICISATION TO EXERT PAN-EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, OR TO WHAT EXTENT THEY FOLLOW AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOGIC. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT ALLOWS AN AGENDA SETTING FOCUS, AS IT HELPS TO UNDERSTAND WHICH FRAMINGS HAVE STRONGER RESONANCE IN THE POSITIONS OF OTHER ACTORS. WE HAVE CODED INDUCTIVELY THE SPEECHES OF EMMANUEL MACRON, ANGELA MERKEL, AND PEDRO SANCHEZ FOR NATIONAL LEADERS AND THE MANIFESTOS OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN POLITICAL FAMILIES (EUROPEAN POPULAR PARTY ( 2019 ), PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND DEMOCRATS ( 2019 ), ALDE ( 2018 )TH E ALLIANCE OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE-CURRENTLY KNOWN AS RENEW EUROPE-THE EUROPEAN GREEN PARTY ( 2019 ), THE EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE AND JAN ZAHRADIL'S ( 2018 ) CAMPAIGN PLEDGE AS HIS ECR PARTY DID 3 SEE BOUZA AND OLEART'S CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME. 166 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO NOT ADOPT A MANIFESTO) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRESIDENT JEAN CLAUDE JUNCKER'S ( 2018 ) SPEECH ON THE STATE OF THE UNION. THE FOCUS IS ON THE FRAMING OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES RATHER THAN ON THE POLICY PROPOSALS. BECAUSE THE PURPOSE IS TO ANALYSE ALTERNATIVE VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EU, THE CODING HAS
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|a CONVERGED AROUND A FEW KEY CODES ON THE POLITICISATION OF A POLITY: WHAT BINDS EUROPE AS A COMMUNITY, THE DESIGNATION OF RIVALS, REFERENCES TO THE FUTURE OF THE EU, THE NATURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS AND REFERENCES TO THE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE IN A HISTOR ICAL PERSPECTIVE (I.E. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND HISTORICAL COMPARISONS). WE HAVE ALSO CODED REFERENCES TO POLICY CHOICES OR PROPOSALS, BOTH FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND TO EVALUATE THE EXTENSION OF POLITICISATION. IN TERMS OF THE CODING METHOD, WE HAVE FOCUSED ON EXPLICIT PROCESSES OF SIGNIFICATION-EUROPE IS Y, PATRI OTISM IS X RATHER THAN Z, WE WILL STAND TO THOSE THATYY-AND TRIED TO KEEP OUR OWN REINTERPRETATION TO THE MINIMUM. OF COURSE, A DEGREE OF SUBJECTIVITY REMAINS IN THE ASSOCIATION OF PARTICULAR REFERENCES IN THE SAME CODE. WE APPLY THE SAME LOGIC TO THE SECOND STEP OF OUR ANALYSIS WHERE WE ADDRESS THE RESONANCE OF THE SPEECHES IN TWITTER. WE EXAMINE THE SPECIFIC RECEPTION OF EACH SPEECH AND ALSO COMPARE THE PREDOMINANT HASHTAGS, UNDERSTOOD AS FRAMES. FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE FURTHER ANALYSE THE RECEPTION OF EACH OF THE THREE SPEECHES IN TWITTER IN THE WEEK AFTER THEIR DELIVERY IN 2018 AND 2019 AND A MAP OF HASHTAGS OBTAINED THROUGH GEPHI'S TWEET STREAMING APP 4 DURING THE TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE ELECTION. THIS ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT OF THE PERSONALISATION IN THE SHORT TERM AND EVEN TUALLY THE IMPACT IN STRUCTURING EUROPEAN CONVERSATION IN A MORE LASTING SENSE. 4.2 EXPECTATIONS WE SHARPLY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION, AS WE ARGUE THAT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE BETWEEN 2017 4 GEPHI IS AN OPEN-SOURCE NETWORK ANALYSIS AND VISUALIZATION SOFTWARE, AND ITS STREAMING APP ALLOWS TO COLLECT TWEETS IN REAL TIME THAT INCLUDE A SEARCH KEYWORD. IN OUR CASE THE SEARCH KEYWORDS WERE THE NATIONAL LEADER'S NAME AS A HASHTAG (E.G. #MERKEL) AND ANY OF THE TERMS (#EPPLENARY; #FUTUREOFEUROPE; #STRASBOURG; #PARLIAMENT),
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|a WHEREAS FOR THE EP ELECTION CAMPAIGN THE RESEARCH WE COLLECTED ALL TWEETS IN ENGLISH THAT INCLUDED THE EPELECTION2019 SEARCH WORDS. 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 167 AND 2019 HAS BEEN LARGELY AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENDA-SETTING PROCESS. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR FIRST EXPECTATION IS TO FIND DIFFERENT FRAMINGS BETWEEN NATIONAL LEADERS' SPEECHES AND TRANSNATIONAL PARTY DISCOURSES. ALSO, IN LINE WITH OUR EXPECTATION ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONALISATION AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (DE WILDE, 2019 ), AND THE FACT THAT EACH LEADER STANDS FOR ONE OF THE THREE LARGEST PARTY GROUPS IN THE EP, WE EXPECT THAT NATIONAL LEADERS' SPEECHES INFLUENCE TRANSNATIONAL DISCOURSES, RATHER THAN THE CONTRARY. IN THIS SENSE, WE ANTICIPATE THAT EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES PROVIDE RESONANCE TO THEIR MAIN COUNCIL MEMBERS' DISCOURSES, WHEREAS NATIONAL LEADERS WILL HARDLY BE INFLUENCED BY THE DISCOURSE OF THEIR PARTY GROUP AND WILL TEND TO ARGUE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THIS IS SUPPORTED BY THE LOW SALIENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTS IN MACRON'S DISCOURSE (BOUZA GARCIA & TUNON NAVARRO, 2018 ). SECONDLY, WE EXPECT TO FIND A SIMILAR DEGREE OF RESONANCE OF THE THREE SPEECHES IN THE TWITTERSPHERE, SINCE THE PUBLIC OF THE EU TWITTERSPHERE IS NOT THE NATIONAL ONE OF EACH LEADER (WE FOLLOW HASHTAGS IN ENGLISH FOR A SPEECH ADDRESSED TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG), AND IS THUS POTENTIALLY EQUALLY INTERESTED IN EACH OF THEM. IN PARTICULAR, IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT THAT TWITTER IS THE FAVOURITE SOCIAL NETWORK AMONG JOURNALISTS (JIVKOVA-SEMOVA ET AL., 2017 ) AND POLITICAL MESSAGES IN TWITTER ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE ADDRESSED TO JOURNALISTS RATHER THAN TO CITIZENS (GRAHAM ET AL., 2014 ). THIRDLY, WE EXPECT THAT PERSONALISATION OF EUROPEAN MESSAGES CONTRIBUTES TO INCREASING POLARISATION, AND THUS TO FINDING A CONTENTIOUS USE OF TWITTER, WHERE HASHTAGS QUESTIONING THE FRAMES OF EU INSTITU
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|a TIONS, LEADERS, AND EUROPEAN PARTIES HAVE MORE SALIENCE THAN THE SAID FRAMES. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT EUROSCEPTIC FRAMINGS ARE MORE SALIENT, AS ONE OF THE POSSIBLE USES OF SOCIAL MEDIA IS FOR OTHER ACTORS (NGOS, JOURNALISTS, NATIONAL PARTIES, ETC.) TO CHALLENGE THE FRAMING OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEADERS. 5 ANALYSING LEADERS ' SPEECHES AND THEIR RECEPTION 5.1 LEADERS' SPEECHES AND MANIFESTOS WE FIRST PRESENT THE COMPARISON OF THE FRAMES IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE GENERAL DISCURSIVE CONTEXT IN WHICH LEADERS ADDRESSED THE PARLIAMENT. 168 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO THEN, WE WILL FOCUS ON HOW EACH LEADER ADDRESSES EACH SUBJECT. A CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF THE 4 EP SPEECHES (JUNCKER, MACRON, MERKEL AND SANCHEZ) AND THE 6 PARTY MANIFESTOS' CODINGS SUGGEST THAT MANIFESTOS AND LEADERS' SPEECHES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SPAIN'S PRIME MINISTER PEDRO SANCHEZ) REFER MORE TO THEIR OWN PEERS THAN TO THE DOCUMENTS IN THE OTHER CATE GORY. THIS PROVIDES A FIRST ALBEIT SUPERFICIAL PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT OUR FIRST EXPECTATION IS NOT MET SINCE THE LEADERS' WORDING DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH PARTY MANIFESTOS, AND THUS COULD NOT SHAPE THESE. THE LEADERS HAVE USED THEIR TIME IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO BOTH PROMOTE THEIR VISION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EU AND TO VOICE CONCRETE DEMANDS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT (SEE FIGURES WITH MAIN ISSUES OF ATTENTION IN THE ANNEX), WHICH MEANS THAT, NOT ONLY DO THEY DIFFER IN CONTENT (FOR INSTANCE, DESIGNATING DIFFERENT RIVALS OR DEMOCRACY PROBLEMS) AND PRIMING OF ISSUES, BUT ALSO IN THAT NOT NECESSARILY ALL OF THEIR SPEECHES FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE OF THE EU AS SOME PARTS FOCUSED ON CURRENT AFFAIRS. THAT BEING SAID, THERE IS A CLEAR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE LEADERS. THE MAIN COMMON ALITY IN THE 3 NATIONAL LEADERS' SPEECHES IS THAT THE MAIN ASPECT THEY PAY ATTENTION TO ARE THE KEY POLICY AREAS THEY EXPECT THE EU TO ADDRESS IN THE FUTURE (9% OF MACRON'S SPEECH, 8% OF SANCHEZ AND AN OVERWHELMING 21% FOR MERKEL),
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|a WHEREAS MUCH LESS IS PRESENT IN JUNCKER'S WORDS. THE NEXT DOMINATING ISSUE IS WHAT WE HAVE CALLED THE ZEITGEIST , THE IDEA THAT THE EU MUST ADAPT TO A CHANGING WORLD, IS FIRST FOR JUNCKER AND SECOND FOR MERKEL AND MACRON (ALTHOUGH MACRON EXPRESSES THIS BY COMPARING THE DECISIONS FACING CURRENT LEADERS WITH THOSE OF THE FATHERS OF EUROPE). THE THIRD COMMON ISSUE IS THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO RIVALS OF THE EU, INTERNAL POPULISTS IN SANCHEZ AND JUNCKER, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL IN MACRON'S, WITH ONLY MERKEL AVOIDING THIS KIND OF POLARISATION. THE MANIFESTOS AND LEADERS' SPEECHES THAT WE HAVE ANALYSED ARE CLEARLY UNITED BY A COMMON ZEITGEIST . THIS MOMENT IS CHARACTERISED BY AN ONTO LOGICAL CHALLENGE (I.E. BREXIT), A CHANGING WORLD CONTEXT (TRUMP'S ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF US PRESIDENT IN 2016), INTERNAL CRISIS (MIGRATION, AGEING, SOCIAL CHALLENGES IN THE EU) AND, FOR SOME, A CHALLENGE TO THE VERY SUBSTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING. THIS TURN IS BEING LABELLED AS THE 'GEOPOLITICISATION OF EUROPE' (MEUNIER & NICOLAIDIS, 2019 ). THIS IS ALSO EVIDENCED IN THE CLEAR TENDENCY TO DESIGNATE INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL RIVALS OF THE EU IN ALL THE DOCUMENTS, AS IT WILL BE SHOWN BELOW. IT CONTRIBUTES TO EXPLAINING THE STRONG SERIES OF INTERTEXTUAL CONNECTIONS AROUND SIX ISSUES THAT THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS REVEALS. 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 169 FIRSTLY, ALL SPEECHES INCLUDE AN EXPLANATION OF THE AUTHORS INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL CONJUNCTURE THAT THE EU IS EXPERIENCING. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE VERY DIFFERENT, ALL DOCUMENTS COINCIDE IN THE FACT THAT THE EU IS AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE, AND THUS IT IS HAVING A FUNDAMENTAL DEBATE. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE DID HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN FRAMING THE MANIFESTOS FOR THE 2019 ELECTION AS A MOMENT OF TRUTH. THE REFERENCES OF THE THREE NATIONAL LEADERS ON THIS ISSUE ARE VERY DISTINCTIVE: WHEREAS MACRON AND SANCHEZ EMPHASISE THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF THE MOMENT-AND
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|a THUS OF THE CHOICE EUROPEANS HAVE IN FRONT OF THEM-MERKEL EMPHASISES THAT EUROPE MUST ADAPT TO A CHANGING WORLD. SECONDLY, AND PROBABLY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EPOCHAL SPIRIT OF ALL SPEECHES, ALL DOCUMENTS ARE EXPLICIT IN PRESENTING THE RIVALS OF EUROPE: ALL DOCUMENTS ANALYSED INCLUDE REFERENCES TO ACTORS THAT ARE RIVALS OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT PROMOTED BY THE LEADER OR ACTOR, AND THUS DESIGNATED AS RIVALS (AND IN SOME CASES, ENEMIES) OF EUROPE (SEE ALSO OLEART & BOUZA GARCIA, 2019 ). THE RIVALS DESIGNATED BY THE NATIONAL LEADERS ARE VERY SIMILAR-POPULISTS, NATIONALISTS, ANTI-EUROPEANS-BUT THE QUALITATIVE REFERENCES ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. HERE AGAIN THE REFERENCES OF MACRON AND SANCHEZ ARE SHARPER AND MORE DIVISIVE WITH MACRON REFERRING TO A EURO PEAN CIVIL WAR AND SANCHEZ REFERRING TO ACTORS SEEKING TO DESTROY EUROPE, WHEREAS MERKEL REFERS TO STRUCTURAL AND MORE IMPERSONAL CHANGES IN THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS NOT BEEN SPARED THE SCOURGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. WARS AND ARMED CONFLICT ARE TAKING PLACE ONLY A FEW HOURS BY PLANE BEYOND OUR DOORSTEP. GLOBAL REFUGEE AND MIGRATION FLOWS ARE ALSO HAVING A DIRECT IMPACT ON US EUROPEANS. THE ADVANCE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING OUR WAY OF LIFE AT BREAKNECK SPEED. WE ARE FEELING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE. OLD ALLIES ARE CALLING TRIED AND PROVEN ALLIANCES INTO QUES TION. THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL BE THE FIRST COUNTRY TO EXIT THE EUROPEAN UNION. (MERKEL, 2018 ) THIRDLY, ALMOST ALL MANIFESTOS AND SPEECHES-JAN ZAHARDIL'S ( 2018 )E CR PROGRAMME BEING THE EXCEPTION-PROVIDE READERS WITH A REFLECTION OF THE KIND OF COMMUNITY THAT THE EU IS, INCLUDING REFERENCES TO THE KINDS OF BONDS THAT EUROPEANS HAVE (SEPARATE CODES DISTINGUISH REFERENCES TO VALUES, RELIGION, ALLIANCES, ETC.) AND CLEAR RESIGNIFICATIONS OF TRADITIONAL STATE REFERENCES SUCH AS SOVEREIGNTY. IT IS COMMISSION PRESIDENT JUNCKER IN HIS SOTEU SPEECH OF 2018 WHO GOES FURTHER IN LINKING MEMBERSHIP TO THE 170 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND
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|a J. TUNON NAVARRO EU TO PATRIOTISM: 'I WOULD LIKE US TO REJECT UNHEALTHY NATIONALISM AND EMBRACE ENLIGHTENED PATRIOTISM. WE SHOULD NEVER FORGET THAT THE PATRI OTISM OF THE 21ST CENTURY IS TWO-FOLD: BOTH EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL' (JUNCKER, 2018 ). IN THIS SENSE, PRESIDENT MACRON'S ( 2018 ) REFERENCE TO 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY' IS THE CLEAREST ATTEMPT TO RESIGNIFY FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR EU USAGE (SEE ALSO THE CHAPTER BY BOUZA AND OLEART IN THIS VOLUME). THIS IS AN AREA WHERE A CLEAR CONNECTION AND DISPUTE IS ESTABLISHED WITH CHANCELLOR MERKEL: PEOPLE WANT A EUROPE THAT PROVIDES ANSWERS TO THEIR BURNING QUESTIONS. THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT EUROPE HAS TO HAVE A FINGER IN EVERY PIE, AS IT WERE. IT IS STILL THE CASE THAT NOT EVERY PROBLEM IN EUROPE IS A PROBLEM FOR EUROPE. SOLIDARITY DOES NOT MEAN OMNIPRESENCE. BUT SOLIDARITY DOES MEAN THAT EUROPE ENGAGES ITSELF WHERE IT IS NEEDED AND THAT IT IS THEN ABLE TO ACT FIRMLY, DECISIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY. (MACRON, 2018 ) THE CHANCELLOR IS ADDRESSING THE SAME ISSUE AS PRESIDENT MACRON, WHO CALLS FOR 'A EUROPE THAT PROVIDES ANSWERS TO THEIR BURNING QUESTIONS' BY 'ENGAG[ING] ITSELF WHERE IT IS NEEDED AND THAT IT IS THEN ABLE TO ACT FIRMLY, DECISIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY' (MERKEL, 2018 ) .A TTH ES AM ETI M E,ASS H E ATTEMPTS TO SLOW DOWN THE PACE AND INTENSITY OF NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION AS SHE MAINTAINS THAT IT 'DOESN'T MEAN THAT EUROPE HAS TO HAVE A FINGER IN EVERY PIE [YY] NOT EVERY PROBLEM IN EUROPE IS A PROBLEM FOR EUROPE' AND RESISTS THE EUROPEAN RESIGNIFICATION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF THE MORE TRADITIONAL 'SOLIDARITY' (MERKEL, 2018 ). IN A DIFFERING EMPHASIS TO PRESIDENT MACRON'S INSISTENCE ON COMMON SOVEREIGNTY, CHANCELLOR MERKEL ALSO REFERS TO DIVERSITY AND THE ABILITY TO REACH COMPROMISES COMING FROM DIFFERENT POSITIONS AS A KEY ASPECT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. SIMILARLY, SPAIN'S PEDRO SANCHEZ REFERS TO THE EU AS A COMMUNITY. IT IS MORE
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|a TRADITIONAL IN A SPANISH CONTEXT AS IT REFERS TO DEMOCRACY, VALUES AND RULE OF LAW AS THE BASIC ASPECT EUROPEANS HAVE IN COMMON. THIS GOES HAND IN HAND WITH REFERENCES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE THEN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC) FOR SPANISH DEMOCRACY: 'I REMEMBER THE EMOTION IN AN ENTIRE GENERATION OF SPANIARDS, THAT OF MY PARENTS; MEN AND WOMEN FOR WHOM EUROPE MEANT, FOR MANY YEARS OF DICTATORSHIP, FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW, PROGRESS AND COHESION' (SANCHEZ PEREZ-CASTEJON, 2019 ,P .2 ) . 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 171 FOURTH, ALL PARTY MANIFESTOS REFER TO THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND PEOPLES TO SHAPE THE EU POLITY AND POLI CIES DEMOCRATICALLY, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO DIFFERENT PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT, GOING FROM PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY TO REINFORCING NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS. HOWEVER, NONE OF THE NATIONAL LEADERS' SPEECHES EMPHASISES THIS ASPECT, DESPITE THE REFERENCES TO DEMOCRACY AS A SUBSTANTIAL ASPECT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND POLITY. THIS INDICATES THAT THE POSITION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL OR INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL FIELD IS A FIRST AND ESSEN TIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT TEXTS IN OUR CORPUS: TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS SUCH AS COMMISSION PRESIDENT JUNCKER AND EU POLITICAL PARTIES EMPHASISE THE NEED TO DEMOCRATISE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, WHEREAS NATIONAL LEADERS EMPHASISE THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF THE EXISTING POLITY. THIS CLASH WILL REAPPEAR IN THE PROCESS OF NOMINATING THE COMMISSION IN 2019 WITH THE CLASH OVER THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS, WHICH IS ALSO LIKELY TO RE-EMERGE DURING THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. FIFTH, ALL SPEECHES DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE BY REFERRING TO SPECIFIC NEW POLICIES AND PROPOSALS THAT SHOULD SHAPE THE FUTURE OF THE EU (MACRON'S SOVEREIGNTIES, DEMANDS FOR EU INTERVENTIONS IN NEW AREAS, ETC.) AND TO HOW DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE. THE INITIAL ASSUMPTION THAT THE NATIONAL LEADERS USED THESE SPEECHES TO PRESENT
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|a NATIONAL DEMANDS AND PRIORITIES IS CLEARLY CONFIRMED. THIS CODE IS RICH IN POLICY-FOCUSED REFER ENCES DESERVING ATTENTION IN DETAIL BEYOND WHAT WE CAN DO IN THIS CHAPTER. HENCE, WE FOCUS ON THOSE REVEALING A PAN-EUROPEAN CONVERSATION EITHER BETWEEN DIFFERENT ACTORS OR BETWEEN NATIONAL LEADERS FOR PAN-EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP. THE ANALYSIS PROVIDES MIXED EVIDENCE, AS THE NATIONAL LEADERS DISPUTE THIS TO DIFFERENT DEGREES AND WITH DIFFERENT STRATEGIES. THE CLEAREST EVIDENCE IS PROVIDED BY A THEME CENTRAL TO PRESIDENT MACRON AND THE ALDE LIBERAL POLITICAL FAMILY, LATER THE RENEW GROUP: STATUS QUO IS NO LONGER AN OPTION. TOO OFTEN WE FACE RESISTANCE AND INERTIA FROM THOSE WHO WANT TO CLING TO THE STATUS QUO. WE LIBERALS WANT EUROPE TO BE STRONG, TO BE WILLING AND ABLE TO ACT, AND BE AT THE FOREFRONT OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS. (ALDE, 2019 ) OTHERS WISELY AFFIRM THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED GRADUALLY SO AS NOT TO RUSH THE PEOPLE AS THIS WOULD BE TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE POPULISTS. THESE INDIVIDUALS WANT US TO GET USED TO A WELL-KNOWN RHYTHM: THE RHYTHM OF PARALYSIS, FAILING TO TAKE NOTE OF THE TIMEFRAMES WE CURRENTLY FACE. (MACRON, 2018 ) 172 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO IT IS HARD TO NOT SEE A DIRECT CRITICISM HERE TO CHANCELLOR MERKEL'S OFTEN REMARKED TENDENCY TO REACT SLOW AND CAUTIOUSLY TO EUROPEAN DEVEL OPMENTS. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE CHANCELLOR BUT HER EUROPEAN PARTY GROUP-THE EPP-THAT SEEMS TO RESPOND TO THIS CRITICISM BY EMPHASISING ADAPTATION AND COMMON ACTION AS WAYS FORWARD FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRA TION. IN THIS SENSE, CHANCELLOR MERKEL SEEMS TO LEAVE PRESIDENT MACRON A BIGGER SPACE IN TRANSNATIONAL DIALOGUE. THE EPP MANIFESTO ALSO DISPUTES THE OWNERSHIP OF SOME OF MACRON'S IDEAS ON SOVEREIGNTY OR ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE, ALBEIT REJECTING HIS CATCHPHRASE OF A EUROPEAN ARMY, AS DID PRES IDENT JUNCKER IN HIS 2018 SOTEU SPEECH: 'THIS IS WHY - DESPITE GREAT RESISTANCE AT THE TIME - I REIGNITED THE IDEA OF A EUROPE OF DEFENCE AS EARLY AS 2014' (JUNCKER,
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|a 2018 ,P .5 ) . FOR HIS PART, PRIME MINISTER SANCHEZ OF SPAIN CLAIMS A ROLE AS LEADER OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY GROUP (WHEN HE FORMED THE NATIONAL GOVERN MENT HE WAS THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LEADER IN CHARGE OF A LARGER MEMBER STATE) BUT HE DOES NOT JOIN THE PES MANIFESTO REFERENCE TO 'STATUS QUO NOT AN OPTION'. INSTEAD, HE ADDRESSES AN ISSUE THAT WILL BE CENTRAL IN THE EPP MANIFESTO-PROTECTING EUROPE-AND SIGNIFY IT IN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TERMS: [I]F YOU ASK ME WHAT IS THE CENTRAL IDEA IN MY INTERVENTION, IT IS A MUCH BROADER APPEAL. IT IS VERY SIMPLE, IT CAN BE SUMMED UP IN ONE SENTENCE: FOR EUROPE TO PROTECT, IT IS OUR TURN RIGHT NOW, IN THIS HISTORIC MOMENT, TO PROTECT EUROPE. TO PROTECT EUROPE IS TO BUILD A EUROPE OF RIGHTS THAT PROTECTS THE VULNERABLE; IT IS PROMOTING A EUROPE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR YOUNG PEOPLE AND ALSO FOR THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED. (SANCHEZ PEREZ CASTEJON, 2019 ,P .4 ) THIS RESIGNIFICATION OF PROTECTION IS NOT, HOWEVER, REPLICATED BY THE PES IN ITS MANIFESTO. EVEN THOUGH THE NOTION OF PROTECTION IS USED OFTEN IN THE MANIFESTO, UNLIKE THE ONE OF EPP THE REFERENCE TO 'PROTECTING EUROPE' IS NOT USED. FINALLY, ALL MANIFESTOS IDENTIFY AREAS WHERE THE DISCUSSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EU HAS OR MUST BECOME POLITICAL, UNDERSTOOD AS A PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT OF THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSION AND OF THE PROCEDURES FOR DECISION-MAKING. HOWEVER, THE ONLY NATIONAL LEADER TO ADOPT SUCH AN APPROACH IS PRESIDENT MACRON, WITH THIS QUOTE BEING SUCH AN EXAMPLE: TO REVIVE THE EUROPE OF PEOPLES, WE MUST THEREFORE ACCEPT TO TAKE A DIFFERENT ROUTE BY DRAWING UPON DEMOCRACY AS A SOURCE AND LOOKING AT 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 173 THINGS AS THEY ARE: HOW CAN WE BE SATISFIED WITH EUROPEAN ELECTIONS WHERE LESS THAN HALF THE CITIZENS GO AND VOTE? SO LET US USE THIS COMING YEAR TO BUILD A GENUINE, STRUCTURED DEBATE ABOUT CONVICTIONS AND PROPOSALS. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO DO AS WE DID IN THE PAST, REFUSING TO TALK ABOUT
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|a EUROPE, DISTRIBUTING POSITIONS AND ACCUSING BRUSSELS OR STRASBOURG OF BEING THE SOURCE OF ALL ILLS. IF WE CONTINUE TO DO THIS, WE ACCEPT A SERIES OF SMOKE SCREENS WHICH MAY BE MORE COMFORTABLE FOR EACH ONE OF US, BUT DOES NOT RESOLVE A SINGLE PROBLEM. LIKE YOU, I BELIEVE IN THE NOBILITY AND COMPLEXITY OF DEMOCRATIC CHOICES. (MACRON, 2018 ) THIS CONFIRMS AGAIN THAT UNLIKE SANCHEZ AND MERKEL, MACRON IS SIMULTA NEOUSLY PLAYING THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL LEADER EXPOSING NATIONAL DEMANDS IN RELATION TO THE DIFFERENT SOVEREIGNTIES AND OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEADER ATTEMPTING TO LEAD A NEW POLITICAL FAMILY AND TAKING PART IN TRANSNATIONAL DEBATES. 5.2 RECEPTION OF THE SPEECHES OVERALL, THE FIRST ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DID MATTER TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PROMPTED NATIONAL LEADERS AND POLITICAL PARTIES DISCUSS THE MOMENT THAT THE EU IS EXPERIENCING, POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND STRATEGIES FORWARD. ONCE THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED, NOW WE CAN INTRODUCE THE FIRST DATA FROM OUR TWITTER-BASED ANALYSIS. THE TWITTER RECEPTION OF MACRON'S (FIG. 1 ) AND MERKEL'S (FIG. 2 ) SPEECHES ARE QUITE SIMILAR. BUT THEY ALSO SHOW SOME IMPORTANT STRUC TURAL DIFFERENCES. THE MAIN SIMILARITY IS THAT THE GRAPH SHOWS A STRONG FRAGMENTATION, WITH DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES INTERACTING STRONGLY AMONG THEM. IN BOTH CASES, SOME OF THE ISOLATED COMMUNITIES HAVE SOME OF THE STRONGER SALIENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF MACRON, THOSE REPRESENT EUROSCEPTIC AND ALT-RIGHT COMMUNITIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. IN THE CASE OF MERKEL, HOWEVER, THESE TWEETS ARE MORE STRONGLY CONNECTED TO VIRAL INDIVIDUAL TWEETS ON BREXIT. THE GRAPHS ARE STRONGLY STRUCTURED BY WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL COMMUNITIES CLUSTERING IN THE PERIPHERIES OF THE GRAPH. THE COMMUNITIES THAT ARE BEST CONNECTED TO THE REST OF THE GRAPH IN THE CENTRE OF THE SPACE TEND TO REPRESENT WELL-CONNECTED PERSONALITIES 174 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO FIG. 1 RECEPTION OF MACRON'S SPEECH IN
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|a TWITTER OF THE POLITICO-BUREAUCRATIC FIELD IN BRUSSELS, SUCH AS COMMISSIONERS, JOUR NALISTS, POLITICAL PUNDITS, AND EXPERTS. INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTS HAVE A MINOR SALIENCE IN THIS AREA OF THE GRAPH. THE MAIN STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE GRAPHS OF MERKEL'S AND MACRON'S SPEECHES SEEMS TO BE THE DEGREE OF FRAGMENTATION OF THE GRAPH. WHEREAS BOTH SPEECHES GENERATED A VERY SIMILAR NUMBER OF TWEETS (2600 FOR MACRON, 2900 FOR MERKEL), THE STRUCTURE OF THE GRAPH IS VERY DIFFERENT. MACRON'S SPEECH GENERATED MULTIPLE SMALL COMMUNITIES CONNECTED ONLY VIA A FEW TWEETS, WHEREAS MERKEL'S SPEECH RESONATES IN A MUCH MORE CONNECTED COMMUNITY. THIS MEANS THAT MACRON IS REACHING A LARGER NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PUBLICS, WHEREAS MERKEL ENGAGES A MORE INTENSE 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 175 FIG. 2 RECEPTION OF MERKEL'S SPEECH IN TWITTER CONVERSATION AMONG THE WELL-CONNECTED EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE. THIS IS FURTHER CONFIRMED BY THE CENTRALITY OF BRUSSELS' INSIDERS IN MERKEL'S GRAPH, WHEREAS IN MACRON'S THE ONLY INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS THAT ARE SALIENT ARE CENTRAL ONES IN MORE PERIPHERAL AREAS, ESSENTIALLY THOSE THAT INTRODUCE THE ISSUE IN A PREVIOUSLY ISOLATED COMMUNITY. THE STRONG DISCONNECTION OF THE TWO LARGEST COMMUNITIES IN MERKEL'S GRAPH FROM THE CENTRAL AREAS IS YET ANOTHER ARGUMENT ABOUT HER HIGHER IMPACT ON A WELL-CONNECTED PUBLIC THAN ON A BROAD ONE. THIS PROVIDES STRONG EVIDENCE FOR THE EFFECTS OF THE STRATEGIES HIGHLIGHTED IN THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ABOVE: MACRON IS COMPETING FOR THE ROLE OF A PAN-EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADER BY REACHING OUT DIRECTLY TO FRAGMENTED EUROPEAN PUBLICS, WHEREAS MERKEL IS CLEARLY AIMING AT A MORE INSTITUTIONALISED PUBLIC, INCLUDING EUROPEAN PARTIES, JOURNALISTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY. 176 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO THE CONTRAST CANNOT BE MORE STRIKING WITH THE SPEECH RECEPTION OF PRIME MINISTER SANCHEZ. THIS SPEECH GENERATED LESS THAN 150 TWEETS, IN CONTRAST WITH THE 2500-2900 OF
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|a THE GERMAN AND FRENCH LEADERS. FURTHERMORE, VIRTUALLY ALL THE TWEETS COME FROM NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND THE CONVERSATION IS DOMINATED BY CRITICAL COMMENTS BY THE OPPOSITION PARTY CIUDADANOS (CS) CONTRASTING SANCHEZ CRITICISM OF POPULISM WITH HIS NATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH LEFT PARTY PODEMOS . THE FACT THAT THE ONLY PAN EUROPEAN GROUP THAT COMMENTS ON SANCHEZ'S SPEECH IS THE FAR-LEFT GUE IS PARTICULARLY CONTRASTING WITH SANCHEZ CLAIMING TO SPEAK AS THE LEADER OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY GROUP (FIG. 3 ). LANGUAGE IS A RELATIVELY WEAK EXPLANATION FOR THESE OBSERVATIONS, AS NONE OF THE LEADERS ADDRESSED THE PARLIAMENT IN ENGLISH BUT IN THEIR OFFI CIAL LANGUAGES WITH TRANSLATION TO ALL OTHER OFFICIAL LANGUAGES. IT IS TRUE THAT, UNLIKE SPANISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN ARE, EU INSTITUTIONS' WORKING LANGUAGES, AND THUS THE EUROSPHERE IS LIKELY TO REACT TO THESE LANGUAGES MORE SPONTANEOUSLY. HOWEVER, THE KEYWORDS USED TO COLLECT THE HASHTAGS WERE IN ENGLISH (SEE FOOTNOTE 3). THIS MEANS THAT MERKEL AND MACRON FIG. 3 RECEPTION OF SANCHEZ' SPEECH IN TWITTER 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 177 HAVE AN ABILITY TO RESONATE IN THE TRANSNATIONAL ENGLISH EUROSPHERE THAT IS INCOMPARABLE TO THAT OF SANCHEZ, AND IN THIS VEIN PROBABLY TO MOST OTHER NATIONAL LEADERS. IN THE SECOND STEP, WE ANALYSED A MAP OF HASHTAGS COLLECTED DURING THE TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE EP ELECTION 2019. THIS WAS DONE IN ORDER TO EVAL UATE OUR THIRD EXPECTATION THAT THE PERSONALISATION OF EUROPEAN MESSAGES CONTRIBUTES TO THE INCREASING POLARISATION EXPRESSED IN A CONTENTIOUS USE OF TWITTER, WHERE HASHTAGS QUESTIONING THE FRAMES OF EU INSTITUTIONS, LEADERS AND EUROPEAN PARTIES WOULD BE THE MORE SALIENT. THE GRAPH BELOW REPRESENTS ALL THE HASHTAGS WITH MORE THAN 15 TWEETS THAT WERE ASSOCIATED TO THE SEARCH TERMS OF EP ELECTION IN THE TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE POLLS OPENED. THE SIZE OF THE HASHTAGS DENOTES THEIR CENTRALITY IN THE OVERALL NETWORK, AND THIS PROVIDES A FIRST INTERESTING RESULT: THE
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|a MAP IS STRONGLY FRAGMENTED INTO NATIONAL FRAMES (AS COULD BE EXPECTED) AND THE ONLY CLEARLY SALIENT TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES ARE BREXIT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (FIG. 4 ). THE SECOND NOTICEABLE RESULT IS THAT THERE ARE VERY FEW OR NO SIGNS OF THE PERSONALISATION OF THE CAMPAIGN: THE GRAPH CONFIRMS THAT BOTH THE POLITICAL FORCES AND INDIVIDUAL LEADERS HAVE LOW VISIBILITY. THIS CONTRASTS CLEARLY WITH THE ATTENTION THAT TWITTER PAID TO THE SPEECHES OF MACRON AND MERKEL, AND IT TENDS TO SUGGEST THAT THE PERSONALISATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IS STRONGLY FOCUSED ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEADERS. FURTHERMORE, HASHTAGS RELATING TO DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY AND THE FUTURE OF THE EU ARE VIRTUALLY ABSENT WHEREAS THOSE THAT RELATE TO POLITY CONTESTATION OR THE POLITICAL MOMENT ARE MORE VISIBLE. THAT BEING SAID, THE HASHTAGS ARE MUCH LESS FOCUSED ON THE ONTOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF WHAT THE EU IS (WITH THE ESSENTIAL EXCEPTION OF BREXIT) AND MUCH MORE INTO POLICY ISSUES, OF WHICH MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE ARE VERY VISIBLE. THIS CLEARLY SUGGESTS THAT THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE HAD A VERY SMALL EFFECT IN THE FRAMING OF TWITTER CONVERSATIONS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE FRAMING OF THE DOMINANT TWEETS IS MUCH MORE FOCUSED ON SETTING THE AGENDA ON THE ABOVEMENTIONED KEY POLICIES RATHER THAN ON THE POLITY DISCUSSIONS PROMOTED BY THE NATIONAL LEADERS. 6 CONCLUSIONS THIS CHAPTER PROVIDES EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT ONE OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU IS THE PERSONALISATION OF POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS, IN PARTICULAR CONFIRMING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSONALISATION EXPECTATIONS. 178 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO FIG. 4 MAP OF HASHTAGS FROM THE MAY 2019 CAMPAIGN THE SPEECHES BY THE MOST SALIENT NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE EU (MACRON AND MERKEL) RESONATE IN SPECIFIC EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN TWITTER THAT REFLECT THEIR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP STYLES. FURTHERMORE, THE LEADERS REFER TO EACH OTHER'S SPEECHES, EITHER EXPLICITLY OR MORE OFTEN IMPLICITLY, AND THE
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|a TONE AND CONTENT OF THEIR DISCUSSION CLEARLY FRAMES THE AGENDA OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES. WHEREAS THE CHAPTER HAS SHOWN THAT THE PERSONALISATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CAN RESONATE IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES, IT ALSO SHOWS THAT PERSONALISATION LEAVES SPACE FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF CHARACTERS IN THE PLOT. THIS FACILITATES AN EXPLANATION FOR THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE IMPACT OF THE GERMAN AND FRENCH LEADERS AND THE SPANISH ONE. DESPITE THEIR THEORETICAL LEADERSHIP OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTY GROUPS, IT IS THE 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 179 PERSONAL AURA-QUALIFIED BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL WEIGHT OF THEIR STATE- THAT THE EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE REFLECTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE DATA REFLECT THE LEADERS' PERSONAL IMAGE AND STRATEGY. MACRON SUCCEEDS AT ENGAGING A CONVERSATION WITH DIVERSE PUBLICS, WHEREAS MERKEL'S SPEECH RESONATES IN THE 'BRUSSELS TWITTER BUBBLE'. HOWEVER, THE STARK CONTRAST WITH SANCHEZ SHOULD ALSO, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, QUALIFY THE SINGLE FACTOR OF PERSONALISATION. WHEREAS MACRON'S FLAMBOYANCE AND NOVELTY COMPENSATES THE TWO DECADES OF REPUTATION OF MERKEL, SANCHEZ ADDRESSED THE EP AS A YOUNG LEADER WITH A PRO-EUROPEAN DISCOURSE. HOWEVER, HIS WEAK RESONANCE IN COMPAR ISON WITH MERKEL AND MACRON SUGGESTS THAT NOT ALL LEADERS HAVE THE SAME PERSONALISATION ABILITY. AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NATURE OF THIS DISCURSIVE EXERCISE DETERMINES IN ADVANCE THE ECONOMY OF ATTEN TION, WITH LEADERS' PERSONALITIES ONLY MARGINALLY INFLUENCING THE AMOUNT OF ATTENTION. THAT BEING SAID, POLITICISED INTERGOVERNMENTALISM PROVIDES LEADERS WITH LARGE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES ACCORDING TO THEIR PERSONAL STYLE. THE RESONANCE OF THIS POLITICISED INTERGOVERNMENTALISM IN TWITTER CONTRASTS WITH THE ABSENCE OF PERSONALISATION OF THE CONVERSATIONS AHEAD OF THE 2019 ELECTION. NEITHER THE NATIONAL LEADERS NOR THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN ARE CENTRAL IN THE DISCUSSIONS. THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF THE TOPICS BROUGHT FORWARD BY
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|a THE CANDIDATES. THIS IS FULLY COMPATIBLE, HOWEVER, WITH THE POLITICISATION EXPECTATION, AS EVIDENCED IN THE CENTRALITY OF POLICY ISSUES SUCH AS BREXIT, MIGRATION OR CLIMATE CHANGE. THIS SUGGESTS THAT ONLINE NETWORKED ACTIVISM IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSONALISA TION. THE LEADERS OF THE MORE POWERFUL MEMBER STATES HAVE AN ABILITY TO FRAME INSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT THAT ARE PICKED UP BY THE TWITTERSPHERE ON THE SPOT. BUT THIS EFFECT IS QUICKLY DILUTED, WHEREAS THE ONLINE CONVERSATION THAT FRAMED THE EU ELECTION WAS CHAR ACTERISED BY A STRONG FRAGMENTATION THAT LIKELY RESPONDS TO THE REGULAR ENGAGEMENT OF MULTIPLE COMMUNITIES. IN THIS SENSE, THE ONGOING PERSON ALISATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL EUROPEAN POLITICSAPPEALS TO MEDIA AND INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICS, BUT IT IS NOT YET REFLECTED IN PAN-EUROPEAN ELECTION AGENDAS. REFERENCES ALLIANCE OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE. (2018). FREEDOM, OPPORTUNITY, PROSPERITY: THE LIBERAL VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE . RETRIEVED APRIL 8, 2021, FROM HTTPS://D3N8A8PRO7VHMX.CLOUDFRONT.NET/ALDEPARTY/PAGES/ 1590/ATTACHMENTS/ORIGINAL/1594139136/2019_FREEDOM_OPPORTUNITY_PRO 180 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO SPERITY_THE_LIBERAL_VISION_FOR_THE_FUTURE_OF_EUROPE_0_%281%29.PDF?159413 9136 . AUSSERHOFER, J., & MAIREDER, A. (2013). NATIONAL POLITICS ON TWITTER: STRUCTURES AND TOPICS OF A NETWORKED PUBLIC SPHERE. INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY, 16 (3), 291-314. BARISIONE, M., & CERON, A. (2017). A DIGITAL MOVEMENT OF OPINION? CONTESTING AUSTERITY THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA. IN M. BARISIONE & A. MICHAILIDOU (EDS.), SOCIAL MEDIA AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (PP. 77-104). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BICKERTON, C. J. (2012). EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: FROM NATION-STATES TO MEMBER STATES . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. BIMBER, B. (2014). DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE OBAMA CAMPAIGN OF 2008 AND 2012: ADAPTATION TO THE PERSONALIZED POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT. JOURNAL OF INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS, 11
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|a (2), 130-150. BLUMLER, J., & KAVANAGH, D. (1999). THE THIRD AGE OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: INFLUENCES AND FEATURES. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 16 (3), 209-230. BOUZA GARCIA, L., & TUNON NAVARRO, J. (2018). PERSONALIZACION, DISTRIBUCION, IMPACTO Y RECEPCION EN TWITTER DEL DISCURSO DE MACRON ANTE EL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO EL 17/04/18. EL PROFESIONAL DE LA INFORMACION, 27 (6), 1239-1247. BRUNS, A., & ENLI, G. (2018). THE NORWEGIAN TWITTERSPHERE. NORDICOM, 39 , 1-20. CAIANI, M., & GUERRA, S. (EDS.). (2017). EUROSCEPTICISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA: COMMUNICATING EUROPE, CONTESTING EUROPE . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. CAMPOS-DOMINGUEZ, E. (2017). TWITTER Y LA COMUNICACION POLITICA. EL PROFE SIONAL DE LA INFORMACION, 26 (5), 785-793. DE WILDE, P. (2019). MEDIA LOGIC AND GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (8), 1193-1212. EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE. (2019). BUILDING A EUROPE OF ALL PEOPLES. 2019 MANIFESTO EUROPEAN ELECTIONS . RETRIEVED APRIL 8, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.E-F-A.ORG/ 2019-MANIFESTO-EUROPEAN-FREE-ALLIANCE/ . EUROPEAN GREEN PARTY. (2019). PRIORITIES FOR 2019: WHAT EUROPEAN GREENS FIGHT FOR-MANIFESTO: TIME TO RENEW THE PROMISE OF EUROPE . RETRIEVED APRIL 8, 2021, FROM HTTPS://EUROPEANGREENS.EU/PRIORITIES-2019-WHAT-EUROPEAN-GRE ENS-FIGHT . EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE. (2019). THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2018-19 . A SYNTHESIS OF THE SPEECHES BY EU HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT. RETRIEVED APRIL 8, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/REGDATA/ETUDES/IDAN/2019/637 948/EPRS_IDA(2019)637948_EN.PDF . EUROPEAN POPULAR PARTY. (2019). EPP MANIFESTO "LET'S OPEN THE NEXT CHAPTER FOR EUROPE TOGETHER" . RETRIEVED APRIL 8, 2021, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EPP.EU/FILES/ UPLOADS/2019/04/EPP-MANIFESTO-2019.PDF . 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 181 GAINOUS, J., & WAGNER, K. (2014). TWEETING TO POWER: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS . OXFORD UNIVERSITY
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|a PRESS. GATTERMANN, K., & DE VREESE, C. (2020). AWARENESS OF SPITZENKANDIDATEN IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: THE EFFECTS OF NEWS EXPOSURE IN DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN CONTEXTS. RESEARCH & POLITICS, 7 (2), 1-8. GRAHAM, T., JACKSON, D., & BROERSMA, M. (2014). NEW PLATFORM, OLD HABITS? CANDIDATE'S USE OF TWITTER DURING THE 2010 BRITISH AND DUTCH GENERAL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGNS. NEW MEDIA AND SOCIETY, 18 (5), 765-783. GUIRAUDON, V., RUZZA, C., & TRENZ, H.-J. (EDS.) (2016). EUROPE'S PROLONGED CRISIS: THE MAKING OR THE UNMAKING OF A POLITICAL UNION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. HABERMAS, J. (2017, OCTOBER 26). WHAT MACRON MEANS FOR EUROPE: "HOW MUCH WILL THE GERMANS HAVE TO PAY". SPIEGEL ONLINE . HTTPS://WWW.SPIEGEL. DE/INTERNATIONAL/EUROPE/JUERGEN-HABERMAS-ON-THE-EUROPEAN-VISION-OF-EMM ANUEL-MACRON-A-1174721.HTML . ACCESSED MAY 21, 2021. HAENSKA M., & BAUCHOWITZ S. (2018). #THISISACOUP: THE EMERGENCE OF AN ANTI AUSTERITY HASHTAG ACROSS EUROPE'S TWITTERSPHERE. IN BASU, L., SCHIFFERES, S., & KNOWLES, S. (EDS.), THE MEDIA AND AUSTERITY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (PP. 248-260). ROUTLEDGE. JACKSON, N., & LILLEKER, D. (2011). MICROBLOGGING, CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: UK MPS AND THE USE OF TWITTER. THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES, 17 (1), 86-105. JIVKOVA-SEMOVA, D., REQUEIJO-REY, P., & PADILLA-CASTILLO, G. (2017). USOS Y TENDENCIAS DE TWITTER EN LA CAMPANA A ELECCIONES GENERALES ESPANOLAS DEL 20D DE 2015: HASHTAGS QUE FUERON TRENDING TOPIC. EL PROFESIONAL DE LA INFORMACION, 26 (5), 824-837. JUNCKER, J. C. (2018). STATE OF THE UNION 2018. THE HOUR OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY AUTHORISED VERSION OF THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 2018 . HTTPS://EC.EUR OPA.EU/INFO/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/SOTEU2018-SPEECH_EN_0.PDF . ACCESSED APRIL 8, 2021. LARSSON, A., & KALSNES, B. (2014). OF COURSE WE ARE ON FACEBOOK: USE AND NON-USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AMONG SWEDISH AND NORWEGIAN POLITICIANS. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 29 (6), 653-667.
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|a LOPEZ-GARCIA, G. (2016). NEW VS 'OLD' LEADERSHIPS: THE CAMPAIGN OF SPANISH GENERAL ELECTIONS 2015 ON TWITTER. COMUNICACION Y SOCIEDAD, 29 (3), 149-168. HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.15581/003.29.3.149-168 LOPEZ-MERI, A., MARCOS-GARCIA, S., & CASERO-RIPOLLES, A. (2017). WHAT DO POLITICIANS DO ON TWITTER? FUNCTIONS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN THE SPANISH ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN OF 2016. EL PROFESIONAL DE LA INFORMACION, 26 (5), 795-804. MACRON, E. (2018), SPEECH BY EMMANUEL MACRON, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, STRASBOURG. RETRIEVED APRIL 17, 2018, FROM HTTPS:// WWW.ELYSEE.FR/EMMANUEL-MACRON/2018/04/17/SPEECH-BY-EMMANUEL-MAC 182 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND J. TUNON NAVARRO RON-PRESIDENT-OF-THE-REPUBLIC-AT-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT.EN . ACCESSED APRIL 8, 2021. MAIR, P. (2013). RULING THE VOID: THE HOLLOWING OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY . VERSO TRADE. MAIREDER, A., & SCHLOEGL, S. (2014). 24 HOURS OF #OUTCRY: THE NETWORKED PUBLICS OF A SOCIO-POLITICAL DEBATE. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 29 (6), 687- 702. MAIREDER, A., SHLOEGL, S., SCHUETZ, F., & KARWAUTZ, M. (2014). THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL TWITTERSPHERE: NETWORK OF THE TOP USERS DISCUSSING THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS (GFK WORKING PAPER). MANIN, B. (1997). THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. MAZZOLENI, G., & SCHULZ, W. (1999). "MEDIATIZATION" OF POLITICS: A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY? POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 16 (3), 247-261. MERKEL, A. (2018). SPEECH BY FEDERAL CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, STRASBOURG. RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 13, 2018, FROM HTTPS:// WWW.BUNDESREGIERUNG.DE/BREG-EN/NEWS/SPEECH-BY-FEDERAL-CHANCELLOR-ANG ELA-MERKEL-TO-THE-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT-STRASBOURG-13-NOVEMBER-2018-155 0688 . ACCESSED APRIL 8, 2021. MEUNIER, S., & NICOLAIDIS, K. (2019). THE GEOPOLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 57 , 103-113. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN SPAIN, FRANCE AND THE UK: TOWARDS AN
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|a EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. OLEART, A., & BOUZA GARCIA, L. (2019). LA LUTTE NARRATIVE POUR LA SIGNIFICATION ET LA POLITISATION DE L'EUROPE DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS DU TTIP: LE RECIT DE L'EUROPE BOUCLIER CONTRE LE POPULISME TRANSNATIONAL. POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE, 4 , 16-42. PARMELEE, J., & BICHARD, S. (2012). POLITICS AND THE TWITTER REVOLUTION . LANHAM, MD. LEXINGTON BOOKS. PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS. (2019). A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR EUROPE PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS 2019 MANIFESTO, MADRID. RETRIEVED FEBRUARY 23, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.PES.EU/EXPORT/SITES/DEFAULT/.GALLERIES/DOCUME NTS-GALLERY/PES-MANIFESTO-2019_EN.PDF_2063069299.PDF . PRINCEN, S. (2011). AGENDA-SETTING STRATEGIES IN EU POLICY PROCESSES. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 18 (7), 927-943. RODRIGUEZ VIRGILI, J., JANDURA, O., & REBOLLEDO, M. (2014). LA PERSONALIZACION DE LA POLITICA EN LA COBERTURA MEDIATICA: UNA COMPARACION DE LAS CAMPANAS ELECTORALES EN ESPANA Y ALEMANIA. TRIPODOS, 1 (34), 61-79. RUIZ-SOLER, J. (2018). THE LAST WILL BE THE FIRST. A STUDY OF EUROPEAN ISSUE PUBLICS ON TWITTER. PARTECIPAZIONE E CONFLITTO, 11.2 , 423-447. SANCHEZ-MURILLO, L.-F. (2005). EL MARKETING POLITICO Y SUS CONSECUENCIAS PARA LA DEMOCRACIA. COMUNICACION Y SOCIEDAD, 4 , 11-38. 8 FRAMING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ON TWITTER YY 183 SANCHEZ PEREZ-CASTEJON, P. (2019). SPEECH BY PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , STRASBOURG. RETRIEVED JANUARY 16, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.LAMONCLOA.GOB.ES/LANG/EN/PRESIDENTE/INTERV ENCIONES/PAGINAS/2019/20190116SPEECH-EUPAR.ASPX . SCHMITT, H., HOBOLT, S., & POPA, S. A. (2015). DOES PERSONALIZATION INCREASE TURNOUT? SPITZENKANDIDATEN IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, 16 (3), 347-368. STATHAM, P. (2008). MAKING EUROPE NEWS: HOW JOURNALISTS VIEW THEIR ROLE AND MEDIA PERFORMANCE. JOURNALISM, 9 (4), 398-422. STIER, S., FROIO, C., & SCHUENEMANN, W. J.
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|a (2020). GOING TRANSNATIONAL? CANDI DATES' TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES ON TWITTER DURING THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS , 44 (7), 1455-1481. THIEL, M., & UCARER, E. M. (2014). ACCESS AND AGENDA-SETTING IN THE EURO PEAN UNION: ADVOCACY NGOS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOCACY, 3 (1), 99-116. VAN-AELST, P., SHEAFER, T., & STANYER, J. (2012). THE PERSONALIZATION OF MEDIATED POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: A REVIEW OF CONCEPTS, OPERATIONALIZATIONS AND KEY FINDINGS. JOURNALISM, 13 (2), 1-18. ZAHRADIL, J. (2018). RETUNE THE EU! HTTPS://WWW.ZAHRADIL.CZ/WORDPRESS/WP CONTENT/UPLOADS/2018/11/JZ-MANIFESTO.PDF . ACCESSED APRIL 8, 2021. PART III EU POLITICISATION NARRATIVES AND PATTERNS CHAPTER 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: SALIENCE, POLARISATION, AND CONFLICT OVER EU INTEGRATION IN (EASTERN/WESTERN) MEDIA COVERAGE ANA ANDGULADZE, JAN BEYER, RAMONA COMAN, AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN 1 INTRODUCTION SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990S, THE EU HAS BECOME THE SUBJECT OF INCREASED PUBLIC DISCUSSION, DEBATE, AND CONTESTATION (SCHMIDT, 2019 ). ITS RAISON D'ETRE HAS BEEN QUESTIONED NOT ONLY BY POLITICAL ACTORS AND CITIZENS ALIKE CLAIMING FOR 'LESS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION' BUT ALSO BY THOSE WHO ARE ARGUING IN FAVOUR OF 'MORE EU' OR A 'DIFFERENT EU' (BRACK, 2018 ; BRACK A. ANDGULADZE ( B ) J. BEYER R. COMAN J. VANDER MEULEN INSTITUT D'ETUDES EUROPEENNES/CEVIPOL, UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM E-MAIL: ANA.ANDGULADZE@ULB.BE J. BEYER E-MAIL: JAN.BEYER@ULB.BE THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_9 187 188 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. &CO S T A , 2012 ; COMAN & LACROIX, 2007 ; FLOOD, 2009 ; LECONTE, 2010 ). WHILE THE 1990S MARKED THE END OF THE
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|a 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' (HOOGHE &M A R KS , 2009 ) ,TH ECU M U L A T I VEEF F EC T SO FTH ER EC EN TCR I S ESFA C EDB YTH E EU-EUROZONE, THE MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION, BREXIT, THE RULE OF LAW DEBATES, AND MORE RECENTLY THE EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC-AS WELL AS THEIR TRANSFORMING EFFECTS FOR BOTH POLITICS AND SOCIETIES HAVE DETERMINED OBSERVERS TO ARGUE THAT THE EU IS WITNESSING AN 'EXISTENTIAL CRISIS'. THE EU'S MULTIPLE CRISES, AND THE SENSE OF EMERGENCY THAT THEY CREATED, PUT THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE POLITICAL AND MEDIA SPOTLIGHT. WHILE SCHOLARS OF POLITICS (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ;K R I E S IETAL . , 2008 ) HAVE SHOWN HOW MAINSTREAM AND PERIPHERAL POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE INCREAS INGLY AMPLIFIED CRITICISM OF THE EU, FEEDING DISCONTENT AND CLAIMS TO LESS SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION, SCHOLARS STUDYING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES POINTED OUT THE INCREASED SALIENCE OF EU TOPICS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL, SHOWING HOW AND WHEN THE SAME EUROPEAN THEMES ARE DISCUSSED AT THE SAME TIME ACROSS NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES AND MEDIA (RISSE, 2003 ; KOOPMANS & STATHAM, 2010 ). WHILE THE FORMER SOUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF CONFLICTS OVER EU INTEGRATION (BRACK ET AL., 2019 ; HOOGHE & MARKS, 2019 ), THE LATTER HAVE SHOWN HOW EU SUPPORT AND CONTESTATION ARE FUELLED IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES THROUGH THE INCREASED SALIENCE OF EUROPEAN ISSUES. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THIS CHAPTER SEEKS TO SHED LIGHT ON PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION OVER EU INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES. THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF 16 NEWSPAPERS (1127 ARTICLES) FROM SEVEN EASTERN (HUNGARY, POLAND, ROMANIA) AND WESTERN (BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY AND SPAIN) EU MEMBER STATES, IT EXAMINES THE EU COVERAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS WITH A FOCUS ON SALIENCE, POLARISATION, AND LINES OF CONFLICT OVER EU INTEGRATION. DRAWING ON TWO MAIN THEO RIES OF EU INTEGRATION-INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (BICKERTON ET AL., 2015 ; MORAVCSIK, 2018 ) AND
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|a POST-FUNCTIONALISM (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2019 )- THE ANALYSIS CAPTURES SIX LINES OF TENSIONS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS, NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL, DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM', IMMIGRATION VS. R. COMAN E-MAIL: RAMONA.COMAN@ULB.BE J. VANDER MEULEN E-MAIL: JUVDMEUL@ULB.BE 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 189 ANTI-IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION TO WHICH WE ADD THE TRADI TIONAL GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION CONFLICT. THE CHAPTER SHOWS THAT THE COVERAGE OF THESE LINES OF CONFLICT VARIES NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN NEWSPAPERS, BUT ALSO AMONG THE TWO REGIONS. THEY ARE ROOTED IN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND MIRROR MEDIA-POLITICS RELATIONS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL. THE CHAPTER IS ORGANISED IN FOUR PARTS: SECT. 2 PROPOSES A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS WHICH SETS OUT THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICISATION AND PUTS FORWARD A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICTS OVER EU INTEGRATION SUPPORTED BY INTERGOVERN MENTALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNTS. SECTION 3 PRESENTS BOTH DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS. SECTION 4 DISCUSSES THE MAIN FINDINGS ORGANISED AROUND ISSUE SALIENCE, POLARISATION, AND CONFLICT OVER EU INTE GRATION AS REFLECTED IN THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF 16 NEWSPAPERS FROM EASTERN (HUNGARY, POLAND, ROMANIA) AND WESTERN (BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SPAIN) EU MEMBER STATES. THE CHAPTER SHOWS THAT WHILE INTEGRA TION VS. DISINTEGRATION AND THE CONFLICT OPPOSING SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERAL' REGIMES ARE COMMON TO THE EASTERN AND WESTERN NEWS PAPERS ANALYSED-ALTHOUGH FRAMED DIFFERENTLY-THE FOUR OTHER LINES OF CONFLICT SEEM TO BE SPECIFIC TO THE EU COVERAGE IN THE EASTERN NEWSPA PERS. THE ARTICLE ALSO SHOWS THAT THE DENSITY OF CONFLICTS VARIES: WHILE IN THE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS THE TWO TRANSNATIONAL LINES OF CONFLICT-INTEGRA TION VS. DISINTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM'-PREVAIL, IN EASTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS, THE LINES OF CONFLICT ARE MORE DIVERSE AND REFLECT TENSIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION OR
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|a DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN ACTORS, WHICH PLAY A ROLE IN THE WAYS IN WHICH EU INTEGRATION IS FRAMED AND THEREFORE POLITICISED. THE ARTICLE IS CONCEIVED AS AN EMPIRICAL TEST TO THEORETICALLY BRIDGE THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION TO THE EU'S THEORIES OF INTEGRATION AND TYPES OF CONFLICT OVER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. 2 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION AND CONFLICT OVER EU INTEGRATION POLITICISATION IS ABOUT HOW A MATTER IS BROUGHT INTO THE POLITICAL SPACE AND ITS VISIBILITY (SALIENCE) IN THE PUBLIC SPHERES. FOR THIS CHAPTER, WE BORROW THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION OF POLITICISATION, WHICH UNDERSTANDS IT AS 'AN INCREASE IN THE POLARISATION OF OPINIONS, INTERESTS OR VALUES AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ARE PUBLICLY ADVANCED' (DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 , P. 140). POLARISATION REFERS TO THE CO-OCCURRENCE OF CONFLICTING DEMANDS. THE PROCESS OF POLITICISATION TAKES PLACE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS AND IMPLIES 190 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. A DIVERSITY OF ACTORS. AS DE WILDE AND ZUERN PUT IT ( 2012 ), POLITICISA TION (IN TERMS OF POLARISATION AND SALIENCE) IS DETERMINED BY THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, THAT IS NATIONAL NARRATIVES, MEDIA RECEPTIVENESS, COMPETITIVE PARTY POLITICS, REFERENDUM, AND CRISIS. IN OTHER WORDS, POLITI CISATION IS MEDIATED BY THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE (DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 , P. 138), WHICH CONSISTS OF INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS OF VOICE AND COGNITIVE FRAMES SUCH AS VISIONS OF EU INTEGRATION. EU INTEGRATION HAS NEVER BEEN A LONG FLEUVE TRANQUILLE . FORMS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESISTANCE EMERGED FROM THE ONSET, SLOWING DOWN ITS PATH TO ACCOMMODATE THE DIVERSITY OF INTERESTS AND PREFERENCES. NOT ONLY HAS THE DEEPENING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BEEN SHAPED BY CRISES, BUT ALSO ITS WIDENING (COMAN ET AL., 2020 , P. 5), STEMMING FROM PERSISTING CONFLICTS IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC IDEAS, PREFERENCES, AND INTERESTS. IN EU STUDIES, THEO RIES OF EU INTEGRATION EXPLAIN CONFLICTS THROUGH DIFFERENT LENSES. ON THE ONE HAND, INTERGOVERNMENTALISTS (BICKERTON ET AL., 2015
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|a ) HAVE ARGUED THAT CONFLICT RESULTS FROM DIVERGING INTERESTS OF AN INCREASING NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, MORE RECENTLY, SCHOLARS WHO CONCEP TUALISED POST-FUNCTIONALISM HAVE PORTRAYED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS A CONFLICTUAL PROCESS ARISING FROM INCOMPATIBLE BELIEF SYSTEMS (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 , 2019 , P. 1117) AND INCREASED POLITICAL COMPETITION OVER EUROPE ABOUT IDENTITY POLITICS ('WHO WE ARE'), RATHER THAN INTEREST POLITICS ABOUT CONCERNS OF REDISTRIBUTION ('WHO GETS WHAT') (STATHAM & TRENZ, 2015 , P. 290). WHILE SOME AUTHORS HAVE CLAIMED THAT 'THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPE IS PRIMARILY DRIVEN BY ECONOMIC RATIONALES - E.G. ADHERENTS OF REGULATED CAPITALISM VERSUS FREE MARKETERS - MORE RECENTLY IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THE ISSUE IS STRONGLY ATTACHED TO A CULTURAL AXIS, MORE SO THAN TO THE ECONOMIC ONE' (HOEGLINGER, 2016 ,P .4 7 ) . TO BEGIN WITH, THE FIRST DAYS OF EU INTEGRATION HAVE BEEN MARKED BY CONFLICTS BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF A FEDERAL VERSUS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL SUPRANATIONAL CONSTRUCTION. THIS LINE OF CONFLICT HAS SHAPED THE INTEGRA TION PROCESS FROM THE ONSET, OPPOSING NATIONAL TO SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS (1), WHERE MUCH OF THE CONTENTION HAS EMERGED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE INCREASING AUTHORITY OF THE EU AND TRANSFERS OF POWERS TO SUPRA NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THIS TYPE OF CONFLICT THEREFORE DIVIDES THOSE IN FAVOUR OF A SUPRANATIONAL 'SUPER-STATE' VERSUS A 'EUROPE OF NATIONS', OR A FEDERAL EUROPE VERSUS A COOPERATION AMONG STATES. ANOTHER LINE OF CONFLICT OPPOSED MEMBER STATES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL SETTINGS (2), WHERE MEMBER STATES ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER ON A ZERO-SUM GAME OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, OPPOSING RICHER AND POORER MEMBER STATES (DE WILDE, 2014 ), 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 191 THOSE IN FAVOUR OF A CHRISTIAN EUROPE VERSUS A 'COSMOPOLITAN EUROPE' OR EVEN A 'FORTRESS EUROPE' VERSUS A 'COSMOPOLITAN EUROPE'; THE MODEL
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|a OF A 'SOCIAL EUROPE' VERSUS A '(NEO)LIBERAL EUROPE'; A 'MILITARY POWER EUROPE' VERSUS A 'PACIFIST EUROPE' (CRESPY & VERSCHUEREN, 2009 , P. 385). CONFLICTS AMPLIFIED NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURE OF THE EU BUT ALSO CONCERNING SPECIFIC POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS (DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 , P. 139). AS THE EU HAS BROADENED AND EXTENDED ITS SCOPE OF ACTION, SEEKING TO CREATE 'AN EVER CLOSER UNION', IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE ERA OF THE 'PER MISSIVE CONSENSUS'-IN WHICH EU TREATIES WERE NEGOTIATED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS FOR THE PEOPLE BUT WITHOUT THE PEOPLE (SCHMIDT, 2006 )-HAS COME TO AN END. EU INTEGRATION 'BY STEALTH' WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. THE POOL OF ACTORS HAS INCREASED AND INCLUDED DOMESTIC CIVIL SOCIETY OF MEMBER STATES AS WELL. WITH THE POLITICISATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY, PERCEPTIONS OF THE EU HAVE SHIFTED FROM A 'BENEVOLENT ENTITY' TO A 'NORMAL POLITY'. AS A RESULT, CRITICISM OF THE EU POLICIES AND CONFLICTS OVER EUROPEAN ISSUES IN NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES MIGHT SUGGEST NORMALISATION OF THE EU AS A POLITY (BOUZA & OLEART, 2018 ). CONTESTATION, DEBATE, AND DISCUSSION OVER EU INTEGRATION-ITS FORM, ITS POLICIES, AND ITS FUTURE-INCREASED, AND WITH IT THE SALIENCE OF THE EU IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL ARENAS WHERE PERIPHERAL POLITICAL PARTIES-WITH A CRITICAL/ANTI-EUROPEAN DISCOURSE-WIN ELECTIONS AGAINST TRADITIONAL PARTIES, TYPICALLY IN FAVOUR OF EU INTEGRATION (HOOGHE &M A R K S , 2009 ), GIVING RISE TO INCREASED TENSIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION OVER EU INTEGRATION (3) AND WIDENING THE OPPORTUNITIES TO CONTEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (DE WILDE & ZUERN, 2012 , P. 139). OVER THE LAST DECADES, NEW CONFLICTS OVER VALUES HAVE CRYSTALLISED WHICH ENGAGE IDENTITIES (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ,P .2 ;HU T T ER&K R I ES I , 2019 ) AND VALUES. THEIR SYSTEMIC EFFECT IS TO POLARISE SOCIETIES ON A CULTURAL DIVIDE THAT ARGUABLY TAKES THE FORM OF A DURABLE
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|a SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGE (HOOGHE &M A R K S , 2019 , P. 1117). THESE CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED AND POLITICISED, THEY ARE MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND MORE DIVISIVE THAN EVER (BRACK ET AL., 2019 , P. 818) OPPOSING PROMOTERS OF INTEGRATION VERSUS DISINTEGRA TION (4), SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY VS. NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIA (5) WITH A DOMINANT LINE OF CONFLICT AGAINST MIGRATION AND IN FAVOUR OF A CHRISTIAN EUROPE (6). WE ARGUE IN THIS CHAPTER THAT THE JUXTAPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONFLICT HYPOTHETICALLY LEADS TO AN INCREASED POLITICISATION OVER EU INTE GRATION, THAT IS SALIENCE AND POLARISATION. THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES ONE FACET OF THIS PROCESS BY EXPLORING PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION OVER THE EU 192 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. IN THE MEDIA. MEDIA COVERAGE MATTERS FOR THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN ANY STATE, EVEN MORE IN A SUPRANATIONAL POLITY LIKE THE EU (OLEART, 2021 ), WHICH SUFFERS-AS MANY HAVE ARGUED-FROM AN IMPORTANT DEMO CRATIC DEFICIT. THE RESEARCH QUESTION DRIVING THIS CHAPTER IS: IF NATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES FUEL POLITICISATION, HOW IS THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE REFLECTING OR REPRODUCING THE LINES OF CONFLICT OVER EU INTEGRATION AS THEY ARE CONCEP TUALISED IN THEORY? MUCH IN THE FASHION THAT DE WILDE, MICHAILIDOU, AND TRENZ HAVE DONE REGARDING THE TYPES OF EU POLITY CONTESTATION ( 2014 ), THIS CHAPTER ANALYSES SIX DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF CONFLICT CRYSTALLISING EU POLITICISATION IN PUBLIC SPHERES: CONFLICTS WHICH OPPOSE MEMBER STATES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT, NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS, GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION, DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM', SUPPORTERS OF IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION, AND INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION. 3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS THE CHAPTER DRAWS ON A SAMPLE OF NEWSPAPERS FROM SEVEN EU MEMBER STATES, INCLUDING FOUR WESTERN MEMBER STATES (BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SPAIN) AND THREE EASTERN MEMBER STATES (HUNGARY, ROMANIA, POLAND). WITH THE HELP OF STUDENT CODERS WHO READ THE 16 NEWSPAPERS IN THEIR ORIGINAL LANGUAGE, TWO
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|a JOURNALS PER COUNTRY WERE SCRUTINISED, EXCEPT BELGIUM FOR WHICH WE COVERED BOTH DUTCH AND FRENCH-SPEAKING JOURNALS. WE SOUGHT TO SELECT TWO QUALITY PRESS JOURNALS WITH A LEFT AND CONSERVATIVE/RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL LEANING. THIS CRITERION HAS BEEN APPLIED TO SELECT LE MONDE AND LE FIGARO (FRANCE), EL PAIS AND EL MUNDO (SPAIN), DIE WELT AND DIE TAGESZEITUNG (GERMANY) AS WELL AS LE SOIR AND LA LIBRE AND DE STANDAARD AND HET LAATSTE NIEUWS (BELGIUM), AS WELL AS RZECZPOSPOLITA AND GAZETA WYBORCZA (POLAND). THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN HUNGARY HAS EVOLVED OVER THE LAST YEARS AND MEDIA INDEPENDENCE HAS DRAMATICALLY DECLINED, AS MORE THAN 80% IS UNDER GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL. FOR THIS REASON, IN THE HUNGARIAN CASE, WE OPTED FOR A NEWSPAPER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT, MAGYAR NEMZET AND A WEEKLY INDEPEN DENT PUBLICATION, HVG. AS FAR AS ROMANIA IS CONCERNED, WE CODED THE ARTICLES DEVOTED TO THE EU IN ADEVARUL, AND LIBERTATEA (TABLOID), CONSID ERING THAT THERE IS NO LEFT-ORIENTED QUALITY NEWSPAPER SIMILAR TO WESTERN PUBLICATIONS. THE PERIOD COVERED HAS BEEN ONE MONTH BEFORE THE 2019 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 193 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. 1 THE TOTAL OF ARTICLES RETRIEVED IN THE CODING PERIOD WAS N = 1127. TO ALLOW FOR A COMBINATION OF BOTH QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS, TWO CODING ROUNDS WERE IMPLEMENTED. IN A FIRST-ROUND, BASIC INFORMATION WAS CODED SUCH AS THE TITLE (BOTH IN ITS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATED IN ENGLISH), A PRELIMINARY JUDGEMENT OF VALENCE OF EACH ARTICLE WAS GIVEN (POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, OR NEUTRAL, BASED ON THE READING OF THE FULL CONTENT OF THE ARTICLE) AND FINALLY THE MOST PROMINENT IDEA OF THE ARTICLE, AS WELL AS SECONDARY AND TERTIARY IDEAS DESCRIBING THE CONTENT IN ONE WORD WERE NOTED DOWN. IN THE SECOND ROUND OF CODING, A VARIETY OF FACTOR VARIABLES WERE ADDED THAT HELPED TO DESCRIBE THE ARTICLES MORE SUBSTANTIVELY. FIRSTLY, IT WAS SEEN WHETHER THE ARTICLES WERE ADDRESSING THE EU IN THE CONTEXT (1) OF EU SPECIFIC
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|a AFFAIRS, (2) CONCERNING THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, (3) VIS-A-VIS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS REGARDING THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR EACH RESPECTIVE JOURNAL OR (4) WHETHER IT DISCUSSED THE EU AS A PLAYER IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. BY DOING SO WE WERE ABLE TO SEE WHETHER THE EU RECEIVED SPECIALISED COVERAGE OR WHETHER THE EU WAS STILL SEEN AS A SIDESHOW FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. SECONDLY, THE TYPES OF CHALLENGES EACH ARTICLE DISCUSSED WERE DISTIN GUISHED. HENCE, IT WAS DIFFERENTIATED WHETHER AN ARTICLE TOUCHED UPON A MORE NARROW AND TECHNICAL POLICY ISSUE (1) OR WHETHER (2) IT ADDRESSED ONE OF THE LOOMING FUTURE CHALLENGES OF THE EU (E.G. BREXIT, THE FUTURE OF THE EU), OR (3) WHETHER NEITHER OF THESE CATEGORISATIONS SEEMED APPLI CABLE. TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING THE PREVIOUS TWO DIMENSIONS, HENCE THE FOCUS OF THE ARTICLE AND CHALLENGE IT ADDRESSES, FURTHER SPECIFI CATIONS WERE MADE. THUS, DEPENDING ON CODING CHOICES IN THE PREVIOUS STEPS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECORDED: IF THE EU WAS ADDRESSED, IT WAS FURTHER SPECIFIED, WHICH EU INSTITUTION THE ARTICLE PRIMARILY ADDRESSED. CATEGORIES INCLUDED (1) EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (2) EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (3) EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (4) COUNCIL; (5) EUROPEAN COUNCIL, OR (7) OR OTHER NON-LISTED INSTITUTIONS. IF THE EU WAS ADDRESSED THROUGH THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, IT WAS SPECIFIED, WHICH MEMBER STATE WAS MENTIONED INCLUDING (1) ITALY, (2) HUNGARY, (3) FRANCE, (4) POLAND, (5) ESTONIA, (6) FINLAND, (7) CZECHIA, (8) ROMANIA, (9) THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1 IN THE MONTHS OF APRIL AND MAY, CODERS WERE ASKED TO CONSULT THE WEBSITES OF EACH NEWSPAPER FOR THE COUNTRY ASSIGNED TO THEM AND SELECT EVERY ARTICLE THAT WAS RELATED TO THE EU IN THE BROADEST SENSE. 194 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. OR (10) ANY OTHER MEMBER STATE. IF THE ARTICLE ADDRESSED EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IT WAS SEEN WHETHER THE ARTICLE EMPHASISED THE EU'S ROLE WITH REGARD TO ONE OF THE MAJOR GLOBAL ACTORS SUCH AS (1) THE UNITED STATES, (2) RUSSIA, (3) CHINA, (4) IRAN,
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|a (5) TURKEY OR (6) WHETHER IT WAS CONCERNED WITH A GLOBAL ACTOR NOT LISTED. IN RELATION TO FOCUS, IT WAS SEEN THAT IF ARTICLES ADDRESSED POLICY ISSUES, WHETHER THESE CORRESPONDED WITH A PRE-DISCUSSED BASKET OF ITEMS COMPRISING: (1) TRADE; (2) MIGRATION; (3) CLIMATE; (4) ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION; (5) EMPLOYMENT AND MOBILITY; (6) BORDER AND SECURITY; (7) ENLARGEMENT; (8) VALUES OR (9) WHETHER IT CORRESPONDED WITH POLICY ISSUES NOT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. WHILE THIS SET OF DATA ALLOWED TO MEASURE THE SALIENCE OF EU TOPICS AND COUNTING WHICH ASPECT WAS MENTIONED THE MOST AMONG EUROPEAN TOPICS, A MORE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED USING NVIVO (11 FOR MAC) TO CAPTURE THE TYPES OF CONFLICTS OVER EU INTEGRATION AS REFLECTED IN THE NEWSPAPERS. EACH NEWSPAPER HAS BEEN TREATED AS A CASE WITH SPECIFIC ATTRIBUTES (LEFT, RIGHT, INDEPENDENT MEDIA, TABLOID) AND, DEPENDING ON THE CONTENT, EACH ARTICLE HAS BEEN LINKED TO A TYPE OF CONFLICT, CONFLICT/POLARISATION BEING A MEASURE OF POLITICISATION. 4 THEMED I AC OVERA G EOFT HEE U AHEAD OF THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN WESTERN AND EASTERN MEMBER STATES THE DATA ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT IN TERMS OF SALIENCE , THE COVERAGE OF EU INTE GRATION ISSUES IS HIGHER IN WESTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS THAN IN EASTERN ONES. EU INTEGRATION ISSUES ARE PORTRAYED IN SIMILAR WAYS IN WESTERN LEFT AND RIGHT-ORIENTED NEWSPAPERS. MORE DIVERSITY IS OBSERVED IN THE EASTERN NEWSPAPERS. IN TERMS OF POLARISATION AND CONFLICT , THIS SECTION SHOWS THAT EACH JOURNAL DISPLAYS AT LEAST TWO LINES OF CONFLICT, WITH THE EXCEP TION OF DE STANDAARD AND LIBERTATEA. TWO MAIN CONFLICTS PREVAIL IN THE COVERAGE OF THE EU ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: THE ONE OPPOSING SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM' AND INTE GRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION, THE FORMER HAVING A HIGHER DENSITY THAN THE OTHER. OTHER TYPES OF CONFLICTS, SUCH AS THE CONFLICT OPPOSING SUPPORTERS OF IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL, GOVERN MENT VS.
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|a OPPOSITION COME NEXT AND HAVE SIMILAR DEGREES OF DENSITY, WHILE THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT SCORES THE LOWEST LEVELS OF DENSITY. 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 195 AS A GENERAL TREND, THE DENSITY OF CONFLICT IS HIGHER ON THE RIGHT THAN ON THE LEFT; THE EASTERN RIGHT-ORIENTED NEWSPAPERS, AS WELL AS THE WESTERN LEFT AND RIGHT-ORIENTED ONES, PRESENTS SIMILAR LEVELS OF CONFLICT DENSITY; LOOKING AT PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE EASTERN NEWSPAPERS AND THE WESTERN ONES, ONE SHOULD NOTE THAT THE TWO FIRST LINES OF CONFLICT- DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM' AND INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION-ARE WELL REPRESENTED ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES. THE CONFLICT OPPOSING IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION IS DOMINANT IN ONE JOURNAL: MAGYAR NEMZET ; THE CONFLICT NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL SEEMS TO BE ALSO SPECIFIC TO EASTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS, AS WELL AS THE CONFLICTS OPPOSING GOVERNMENTS VS. OPPOSITION AND MEMBER STATES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARENAS. 4.1 THE SALIENCE OF EU TOPICS ONE MONTH BEFORE THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS TO APPROACH THE QUESTION OF SALIENCE IN DETAIL, THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS DISCUSSES HOW MUCH EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WERE COVERED AND WHICH SPECIFIC POLICY DOMAINS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ACROSS THE SAMPLED NEWSPAPERS. A TOTAL OF 1127 ARTICLES HAD BEEN CODED, THE AVERAGE (MEAN) FOR THE 16 NEWSPAPERS OF APPROX. 70 AND A MEDIAN OF APPROX. 60 ARTICLES. IT RESULTS THAT EACH JOURNAL DEVOTED MORE THAN 1 ARTICLE PER DAY TO EU TOPICS AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIG. 1 . AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIG. 1 , THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES DEDICATED TO THE EU AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION STRONGLY VARIED ACROSS THE SAMPLED NEWSPAPERS, RANGING FROM 20 ( LIBERTATEA ) TO 191 ( EL PAIS ). AS A FIRST OBSERVATION, IT CAN BE STATED THAT THE DIVERSITY, IN TERMS OF THE AMOUNT OF COVERAGE, DOES NOT REFLECT ANY REGIONAL PATTERN. NEITHER THE NEWSPAPERS THAT FELL ABOVE THE MEDIAN NOR THE ONES THAT FELL BELOW IT COULD BE GROUPED INTO A REGIONAL CLUSTER . WHILE IT IS
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|a PREDOMINANTLY WESTERN NEWSPAPERS ( EL PAIS , EL MUNDO , DIE WELT, LE MONDE, LE SOIR, AND HET LAATSTE NIEUWS )TH A T SHOWED A STRONG COVERAGE (OR SALIENCE) OF EU-RELATED TOPICS, HUNGARIAN NEWSPAPERS ( HVG , MAGYAR NEMZET ) DID AS WELL. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE GROUP OF NEWSPAPERS THAT FELL BELOW THE MEDIAN ( GAZETA WYBORCZA, RZECZ POSPOLITA, ADEVARUL, LIBERTATEA, DE STANDAARD, LA LIBRE, LE FIGARO, DIE TAGESZEITUNG ) REPRESENTED A MIX OF BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN NEWSPAPERS. IN GENERAL, THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES SAMPLED WAS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER IN THE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS THAN IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ONES (AS WE CODED FOUR JOURNALS FOR BELGIUM AND THERE ARE ONLY THREE EASTERN MEMBER 196 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. FIG. 1 DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES BY JOURNAL STATES IN THE SAMPLE). THE SAMPLE WAS RATHER BALANCED WHEN IT COMES TO IDEOLOGICAL LEANING (SEE FIG. 2 ). WHILE IN BOTH REGIONS CENTER LEFT ARTICLES WERE SLIGHTLY OVERREPRESENTED, THE DISTRIBUTION (CALCULATED IN PERCENTAGES) APPROXIMATED 50/50 IN THE EAST AND A 60/40 DIVISION IN THE WEST IN FAVOUR OF CENTER LEFT ARTICLES. THIS UNDERLINES THAT NEITHER IN THE EAST NOR IN THE WEST, THE INTEREST IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A PARTICULAR IDEOLOGICAL COHORT. TURNING TO THE CONTENT IN WHICH THE EU AND THE SPECIFIC POLICY DOMAINS AND POLICY ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED, SOME REGIONAL TRENDS COULD BE OBSERVED. IN RELATION TO THE CONTENT, THE MAJORITY OF ARTICLES FOCUSED ON THE EURO PEAN UNION AS SUCH. THIS TREND APPLIED TO BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN NEWSPAPERS (SEE FIG. 3 ). SLIGHT DIFFERENCES, IN TERMS OF WHAT WAS COVERED WERE PRESENT, HOWEVER, WHEN STUDYING DIFFERENT CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE EU APPEARED AS AN ACTOR. HENCE, EASTERN NEWSPAPERS AND IN PARTICULAR THE POLISH ONES ( GAZETA WYBORCZA, RZECZPOSPOLITA) HAD A HIGHER TENDENCY TO LOOK AT THE EU THROUGH A DOMESTIC LENS. WHEN IT CAME TO EU AFFAIRS THAT INVOLVED OTHER MEMBER STATES (OR WHICH MAKE THE HEADLINES IN OTHER EU MEMBER STATES) OR WHEN THE FOCUS IS ON THE EU IN THE WORLD,
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|a WESTERN NEWSPAPERS HAD ON AVERAGE A STRONGER COVERAGE. IT IS PARTICULARLY STRIKING THAT DISCUSSIONS OF THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR DID NOT APPEAR IN SOME 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 197 FIG. 2 DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES BY IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE NEWSPAPER (IN %) EASTERN NEWSPAPERS AT ALL ( GAZETA WYBORCZA, RZECZPOSPOLITA, LIBERTATEA ). YET, AS FIG. 3 SHOWS, THE EU'S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR WAS GENERALLY COVERED THE LEAST ACROSS BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN NEWSPAPERS, PARTLY DUE TO THE PROFILE OF THE NEWSPAPERS, PARTLY TO THE FACT THAT IT IS OFTEN DISCUSSED IN 'INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS' SECTIONS. WHEN IT COMES TO SETS OF POLICIES THAT WERE DISCUSSED BY THE JOURNALS (SEE FIG. 4 ), TWO TRENDS BECOME APPARENT. FIRSTLY, INDIVIDUAL OUTLETS OR NEWSPAPERS FROM A SPECIFIC COUNTRY FEATURED A STRONG FOCUS ON A SINGLE ISSUE. THIS IS SHOWN FOR EXAMPLE WITH THE POLISH PAPERS ( GAZETA WYBORCZA, RZECZPOSPOLITA ) PAYING STRONG ATTENTION TO DEBATES SURROUNDING VALUES AND THE ROMANIAN PAPERS ( ADEVARUL AND LIBERTATEA ), WHICH WERE PARTICULARLY FOCUSED ON BORDER AND SECURITY ISSUES. IT BECOMES, HOWEVER, EVEN MORE DRASTICALLY APPARENT WITH THE HUNGARIAN MAGYAR NEMZET THAT DEVOTED NEARLY ALL ITS COVERAGE TOWARDS QUESTIONS OF MIGRATION. THE SECOND TREND THAT BECOMES APPARENT IS THE FACT THAT ENLARGEMENT, AN ISSUE THAT WAS RATHER DIVISIVE IN THE 2014 ELECTION, GAINED LITTLE TO NO 198 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. FIG. 3 FOCUS OF ARTICLES. EU, EU IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, EU FROM A DOMESTIC ISSUE PERSPECTIVE, EU IN THE WORLD (IN %) ATTENTION DURING THE 2019 ELECTORAL CYCLE ACROSS BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN NEWSPAPERS. WITH OTHER POLICY ISSUES, THE TWO REGIONS SHOWED VARIATION IN THEIR FOCUS, WITH WESTERN PAPERS BEING MORE CENTRED ON THE CLIMATE OR TRADE AND EASTERN PAPERS PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ECONOMY FOR EXAMPLE. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESENCE OF OUTLIERS IN THIS REGIONAL COMPARISON LIMITS TO SOME EXTENT THE
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|a GENERALISABILITY OF THESE FINDINGS, AS THEY OVERREPRESENT SPECIFIC TENDENCIES. THIS IS SHOWN ESPE CIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION, WHICH WAS DRIVEN BY THE UNUSUALLY HIGH COVERAGE BY MAGYAR NEMZET AND THE RELATIVELY SMALL SAMPLE OF EASTERN NEWSPAPERS. THE FACT THAT APPROX. 35% OF COVERAGE IN EASTERN NEWSPA PERS WAS DEVOTED TO MIGRATION NEEDS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO MAGYAR NEMZET SKEWING THE DISTRIBUTION TO THE RIGHT. 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 199 FIG. 4 COVERAGE OF POLICY ISSUES BY JOURNAL 4.2 THE COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CONSENSUAL, CONTESTED, OR ABSENT NONE OF THE NEWSPAPERS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS ARGUES IN FAVOUR OF LEAVING THE EU. ALL PUBLISHED ARTICLES CLAIMED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY (THROUGH THE VOICE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTORS) IN FAVOUR OF REMAINING IN THE EU AND STRENGTHENING THE UNION, ALTHOUGH THE COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED IS DIFFERENT FROM ONE JOURNAL TO THE OTHER. DEPENDING ON THE PROFILE AND THE STYLE OF THE JOURNAL, A MAJORITY OF ARTICLES REPORT ON WHAT THE EU IS DOING AS WELL AS ON CONCRETE DECISIONS TAKEN IN SPECIFIC POLICY AREAS. OTHERS TAKE A MORE NORMATIVE STANCE IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUES THAT THE EU IS FACING AND THE WAYS FORWARD. IN TERMS OF THE ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE EU, THE ARTICLES DISPLAY POSITIVE ACCOUNTS, NEGATIVE OR MIXED VIEWS ON EU INTEGRATION. THE READING OF THE ARTICLES SHOWS HOWEVER THAT WESTERN NEWSPAPERS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLIT ICAL LEANING, SUCH AS LE SOIR, LA LIBRE, HLN, DE STANDAARD, LE MONDE 200 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. AND LE FIGARO, DIE WELT AND DIE TAGESTZEITUG AS WELL AS EL PAIS AND EL MUNDO DISPLAY POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS EU INTEGRATION. AS IT WILL BE SHOWN IN THE NEXT SECTIONS, BOTH RZECZPOSPOLITA AND GAZETA WYBORCZA OVERTLY EXPRESS SUPPORT TOWARDS THE EU. THE TWO ROMANIAN NEWSPAPERS AND THE HUNGARIAN ONES DISPLAY MIXED VIEWS. IN BELGIUM, BOTH NEWSPAPERS ANALYSED INVESTIGATE IN DEPTH THE QUES TION OF WHETHER EU MEMBERSHIP IS ADVANTAGEOUS. HET LAATSTE NIEUWS PUTS FORWARD A
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|a IMAGE OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE EU. ARTICLES' TITLES HIGHLIGHT BOTH ENTITIES' QUALITIES, SUCH AS POINTING OUT HOW MANY JOBS THE EU CREATES IN BELGIUM OR CONVERSELY HOW BELGIUM HAS CREATED AN ANTI-TAX EVASION SYSTEM THAT WILL BENEFIT THE WHOLE OF THE EU. DE STANDAARD FOLLOWS A SIMILAR VEIN WITH A TITLE SAYING THAT 'EUROPE BRINGS BELGIANS 1561 EURO YEARLY'. LA LIBRE SEEMS LESS INVESTED IN PORTRAYING THE EU POSITIVELY, ALTHOUGH IT DOES SHOW THAT THE EU HAS POWER OVER WHAT IS IMPLEMENTED IN BELGIUM. LE SOIR PORTRAYS A SOMEWHAT LESS UNMITIGATED VISION OF THE BELGIUM-EU RELATION BY PUTTING FORWARD INSTANCES WHERE BELGIUM SEEMS LESS CONVINCED WITH WHAT THE EU TRIES TO DO: SUCH AS ITS POSITION TOWARDS TRUMP, THE TOBIN TAX, OR THE UNEMPLOYMENT REFORM THE EU TRIES TO IMPLEMENT. IN GERMANY , THIS NEUTRAL TONE IS EXPRESSED THROUGH THE FACT THAT THE EU SEEMS TO BE AN IMPORTANT TOPIC MOSTLY IN RELATION TO CONCRETE ISSUES, SUCH AS THE ECONOMY AND CLIMATE CHANGE. THE TWO NEWSPAPERS, DIE WELT AND DIE TAGESZEITUNG, COVER SIMILAR ISSUES WITH A NEUTRAL TONE. HOWEVER, THERE IS STILL A SLIGHT DIFFERENCE IN TERMS OF FOCUS AND PORTRAYAL OF THE NEWS ABOUT THE EU. WHEN REPORTING ABOUT THE EU, DIE WELT DEVOTES ITS ATTEN TION TO ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE PERSPECTIVE OF HIGHER WAGES IN THE EUROZONE AND ALSO IN GERMANY IS DISCUSSED, AS WELL AS BENEFITS OF FREE TRADE IN THE EU FOR SMALL AND COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES. ISSUES OF CLIMATE CHANGE ARE ALSO PRESENT, BY CALLING FOR TOUGHER CLIMATE PROTECTION OR EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING MEASURES IN GERMANY AND IN THE EU, IN AN ARTICLE TITLED 'EUROPE CANNOT SAVE THE PLANET', FOR EXAMPLE. BOTH LE MONDE AND LE FIGARO AS WELL AS EL PAIS AND EL MUNDO ARE POSITIVE ABOUT THE EU. THESE NEWSPAPERS DISPLAY AN ATTACHMENT TO THE EUROPEAN VALUES (AND TO A EUROPEAN IDENTITY AS WELL IN THE CASE OF SPAIN). OF ALL THE WEST EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES ANALYSED HERE, SPANISH NEWSPA PERS STAND OUT AS THE MOST
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|a POSITIVE ONES TOWARDS THE EU. INTERESTINGLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE PORTRAYED IN BOTH SPANISH NEWSPAPERS IS THEIR FOCUS ON VALUES. THEY DO SO THROUGH POLICY ISSUES SUCH AS MIGRATION AND THE ECONOMY, THROUGH DISCUSSING FUTURE CHALLENGES THE EU MIGHT FACE, 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 201 AS WELL AS BY ITS FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF CATALONIA. IT IS THE MOST STRIKING EXAMPLE IN THE FOUR EU MEMBER STATES STUDIED, SO CLOSELY INTERTWINING THE FATE WITH THE EU'S, BEYOND SIMPLY MENTIONING THE EUROPEAN PARLIA MENTARY ELECTIONS AND THE SPANISH CANDIDATES RACING. IN FRANCE, HOWEVER, NEWSPAPERS REVIVE A SENSE OF OPTIMISM TOWARDS THE EU AMONG THEIR READ ERSHIP. LE MONDE SHOWS THE BENEFITS THE EU GIVES TO EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES IN GENERAL BUT ARGUES THAT IN ORDER TO PROGRESS THE EU NEEDS TO GET OVER THE FACT THAT IT IS 'BUILT-IN FEAR OF THE PAST' AND 'SCARED FOR THE FUTURE', QUOTING IVAN KRASTEV IN AN ARTICLE. LE FIGARO ALSO DISPLAYS A PRO EUROPEAN ATTITUDE EITHER BY QUOTING POLITICAL MESSAGES OR BY SUMMARISING RESEARCH TO HIGHLIGHT THAT EUROPEANS WANT MORE INTEGRATION. NONETHELESS, LE FIGARO DISCUSSES THE EU AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MORE NEUTRAL AND PRACTICAL TERMS, THEREBY PORTRAYING A MORE NUANCED VISION OF THE EU'S ASSETS, BUT ALSO ITS FAILURES, FOR EXAMPLE BY DEPLORING THE INABILITY OF THE EU TO TELL ITS OWN STORY OR WHEN IT STATES THAT DEMOCRACY IN THE EU ISN'T WORKING THAT WELL. IF THE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS DISPLAY RATHER SIMILAR TRENDS OF SUPPORT TOWARDS THE EU, THE SELECTED EASTERN NEWSPAPERS REVEAL MORE DIVERSITY (PARTLY DUE TO THE PROFILE OF THE NEWSPAPER SELECTED). FROM ALL THREE EASTERN COUNTRIES, THE SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP AND EUROPEAN INTE GRATION IS STRONGEST IN THE POLISH NEWSPAPERS. BOTH OF THEM EMPHASISE THE BENEFITS OF ACCESSION, WHICH ARE PRESENTED IN GAZETA WYBORCZA THROUGHOUT A SUCCESSION OF ARTICLES DEVOTED TO THE 15 YEARS OF EU MEMBERSHIP. RZECZPOSPOLITA REMINDS THAT EU ACCESSION HAS BEEN
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|a BENEFICIAL FOR THE EU ECONOMY, UNDERLINING THAT IT HAS BROUGHT LARGE FINANCIAL TRANSFERS FROM THE EU BUDGET AND, THAT POLISH REGIONS HAVE BEEN THE MAIN BENEFICIA RIES OF SOLIDARITY POLICIES ESTABLISHED AT THE EU LEVEL THANKS TO WHICH RURAL AREAS IN POLAND DEVELOPED OVER THE LAST DECADES. THE ARTICLES DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES THAT THE EU IS FACING, AND THE FUTURE OF EU INTEGRATION ARE IN FAVOUR OF MORE EUROPE, MAINLY IN THE GAZETA . TAKING A MORE NORMATIVE STANCE, RZECZPOSPOLITA POINTS OUT THE CHALLENGES THAT THE EU IS FACING SUCH AS ECONOMIC STAGNATION, MIGRATION, THE TENSE TRADE RELA TIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS TENSIONS WITH IRAN AND CHINA AND ARGUES THAT POLAND'S DECISION-MAKING POWER IN BRUSSELS DOES NOT REFLECT ITS ECONOMIC POWER. SOME ARTICLES EVEN SUPPORT THE IDEA OF STRENGTHENING THE POWER OF THE EU TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH MEMBER STATES INFRINGING THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATIES. GAZETA SHARES THE SAME POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS EU INTEGRATION AND ARGUES IN FAVOUR OF MORE INTEGRA TION IN PARTICULAR CONCERNING THE RULE OF LAW. LIKE RZECZPOSPOLITA , GAZETA 202 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. WYBORCZA DETAILS THE ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATION FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CITIZENS, FROM STUDENTS, WHO DO NOT BENEFIT ENOUGH FROM THE POTENTIAL OF ERASMUS MOBILITY TO POLISH FISHERMEN AND AGRICULTURE. BESIDES THIS STRONG SUPPORT TO THE EU, THEY CLAIM FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE EURO, AS A WAY TO MAKE INTEGRATION IRREVERSIBLE AND THEREFORE WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY TO LEAVE THE UNION. THE TWO HUNGARIAN NEWSPAPERS ARE MORE DIVERSE SINCE MAGYAR NEMZET TAKES A PRO-GOVERNMENTAL STANCE AND FEATURES THE PROGRAMME OF FIDESZ, AS THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT USED PUBLIC FUNDS TO REINFORCE THE POSI TION OF THIS DAILY NEWSPAPER ON THE MARKET (BATORFY & URBAN, 2020 , P. 44), WHILE INDEPENDENT HVG IS MORE NEUTRAL OR CRITICAL BOTH VIS-A-VIS THE EU AND THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR STANCE ON HUNGARY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU IS STRONG AND
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|a THERE IS NO FURTHER DISCUS SION ABOUT LEAVING THE UNION. THE MESSAGE OF THE NEWSPAPER MAGYAR NEMZET IS CLEAR IN STATING THAT THERE IS NO PLACE 'FOR US' OUTSIDE EUROPE 'YET'. HVG IS PORTRAYING THE EU AS A 'LAST HOPE' OR FOCUSING ON FINAN CIAL BENEFITS FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS FROM THE EU SINGLE MARKET, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, IT UNDERLINES THAT THESE BENEFITS ARE NOT DISTRIBUTED EVENLY AMONG THE MEMBER STATES. WHILE MAGYAR NEMZET IS COVERING THE FIDESZ PROGRAMME FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR THE EU, HVG TAKES A CRITICAL STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MEDIA SECTOR WHICH IS UNDER THREAT AND PUT FORWARD TOPICS SEEKING TO EXPLAIN HOW 15 YEARS AFTER BECOMING THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU, VISEGRAD COUN TRIES WENT FROM 'BEING A-STAR STUDENTS TO BLACK SHEEP'. HVG IRONICALLY DISCUSSES IN ONE ARTICLE 'HOW WE (HUNGARY) SHOWED EUROPE HOW TO STEAL EU MONEY'. ROMANIAN NEWSPAPERS ALSO FRAME THE EU IN A POSITIVE LIGHT. ADEVARUL IS MAINLY REPORTING ON WHAT THE EU IS DOING AND THE IMPACT OF ITS PROVISIONS ON ROMANIAN POLICIES AS WELL AS ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, MOSTLY RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND SPECIFIC POLICY PROVISIONS. ROMA NIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IS COMPARED TO OTHER EU MEMBER STATES, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE CAN READ THAT ROMANIA HAS 'THIRD SMALLEST WAGES IN EUROPE', OR 'SECOND-LARGEST DEFICIT IN THE EU'. THE RISK OF SEEING THE COMMISSION TRIGGERING ARTICLE 7 AGAINST THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE LEGISLATION IN THE FIELD OF JUSTICE IS MENTIONED. COMPARED TO ADEVARUL , LIBERTATEA DEVOTED ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF ARTICLES TO THE EU DURING THE ONE-MONTH CAMPAIGN. INSTEAD, THE NEWSPAPER FOCUSED MORE ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND THE SIBIU SUMMIT. DIFFERENT ISSUES SUCH AS HIGH 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 203 INFLATION RATE IN ROMANIA, AS THE HIGHEST IN THE EU OR SAFETY AT THE WORK PLACE, WITH ROMANIA BEING ONLY THE 'SECOND IN THE EU
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|a WITH DEADLY WORK ACCIDENTS' ARE PUT FORWARD. LIKE ADEVARUL , LIBERTATEA ALSO DRAWS MUCH OF ITS ATTENTION TO SIBIU SUMMIT, SOME OF THE ARTICLES COVERING THE SUMMIT ARE VERY POSITIVE, LIKE THE ONE TITLED 'ROMANIA AND THE EU: A LOVE STORY FOR THE XXI CENTURY', OR THE ONES WHO ARE FOCUSING ON WELL-ORGANISATION OF THE SUMMIT. 5 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION AND TYPES OF CONFLICT IN THE EU COVERAGE SIX TYPES OF CONFLICT EMERGE FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE EU IN THE 16 NEWSPAPERS, THE MOST PROMINENT BEING THE ONE OPPOSING SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM' (90), INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION (58), IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION (23), NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL (22), GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION (18), AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS (2) AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIG. 5 . CONSIDERING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTICLES DEVOTED TO THE EU, THE DENSITY OF CONFLICT IS LOW. OF A TOTAL OF 1127 ARTICLES DEVOTED TO THE EU, ONLY 211 (18.72%) REPORT ON THE EU IN TERMS OF CONFLICT. THIS INDICATES THAT COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WAS RATHER CONSEN SUAL. HOWEVER, THE NATURE OF THESE FRAMES AND THE LINES OF CONFLICTS, IN RELATION TO THE IDEOLOGICAL STANCE AND COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF THESE NEWSPA PERS INDICATES INTERESTING VARIATION THROUGHOUT ANALYSED NEWSPAPERS AND REFLECTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL TENSIONS. COMPARING EU COVERAGE IN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN LEFT- AND RIGHT ORIENTED NEWSPAPERS (SEE FIG. 6 ), IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS A HIGHER PROPENSITY ON THE RIGHT TO PRESENT THE EU IN CONFLICTUAL TERMS, ALTHOUGH THIS FINDING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH CAUTION CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NEWSPAPERS SELECTED FOR OUR DATA SET. 5.1 DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM' DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERALISM' APPEARS AS THE DOMINANT LINE OF CONFLICT (SEE FIG. 7 ). THE BELGIAN NEWSPAPERS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS LE SOIR, LA LIBRE IN THE FRENCH-SPEAKING COMMUNITY AND DE STANDAARD AND HLN IN THE DUTCH-SPEAKING COMMUNITY-PORTRAY NATIONALISM AND POPULISM AS ONE OF THE BIGGEST
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|a CHALLENGES THAT THE EU IS FACING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2019 EU ELECTIONS AND REPORT HOW EUROPEANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISE OF POPULISM ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. WHILE LA LIBRE DISCUSSES WHY 204 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. FIG. 5 CONFLICT DENSITY VIKTOR 'ORBAN'S ILLIBERAL MODEL IS A MYTH', LE SOIR INFORMS 'HOW MARINE LE PEN IN FRANCE SEEKS TO CHANGE EUROPE', HLN REPORTS ON 'HOW THE DUTCH PARTY OPENVLD SEEKS TO FIGHT NATIONALISM AND POPULISM IN EUROPE' AND I NTH ES A M EW A Y DE STANNDAARD ACCOUNTS ON HOW EMMANUEL MACRON 'WARNS FOR THE DANGERS OF NATIONALISM AND THE END OF EUROPE'. IN FRANCE, LE MONDE DISCUSSES THE CHALLENGES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY WITH A WIDE RANGE OF ARTICLES DEVOTED TO THE RISE OF THE FAR AND EXTREME RIGHT NOT ONLY IN FRANCE, WHERE 'MARINE LE PEN IS LOOKING FOR ALLIES AT THE EU LEVEL' BUT ALSO IN FINLAND AND ESTONIA. LE FIGARO FOCUSES ALSO ON THE CHALLENGES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY LOOKING AT 'HOW POPULISTS APPROACH EUROPEANS IN A DISPERSED ORDER' AND AT THE VISIONS FOR EUROPE OF VIKTOR ORBAN, MATTEO SALVINI, AND JAROS¯AW KACZYNSKI. 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 205 FIG. 6 LEFT/RIGHT AND EAST/WEST-DENSITY OF CONFLICT IN GERMANY, DIE WELT PAYS ATTENTION TO THE ALTERNATIVE FUER DEUTSCH LAND ( AFD ) WHILE DIE TAGESZEITUNG ADDRESSES THE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY FROM A MORE DIVERSE PERSPECTIVE LOOKING AT THE RISE OF THE RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND AUSTRIA AND THE ATTEMPTS OF MACRON TO ESTABLISH AT EU LEVEL A COALITION FIGHTING POPULISM AND NATIONALISM. IN SPAIN, THIS LINE OF CONFLICT HAS THE HIGHEST DENSITY COMPARED TO OTHER JOURNALS. ON THE ONE HAND, EL MUNDO ANNOUNCES THAT 'THE ENEMY IS INSIDE', REFERRING TO THE RISE OF POPULISM, NOT ONLY IN SPAIN, BUT ALSO IN FINLAND, IN THE NETHERLANDS, IN ESTONIA, IN AUSTRIA, IN FRANCE, AND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. EL PAIS HIGHLIGHTS THAT EU ELECTIONS WILL BE DECISIVE CONSIDERING THE RISE OF
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|a POPULISM IN EUROPE DEVOTING MORE ATTENTION TO EASTERN EUROPE AND TO MATTEO SALVINI THAN TO THE WESTERN PARTIES, WITH REFERENCES TO THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN SPAIN. THIS CONFLICT IS ALSO WELL REPRESENTED IN THE EASTERN NEWSPAPERS ALTHOUGH THE FRAMING IS DIFFERENT, DEPENDING ON THE JOURNAL. MAGYAR NEMZET IS PRAISING THE VISION FOR EUROPE OF VIKTOR ORBAN ARGUING THAT 'THE TIME WILL PROVE THAT HE WAS RIGHT' AND PRESENTS HIM AS AN ESSENTIAL POLIT ICAL LEADER, NEEDED BY HIS HOMOLOGUES IN AUSTRIA, HEINZ-CHRISTIAN STRACHE AND IN ITALY, MATTEO SALVINI. THE FRAMING IN THE HUNGARIAN HVG WHICH AT THE MOMENT OF THE ANALYSIS WAS STRUGGLING FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS 206 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. FIG. 7 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN DEMOCRACY VS. ILLIBERALISM FIDESZ DEVOTED A WIDE RANGE OF ARTICLES POINTING OUT 'ORBAN'S ISSUE WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRACY' AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH ALLIANCES WITH OTHER FAR RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN EUROPE TO 'UNITE ALL POPULISTS', AS HVG PUT IT. THE PUBLICATION REPORTS HOW WESTERN MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, SUCH AS THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CRITICISE THE DECLINING LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY AND MEDIA FREEDOM IN HUNGARY AND HOW VIKTOR ORBAN IS COMPARED TO A DICTATOR. IN POLAND, GAZETA WYBORCZA IS ALSO REPORTING ON POPULIST 'LIES' AND, AS A REACTION TO THE RISE OF POPULISM, CONTENDS THAT 'MORE EUROPEAN DEMOC RACY IS NEEDED'. RZECZPOSPOLITA WARNS THAT 'THE DEMONS OF THE PAST ARE RETURNING'. IN ROMANIA, ADEVARUL STATES THAT 'POPULISM IS NOT DEMOC RACY' AND DISCUSSES THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN THE GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN POWER. 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 207 5.2 INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION AS SHOWED IN FIG. 8 , THE CONFLICT INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION IS WELL REPRESENTED IN THE NEWSPAPERS ANALYSED AS THE VAST MAJORITY ARE DEVOTED TO BREXIT AND ITS CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN HLN, LE SOIR, LA
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|a LIBRE, LE MONDE, LE FIGARO, HVG, ADEVARUL, EL MUNDO, DIE WELT WHICH IS ADDRESSING THE QUESTION 'HOW CAN THE EU SURVIVE?' AND THE TAGESZEITUG REMINDING THAT 'THE FOUNDERS OF THE EU DID SOMETHING GREAT'. MAGYAR NEMZET DEVOTES TWO ARTICLES ANNOUNCING FIRST THE DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE EU AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE 'SUCCESS' OF NIGEL FARAGE. THE POLISH NEWSPAPERS FRAME THE CONFLICT OF INTEGRATION VERSUS DISIN TEGRATION DIFFERENTLY. IT IS LESS ABOUT BREXIT AND MORE ABOUT THE FEAR OF SEEING THE GOVERNMENT PUSHING THE COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE EU. THE FEAR OF FIG. 8 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION 208 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. DISINTEGRATION IS SEEN AS A DOMESTIC CONCERN. GAZETA IS REPORTING ON HOW THE LAW AND JUSTICE PARTY PLANS TO DISMANTLE THE EU AND HOW KONFED ERACJA 'SEEKS TO DESTROY THE EU FROM INSIDE'. GAZETA SURPRISINGLY ARGUES THAT 'POLEXIT IS A RISK OF LOSING SOVEREIGNTY'. A SIMILAR MESSAGE CAN BE READ IN THE ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN RZECZPOSPOLITA WHICH CONTENDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT PLAY WITH A POSSIBLE POLEXIT AND THAT JOINING THE EUROZONE, REJECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, WILL BE A WAY TO SECURE THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY IN THE EU. AS MENTIONED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION, BOTH OF THEM ADOPT A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS EU INTEGRATION AND BRING TO ATTENTION ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF 'MORE EU'. JOURNALISTS GO BEYOND THE CURRENT DEBATE ON THE RULE OF LAW POINTING OUT THE NEED TO TAKE MORE SERI OUSLY INTO ACCOUNT THE THREATS TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE MEDIA SECTOR. FOR GAZETA: 'IF POLAND HAD LEFT THE EU, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FACING AN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND AN EXODUS OF INVESTORS, UNEMPLOYMENT, TRAVEL DIFFICUL TIES, THE RISK OF LOSING SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF RUSSIA'. LIKE RZECZPOSPOLITA , GAZETA DETAILS THE ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATION FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CITIZENS, FROM STUDENTS, WHO DO NOT BENEFIT ENOUGH FROM THE POTENTIAL OF ERASMUS MOBILITY TO POLISH FISHERMEN AND
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|a AGRICULTURE. GAZETA DISPLAYS CLEAR MESSAGES ABOUT THE POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU WHICH SHOULD BE 'IRREVERSIBLE' AND SHOULD BE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. AGAINST THE IDEA OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNTRY, THE NEWSPAPER TAKES A POSITIVE STANCE ON THE ADOPTION OF THE EURO, WHICH IS INVOKED BY THE GOVERN MENT AS A RISK FOR POLAND. WITHOUT IGNORING THE CHALLENGES THAT THE EU IS FACING, THE MESSAGE THAT THE NEWSPAPERS ARE PUTTING FORWARD IN THIS ONE MONTH CAMPAIGN IS THAT POLAND MUST REMAIN IN THE EU AND FIGHT THOSE CHALLENGES 'SIDE BY SIDE WITHIN THE EU, NOT OUTSIDE. BECAUSE THE EU IS NOT JUST ABOUT PROCEDURES AND MONEY, IT IS ABOUT A SYSTEM OF VALUES'. THE NEWSPAPER REMINDS US THAT BY JOINING THE EU POLAND IS NOW 'ROOTED IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF THE WEST'. SOME ADVANTAGES-SUCH AS LABOUR MOBILITY-ARE NOT SEEN AS SUCH AS FOR POLISH CITIZENS, THE NEWS PAPER STATES, 'WORKING FOR A GERMAN IS NOT A DREAM COME TRUE. IT'S MORE OF A CONSTRAINT' AND POLISH CITIZENS 'HOPE FOR MORE'. IN THE SAME WAY, RZECZPOSPOLITA EMPHASISES THAT POLAND IS ATTACHED TO THE EU 'MORE THAN EVER'. THE GOVERNMENT, STATES THE JOURNAL, SHOULD ADOPT THE EURO TO MAKE POLISH'S MEMBERSHIP TO THE EU IRREVERSIBLE. HOWEVER, POLAND SHOULD HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN THE EU DECISION-MAKING REFLECTING ITS ECONOMIC POWER. 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 209 5.3 IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION THE MOST PROMINENT DEBATE ABOUT IMMIGRATION IS OBSERVED IN THE HUNGARIAN NEWSPAPER MAGYAR NEMZET . IT IS EVOKED ONCE IN EL PAIS AND EL MUNDO ABOUT VIKTOR ORBAN, HLN IN REFERENCE TO HOW THE DUTCH PARTY N-VA HIGHLIGHTS THE 'DANGER OF A NEW MIGRATION CRISIS' AND HVG (FIG. 9 ). MAGYAR NEMZET OPPOSES SUPPORTERS OF MIGRATION-WHO GO 'AGAINST HUNGARIAN VOTERS'-AND VIKTOR ORBAN, WHO IS PROTECTING THE EU SO THAT 'EUROPE REMAINS TO THE EUROPEANS'. MIGRATION SHOULD BE STOPPED, STATES THE
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|a NEWSPAPER, BECAUSE 'EUROPE'S SAFETY IS IN DANGER'. VIKTOR ORBAN IS AT THE CENTRE OF THIS NARRATIVE AND MAGYAR NEMZET REPEATS THE POPULAR SUPPORT THAT HE ENJOYS IN FIGHTING AGAINST MIGRATION AND ITS SUPPORTERS FIG. 9 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI IMMIGRATION 210 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. AT THE DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN LEVEL. THE MAIN CHALLENGE THAT THE EU IS FACING, WE READ IN THE NEWSPAPER, IS MASS MIGRATION WHICH SHOULD BE PREVENTED BECAUSE 'MIGRANTS CANNOT AND DO NOT WANT TO INTEGRATE'. WHILE MIGRATION IS PRESENTED AS A SERIOUS THREAT, 'TOO EXPENSIVE', LEADERS AT EU LEVEL ARE PRESENTED AS BEING SUPPORTERS OF MIGRATION 'WHO ARE GOING TO ERASE EUROPE FROM HISTORY', THE NEWSPAPER ANNOUNCES. THE EURO PEAN COMMISSION, IN PARTICULAR, FRANS TIMMERMANS 'WHO SUPPORTS THE MIGRATION SYSTEM', IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SITUATION AND IMPOSES A QUOTA SYSTEM AGAINST THE WILL OF SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES. SPECIFIC EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE BLAMED, IN PARTICULAR MEP SARGENTINI, WHO WROTE THE REPORT ON THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY. DISCREDITING HER WORK, THE NEWSPAPER STATES THAT 'SHE KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT HUNGARY'. EUROPE SHOULD BE SEEN AS A UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES AND SHOULD PROTECT ITS VALUES, BUT IT DOES 'NOT CARE ABOUT NATIVE MINORITIES', IT CARES 'ONLY' ABOUT 'SEXUAL MINORITIES AND MIGRANTS' WHO 'ENJOY ALL THE SUPPORT OF THE EU'. 5.4 NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL THIS LINE OF CONFLICT IS ALSO EXTANT IN EASTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS, WITH ONE MENTION IN EL MUNDO IN REFERENCE AGAIN TO VIKTOR ORBAN AND HUNGARY. IT IS HOWEVER DOMINANT IN MAGYAR NEMZET WHICH FRAMES THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMIS SION CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MIGRATION AND THE REFUGEE QUOTA SYSTEM. MAGYAR NEMZET DISCUSSES THE PLAN OF VIKTOR ORBAN TO STOP MIGRATION AND HIGHLIGHTS THE MESSAGE THAT 'WE NEED TO TELL BRUSSELS THAT IMMIGRATION NEEDS TO
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|a STOP'. THE NEWSPAPER EMPHASISES THE TENSIONS BETWEEN VIKTOR ORBAN AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, AS WELL AS WITH MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, SUCH AS JUDITH SARGENTINI. HVG FOCUSES ON THE ROMANIAN SITUATION AND POTENTIAL TENSIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WITH REGARD TO THE RULE OF LAW. IN THE SAME WAY, GAZETA WYBORCZA DEVOTES ATTENTION TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VISEGRAD GROUP AND THE EURO PEAN COMMISSION IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION, WHILE ADEVARUL ANNOUNCES THAT THE COMMISSION CAN TRIGGER THE NUCLEAR OPTION (ARTICLE 7) AGAINST THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE (FIG. 10 ). 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 211 FIG. 10 CONFLICT FRAMED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS 5.5 GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION EU INTEGRATION IS AN ISSUE FOR GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS. THIS LINE OF CONFLICT IS PROMINENT IN THE HUNGARIAN MAGYAR NEMZET WHICH CONSTANTLY CONFRONTS VIKTOR ORBAN AND THE HUNGARIAN OPPOSITION, ARGUING THAT THE LATTER 'ATTACKS HUNGARIANS' AND 'PUT AT RISKS HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES', WHILE THE FIDESZ IS 'GAINING STRENGTH'. THE JOURNAL DISCREDITS THE OPPOSITION, BOTH AT THE EU AND NATIONAL LEVEL, WHICH IS IN FAVOUR OF MIGRATION AND PUTS AT RISK 'HUN GARIAN FAMILIES'. 'SOCIALISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF MIGRATION ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE PLANS OF BRUSSELS AND SOROS', THIS IS WHY, THE JOURNAL TITLES, 'CHRISTIAN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEEDS TO BE PROTECTED'. THIS LINE OF CONFLICT IS ALSO 212 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. PROMINENT IN THE TWO POLISH NEWSPAPERS. BOTH GAZETA AND RZECZPOSPOLITA STRONGLY CRITICISE THE GOVERNMENTAL MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF JUSTICE, THE DUPLICATIVE DOUBLE VIS-A-VIS THE EU AND HIGHLIGHT THE RISKS OF AN EVEN TUAL POLEXIT. A CRITICAL STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKEN ALSO BY ADEVARUL WHICH STATES THAT THE
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|a SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS PROMOTING AN ANTI-EUROPEAN DISCOURSE. 5.6 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS ULTIMATELY, TENSIONS AMONG EU MEMBER STATES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL SETTINGS ARE MENTIONED ONLY IN MAGYAR NEMZET AND IN GAZETA ,TH EFO R M ER DEPLORING THAT GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE ARE 'FORCING' HUNGARY TO ACCEPT REFUGEES, WHILE THE LATTER HIGHLIGHTS THAT 'FRENCH PRESIDENT MACRON IS THREATENING TO EXCLUDE FROM SCHENGEN THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE NOT READY FOR SOLIDARITY IN MIGRATION POLICY'. TO CONCLUDE, AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIG. 11 : CLUSTERS OF CONFLICT BELOW, WHILE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS TWO LINES OF CONFLICT PREVAIL, IN EASTERN FIG. 11 CLUSTERS OF CONFLICT 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS YY 213 NEWSPAPERS THE CONFLICT DENSITY IS HIGHER: MAGYAR NEMZET MOBILISES THE SIX LINES OF CONFLICT PUT FORWARD IN THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, FOLLOWED BY GAZETA WYBORCZA, ADEVARUL, HVG, AND RZECZPOSPOLITA . WHEN DEMOC RACY AND MENACES TO DEMOCRACY ARE FRAMED, OTHER LINES OF CONFLICT COME ALONG SUCH AS IMMIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS. BUT THIS JUXTAPOSITION IS RARE. ONLY IN A COUPLE OF ARTICLES CLUSTERS OF TWO CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN NOTICED. 6 CONCLUSION THIS CHAPTER SOUGHT TO SHED LIGHT ON PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION OVER EU INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES WHILE FOCUSING ON THE NEWS PAPER ANALYSIS OF SEVEN MEMBER STATES IN THE RUN-UP OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN 2019. THE SAMPLE OF ARTICLES CONSIDERED FOR THIS ANAL YSIS SHOWS THAT THE SALIENCE OF EU INTEGRATION IS COMPARABLE IN THE WESTERN AND EASTERN NEWSPAPERS. IT HAS SHOWN A RATHER WIDESPREAD VARIETY CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES DEDICATED TO THE EU. HOWEVER, THE VARIANCE DID NOT FALL INTO REGIONAL CLUSTERS. A SIMILAR PATTERN EMERGED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC POLICY ISSUES. ON AVERAGE, BOTH REGIONS ONLY SHOWED SLIGHT VARIATIONS IN THE ISSUES COVERED. ON A COUNTRY LEVEL, HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT
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|a THAT SINGULAR POLICY ISSUES COULD HOLD PARTIC ULAR PROMINENCE, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE POLISH NEWSPAPERS WITH THEIR FOCUS ON DEBATES SURROUNDING VALUES AND THE ROMANIAN PAPERS WITH THEIR ATTEN TION TO BORDER AND SECURITY ISSUES. THE STRONGEST OUTLIER, HOWEVER, WAS THE HUNGARIAN MAGYAR NEMZET WHICH DEVOTED NEARLY ALL ITS COVERAGE TOWARDS QUESTIONS OF MIGRATION. DESPITE THE GENERAL TREND OF INCREASING EU POLITICISATION DISCUSSED IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE, THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF 'HOW' THE EU WAS COVERED INDICATES THAT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS DEPICTED IN RATHER CONSEN SUAL TERMS. ONLY 211 (18.72%) ARTICLES OUT OF 1127 FRAME EU-RELATED ISSUES IN TERMS OF CONFLICT. HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS REVEALS INTERESTING ASPECTS REGARDING THE NATURE OF CONFLICT LINES PRESENTED IN THE NEWSPAPERS. ON THE ONE HAND, WHEN EU INTEGRATION IS DEPICTED AS OPPOSING CONTRASTING VIEWS, TWO LINES OF CONFLICT PREVAIL: DEMOCRACY VS. 'ILLIBERAL ISM' AND INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION, THE FORMER BEING A REACTION TO THE RISE OF PARTIES CONTESTING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. IT OPPOSES THOSE ARGUING THAT DEMOCRACY IS ENDANGERED BY 'ILLIBERAL' TRENDS, NATIONALISM, EXTREMISM, AND XENOPHOBIA TO THOSE PROMOTING ANTI-LIBERAL IDEAS, REJECTING PLURALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CONFLICT INTEGRATION VS. 214 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. DISINTEGRATION IS NOT ONLY ABOUT BREXIT. WHEN THE ISSUES OF INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION ARE ADDRESSED IT IS MAINLY TO EXPRESS SUPPORT TO EU INTEGRATION, TO INDICATE WAYS FORWARD AND TO POINT OUT THE CHALLENGES OF BREXIT. AS POINTED OUT, NONE OF THE NEWSPAPERS CLAIMS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU, NEITHER DISINTEGRATION. EVEN NEWSPAPERS CONTESTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE EU SUCH AS MAGYAR NEMZET ARE IN FAVOUR TO REMAIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OTHER LINES OF CONFLICT SEEM TO BE SPECIFIC TO EASTERN EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS AND REFLECT TENSIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION ( GAZETA WYBORCZA AND RZECZPOSPOLITA ) AS WELL AS TENSION BETWEEN EU MEMBER
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|a STATES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL SETTINGS AT THE EU LEVEL ( MAGYAR NEMZET AND RZECZPOSPOLITA) AND TENSION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS (HUNGARIAN MAGYAR NEMZET , GAZETA WYBORCZA AND RZECZPOSPOLITA, ADEVARUL ). THE CONFLICT LINE CONCERNING MIGRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION IS DOMINANT IN ONE NEWSPAPER WHICH IS MAGYAR NEMZET. RELATING TO POLITICISATION, THE OVERALL INSIGHTS THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM THIS STUDY IS THAT THE REGIONAL LENS, HENCE DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, DOES NOT PROVIDE A STRONG PREDICTOR NEITHER FOR 'HOW MUCH' NOR FOR 'HOW' EUROPE IS COVERED. IN CONTRAST, WHEN IT COMES TO INTENSITY AND FRAMING, DIFFERENCES OCCUR NOT ONLY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BUT ALSO AMONG THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS OF EACH GROUP. AS THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTS SHOWS, THE PATTERNS THAT OCCUR BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST (BUT ALSO AMONG COUNTRIES) ARE A REFLECTION OF DOMESTIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, IN OTHER WORDS, DOMESTIC POLITICAL TENSIONS IN EACH MEMBER STATE. ADDITIONALLY, AS THE ANALYSIS OF THE NEWSPAPERS OF THE EASTERN MEMBER STATES HAS REVEALED, THE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE NEWSPAPER IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS REGARD. WHILE THIS CHAPTER SERVES AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATES OVER POLITI CISATION IN THE CONTEXT OF 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, LINKING THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION WITH THE THEORIES OF EU INTEGRATION, FURTHER RESEARCH IS NEEDED ON THE ROOTS OF DIFFERENT LINES OF CONFLICTS THROUGH WIDER COMPAR ATIVE ANALYSIS TO SHOW HOW THESE CONFLICTS ARE SHAPED BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES. FUNDING THE DATA USED IN THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN COLLECTED WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH GRANTS: CONFLICTS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EU FUNDED BY THE FOUNDATION WIENER ANSPACH (COORDINATED BY NATHALIE BRACK, RAMONA COMAN AND AMAN DINE CRESPY) AND THE PROJECT VALEURS (ACTION DE RECHERCHE CONCERTEE - ULB - CEVIPOL - IEE, COORDINATED BY FRANCOIS FORET, RAMONA COMAN AND FRANCOIS HEINDERYCKX). 9 PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN
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|a ELECTIONS YY 215 REFERENCES BATORFY, A., & URBAN, A. (2020). STATE ADVERTISING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRANS FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MARKET IN HUNGARY. EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 36 (1), 44-65. BICKERTON, C., HODSON, D., & PUETTER, U. (2015). THE NEW INTERGOVERNMENTALISM: STATES AND SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS IN THE POST-MAASTRICHT ERA (1ST ED.). OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. BOUZA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87-104. BRACK, N. (2018). OPPOSING EUROPE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: REBELS AND RADICALS IN THE CHAMBER . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BRACK, N., & COSTA, O. (2012). BEYOND THE PRO/ANTI-EUROPE DIVIDE: DIVERGING VIEWS OF EUROPE WITHIN EU INSTITUTIONS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION : DIVERGING VIEWS OF EUROPE: THE EU AGAINST ITSELF? ,34 (2), 101-111. BRACK, N., COMAN, R., & CRESPY, A. (2019). UNPACKING OLD AND NEW CONFLICTS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EUROPEAN POLITY. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION : UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EU ,41 (7), 817-832. COMAN, R., & LACROIX, J. (2007). LES RESISTANCES A L'EUROPE: CULTURES NATIONALES, IDEOLOGIES ET STRATEGIES D'ACTEURS . EDITIONS DE L'UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES. COMAN, R., CRESPY, A., & SCHMIDT, V. (2020). GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS IN THE POST CRISIS EUROPEAN UNION . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. CRESPY, A., & VERSCHUEREN, N. (2009). FROM EUROSCEPTICISM TO RESISTANCE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE. PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 10 (3), 377-393. DE WILDE, P. (2014). THE OPERATING LOGICS OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND MASS MEDIA IN THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPE. THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES, 20 (1), 46-61. DE WILDE, P., & ZUERN, M. (2012). CAN THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BE REVERSED? JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON
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|a MARKET STUDIES, 50 , 137-153. DE WILDE, P., MICHAILIDOU, A., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2014). CONVERGING ON EUROSCEP TICISM: ONLINE POLITY CONTESTATION DURING EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 53 (4), 766-783. FLOOD, C. (2009). DIMENSIONS OF EUROSCEPTICISM. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 47 (4), 911-917. HOEGLINGER, D. (2016). THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN DOMESTIC ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 44-63. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. 216 A. ANDGULADZE ET AL. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2019). GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (8), 1113-1133. HUTTER, S., & KRIESI, H. (2019). EUROPEAN PARTY POLITICS IN TIMES OF CRISIS . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. HUTTER, S., GRANDE, E., & KRIESI, H. (EDS.) (2016). POLITICIZING EUROPE: INTE GRATION AND MASS POLITICS (CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS). JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 50 (51), 137-153. KOOPMANS, R., & STATHAM, P. (2010). THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE: MEDIA DISCOURSE AND POLITICAL CONTENTION . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. KRIESI, H., GRANDE, E., LACHAT, R., DOLEZAL, M., BORNSCHIER, S., & FREY, T. (2008). WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. LECONTE, C. (2010). UNDERSTANDING EUROSCEPTICISM. PALGRAVE. MORAVCSIK, A. (2018). PREFERENCES, POWER AND INSTITUTIONS IN 21ST-CENTURY EUROPE. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 56 , 1648-1674. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. RISSE, T. (2003, MARCH 27-30). AN EMERGING EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE? THEORETICAL CLARIFICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL INDICATORS . PAPER PRESENTED AT THE EUSA. SCHMIDT, V.
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|a A. (2006). DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. SCHMIDT, V. A. (2019). POLITICISATION IN THE EU: BETWEEN NATIONAL POLITICS AND EU POLITICAL DYNAMICS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (7), 1018-1036. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2015). UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF EU POLITI CIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE EUROZONE CRISIS. COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 13 (3), 287-306. CHAPTER 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION' AND CLASHES OF NARRATIVES ON SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 'FUTURE OF EUROPE' DEBATES MIRUNA BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYAANDD R AG O S , IONIT , YY A 1 INTRODUCTION AN EXPANDING BODY OF LITERATURE DURING THE PAST DECADE HAS SHOWN THAT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) HAVE BECOME MORE AND MORE POLITICISED, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON CAME INTO FORCE IN 2009. THIS MEANT THAT EU POLICY DEBATES STARTED TO ATTRACT GROWING MEDIA ATTENTION AND GENERATED BOTH POLITICAL CONTROVERSY AND THE MOBIL ISATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY. IN THIS VIEW, THE EU'S 'POLYCRISIS' HAS HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ONGOING POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. DURING M. BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA( B ) D. IONIT , YY A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (SNSPA), BUCHAREST, ROMANIA E-MAIL: MIRUNA.TRONCOTA@DRI.SNSPA.RO THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_10 217 218 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A THESE RECENT CRISES, SUBSTANTIAL DISSONANCES BETWEEN VARIOUS EU INSTITU TIONS LED TO SEVERE CONFLICTS AMONG EU MEMBER STATE GOVERNMENTS AND TO STRONG ANTI-EU NARRATIVES, AS WELL AS PROVOKING TARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST THE 2014-2019 JUNCKER COMMISSION. THE COMBINED EFFECT OF THESE DISPUTES WAS TO BRING INTO QUESTION THE EU'S INTER-INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF POWER, RAISING IN PARTICULAR
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|a THE ISSUE THAT IS MOST CENTRAL FOR THE INTEGRATION PROCESS: WHO IS ACTUALLY STEERING THE EU'S POLITICAL DIRECTION? THE DEBATES RELATING TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPE STARTED AS AN INTER-INSTITUTIONAL BATTLE BETWEEN THE KEY EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC), THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP), AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, ALL OF WHICH WERE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN INFLUENCING THE OUTCOME OF THE DEBATES AND THE OPINIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL AUDIENCES. THE MAIN AIM OF THIS CHAPTER IS TO OFFER INSIGHTS INTO THIS VERSION OF 'SUPRANATIONALPOLITICISATION' BY ANALYSING THE DISCOURSES OF EC PRESIDENT JUNCKER AND VARIOUS EU MEMBER STATE LEADERS WITHIN THE SPECIFIC SETTING OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. IN JUNE 2016, THE RESULTS OF THE BREXIT REFERENDUM CONFIRMED THE DESIRE OF UK CITIZENS TO LEAVE THE EU. THIS PROVOKED VISIBLE SHOCK WAVES AROUND THE WORLD, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY INSIDE THE EU. IN RESPONSE TO THIS UNEXPECTED AND HISTORICAL EVENT, EU MEMBER STATES ISSUED THE BRATISLAVA DECLARATION IN SEPTEMBER 2016. THIS ANNOUNCED THE LAUNCH OF A SERIOUS REFLECTION PROCESS ON HOW BEST TO DEVELOP BOTH INDIVIDUAL POLICY AREAS AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE EU AS A WHOLE, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE REORGANISATION OF EU INSTITUTIONS, THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC DIMENSION OF THE EU AND THE ENCOUR AGEMENT OF GREATER CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN EU DYNAMICS. THE JUNCKER COMMISSION TOOK THE LEAD ON THIS INITIATIVE AND IN MARCH 2017 PRESENTED THE WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE , A STRATEGIC DOCUMENT THAT SET IN MOTION A TWO-YEAR PROCESS, WHICH CAME TO BE KNOWN AS THE 'FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES'. THIS WAS AIMED TO INITIATE A WIDE TRANSNATIONAL DEBATE, WHICH THE COMMISSION ENVISIONED WOULD LAST FOR THE FINAL TWO YEARS OF ITS MANDATE (2017-2019), HIGHLIGHTING CRITICAL ASPECTS THAT THE EU AS A WHOLE SHOULD TACKLE IN THE YEARS AHEAD AFTER THE UNITED KINGDOM'S WITH DRAWAL FROM THE UNION. PRESIDENT JUNCKER FIRST EXPRESSED HIS EXPECTATIONS FOR THE PROCESS IN HIS
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|a SPEECH AT THE LAUNCHING EVENT IN ROME IN MARCH 2017, AND THEN AGAIN VIA HIS STATE OF THE UNION SPEECHES IN THE AUTUMN OF 2017 AND 2018, CULMINATING WITH THE COMMENTS HE MADE AT THE SIBIU SUMMIT IN MAY 2019, WHEN THE FIRST PART OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE ENDED. 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 219 BEARING IN MIND THAT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE WAS A TRANSNATIONAL PROCESS INVOLVING CITIZENS, DIPLOMATS, AND POLITICIANS AT BOTH NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL LEVELS, THE FOCUS WILL BE PLACED ON INVESTIGATING HOW THE EC ATTEMPTED TO SET THE STAGE FOR SHARING DIFFERENT VISIONS ON EUROPE AND HOW DIFFERENT LEADERS OF MEMBER STATES EXPRESSED RESISTANCE OR SUPPORT FOR DEEPENING INTEGRATION. OUR MAIN ASSUMPTION IS THAT A GROUP OF 'DIS CURSIVE ENTREPRENEURS' (I.E. MEMBER STATE OFFICIALS, BOTH AT THE EU AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL) INSTRUMENTALISED THE CONCEPT OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING THEIR OWN VISION OF THE EU. THIS PROCESS TOOK PLACE WITHIN A POLITICAL CONTEXT MARKED BY THE INCREASING ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE EU AND THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN MAY 2019. THE POLARISATION OF OPINIONS BETWEEN EU ACTORS IS AN AMBIVALENT PROCESS THAT FREQUENTLY COINCIDES WITH EU CRISES AND CREATES FRAGMENTATION, BUT IN CERTAIN SITUA TIONS CAN ALSO BE BENEFICIAL FOR THE DEEPENING OF EUROPEANISATION. HAVING REVIEWED THE RECENT LITERATURE ON THIS TOPIC, WE ADVANCE A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE, WHICH ARGUES THAT THESE TYPES OF TRANSNATIONAL DEBATES ARE PURPOSEFULLY DESIGNED BY 'SUPRANATIONAL ENTREPRENEURS' TO BRING TO LIGHT COMMON ISSUES AND CONCERNS THAT CAN BE DEALT WITH MORE EFFECTIVELY BY CREATING A 'TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY', WHERE TOPICS ARE 'EUROPEANISED' IN COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTIONS. THE CHAPTER IS ORGANISED AS FOLLOWS: AFTER THIS INTRODUCTION, THE THEORET ICAL SECTION DISCUSSES THE IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICISATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC DEBATES ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE TRANSFERS OF SOVEREIGNTY FROM EURO PEAN NATION
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|a STATES TO THE EU LEVEL FOR DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. THE THIRD SECTION DISCUSSES THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION IN FACILITATING THIS PROCESS OF POLARISATION AND POLITICISATION BEFORE THE 2019 ELECTIONS, AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT DEFINED THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES. FOLLOWING THIS, WE CONTEXTUALISE THIS COMMISSION-LED SUPRANATIONAL FORM OF POLITICISATION, REFLECTING ON THE PARTICULAR ROLE PLAYED BY 'NARRATIVES OF SOVEREIGNTY', BY LOOKING QUALITATIVELY AT HOW SOVEREIGNTY WAS DISCURSIVELY PORTRAYED DURING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES. NEXT, WE ILLUSTRATE HOW THE REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES QUESTIONED OR PROMOTED THE EU'S AUTHORITY AND SUPRANATIONAL DECISION-MAKING POWERS IN RESPONSE TO THE FIVE SCENARIOS PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION. LASTLY, THE CONCLUSIONS HIGHLIGHT THE MAIN ELEMENTS BROUGHT TO LIGHT BY THE STUDY. 220 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A 2 POLITICISATION WITHIN THE EU CONTEXT: ' POLYCRISES ' , DISSATISFIED CITIZENS, AND CONTESTATION THE FACT THAT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY POLITICISED IN THE COURSE OF THE MOST RECENT DECADES IS A COMMONLY AGREED OBSERVATION IN THE MAINSTREAM LITERATURE. HOWEVER, THE MOST CHALLENGING SCHOLARLY DEBATES NOW RELATE TO THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS PHENOMENON, TOGETHER WITH ITS MAIN CAUSES AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE VARIOUS ACTORS. WHAT ARE THE MAIN FEATURES OF POLITICISATION IN THE EU? DE WILDE ET AL. ( 2016 ) AND WIESNER ( 2021 ) HAVE DISCUSSED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF EU POLITICISATION RESEARCH, UNDERLINING THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENTIATED FORMS OF THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE, WHICH FOCUS EITHER ON THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE EU OR ON ITS DAY-TO-DAY DECISION-MAKING POWERS AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. DRAWING ON THESE VARIOUS PERSPEC TIVES ON THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE, THEY OFFER A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT AS 'A THREE-DIMENSIONAL PROCESS INVOLVING INCREASING SALIENCE, POLARISATION OF OPINION AND THE
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|a EXPANSION OF ACTORS AND AUDIENCES INVOLVED IN EU ISSUES' (DE WILDE ET AL., 2016 ,P .3 ) .O T H ER AUTHORS ALSO SHOW THAT THE POST-LISBON POLITICISATION OF THE EU IS FAR MORE THAN A SIMPLE POLARISATION OF CONFLICTS RELATED TO EU POLICIES, LINKING IT TO OTHER RELATED PROCESSES SUCH AS 'POLITIFICATION', THE 'PARTISANISATION' ( VERPARTEILICHUNG ) OF ISSUES OR EVEN 'POLEMICISATION' (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). A SET OF ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE PROCESS ARE GIVEN BY VARIOUS AUTHORS. THESE INCLUDE THE MULTIPLE OVERLAPPING CRISES THAT HAVE HIT THE EU AND HAVE CREATED NEW ROOM FOR QUESTIONING THE EU'S LEGITIMACY; THE WIDENING GAP BETWEEN CITIZENS AND EU INSTITUTIONS; AND THE EVER-PRESENT DISCUSSIONS CONCERNED WITH SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN THE EU. THE LITERATURE OFTEN DISCUSSES THESE ASPECTS SEPARATELY, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED. FIRSTLY, WHAT ROLE DO CRISES PLAY IN THE INCREASING POLITICISATION OF THE EU? IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THE EUROZONE CRISIS, MORE THAN OTHER PREVIOUS EU CRISES, HAS MOST VISIBLY CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS THE POLITICISATION OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS (KRIESI & GRANDE, 2016 ). THERE ARE MANY AUTHORS WHO REGARD THIS 'CRISIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION' AS THE RESULT OF A RECURRING 'DECADE OF CRISES' THAT HAS STRUCK THE EU IN RECENT TIMES (SCHIM MELFENNIG, 2018 ). IN ESSENCE, THERE ARE TWO MAIN SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT THAT SEEK TO INTERPRET THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS AS A KEY TRIGGER FOR OTHER PROFOUND CHANGES WITHIN THE EU. ON THE ONE HAND, THE PUBLIC 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 221 DEBATES AND CONFLICTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS CAN BE CONSIDERED AS 'MORE OF THE SAME' IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICISATION OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CRISIS CAN BE SEEN AS FUNDAMEN TALLY ALTERING THE 'NATURE OF THE BEAST' IN TERMS OF THE SOCIETAL CONTESTATION OF EU COMPETENCIES (RAUH ET AL., 2020 ). SOME AUTHORS
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|a EXPLAIN THIS HIGH LEVEL OF CONFLICT WITHIN IN THE EU BY POINTING OUT THAT DURING THE EURO ZONE CRISIS THE POLITICISATION PROCESS WAS NOT PRINCIPALLY DRIVEN BY TRANSFERS OF AUTHORITY AND MEMBERSHIP CONFLICTS, AS IN PREVIOUS INTEGRATION DEBATES, BUT RATHER 'BY THE RETURN OF REDISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS BOTH WITHIN AND ACROSS MEMBER STATES' (STATHAM & TRENZ, 2015 , P. 299). AS IT TURNED OUT, THE EUROZONE CRISIS WAS JUST THE STARTING POINT FOR A SERIES OF OTHER SIGNIFICANT CRISES THAT HAVE PROFOUNDLY SHAKEN THE EU-THE MIGRATION CRISIS, BREXIT, THE EMERGENCE OF ILLIBERAL REGIMES, AND THE RESULTING CONFLICTS RELATING TO RULE OF LAW ISSUES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND POLAND, HUNGARY AND ROMANIA, AND, LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC. ALL OF THESE CRISES HAVE KEPT THE UNION IN A CONSTANT STATE OF TURMOIL, WITH SOME SCHOLARS EVEN REFERRING TO A SINGLE 'POLYCRISIS' THAT HAS CONTINUED FOR OVER A DECADE AND HAS TESTED THE ENDURANCE AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE EU POLITY TO ITS LIMITS (ZEITLIN ET AL., 2019 ). OVERALL, AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THESE CRISES PRESENTS A MIXED PICTURE. THEY CERTAINLY LEFT TRACEABLE MARKS ON INTRA-EUROPEAN UNITY. IN SOME CASES, THEY REPRESENTED OPPORTUNITIES FOR WIDE AND CONSTRUCTIVE REFORMS; IN OTHERS, THEY DEEPENED DIVISIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND HELPED TO AUGMENT THE NUMBER OF POPULIST AND EUROSCEPTIC VOICES. IT HAS BEEN SHOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WHEREAS THE EUROZONE CRISIS BROUGHT ABOUT A MAJOR DEEPENING OF INTEGRATION, THE SCHENGEN CRISIS HAS NOT; ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS DEEPENED MISTRUST BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES (SCHIM MELFENNIG, 2018 ). OTHER AUTHORS HAVE UNDERLINED THAT THE SO-CALLED 'OLD CENTRIST CONSENSUS' HAS SHRUNK AND NEW DIVISIONS HAVE EMERGED, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE (WRIGHT, 2019 ). SECONDLY, WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THESE OVERLAPPING EU CRISES ON CITIZEN PERCEPTION OF AND CITIZEN TRUST IN THE EU? IN THIS CONTEXT, SCHOLARS FOCUS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE
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|a 'EU'S CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY' (FUCHS & ESCHER, 2015 ; HOBOLT, 2018 ; SCHMIDT, 2015 ), ARGUING THAT THIS MANIFESTS ITSELF MOST EVIDENTLY IN THE HOSTILE PERCEPTIONS THAT MANY CITIZENS NOW HAVE WITH REGARD TO THE EU. THIS IS SUPPORTED BY EUROBAROMETER DATA, WHICH SHOWS AN EXPONENTIAL DECREASE IN CITIZEN TRUST, COINCIDING WITH THE EU CRISES OF THE LAST DECADE. HOWEVER, SOME AUTHORS ALSO POINT TO THE 'BRIGHT SIDE' OF THIS PROCESS OF INTERNAL CONTESTATION AND THE RESULTING BOTTOM-UP 222 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A PRESSURE ON THE EU (OLEART & BOUZA GARCIA, 2018 ), CLAIMING THAT THE RECURRING DEBATES ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAVE LED TO A SO-CALLED 'COSMOPOLITAN MOMENT' (BECK, 2000 ), IN WHICH NATIONAL DEBATES HAVE BECOME INTEGRATED AND EUROPEANISED IN A NEW AND UNIQUE WAY (KRIESI & GRANDE, 2016 ; RISSE, 2010 ; BOUZA GARCIA & OLEART, 2018 ). VIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEANISATION, POLITICISATION MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, BECAUSE IT STRENGTHENS THE LINK BETWEEN THE EU'S CITIZENS AND EU POLICIES, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE EURO PEANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERES (TRONCOTYYA&LO Y , 2018 ) IN WHICH THESE ISSUES ARE DEBATED. THIRDLY, IT HAS BEEN CONTENDED THAT THROUGHOUT THE RECURRING CRISES OF RECENT YEARS, CRITICISMS RELATING TO THE GULF BETWEEN BRUSSELS AND EUROPE'S CITIZENS HAVE REPEATEDLY BROUGHT THE TOPIC OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' BACK TO THE CENTRE OF ATTENTION. IN REALITY, THE POWER ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS IN THE EU HAS BEEN A CONSTANT THEME OF EVERY EU INTEGRATION DEBATE SINCE THE 1950S (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). THE INCREASED CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE EU HAS NOT PUT AN END TO THIS DEBATE. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE EU'S GOVERNANCE HAS BECOME MORE SUPRANATIONAL AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON STILL REMAINS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION (DEHOUSSE, 2016 ; FABBRINI & PUETTER, 2016 ). WHAT IS
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|a CLEAR IS THAT THE INCREASE OF THE EU'S COMPETENCES, FIRST WITH THE TREATY OF MAAS TRICHT AND THEN WITH THE TREATY OF LISBON, HAS ALSO LED TO A MORE ACCEN TUATED DIFFERENTIATION OF THE OPINIONS HELD BY EUROPE'S CITIZENS ABOUT HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SHOULD PROCEED. IN OTHER WORDS, INCREASING CITIZEN DISSATISFACTION TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS PROVOKED MORE AWARENESS AND GREATER EU POLITICISATION. 3' SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION ' THROUGH POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS WE HAVE ALREADY HIGHLIGHTED THE FACT THAT IN THE LITERATURE THERE ARE AMBIVALENT OPINIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF POLITICISATION ON THE EU. ON THE ONE HAND, IT IS SEEN AS A BRAKE ON INTEGRATION, BECAUSE MANY CITI ZENS TURN OUT TO BE MORE SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE EU THAN THE ELITES (HOOGHE &M A R K S , 2009 ). ON THE OTHER HAND, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT POLITICISA TION FUNCTIONS AS A PROCESS SUPPORTING THE LEGITIMATION RATHER THAN THE DELEGITIMATION OF THE EU POLITY (OLEART, 2021 ;TR E N Z&E D E R , 2004 ). DE WILDE ( 2019 ) ALSO SHOWED HOW EUROPE-WIDE DEBATES, REFLECTED IN THE MEDIA, ENABLE NEW 'SUPRANATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP', WHEREBY CHARISMATIC 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 223 EU OFFICIALS CAN PROMOTE INTEGRATION THROUGH EXECUTIVE ACTION IN AREAS WHERE THE EU HAS SIGNIFICANT COMPETENCIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS A NEED TO LOOK CLOSELY AT THE MAIN ACTORS WHO TAKE PART IN SUCH 'SUPRANATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP', PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CRUCIAL MOMENTS FOR THE EU. THEIR ACTIONS SHOULD BE SEEN AS INTENDING TO WIDEN THE EXISTING SPACES FOR EU POLITICISATION. ONE OF THE ACTORS THAT COULD HAVE SUCH A SYMBOLIC POWER AND COULD USE IT IN THIS WAY IS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT DIFFERENT FORMS OF RESISTANCE TO EU INTEGRATION, UNDERSTOOD AS 'MANIFESTATIONS OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS ONE (OR SEVERAL) ASPECT(S) OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION' (CRESPY & VERSCHUEREN, 2009 , P. 379), ARE NOT AT ALL NEW FOR THE EU. WHAT IS NEW, AND WHAT
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|a REQUIRES FURTHER ANALYSIS IS HOW THE POLITICISATION THAT EMERGED IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES, WHICH WE REFER TO AS 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISA TION', WAS CONSTRUCTED WITHIN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS AND IN DIFFERENT NATIONAL AND EU POLITICAL SPACES. BASED ON THIS PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVE, WE ARGUE THAT ACHIEVING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLITICISATION IS ENACTED WITHIN EU DEBATES REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE KEY MESSAGES PROPOUNDED BY RELEVANT 'DISCURSIVE ENTREPRENEURS' PRIOR TO 2019 EURO PEAN ELECTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WORKS IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO 'BOTTOM-UP POLITICISATION' (AS PROPOSED BY WIESNER IN HER CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME), WHICH IMPLIES REACHING OUT AND ENGAGING CITIZENS. IN THIS SENSE, THE CONCEPT FURTHER IMPLIES THAT THE COMMISSION ACTS AS A DRIVER FOR POLITI CISATION WHEN THE EU'S LEGITIMACY IS CONTESTED, AND THIS CAN ALSO BE SEEN IN THE PERIOD PREPARATORY TO THE 2019 ELECTIONS. 4 METHODOLOGY DEBATING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IS A MEANING-MAKING PROCESS. APPLYING THIS CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FACILITATES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLITI CISATION TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE EU AND STRESSES THE ANALYTICAL RELEVANCE OF POLICY NARRATIVES AND THEIR CAPACITY TO LEGITIMISE OR DE-LEGITIMISE WAYS FORWARD FOR THE INTEGRATION PROCESS. VIEWED FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, WE THEREFORE NEED TO EXAMINE POLICY NARRATIVES AS RELEVANT UNITS OF ANAL YSIS, BECAUSE THEY CONSTITUTE 'EUROPE' AS A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SPACE IN PEOPLE'S BELIEFS AND COLLECTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS (BOUZA GARCIA, 2017 ; OLEART & BOUZA GARCIA, 2019 ). WE ARE THUS INTERESTED IN ANALYSING THE ACTORS' LEGITIMISING NARRATIVES: THE DISCOURSES THAT ACTORS PUBLICLY 'PER FORM'. THESE NARRATIVES ARE REGARDED AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS THAT BOTH THE NATION STATES AND THE EU'S INSTITUTIONS USE AND ADAPT TO VARIOUS CONTEXTS. 224 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A THEY IMPLY MUCH MORE THAN SIMPLY 'COMMUNICATING' THE EU, SINCE
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|a THEY ALSO APPEAL TO PEOPLE'S EMOTIONS AND ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SENSE OF 'OWN ERSHIP' AMONG CITIZENS. FROM A CONSTRUCTIVIST POINT OF VIEW, POLITICISATION IS ENACTED THROUGH INFLUENTIAL NARRATIVES PERFORMED BY ACTORS, WHICH CAN EITHER BE A CRUCIAL PART OF THE FABRIC THAT KEEPS THE EU TOGETHER OR, CONVERSELY, DIVIDES IT. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS IS THEREFORE A USEFUL METHOD FOR UNDERSTANDING HOW VARIOUS VISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WERE MADE MEANINGFUL AND JUSTIFIED BY EU AND MEMBER STATE ACTORS. OUR CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYTIC STRATEGY INCLUDES CLOSE TEXTUAL INTERPRETA TION AND HERMENEUTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE SOURCES, IN ORDER TO MAP THE MAIN DISCURSIVE FEATURES OF THIS PROCESS OF COMMISSION-DRIVEN 'SUPRANA TIONALPOLITICISATION' IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE TRANSNATIONAL DEBATES THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN 2017 AND 2019. INITIALLY, WE IDENTIFIED THE MAIN CONTENTIOUS ELEMENTS WITHIN THESE DISCOURSES. NEXT, WE LOOKED AT HOW CERTAIN POLITICAL ACTORS EMBRACED 'THE STRATEGIC USAGE OF SOVEREIGNTY' IN THEIR PUBLIC NARRATIVES. CONCEIVING 'SOVEREIGNTY' AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION WHOSE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MEANINGS ARE CONTEXTUALLY BOUND, WE AIM TO PROVIDE INSIGHTS INTO THE VARIOUS USES OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 'DISCURSIVE BATTLES', AS PERFORMED AT THE EU LEVEL. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE EXAMINED FOUR SPEECHES BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EC, JEAN CLAUDE JUNCKER, TOGETHER WITH A SELECTION OF DISCOURSES MADE BY THE LEADERS OF SIX MEMBER STATES (FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, HUNGARY, POLAND, AND ROMANIA), ALL OF WHICH WERE ANALYSED AND PLACED IN BROADER CONTEXTS (SEE TABLE 1 ). WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON LEADERS WHO DIRECTLY REFERRED TO THE CONCEPT OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' IN THEIR SPEECHES AND MOST VISIBLY USED THEIR POWER TO MOBILISE BOTH PRO-EU AND ANTI-EU SENTIMENTS. AN EVIDENT LIMI TATION OF THIS APPROACH IS THAT THE RESTRICTED SELECTION OF TEXTS MEANS THAT WE CANNOT OFFER AN EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MUCH BROADER MEANING
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|a MAKING PROCESS IN WHICH THE ACTORS WERE ENGAGED, BOTH IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SETTINGS. WE HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE FACT THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS OTHER FACTIONS WITHIN EACH COUNTRY, WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EUROSCEPTI CISM OR PRO-EU BELIEFS, WHICH RESPONDED IN DIFFERENT WAYS TO PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S ATTEMPTS AT POLITICISATION PRIOR TO THE 2019 ELECTIONS, BUT A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THESE RESPONSES GOES FAR BEYOND OUR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES. AMONG OTHER DISCURSIVE ARENAS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES ALSO INCLUDED CONTRIBUTIONS BY A TOTAL OF TWENTY HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENTS, WHO SHARED THEIR VIEWS IN SPEECHES IN THE EP, FOLLOWED BY A DEBATE WITH MEPS DURING PLENARY SESSIONS. INITIALLY INTENDED TO RUN FOR THE YEAR 2018 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 225 TABLE 1 SELECTED SPEECHES FROM THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES N O . DATE SPEAKER POSITION ACTOR REPRESENTED TOPIC 1 1 MARCH 2017 JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER PRESIDENT EUROPEAN COMMISSION WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE - BEGINNING OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES 2 13 SEPTEMBER 2017 JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER PRESIDENT EUROPEAN COMMISSION STATE OF THE UNION (SOTEU) 3 17 APRIL 2018 EMMANUEL MACRON PRESIDENT FRANCE LEADERS' SPEECHES ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 4 4 JULY 2018 MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI PRIME MINISTER POLAND 5 11 SEPTEMBER 2018 VIKTOR ORBAN PRIME MINISTER HUNGARY DEBATE ON THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY 6 12 SEPTEMBER 2018 JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER PRESIDENT EUROPEAN COMMISSION STATE OF THE UNION (SOTEU) 7 23 OCTOBER 2018 KLAUS IOHANNIS PRESIDENT ROMANIA 8 13 NOVEMBER 2018 ANGELA MERKEL CHANCELLOR GERMANY 9 12 FEBRUARY 2019 GIUSEPPE CONTE PRIME MINISTER ITALY 10 7/ 9 MAY 2019 JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER PRESIDENT EUROPEAN COMMISSION SIBIU SUMMIT - END OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES LEADERS' SPEECHES ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EC PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S SPEECHES ( BLUE ) AND LEADERS' SPEECHES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ( ORANGE ) SOURCE EPRS ( 2019A ) AND AUTHORS'
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|a COMPILATION ONLY, THESE DEBATES CONTINUED UNTIL THE LAST PLENARY SESSION IN APRIL 2019. THIS REPRESENTED NOT ONLY A FORUM FOR DEBATING DIFFERENT VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EU, BUT ALSO AN OCCASION TO LAUNCH AND DISCUSS BOTH NEW IDEAS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS. THE DEBATES OFFERED A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS HELD BY MEMBER STATES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE EU AND TO RAISE THE AWARENESS OF CITIZENS AND POLITICIANS ALIKE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT OF 9 MAY 2019 IN SIBIU, ROMANIA, AND, LATER THAT SAME MONTH, THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. THIS SECTION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE STIMULATED COUNTRIES TO EXPRESS THEIR NEED TO REDEFINE THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE NATION STATES AND COOPERATION AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL. AS A RESULT, SOVEREIGNTY NARRATIVES WERE A SIGNIFICANT TOPIC IN SEVERAL OF THE LEADERS' SPEECHES. BECAUSE THESE SPEECHES WERE PUBLIC AND WIDELY BROAD CASTED, THEY WERE INTENDED TO TARGET A TRANSNATIONAL AUDIENCE. THE LEADERS USED THE OPPORTUNITY BOTH TO SET OUT THEIR PERSONAL VISION AND TO RESPOND 226 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A TO PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S SPEECHES, HIGHLIGHTING THEIR PRIORITIES AND POINTING TO AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT WAS NECESSARY, AS WELL AS REVISITING THE EU'S PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND/OR FAILURES. SOME LEADERS EXPLICITLY USED THE CONCEPT OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' AS A REACTION TO THE DIFFERENT FRAMING OF THE TOPIC BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN HIS ANNUAL STATE OF THE UNION SPEECHES AND IT IS ON THESE LEADERS THAT WE HAVE CHOSEN TO FOCUS THE BULK OF OUR ATTENTION. AS POLARISATION OF OPINION IS CONSIDERED TO BE A NECESSARY COMPONENT OF POLITICISATION, WE BEGAN OUR ANALYSIS BY FIRST EXAMINING THE MOST POLARISED VIEWS EXPRESSED BY NATIONAL LEADERS IN THEIR SPEECHES ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. SOME ARGUED THAT SOME AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY NEEDED TO BE GIVEN BACK TO THE NATION STATES, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF POLAND, MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI, EVEN CALLING FOR 'A UNION OF NATIONS 2.0'.
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|a IN CONTRAST, FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON CALLED FOR GREATER 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY' AND FOR AN UPGRADING OF THE EUROPEAN LEVEL. IT IS IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE THAT MANY OF THE NATIONAL LEADERS WHO WERE IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE TOPICS LAUNCHED BY THE COMMISSION HAD A PREVIOUS 'TRACK RECORD' OF TENSION WITH THE COMMISSION, LONG BEFORE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE DEBATES PROVIDED THE EC WITH A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO STIR AND EXPLOIT PRIOR ANIMOSITIES AMONG MEMBER STATES ON TOPICS THAT WERE CRUCIAL FOR THE GOAL OF 'SUPRANATIONALPOLITICISATION'. AN EXAMPLE THAT WAS MUCH IN EVIDENCE IN THE LEADERS' SPEECHES IN THE EP WAS THE PREFERENCE OF CERTAIN MEMBER STATES FOR THE 'MULTI-SPEED EUROPE', A SCENARIO THAT WAS FIERCELY OPPOSED BY A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE NEW MEMBER STATES-THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES TOGETHER WITH ROMANIA- NOT ONLY EXPRESSED CRITICISM AGAINST THE EU'S SUPRANATIONAL POWERS AND THE IMPOSITION OF DECISIONS AGAINST THEIR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY (BOTH BY THE EC PRESIDENT JUNCKER AND VICE-PRESIDENT TIMMERMANS), BUT AT THE SAME TIME ALSO OPPOSED THE SCENARIO OF A 'MULTI-SPEED EU', IN WHICH SOME EU MEMBERS COULD PURSUE GREATER INTEGRATION IN SPECIFIED AREAS, WHILE OTHERS COULD OPT OUT OR APPLY FINANCIAL CUTS TO THE COHESION POLICY. IT IS EQUALLY INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THESE DOUBLE-STANDARDS SUGGEST THAT- NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE EU OFFERS A SORT OF 'VARYING MEMBERSHIP' ON A RANGE OF EU INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EUROZONE, SCHENGEN, JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS ISSUES, AND DEFENCE POLICY- SOME STATES STILL FEAR THAT THEY WOULD LOSE ACCESS TO SOME OF THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF INTEGRATION INSIDE THE EU. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO EXAMINE HOW THESE SPEECHES RESPONDED TO THE EC'S INITIATIVES IN TERMS OF DE WILDE'S CONCEPT OF 'DISCURSIVE INTERGOVERNMENTALISM' ( 2019 ), WHICH DESCRIBES THE 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES
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|a THE LEAD? YY 227 DOMINANT FOCUS IN THE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE ACTORS-PARTICULARLY PRIME MINISTERS AND HEADS OF STATE AND THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THEM AND THE EURO PEAN COUNCIL AND/OR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION-AS THE 'PRIMARY LOCUS OF EU POLITICS'. FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2017 AND 2019, WE CAN CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS MODEL OF 'DISCURSIVE INTERGOVERNMENTAL ISM', WHICH DEEPENED THE POLITICISATION PROCESS THAT WAS SET TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES GENERATED BY THE EC. 5 THE POLITICISATION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES 5.1 THE JUNCKER COMMISSION RAISES THE BONE(S) OF CONTENTION IT IS WORTH UNDERLINING THE PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIMING OF THE LAUNCH OF THE COMMISSION'S WHITE PAPER IN 2017. IT COINCIDED WITH THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY OF ROME. THIS SYMBOLIC MOMENT WAS EXPECTED TO HAVE A POWERFUL IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EU AND TO ATTRACT WIDE MEDIA ATTENTION, SINCE IT WAS A KEY EVENT IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ENTIRE FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES WAS DEFINED BY THE COMMISSION MATCHES ALL THE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. IN HIS MAIN SPEECHES, PRESIDENT JUNCKER, BY OUTLINING FIVE SCENARIOS ON BEHALF OF THE EC, EFFECTIVELY RAISED THE 'BONES OF CONTENTION' IN THE EURO PEAN PUBLIC SPHERE AND THEREBY MANAGED TO POLITICISE THE DEBATE. THE RESULT WAS 'TO TRANSFORM UNCONTESTED ASSUMPTIONS, IDENTITIES AND PRINCI PLES INTO OBJECTS OF POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES' (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ,P .1 2 ) . FURTHERMORE, BY FOCUSING ON SUCH A CRUCIAL TOPIC AS THE CHANGE OF EUROPE DURING THE FORTHCOMING DECADE, THE SCENE WAS INEVITABLY SET FOR PROVOKING AGE-OLD CONTROVERSIES AMONG THE DIFFERENT ACTORS IN THE EU. THE COMMIS SION ENVISAGED A COMPLEX PROCESS TO FACILITATE THIS MULTI-LAYERED DEBATE, INVOLVING LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND TRANSNATIONAL AUDIENCES, WITH TOPICS OF GREAT INTEREST FOR MULTIPLE EU ACTORS,
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|a INCLUDING CITIZENS FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE. THIS CONFIRMS THE FIRST CRITERIA IN DE WILDE'S THEORETICAL MODEL-THE SALIENCE OF EU GOVERNANCE. THE WAY IN WHICH THE COMMISSION STRUCTURED THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES WAS MEANT TO FOCUS ON HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS TOPICS THAT WERE EXPECTED TO RAISE CONFLICTING NARRATIVES: FROM THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON SOCIETY AND JOBS TO DOUBTS ABOUT GLOBALISATION, SECURITY, THE RISE OF POPULISM, AND THE THREAT OF ILLIBERALISM. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF EACH SCENARIO IN TABLE 2 , 228 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A TABLE 2 SCENARIOS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017A ) SCENARIO LABEL LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT BY EU MEMBER STATES 1 CARRYING ON THE EU27 FOCUSES ON DELIVERING ITS POSITIVE REFORM AGENDA 2 NOTHING BUT THE SINGLE MARKET THE EU27 IS GRADUALLY RE-CENTRED ON THE SINGLE MARKET 3 THOSE WHO WANT MORE DO MORE THE EU27 ALLOWS WILLING MEMBER STATES TO DO MORE TOGETHER IN SPECIFIC AREAS 4 DOING LESS MORE EFFICIENTLY THE EU27 FOCUSES ON DELIVERING MORE AND FASTER IN SELECTED POLICY AREAS, WHILE DOING LESS ELSEWHERE 5 DOING MUCH MORE TOGETHER MEMBER STATES DECIDE TO DO MUCH MORE TOGETHER ACROSS ALL POLICY AREAS THE OPTIONS PRESENTED TO THE MEMBER STATES LEFT ROOM FOR CONTINGENCY AND THUS FOR THE CONTESTATION OF EACH OF THE ASPECTS RAISED. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THE WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE ALSO ADDED A NEW ELEMENT TO THE SITUATION BY INCREASING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CONTES TATION (AND THUS FOR POLITICISATION) BY USING FIVE SCENARIOS THAT DELIBERATELY APPEALED TO THE VALUES OF THE AUDIENCE (CITIZENS, NATIONAL OFFICIALS, EU OFFICIALS) IN RESPECT OF THE CONTENTIOUS TOPIC OF 'SOVEREIGNTY'. PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S SPEECH DELIVERED ON 1 MARCH 2017 WAS THE FIRST POLITICAL COMMUNICATION EVENT AIMED AT HIGHLIGHTING THE MAIN ISSUES FACED BY POST-ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POST-MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE, IN WHICH HE CALLED FOR A NEW APPROACH TOWARDS THE EU'S FUTURE ACTIONS, IN ORDER TO
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|a PREVENT SUCH CRISES FROM ARISING AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT 'GLOBALISATION, TERRORISM, MIGRATION AND THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON SOCIETY AND JOBS ARE PROFOUNDLY CHANGING THE DAILY LIVES OF EUROPEANS', JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER WARNED THAT 'THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CANNOT BE HELD HOSTAGE BY ELECTORAL CYCLES, PARTY POLITICS OR SHORT-TERM WINS' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017A ). IN THIS WAY, HE CONTESTED THE MANNER IN WHICH POLIT ICAL ACTORS (ESPECIALLY SOME POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS IN THE EP) WERE HANDLING CURRENT AFFAIRS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY HOLDING THEM ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OF THE RECENT PAST. AT THE SAME TIME, JUNCKER CALLED UPON NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO ENGAGE MORE FULLY IN SOLVING 'CLOSE-TO-HOME' ISSUES SUCH AS UNEMPLOYMENT, INDIRECTLY REAFFIRMING THE VALUE OF SUBSIDIARITY AS ONE OF THE EU'S ASSETS. NEVERTHELESS, SUCH A CALL 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 229 MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY NATIONAL LEADERS AS ADVOCATING AN INTERGOV ERNMENTAL APPROACH, COMING AS IT DID FROM A MAINLY SUPRANATIONAL BODY, THEREBY CALLING INTO QUESTION THE LIMITS OF THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSI BILITY WITH REGARD TO CERTAIN POLICIES AND LEAVING ROOM FOR CONTINGENCY AS TO WHAT STRATEGIES SHOULD BE APPLIED AT NATIONAL LEVEL. PRESIDENT JUNCKER POINTED OUT SEVERAL FLAWS IN THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE EU AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (AT BOTH THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE LEVELS). THE PRESIDENT DID NOT REFRAIN FROM CRITICISING CERTAIN NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 'THAT WANT TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ERGO THE COMMISSION TO THE INTERNAL MARKET' AND CHALLENGED THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS (AND MEDIA INSTITUTIONS) THAT WERE 'ACCUSING THE COMMISSION OF OVER-REGULATION' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2017A ). JUNCKER POSITIONED HIMSELF AS A 'GUARDIAN' OF CIVIL AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, OPPOSING ISOLATIONIST AND NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS AND ENCOURAGING REACTIONS FROM NATIONAL LEADERS AS PART OF
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|a THE DEBATE. SUBSEQUENT SPEECHES BY PRESIDENT JUNCKER (THE 2017 AND 2018 STATE OF THE UNION SPEECHES) CONTINUED TO DRAW ATTENTION EVEN MORE FORCE FULLY TO KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES AND THE WAY THEY WERE DEALT WITH AT THE TIME BY THE NATIONAL ACTORS (PARTICULARLY THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND POLIT ICAL PARTIES). IN CONTRAST TO THE WHITE PAPER, THESE SPEECHES WERE MAINLY DIRECTED AT EUROPE'S CITIZENS, A STRATEGY THAT INVOLVED THE ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIARY BODIES (I.E. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS) IN AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE IN A MORE SINCERE DIALOGUE WITH ORDINARY PEOPLE. WHILE, FROM A COMMU NICATION PERSPECTIVE, IT IS DESIRABLE TO ENGAGE IN THIS KIND OF DIALOGUE, THE STRATEGY RAISES THE RISK OF INCREASED POLITICISATION, BY ACTIVATING YET ANOTHER PARTICIPANT GROUP FROM THE AUDIENCE: THE GENERAL PUBLIC. CALLING FOR GREATER SOLIDARITY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION URGED NON-MEDITERRANEAN STATES TO OFFER POSITIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE MORE EXPOSED MEMBER STATES IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO MANAGE THE ONGOING REFUGEE CRISIS, THEREBY RE-LAUNCHING THE DEBATE ABOUT WHERE EACH STATE SHOULD POSITION ITSELF ON THIS MATTER. FURTHERMORE, BY ASKING FOR GREATER INVOLVEMENT FROM POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE FORTHCOMING POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE 2019 EURO PEAN ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION'S LEADER REAFFIRMED HIS 'SYMPATHY FOR THE IDEA OF HAVING TRANSNATIONAL LISTS IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS', AS A MEANS OF ESCAPING FROM THE RECURRENT TRAP OF SUCH ELECTIONS, WHICH 'HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO NOTHING MORE THAN THE SUM OF NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS' (EURO PEAN COMMISSION, 2017B ). THESE TWO DELICATE ISSUES FORMED THE CORE OF THE 2017 STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH, PROMPTING POLITICAL DEBATES AND EVEN VOTES IN THE EP, AHEAD OF THE 2019 ELECTIONS (EURACTIV, 2018 ). 230 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A AT THE SAME TIME (AND BROADLY ON THE SAME THEME), JUNCKER ACKNOWL EDGED THE ROLES PLAYED BY NATIONALISM, GEOPOLITICS, AND THE RULE OF LAW, STATING THAT 'EUROPE IS TOO SMALL TO LET
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|a ITSELF BE DIVIDED INTO HALVES OR QUAR TERS' AND LAUNCHING A CALL FOR GREATER UNITY, ESPECIALLY IN THOSE PARTICULAR FIELDS. POINTING OUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM, THE COMMISSION'S PRESIDENT CALLED FOR THE REJECTION OF THE LATTER, DESCRIBING IT AS AN INSTRUMENT USED BY SOME TO 'POINT THE FINGER AT OTHERS, INSTEAD OF SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO BETTER LIVE TOGETHER'. WHEN THE RULE OF LAW ISSUE WAS RAISED, JUNCKER DID NOT REFRAIN FROM SAYING THAT HE AND HIS TEAM CONTINUED 'TO BE VERY CONCERNED BY THE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOME OF OUR MEMBER STATES. ARTICLE 7 MUST BE APPLIED WHENEVER THE RULE OF LAW IS THREAT ENED', WITHOUT REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO ANY SPECIFIC CASES, SUCH AS HUNGARY OR POLAND (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018 ). NEVERTHELESS, HIS WORDS STILL PROMPTED WIDESPREAD DEBATE ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF SEVERAL MEMBER STATES TO EU VALUES AND THEIR FURTHER ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE ITSELF (CALDWELL, 2019 ; POLITICO, 2018 ). ANOTHER RELATED SENSITIVE TOPIC TOUCHED UPON BY JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER WAS THAT OF SOVEREIGNTY. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY IS BORN OF THE MEMBER STATES' NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DOES NOT REPLACE IT', HE ALSO INSISTED THAT 'SHARING SOVEREIGNTY - WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED - MAKES EACH OF OUR NATION STATES STRONGER' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018 , P. 5). IN THIS WAY, THE COMMISSION'S LEADER INDIRECTLY ENDORSED THE FIRST SCENARIO OF THE WHITE PAPER, THEREBY LAUNCHING A POTENTIAL DISCUSSION ABOUT ITS OWN ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE (EUROPEAN COMMIS SION, 2018 ). IN ADDITION TO THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES DELIVERED EACH YEAR BY THE PRESIDENT, THE COMMISSION IN ITS COMMUNICATION OF MARCH 2018 OFFERED FURTHER SUPPORT WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, SUCH AS THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS, THE REVISED COMPOSITION OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL LISTS, AND THE REFORM OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE
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|a EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF A 'DOUBLE-HATTED' POSITION THAT WOULD ENCOMPASS BOTH FUNCTIONS (EPRS, 2019B ). LASTLY, JUST TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE 2019 SIBIU SUMMIT, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO BRING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE TO AN END AND DISCUSS THE EU'S NEXT STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR THE PERIOD 2019-2024, PRESIDENT JUNCKER SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL, WITH THE AIM OF AGAIN PRESSURING RECALCITRANT NATIONAL LEADERS: 'IF THERE IS POLITICAL WILL TO DELIVER THIS LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE, THEN IT CAN BE DELIVERED. AND IT CAN BE 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 231 DONE WITHOUT REOPENING THE TREATIES. I AM NOT AGAINST TREATY CHANGES BUT A LOT CAN BE DONE IF THERE IS POLITICAL WILL' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019 ). DESPITE THE MANY DISAGREEMENTS AND POST-BREXIT UNCERTAINTIES VISIBLE AT THE SUMMIT, HE INSISTED ON A FINAL MESSAGE OF UNITY, WHILE ALSO ACKNOWL EDGING THE DISSATISFACTION OF MANY EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND ADMITTING TO A NUMBER OF ERRORS: 'THIS EUROPEAN COUNCIL HAS SHOWN THAT WE CAN STAND UNITED, NOT JUST AS A FACADE, BUT FOR REAL, JUST AS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS WE SUCCEEDED IN ACTING TOGETHER. IT IS OFTEN SAID, AND NOT WHOLLY ERRONEOUSLY, THAT [THERE ARE] WHOLE AREAS WHERE THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS FAILED TO MEET EXPECTATIONS' (ROMANIA INSIDER, 2019 ). WHILE IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT MOMENTS OF CRISIS AND QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EU'S LEGITIMACY HAD MARKED A MANDATE PERIOD OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (THE BARROSO CABINET HAD FOUND ITSELF IN A SIMILAR POSITION: SEE MORE IN SOLDEVILA & VANDER MEULEN'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK), THE SCALE OF THE DEBATE AND THE COMPLEX ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THAT DEBATE WAS LAUNCHED AND ORGANISED THIS TIME TOOK POLITICISATION TO ANOTHER LEVEL. BY INCLUDING SENSITIVE ASPECTS SUCH AS UNEMPLOYMENT, MIGRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE DEBATE, THE COMMISSION ACTED AS A 'SUPRANATIONAL ENTREPRENEUR'
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|a AND ENSURED ITSELF OF THE ATTENTION IT DESIRED, WHILE POLARISING ACTORS SITUATED AT THE OPPOSITE END OF THE INFORMATION CHANNEL AND PROMPTING THEM TO RESPOND IN A POLITICAL MANNER TO THE ISSUES RAISED-AS CAN BE SEEN IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION. 5.2 THE 'SOVEREIGNTISTS'-POWER TO THE NATION STATES AND THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE WE TURN NOW TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE OFTEN-DISSONANT RESPONSE OF SOME EU LEADERS TO THE JUNCKER NARRATIVE. THE MOST VOCAL LEADERS IN THIS SO-CALLED 'SOVEREIGNTIST' GROUP WERE, UNSURPRISINGLY, THE POLISH AND HUNGARIAN HEADS OF STATE, ALTHOUGH THEIR RESPONSES TOOK DIFFERENT FORMS AND FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. THEIR SPEECHES IN THE EP DID, HOWEVER, HAVE A COMMON BASIS: NAMELY, AN OUTSPOKEN DEFENCE OF THE SUPREMACY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, ARGUING THAT SOVEREIGNTY NEEDS TO REMAIN THE EXCLUSIVE PROP ERTY OF NATION STATES AND SHOULD NOT BE SHARED WITH THE EU. THIS IMPLIES THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, THE FUTURE OF THE EU SHOULD BE LESS INTEGRATED, WITH MEMBER STATES HAVING MORE EFFECTIVE DECISION-MAKING POWER THAN THE COMMISSION. THIS WAS NOT A NEW POSITION AND ITS RESTATEMENT DID NOT TAKE ANYONE BY SURPRISE. THE STARK OPPOSITION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND (TO A LESSER EXTENT) ROMANIA TO THE ACTIONS OF THE EC STARTED DURING THE 232 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A MIGRATION CRISIS, BUT REACHED ITS PEAK AND WAS EXTENDED TO COVER OTHER TOPICS OF CONTENTION DURING THE EXACT PERIOD OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES DURING 2018 AND 2019 (COMAN & LECONTE, 2019 ). PLACED IN THIS OVERALL CONTEXT, THE SPEECHES OF BOTH HUNGARY'S VIKTOR ORBAN (APRIL 2018) AND POLAND'S MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI (JULY 2018) WERE CENTRED ON STRESSING THE RIGHT OF THEIR COUNTRIES' CITIZENS TO DECIDE ON SENSITIVE ISSUES (MIGRATION, TAXATION, ETC.), REGARDLESS OF THE SUPRANATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE EU COMMISSION. HUNGARY'S PRIME MINISTER GAVE A STRAIGHTFORWARD DESCRIPTION OF THE FUTURE HE FORESEES: 'IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT OUR VISION IS BASED ON A STRONG
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|a EUROPE OF STRONG MEMBER STATES. IN SUCH A EUROPE, MEMBER STATES BEAR RESPONSIBILITY INSTEAD OF RUNNING AWAY FROM IT. RESPONSIBILITY FOR STATE DEBT, THE BUDGET AND BORDER PROTEC TION' (ORBAN, 2018 ). THE TWO LEADERS SHARED ANOTHER SIMILAR OPINION: NAMELY, THAT CHRISTIANITY IS ONE OF EUROPE'S CORE VALUES. EQUALLY, BOTH VIEWED SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT OF EACH NATION TO DECIDE ON ITS OWN FUTURE IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO INTERNAL AFFAIRS (SUCH AS SECURITY AND FINANCE). IN VIKTOR ORBAN'S WORDS: 'HUNGARY IS A PROUD COUNTRY. HUNGAR IANS HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THEMSELVES AN IMPORTANT NATION, DEVOTED TO THE CHRISTIAN VALUES OF EUROPE, AND WANTING TO HAVE THEIR SAY IN THE DECI SIONS THAT CONCERNED THEM' (ORBAN, 2018 ). ON THE SAME THEME, HIS POLISH COUNTERPART ADDED: 'WITHOUT CHRISTIANITY, EUROPEAN DIVERSITY WOULD NEVER HAVE ACHIEVED - ESPECIALLY IN THIS HOUSE - SUCH A VALUED SENSE OF UNIVERSALISM AND UNITY IN DIVERSITY' (MORAWIECKI, 2018 ). ANOTHER RELEVANT CONCERN THEY BOTH MENTIONED WAS THEIR CITIZENS' GENERAL DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE EU, WHICH THEY SAW AS A MAIN SOURCE OF PROBLEMS: WE ARE IN MANY RESPECTS DISSATISFIED WITH THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. WE ARE FORMULATING CRITICISM BECAUSE WE WANT TO CORRECT MISTAKES AND WE WANT TO REFORM THE EUROPEAN UNION. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE CAN ONLY REGAIN THE TRUST OF CITIZENS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, IF WE DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF BAD AND INEFFICIENT OPERATION. FOR THE THERAPY WE NEED A CLEAR DIAGNOSE [SIC] AND THE UNEQUIVOCAL NAMES OF OUR MALADIES. (ORBAN, 2018 ) ANALYSING THE SPEECHES, IT CAN NEVERTHELESS BE SEEN THAT THE VISIONS OF THESE TWO SOVEREIGNTIST LEADERS ARE DIFFERENT WHEN IT COMES TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE EU SHOULD ENGAGE WITH MEMBER STATES. WHEREAS ORBAN PLEADED FOR THE TOTAL NON-INTERVENTION OF THE EU IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MEMBER STATES, MORAWIECKI CLAIMED THAT EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY WOULD REQUIRE A 10 THE COMMISSION
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|a TAKES THE LEAD? YY 233 REDEFINED BALANCE BETWEEN THE SUPRANATIONAL AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVELS, SINCE BOTH OF THE TWO 'LUNGS' OF EUROPE-THE WESTERN AND THE EASTERN-ARE OF EQUAL VALUE FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS. THE POLISH LEADER ALSO GAVE A DEFINITION OF HIS VERSION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATION TO THE EU, AT THE SAME TIME REJECTING THE 'MULTI-SPEED EUROPE' SCENARIO: TO DEAL WITH ALL THESE CHALLENGES, WE NEED TO REDEFINE THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATION-STATES AND COOPERATION AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL. THIS IS WHAT THE UNION OF NATIONS 2.0, DE GAULLE'S VISION, ADAPTED TO THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN TIMES SHOULD RELY ON. (YY) EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY CANNOT MEAN BUILDING THE UNION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE MEMBER STATES, BECAUSE THE STRENGTH OF A SOVEREIGN EUROPE COMES FROM THE STRENGTH OF THE MEMBER STATES. WEAK MEMBER STATES, NATIONS LIVING IN A SENSE OF DISRE GARDING THEIR OPINIONS AND INTERESTS ARE A RECIPE FOR A UNION THAT WILL NOT CARE ABOUT ANYONE WHO BECOMES A PROBLEM AND NOT A SOLUTION TO OUR PROB LEMS. POLAND WILL DO EVERYTHING TO PREVENT THIS SCENARIO FROM OCCURRING. (MORAWIECKI, 2018 ) EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT SHARE THE STRONG SOVEREIGNTIST VIEWS OF ORBAN AND MORAWIECKI, ROMANIA'S PRESIDENT KLAUS IOHANNIS ALSO OPPOSED THE IDEA OF A 'MULTI-SPEED EUROPE' IN HIS SPEECH, INVOKING THE NEED FOR A SENSE OF BELONGING TO THE 'SAME EUROPE' (IOHANNIS, 2018 ; REUTERS, 2017 ). THIS WAS SIMILAR TO WHAT ITALY'S GIUSEPPE CONTE HAD MEANT WHEN HE EXPLAINED TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE EP THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR A TRUE 'EU DEMOS' (CONTE, 2019 ), AS THE ONLY WAY FOR THE EU TO RECONNECT WITH ITS CITIZENS. AS FAR AS THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS WERE CONCERNED, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS WHO PRIORITISED THE NEED FOR GREATER CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT, A POSITION THAT THE TWO SOVEREIGNTIST LEADERS SHARED WITH OTHERS. I THINK THAT IN THIS HOUSE WE ARE ALL MORE OR LESS CONVINCED THAT EUROPEAN
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|a INTEGRATION IS ONE OF THE BEST IDEAS IN THE HISTORY OF NOT ONLY EUROPE BUT ALSO THE WORLD. BUT IF THIS BELIEF WILL NOT BE SHARED BY OUR CITIZENS, NO FURTHER INTEGRATION WILL SIMPLY BE POSSIBLE. (MORAWIECKI, 2018 ) IT IS RELEVANT TO MENTION HERE THAT THIS DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, POLAND, HUNGARY, AND (LATER) ROMANIA, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HAS INTENSIFIED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THE PERIOD OF 234 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A THE FUTURE OF EUROPE PROCESS, WHICH HAS LED AND IS STILL LEADING TO DEEP ENING POLITICISATION. IN 2017, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO INITIATE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, AND POLAND FOR REFUSING TO TAKE RELOCATED REFUGEES. FOLLOWING THIS, THE INVO CATION OF ARTICLE 7 HAD DIRECT NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THESE COUNTRIES, GENERATING STRONG ANTI-EU FEELINGS. HUNGARY AND POLAND BOTH CONTINUED TO TAKE A VERY TOUGH LINE, PORTRAYING THEMSELVES AS 'VIC TIMS' OF PERSISTENT DISCRIMINATION BY THE CORE MEMBER STATES IN THE WEST. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEIR NARRATIVES WERE BUILT ON THE NECESSITY OF PROTECTING THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE FACE OF AN ALL-EMBRACING EUROPEAN INTE GRATION PROCESS, JUSTIFYING THEIR ACTIONS IN TERMS OF THE NEED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. 5.3 THE SUPPORTERS OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY-THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE AND INTRA-EU SOLIDARITY A VERY DIFFERENT VIEW ON SOVEREIGNTY THAN THE ONE DISCUSSED ABOVE WAS PROPOSED BY EMMANUEL MACRON, THE FRENCH PRESIDENT. IN HIS SPEECH, HE URGED FOR THE CREATION OF A 'NEW EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY' THAT WILL ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH THE USE OF DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED EU INSTITUTIONS (PRIMARILY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT) AS FACILITATORS OF DIALOGUE (MACRON, 2018 ). HE UNDERLINED IN DRAMATIC TERMS THE RELEVANCE OF THIS DEBATE: 'A SORT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR IS REAPPEARING, WHERE OUR DIFFERENCES, SOME TIMES OUR NATIONAL EGOISMS, APPEAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT
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|a UNITES US WITHIN A GLOBAL CONTEXT' (MACRON, 2018 ). THIS VIEW WAS ECHOED BY OTHER LEADERS, WHO PUT FORWARD COMPROMISE AND CONSENSUS-SEEKING NARRATIVES, EXPLAINING THAT IF THE EU WISHED TO BECOME MORE INTEGRATED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE MEMBER STATES TO HAVE LESS POWER. AT THE SAME TIME, MACRON PLEADED FOR A 'STRONGER FORM OF SOVEREIGNTY' THAN THE NATIONAL ONE, IMPLYING THAT EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY COULD HELP THE EU TO DEAL EFFEC TIVELY WITH ALL MAJOR PRESENT-DAY ISSUES, SUCH AS LARGE-SCALE MIGRATION, GLOBAL INSECURITY, AND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMA TION. IN HIS VIEW, THIS 'NEW SOVEREIGNTY' WOULD HELP TO TRANSCEND REGIONAL AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES. HE OFFERED A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY FROM HIS POLISH AND HUNGARIAN COUNTERPARTS: TO DEFEND THE EUROPEAN IDEA IS NOT TO DEFEND AN ABSTRACT IDEA, SOME SORT OF DILUTION OF OUR OWN INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY, BUT IT IS TO ACT IN THE FAITH 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 235 THAT FACED WITH SUCH GREAT GLOBAL CHANGES, SUCH LARGE-SCALE TRANSFORMATIONS, THIS TIME IN WHICH WE ARE LIVING, WE NEED A SOVEREIGNTY WHICH IS STRONGER THAN OUR OWN, WHICH WORKS ALONGSIDE OUR OWN AND DOES NOT REPLACE IT, AS ONLY THIS SOVEREIGNTY CAN PROVIDE THE RIGHT ANSWERS TO LARGE-SCALE MIGRATION, GLOBAL INSECURITY AND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS. THIS IS THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY WHICH I BELIEVE IN. (YY) I HOPE THAT IN THE COMING MONTHS WE WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THE DIVIDES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH, EAST AND WEST, SMALL AND LARGE AND BEYOND NATIONAL SELFISHNESS. (MACRON, 2018 ) ON A SIMILAR THEME, ANGELA MERKEL'S INTERVENTION FOCUSED ON TWO INTER CONNECTED ISSUES THAT HAVE DEFINED THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE EU: MIGRATION AND SOLIDARITY. IN HER SPEECH, THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR PLEADED FOR GREATER SOLIDARITY AMONG THE MEMBER STATES WHEN TAKING DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE ENTIRE EU, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION-A MATTER THAT ALSO DEALS WITH THE
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|a LIVES OF PEOPLE WHO COME FROM OUTSIDE THE EU, SEEKING REFUGE FROM VIOLENCE AND ABUSE (MERKEL, 2018 ). IN HER VIEW, SOLIDARITY MUST BE SIMULTANEOUSLY A VALUE, A RESPONSIBILITY OF EVERY EUROPEAN CITIZEN AND A RATIONAL CHOICE OF STRATEGY, DIRECTED TO ENSURING THE CONTINUING PROGRESS OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT: EUROPE WILL ONLY MAKE ITS VOICE HEARD IN THE WORLD IF IT STANDS UNITED. THIS MEANS THAT SHOWING SOLIDARITY ALWAYS REQUIRES OVERCOMING NATIONAL EGOISMS. (YY) WE NEED A SOLIDARITY THAT BENEFITS ALL, ALSO ULTIMATELY AND RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD, MEANS SOLIDARITY THAT IS IN EVERYONE'S OWN BEST INTEREST. RESPECTING AND SUPPORTING OTHERS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND PURSUING ONE'S OWN INTERESTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE NOT CONTRADICTORY. THESE ARE HALL MARKS OF EUROPE: SOLIDARITY AS A UNIVERSAL, FUNDAMENTAL VALUE; SOLIDARITY AS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMUNITY; AND SOLIDARITY IN TERMS OF ONE'S OWN RATIONAL INTEREST. IT IS STILL THE CASE THAT NOT EVERY PROBLEM IN EUROPE IS A PROBLEM FOR EUROPE. SOLIDARITY DOES NOT MEAN OMNIPRESENCE. BUT SOLIDARITY DOES MEAN THAT EUROPE ENGAGES ITSELF WHERE IT IS NEEDED AND THAT IT IS THEN ABLE TO ACT FIRMLY, DECISIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY. (MERKEL, 2018 ) THIS SAME CONCEPT, ASSOCIATED WITH A MORE CONSENSUS-SEEKING VIEW, WAS ALSO EXPRESSED BY ITALY'S PRIME MINISTER GIUSEPPE CONTE, WHO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A FEELING OF BELONGING FOR THE EU'S CITIZENS: THE NEED FOR TRUE SOLIDARITY AND SHARING BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, WITHOUT DIVIDING THE AREAS AND REGIONS OF THE UNION, EUROPE MUST BE CLOSE TO ITS PEOPLES. THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN THE 21ST CENTURY, MUST PURSUE ITS PROJECT 236 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A 'FROM THE PEOPLE' AND 'FOR THE PEOPLE', STARTING WITH COURAGE AND RIGOR WE MUST COMMIT OURSELVES TO REVIEWING WHAT DID NOT WORK, EVEN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATIES, AND TO COUNTER THE CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES AND EUROPEAN DISINTEGRATION, DAUGHTERS SOMETIMES - AS ALSO HAPPENS IN MY COUNTRY -
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|a OF EUROPEAN DISILLUSIONMENT. (CONTE, 2019 ) THE CONCEPT OF 'SOVEREIGNTY' LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MAJOR DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE EU'S NATIONAL LEADERS. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE ARE THE ADVO CATES OF A 'UNION OF NATIONS 2.0', SUCH AS POLAND AND HUNGARY, WHO WISH TO MOVE THE EU CLOSER TO DISSATISFIED CITIZENS AND SEEK TO PUT CHRIS TIANITY AT THE CENTRE OF ITS VALUE SYSTEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS A GROUP OF COUNTRIES, SUCH AS FRANCE AND GERMANY, WHO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF 'MORE EUROPE' (IN CERTAIN POLICY AREAS AT LEAST), EVEN TO THE POINT OF DEFINING NEW FORMS OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY AND GREATER SOLIDARITY. THE EU'S SEVERE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IS ADDRESSED IN ALL THE SELECTED SPEECHES AND SEVERAL INVITATIONS FOR INCREASED CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT HAVE BEEN EXTENDED AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS, NOTABLY BY ITALY. THIS SUCCESSION OF SPEECHES GIVEN IN A TRANSNATIONAL SETTING SERVED TO PERPETUATE TENSIONS ALREADY EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES, DEMONSTRATING ONCE AGAIN THAT THE MORE POLARISED THESE DISCOURSES ARE, THE MORE POLITICISED EU ISSUES BECOME. HOWEVER, THIS TYPE OF 'DISCURSIVE INTERGOVERNMENTALISM' IS NOT PROOF THAT THE DEBATE HAS BECOME MORE INCLUSIVE AS FAR AS OTHER ACTORS ARE CONCERNED, BUT IS RATHER A CONSOLIDATION OF ELITE POSITIONS THAT DO NOT EXTEND FAR BEYOND THE 'EU BUBBLE'. 6 CONCLUSIONS EUROPEAN NARRATIVES ARE RELEVANT FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT FRAGMEN TATION OF THE EU, WHICH HAS BEEN MARKED IN RECENT YEARS BY MULTIPLE LEGITIMACY CRISES. CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARLY DEBATE HAS SHOWN THAT ANY NARRATIVE PUBLICLY PERFORMED IS SUBJECT TO POLITICISATION, OFFERING SPACE FOR CONTRASTING POSITIONS ON THE SAME SUBJECT. DURING THE 'POLYCRISES' THAT CHARACTERISED THE 2010S, SUBSTANTIAL DISSONANCES BETWEEN EU INSTITUTIONS AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES RESULTED IN STRONG ANTI-EU NARRATIVES AND TARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST THE JUNCKER COMMISSION. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BREXIT
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|a REFERENDUM, OPPOSING THE EU AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION BECAME THE MAIN FOCUS FOR SEVERAL LEADERS IN MEMBER STATES, WHO VOCALLY ADVOCATED THE NEED FOR FEWER SUPRANA TIONAL POWERS AND GREATER NATIONALIST PROTECTIONISM 'AGAINST BRUSSELS'. IN 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 237 THIS CHAPTER, WE ARGUE THAT THE EC PURPOSEFULLY ORGANISED THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES AGAINST THIS TENSE BACKGROUND, SPECIFICALLY IN ORDER TO USE THESE INTERNAL EU FRICTIONS AS A BOOST TO THE PROCESS OF POLITICISATION. BY OFFERING A SPACE TO ALL THESE DIFFERENT AND OPPOSING VIEWS, THE COMMISSION AIMED TO BRING THE EU BACK INTO CLOSER CONTACT WITH ITS CITIZENS, WHICH ILLUSTRATES WHAT WE CALL 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION'. THE FINAL TWO YEARS OF PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S MANDATE REPRESENT AN IMPOR TANT POLITICAL JUNCTURE FOR THE EU , DURING WHICH CRUCIAL TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AND POSITIONS RENEGOTIATED BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, OFTEN FAR OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIC TOPICS OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. SINCE THE LAUNCH OF THE WHITE PAPER IN MARCH 2017, THE COMMISSION'S RHETORIC ACTIVATED SOME OF THE MAIN CATALYSTS FOR A VIBRANT AND POLITICISED DEBATE WITHIN THE EU, MAKING THE DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN VARIOUS MEMBER STATES MORE VISIBLE. IT WAS IN THIS PERIOD THAT THE CLASHES BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF POLAND AND HUNGARY AND THE COMMISSION REACHED THEIR PEAK, AT EXACTLY THE TIME WHEN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES WERE TAKING PLACE. OUR CONCLUSIONS MATCH THOSE OF COMAN AND LECONTE ( 2019 ), WHO DEMON STRATED THAT THE EU'S RECENT MULTIPLE CRISES-WHETHER RELATED TO ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY, BORDERS AND MIGRATION, OR DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW-HAVE GENERATED PARALLEL CONFLICTS ABOUT VALUES AND THE LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY, CALLING INTO QUESTION THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL LEGIT IMACY OF THE EU. THIS CONFIRMS WHAT OTHER AUTHORS HAVE OUTLINED: THAT A NEW TRANSNATIONAL-NATIONAL CLEAVAGE IS BEING CREATED BY THE DEEPENING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THE GROWTH OF TRADE AND
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|a INCREASING IMMIGRATION, WHICH HAS DRAMATICALLY CHANGED THE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM BY PROMOTING THE RISE OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING AND RADICAL LEFT-WING PARTIES THAT ARE OPPOSED TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2018 ). OUR CONTRIBUTION SHOWS THAT THE FUTURE OF EUROPE INITIATIVE WAS NOT ONLY A FORUM FOR DEBATING DIFFERENT VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EU, BUT ALSO AN OPPORTUNITY TO LAUNCH AND DISCUSS NEW IDEAS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS, WHICH OFTEN DISPLAYED DIFFERENT NATIONAL PRIORITIES. IN THIS WAY, OUR CHAPTER PROPOSES A THEORETICAL MODEL THAT VIEWS 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITI CISATION' AS A PROCESS THAT CREATES INCENTIVES FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO PANDER TO WIDELY SHARED INTERESTS, PROVIDING IT CHOOSES ISSUES THAT ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION AND THAT PROVOKE MEMBER STATES' REACTIONS. THIS WAS CERTAINLY THE CASE WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND THE MOST DESIRABLE MODEL FOR FURTHER INTEGRATION, WHICH FORMED THE CORE OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES THAT WERE STRATEGICALLY PLANNED TO END JUST DAYS BEFORE THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S BID 238 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A TO 'REGAIN CITIZEN TRUST' HAD LIMITED EFFECT IN TERMS OF 'EXTENDING THE DEBATE TO MORE AND MORE ACTORS', BUT IT DID INDEED SET THE SCENE FOR WHAT THE NEW EC PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN, TOGETHER WITH THE EP AND THE COUNCIL, HAS ANNOUNCED AS A 'PERMANENT DIALOGUE BETWEEN EU CITIZENS IN EU MEMBER STATES AND THE HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS', WHICH WILL FIND EXPRESSION IN THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE INITIATED IN MAY 2021. MORE IN-DEPTH RESEARCH ON OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION' AND HOW THEY INFLU ENCE THE POLITICAL STEERING OF THE NEW COMMISSION IN THE YEARS AHEAD IS NOW NEEDED. REFERENCES BECK, U. (2000). THE COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE: SOCIOLOGY OF THE SECOND AGE OF MODERNITY. BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 51 (1), 79-105. BOUZA GARCIA, L.
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|a (2017). THE NARRATIVE TURN IN EUROPEAN STUDIES. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES, 25 (3), 285-378. BOUZA GARCIA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87- 104. CALDWELL, C. (2019). HUNGARY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS. RETRIEVED JUNE 20, 2019, FROM HTTPS://CLAREMONTREVIEWOFBOOKS.COM/ HUNGARY-AND-THE-FUTURE-OF-EUROPE/ . COMAN, R., & LECONTE, C. (2019). CONTESTING EU AUTHORITY IN THE NAME OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE NEW CLOTHES OF THE SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 41 (7), 855-870. CONTE, G. (2019). DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: STATEMENT BY GIUSEPPE CONTE, ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 7, 2019, FROM HTTPS://MULTIMEDIA.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/EN/DEBATE-ON-THE-FUTURE-OF-EUR OPE-STATEMENT-BY-GIUSEPPE-CONTE-ITALIAN-PRIME-MINISTER-17_I167323-V_V . CRESPY, A., & VERSCHUEREN, N. (2009). FROM EUROSCEPTICISM TO RESISTANCE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE. PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY., 10 (3), 377-393. DE WILDE, P. (2019). MEDIA LOGIC AND GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (8), 1193-1212. DE WILDE, P., LEUPOLD, A., & SCHMIDTKE, H. (2016). INTRODUCTION: THE DIFFER ENTIATED POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 3-22. DEHOUSSE, R. (2016). HAS THE EUROPEAN UNION MOVED TOWARDS SOFT GOVERNANCE? COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 14 (1), 20-35. 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 239 EPRS. (2019A). THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. A SYNTHESIS OF THE SPEECHES BY EU HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 7, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/REGDATA/ETUDES/ IDAN/2019/637948/EPRS_IDA(2019)637948_EN.PDF . EPRS. (2019B). ORIGINS OF
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|a THE 2019-24 EU STRATEGIC AGENDA. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/REGDATA/ETUDES/STUD/ 2019/631762/EPRS_STU(2019)631762_EN.PDF . EURACTIV. (2018). EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT VOTES AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL LISTS. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.EURACTIV.COM/SECTION/ELECTIONS/NEWS/EP VOTES-AGAINST-TRANSNATIONAL-LISTS/ . EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2017A). WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (2017). RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/COMMISSION/FUTURE-EUR OPE/WHITE-PAPER-FUTURE-EUROPE_EN . EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2017B). PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 2017. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 7, 2019, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA. EU/COMMISSION/PRESSCORNER/DETAIL/EN/SPEECH_17_3165 . EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2018). STATE OF THE UNION 2018. THE HOUR OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 7, 2019, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/INFO/ SITES/INFO/FILES/SOTEU2018-SPEECH_EN_0.PDF . EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2019). PROGRESS REPORT ON CITIZENS' DIALOGUES AND CITI ZENS' CONSULTATIONS. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/ COMMISSION/PROGRESS-REPORTS-CITIZENS-DIALOGUES-AND-CONSULTATIONS_EN . FABBRINI, S., & PUETTER, U. (2016). INTEGRATION WITHOUT SUPRANATIONALISATION: STUDYING THE LEAD ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL IN POST LISBON EU POLITICS. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 38 (5), 481-495. FUCHS, D., & ESCHER, R. (2015). IS THERE A LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?. IN A. HURRELMANN & S. SCHNEIDER (EDS.), THE LEGITIMACY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. HOBOLT, S. B. (2018). THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. IN M. CASTELLS, O. BOUIN, J. CARACA, G. CARDOSO, J. THOMPSON, & M. WIEVIORKA (EDS.), EUROPE'S CRISES (PP. 243-268). NEW JERSEY: JOHN WILEY & SONS. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POST-FUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2018). CLEAVAGE THEORY MEETS EUROPE'S CRISES: LIPSET, ROKKAN, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 25 (1), 109-135. IOHANNIS, K. (2018). DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: STATEMENT BY KLAUS IOHANNIS, PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 7, 2019, FROM HTTPS://MULTIMEDIA.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/EN/DEBATE--ON-THE-FUTURE-OF-EUROPE STATEMENT-BY-KLAUS-IOHANNIS-PRESIDENT-OF-ROMANIA_I162130-V_V . 240 M. BUTNARU-TRONCOT YY A AND D. IONIT , YY A KAUPPI, N., PALONEN, K., & WIESNER, C. (2016). 'THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITI CISATION OF THE EU', REDESCRIPTIONS: POLITICAL THOUGHT . CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND FEMINIST THEORY, 19 (1), 72-90. KRIESI, H., & GRANDE, E. (2016). THE EURO CRISIS: A BOOST TO THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? IN H. KRIESI, S. HUTTER, & E. GRANDE (EDS.), POLITICISING EUROPE: INTEGRATION AND MASS POLITICS (PP. 240-276). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. MACRON, E. (2018). SPEECH BY EMMANUEL MACRON, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.ELYSEE.FR/ EMMANUEL-MACRON/2018/04/17/SPEECH-BY-EMMANUEL-MACRON-PRESIDENT-OF THE-REPUBLIC-AT-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT.EN . MERKEL, A. (2018). DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: OPENING STATEMENT BY ANGELA MERKEL, GERMAN FEDERAL CHANCELLOR. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://MULTIMEDIA.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/EN/DEBATE-ON-THE-FUT URE-OF-EUROPE-OPENING-STATEMENT-BY-ANGELA-MERKEL-GERMAN-FEDERAL-CHANCE LLOR-_I162933-V_V . MORAWIECKI, M. (2018). FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE WITH MATEUSZ MORAW IECKI, POLISH PRIME MINISTER: EXTRACTS FROM THE OPENING SPEECHES. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://MULTIMEDIA.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/EN/FUTURE-OF EUROPE-DEBATE-WITH-MATEUSZ-MORAWIECKI-POLISH-PRIME-MINISTER-EXTRACTS-FROM THE-OPENING-SPEECHES--_I158089-V_V . OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. OLEART, A., & BOUZA GARCIA, L. (2018).
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|a DEMOCRACY AT STAKE: MULTIPOSITIONAL ACTORS AND POLITICIZATION IN THE EU CIVIL SOCIETY FIELD. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 56 (4), 870-887. OLEART, A., & BOUZA GARCIA, L. (2019). LA LUTTE NARRATIVE POUR LA SIGNIFICATION ET LA POLITISATION DE L'EUROPE DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS DU TTIP: LE RECIT DE L'EU ROPE BOUCLIER CONTRE LE POPULISME TRANSNATIONAL. POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE, 66 (4), 16-42. ORBAN, V. (2018). PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR ORBAN'S SPEECH IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. RETRIEVED DECEMBER 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://BERN.MFA.GOV.HU/ ENG/NEWS/ORBAN-VIKTOR-MINISZTERELNOEK-FELSZOLALASA-AZ-EUROPAI-PARLAMENT-PLE NARIS-UELESEN . POLITICO. (2018). POLAND IS EUROPE'S FUTURE-BUT WHICH ONE? RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.POLITICO.EU/ARTICLE/POLAND-EUROPE-EU-BRUSSELS WARSAW-FUTURE/ . REUTERS. (2017). ROMANIA OPPOSES MULTI-SPEED EU, NEW MECHANISMS FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://UK.REUTERS. COM/ARTICLE/US-CEE-SUMMIT-MELESCANU/ROMANIA-OPPOSES-MULTI-SPEED-EU NEW-MECHANISMS-FOR-HUNGARY-AND-POLAND-IDUKKBN18K25W . 10 THE COMMISSION TAKES THE LEAD? YY 241 RAUH, C., BES, B. J., & SCHOONVELDE, M. (2020). UNDERMINING, DEFUSING OR DEFENDING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? ASSESSING PUBLIC COMMUNICATION OF EURO PEAN EXECUTIVES IN TIMES OF EU POLITICISATION. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 59 (2), 397-423. RISSE, T. (2010). A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES? CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS. ROMANIA INSIDER (2019). SIBIU SUMMIT: EU LEADERS STRESS UNITY BUT POSTPONE IMPORTANT DECISIONS FOR AFTER THE ELECTIONS. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.ROMANIA-INSIDER.COM/SIBIU-POST-SUMMIT-2019 . SCHIMMELFENNIG, F. (2018). EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (THEORY) IN TIMES OF CRISIS. A COMPARISON OF THE EURO AND SCHENGEN CRISES. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 25 (7), 969-989. SCHMIDT, V. (2015). THE FORGOTTEN PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. IN M. BLYTH & M. MATTHIJS (EDS.), THE FUTURE OF THE EURO (PP.
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|a 90-116). OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H. J. (2015). UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF EU POLITI CIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE EUROZONE CRISIS. COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 13 (3), 287-306. TRENZ, H. J., & EDER, K. (2004). THE DEMOCRATISING ROLE OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE. TOWARDS A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONALISM. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY, 7 (1), 5-25. TRONCOTYYA, M., & LOY, A. (2018). EU CRISES AS 'CATALYSTS OF EUROPEANIZA TION'? INSIGHTS FROM EUROBAROMETER DATA IN ROMANIA ON THE IMPACT OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS AND BREXIT. EUROPOLITY, 12 (1), 171-232. RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTP://EUROPOLITY.EU/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2018/06/VOL-12 NO1_TRONCOTA_LOY_EUROPOLITY_12_1_2018.PDF . WIESNER, C. (2021). POLITICISATION, POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY. IN RETHINKING POLITI CISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WRIGHT, T. (2019). THE OPENING OF EUROPE'S OVERTON WINDOW. BROOKINGS . RETRIEVED JUNE 15, 2019, FROM HTTPS://WWW.BROOKINGS.EDU/RESEARCH/THE OPENING-OF-EUROPES-OVERTON-WINDOW/ . ZEITLIN, J., NICOLI, F., & LAFFAN, B. (2019). INTRODUCTION: THE EUROPEAN UNION BEYOND THE POLYCRISIS? INTEGRATION AND POLITICIZATION IN AN AGE OF SHIFTING CLEAVAGES. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (7), 963-976. CHAPTER 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS A RESPONSE TO POLITICISATION IN TIMES OF EU CONTESTATION MARIA-ISABEL SOLDEVILA AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN 1 INTRODUCTION IN THE FACE OF THE INCREASING POLITICISATION OF DEBATES ABOUT THE EU, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC) HAS BEEN ADAPTING AND REVISING THE DESIGN OF ITS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY TOWARDS CITIZENS WITH THE AIM OF ADDRESSING THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. THIS CHAPTER SEEKS TO OUTLINE THIS EVOLUTION IN ORDER TO SHOW THE WAYS IN WHICH THE EC HAS ADAPTED ITS COMMUNICA TION STRATEGY TO BETTER FUNCTION IN A CLIMATE OF EU CONTESTATION (DE WILDE ET AL., 2013 ) AND THE SUBSEQUENT NEED FOR FURTHER LEGITIMATION IT
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|a GENERATES. IT THEREFORE AIMS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EXTENSIVE LITERATURE ON THE EURO PEAN COMMISSION'S ONGOING EFFORTS TO MOVE THE NEEDLE TOWARDS POSITIVE M.-I. SOLDEVILA J. VANDER MEULEN ( B ) UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM M.-I. SOLDEVILA E-MAIL: MARIA-ISABEL.SOLDEVILA.BREA@ULB.BE THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_11 243 244 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN FEELINGS ABOUT THE EU BY ANALYSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMIS SION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY TOWARDS AN AUDIENCE-CENTRIC DATA-BASED APPROACH. IN ORDER TO DO SO, LET US FIRST TURN TO THE THEORETICAL DISCUS SIONS AROUND THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, ITS STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY, ITS POLITICISATION, AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE EC'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY, TO SITUATE THIS CHAPTER WITHIN THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND THEN MOVE ON TO THE EMPIRICAL PARTS WITH A SET FRAMEWORK IN MIND. AS EU INSTITUTIONS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE WEIGHT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION, THE 'LEGITIMACY' PROBLEM HAS BECOME A KEY DRIVER FOR POLICY-MAKING, SPECIFICALLY IN THE CASE OF COMMUNICATION TOWARDS EU CITIZENS. ALTHOUGH INTER-INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE EFFORTS TO COMMUNICATE THE EUROPEAN PROJECT IS INCREASINGLY PUT FORWARD, UNDER STANDING THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AS A BODY THAT PROPOSES AND IMPLEMENTS POLICY AND LEGISLATION IS KEY WHEN TRYING TO STUDY HOW THE EU HAS TRIED TO COMMUNICATE AND ENGAGE WITH ITS CITIZENS, MOST NOTABLY IN TIMES OF CONTESTATION. THE EC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENTING EU POLI CIES TO ITS CITIZENS WHO, FOR THE MOST PART, FEEL ALIENATED FROM BRUSSELS BECAUSE THEY PERCEIVE THAT THEY 'HAVE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD ON EUROPEAN ISSUES' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006A ,P .4 ) . INDEED, IN THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY, THERE HAS BEEN A
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|a TENDENCY TO GAIN MORE UNDERSTANDING OF HOW INTERLINKED THE EU AND ITS CITIZENS ARE, AND A CONCEPT EMERGED AS A RESULT: THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE (EPS). THIS SHIFT OF ATTENTION TOWARDS THE EPS FURTHER LED TO THE REALISATION OF WHAT BRUEGGEMAN CALLED THE 'NEW BLACK HOLE' OF THE EU PROJECT, NAMELY, THE COMMUNICATION DEFICIT-WHICH IS, IN TURN, TIGHTLY RELATED TO THE DEMOCRATIC AND LEGITIMACY DEFICITS (BRUEGGEMANN, 2005 ,P .5 8 ) . UNMEASURABLE AMOUNTS OF INK HAVE BEEN POURED TO DISCUSS WHETHER THE EU IS LEGITIMATE OR NOT, TO DESCRIBE THE SYMPTOMS THAT DEFINE THE SO-CALLED DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND THE REASONS FOR IT (E.G. FOELLESDAL, 2006 ; SCHMIDT, 2013 ). BUT BEYOND THE REASONS EXPLAINING THE (IL-)LEGITIMACY OF THE EU, THE FACT REMAINS THAT CONTESTATION AGAINST THE EUROPEAN PROJECT HAS BEEN A CONSTANT SINCE THE END OF THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' PERIOD (HOOGHE &M A R K S , 2009 )-NEARLY 30 YEARS AGO-EMBODIED FIRST BY THE FRENCH AND DANISH REJECTIONS OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, A TURNING POINT THAT MARKED THE BEGINNING OF SUBSEQUENT TRIAL AND ERROR EXPERIMENTS TO REACH OUT AND (RE)CONNECT EUROPEAN CITIZENS TO THE EU PROJECT. MOMENTS OF CRISES AND STRONG QUESTIONING OF THE EU'S LEGITIMACY HAVE MARKED THE LAST THREE TENURES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. DURING JOSE MANUEL DURAO 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 245 BARROSO'S FIRST PRESIDENCY (2004-2009), IT WAS THE REJECTION OF A EURO PEAN CONSTITUTION; DURING HIS SECOND MANDATE (2009-2014), THE EURO CRISIS SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNION. HIS SUCCESSOR, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER (2014-2019), HAD TO DEAL WITH BREXIT, THE SO-CALLED REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE RISE OF POPULISM IN MEMBER STATES. ALL THESE EVENTS HAVE IGNITED CONTESTATION, AND WITH IT, THE POLITICISATION OF EU ISSUES, WHICH ENTAILED IMPORTANT SHIFTS IN THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WITH THE INTENT TO REACH OUT TO CITIZENS TO BRIDGE THE GAP SEPARATING
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|a THEM FROM THE EU PROJECT. BUT FAR FROM BEING A LINEAR PROCESS, IT SEEMS THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED BY A CONSTANT BACK AND FORTH MOVEMENT BETWEEN A DESIRE TO BRIDGE THE DEFICITS IT HAS BEEN CRITICISED FOR AND WHAT MEYER ( 1999 ) PORTRAYED ALREADY TWO DECADES AGO AS A RETICENCE TOWARDS PUBLIC COMMUNICATION. AS HE EXPLAINED, 'THE COMMISSION'S PUBLIC COMMUNICATION SUFFERS FROM THE FRAGMENTATION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, A PERVADING TECHNOCRATIC MINDSET', AND '(IT) IS LOCATED WITHIN A SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE, WHICH DEPOLITICISES CONFLICT AND OBFUSCATES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY' (MEYER, 1999 , P. 617). VAN BRUSSEL'S PAPER EXEMPLIFIES THIS PARTICULARLY WELL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO FOCUS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'DIALOGIC AND PARTICIPATORY' DIMENSIONS OF THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FROM 2001 TO 2013 (VAN BRUSSEL, 2014), IN WHICH IT ARGUES THAT THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO DIALOGUE WITH CITIZENS WAS PERMEATED BY THE OBJECTIVE OF FILLING THE LEGITIMACY GAP AND HIGHLIGHTS THE STRATEGIC SHIFTS BACKWARDS DURING SECOND BARROSO TENURE. STILL, THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AN ONGOING EFFORT IN THE DIALOGIC DIREC TION, WHICH HAS BEEN PUSHED FURTHER AS EU CONTESTATION STRENGTHENED. IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THERE WAS A SHIFT FROM THE COMMUNICATION APPROACH OF THE COMMISSION BEFORE AND AFTER THE REJECTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION IN 2005. INDEED, PRE-CONSTITUTION, THE COMMISSION WAS COMMUNICATING AROUND ISSUES OF CONTESTATION AND LEGITIMACY IN A UNILAT ERAL MANNER, MAINLY FOCUSING ON MAKING THE ALREADY EXISTING INFORMATION MORE TRANSPARENT; POST-CONSTITUTION, THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY BECAME MORE OPEN AS THE COMMISSION ACTIVELY SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH CITIZENS AND 'GO LOCAL', THROUGH PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE (MICHAILIDOU, 2010 ,P .7 0 ) . 246 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN ALTHOUGH THE EC AND ITS DG COMM 1 MAY WELL HAVE GRADUALLY INTRO DUCED TOOLS
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|a FOR INTERACTION WITH CITIZENS IN THEIR COMMUNICATIONAL TACTICS, THEY ARE STILL FIXED ON WHAT SCHLESINGER CALLED 'A TOP-DOWN SUPPLY-SIDE TRANSMISSION OF POLITICAL INFORMATION TO RECALCITRANT CITIZENS, USING TRADI TIONAL MEDIA INSTRUMENTALLY AND NEW MEDIA EXPEDIENTLY ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS WILL "CLOSE THE GAP" AND END THE "ALIENATION" DETECTED' (FOSSUM ET AL., 2007 , P. 68). THE ROAD HAS BEEN ROCKY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMIS SION TO, FIRST, UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A STRATEGY TO COMMU NICATE WITH CITIZENS, AND SECOND, TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO SHIFT FROM A VERTICAL, UNIDIRECTIONAL STRATEGY, TO ONE THAT FOSTERS DIALOGUE AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT. AS POST-EMPIRICIST SCHOLARS HAVE LONG ARGUED, ELEMENTS LIKE LANGUAGE, DISCOURSE, ARGUMENT, AND STORIES ARE KEY IN FRAMING POLICY QUESTIONS (FISCHER, 2003 ). IT HAS ALSO BEEN ARGUED THAT SYMBOLS AND MESSAGES CAN INFLUENCE THE SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE OF ITS CITIZENS (BRUTER, 2003 ). UNDER THIS LOGIC, MESSAGES ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS ADVANTAGES ARE POTENTIALLY POWERFUL FRAMES THAT INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE COMMISSION USE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR AUDIENCES, AND AS A RESULT, THE COMMISSION HAS FOR DECADES FRAMED ITS MESSAGES TO BETTER REACH CITIZENS IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE LEGITIMACY GAP. AS BIEGON( 2013 ) SHOWS THROUGH HER TRIPARTITE TYPOLOGY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION USED THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF NARRATIVES FROM 1973 TO 1994. EACH TIME IT ATTEMPTED TO LEGIT IMISE THE EU BY ADAPTING TO THE CONTEXT OF THE MOMENT, GOING FROM THE NARRATIVE OF A 'FUNCTIONALIST EUROPE' FROM 1973 TO 1984, TO A NARRATIVE OF 'EUROPEAN IDENTITY' FROM 1985 TO 1989, TO THE NARRATIVE OF A 'DEMOCRATIC EUROPE' FROM 1990 TO 1994, THE LATTER'S UNDERLYING LOGIC BEING THAT THE ONLY WAY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT TO BE BRIDGED IS THROUGH IMPROVING THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EU'S INSTITUTIONS AND ITS CITIZENS. THE EC'S LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES WERE FURTHER
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|a INVESTIGATED BY PANSARDI AND BATTEGAZZORRE ( 2018 ) IN LATER PERIODS AS THEY FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BARROSO AND JUNCKER COMMISSIONS, HIGHLIGHTING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. JUNCKER'S STRATEGY WAS BASED ON AN INPUT-BASED CONCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY FOCUSED ON LEGITIMACY AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY. ANALYSING THE EC'S LEGITIMATION PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS OF INTER INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS, BUNEA SHOWS HOW THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION USES PUBLIC DEBATES, ESPECIALLY AROUND POLICY CONTROVERSIES, TO INFORM ITS 1 I.E. THE BODY OF THE COMMISSION WHOSE GOAL IS TO COMMUNICATE ON WHAT THE EU ACTUALLY DOES AND EXPLAIN EUROPEAN POLICIES TO EU CITIZENS. 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 247 DRAFT AGREEMENTS AS A LEGITIMATION PROCESS (BUNEA, 2020 ). A PERSISTENT PATTERN THEREFORE EMERGES IN THE LITERATURE. NO MATTER WHICH WAY SCHOLARS TACKLE THE TOPIC OF HOW THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DISCURSIVELY APPROACHES THE EU, THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT IS EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON STRENGTHENING ITS LEGITIMACY. AS BARKER EXPLAINS, LEGITIMATION IS 'AN ACTIVITY IN WHICH RULERS ENGAGE (BY CLAIMING) THAT THEY POSSESS A DISTINGUISHING, SPECIFIC MONOPOLY OF THE RIGHT TO RULE, OF "LEGITIMACY"' (BARKER, 2001 ,P .2 4 ) .FU R T H ER ,TH EE CI S CHARACTERISED BY THE USE OF WHAT IS CALLED TOP-DOWN LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES, WHICH ARE 'GOAL-ORIENTED ACTIVITIES EMPLOYED TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A RELIABLE BASIS FOR DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR A POLITICAL REGIME BY ITS SOCIAL CONSTITUENCIES' (GRONAU & SCHMIDTKE, 2016 , P. 541). SOME, LIKE THEILER ( 2005 ), HOWEVER, ARGUE THAT SUCH TOP-DOWN LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES, BY CONSTRUCTING CERTAIN SYMBOLS AND IDEAS ABOUT THE EU, CAN SPARK A FORM OF BOTTOM-UP COMMUNICATION AS A RESPONSE. IN THE SAME VEIN, STATHAM AND TRENZ ( 2013 ) ARGUE THAT CRITICAL FEEDBACK AND DEBATE ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPACES DEMOCRATISES AND THEREFORE ALSO LEGITIMISES THE EU THROUGH THIS INCREASE OF
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|a POLITICISATION (SEE ALSO BOUZA &O L EA R T , 2018 ;O L EAR T , 2021 ). THIS FORM OF POLITICISATION THROUGH CONTESTATION IS SEEN, IN THIS CHAPTER, THROUGH THE SCHMITTERIAN LENS AS AN OPTIMIST DYNAMIC MODEL (SCHMITTER, 1969 , P. 166) WHERE THE CONFLICTS THAT EMANATE FROM INCREASING POLITICISA TION OF INTEGRATION CAN LEAD TO A TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND EU INSTITUTIONS, ALLOWING FOR A MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION THROUGH THE REDEFINING OF 'MUTUAL OBJEC TIVES'. ALSO, IN THIS BOOK, BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA AND IONIT , YY A'S CHAPTER PROPOSES THAT THE LEGITIMISING NARRATIVES USED BY THE COMMISSION IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE HAVE OPENED UP SPACE FOR COUNTER-NARRATIVES TO EMERGE ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL, FURTHER ARGUING THAT THIS CAN BE SEEN AS A FORM OF 'SUPRA NATIONAL POLITICISATION' ON THE PART OF THE EC IN ITS WILLINGNESS TO REGAIN LEGITIMACY. LOOKING AT THE IMPACT OF POLITICISATION OF EU DEBATES FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, WE SEEK TO EXPLAIN HOW THE EUROPEAN COMMIS SION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY HAS EVOLVED IN THE FACE OF EU CONTESTATION AS A RESPONSE TO THIS INCREASED POLITICISATION OF EU ISSUES IN THE EPS. WHILE SOME, LIKE ZUERN ( 2016 ), ENVISAGE POLITICISATION AS THE MOVE MENT OF A 'FIELD' OR 'SPHERE' BECOMING POLITICAL THAT PREVIOUSLY WAS NOT CONSIDERED AS SUCH, WE (LIKE WIESNER, KAUPPI, HAAPALA AND PALONEN IN THIS VOLUME), CHOOSE TO UNDERSTAND IT AS AN 'ACTIVITY'. IT IS A VISION OF POLITICISATION THAT IS INGRAINED IN A PERCEPTION OF POLITICS THAT 'RELATES TO 248 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN WHAT THE ACTORS DO, THEN, NOT TO THE FIELD IN WHICH THEY ACT' (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 , P. 76). AS PALONEN EXPLAINS, POLITICISATION 'THUS REFERS TO THE ACT OF NAMING SOMETHING AS POLITICAL, INCLUDING THE CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS NAMING' (PALONEN, 2003 , P. 182). THIS CONCEP TION OF POLITICISATION REQUIRES A
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|a CHANGE FROM SOMETHING BEING PERCEIVED AS 'NON-POLITICAL' TO CONSCIOUSLY MAKING IT BECOME POLITICAL-IT NEEDS SOME THING NEW TO EMERGE OUT OF A CONSCIOUS CHOICE TRANSLATED INTO AN ACTION THAT CREATES A 'POLITICISING SHIFT' (IBID., P. 183). REGARDING EU INTEGRATION, THIS LINE OF THINKING HOLDS THAT THE INTEGRATION PROJECT WAS A POLITICAL ONE FROM ITS VERY ONSET BUT IT WAS PRESENTED AS APOLITICAL BY THE EUROPEAN ELITE FOR POLITICAL REASONS (KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). IT INCLUDES THREE TIMES/FORMS OF POLITICISATION THROUGH THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS: 'POLITIFICATION' WHICH IS A FORM OF POLITICISATION THAT OCCURS THROUGH DEPOLITICISATION; 'POLITISATION' WHICH AMOUNTS TO THE PASSIVE ACTION OF BEING UNINTENDINGLY POLITICISED, AND 'POLITICISATION' WHICH IS THE ACTIVE FORM OF WILLINGLY RENDERING SOME THING POLITICAL (IBID., P. 74). A FOURTH CONCEPT, 'POLITICKING' IS ALSO OF INTEREST TO THIS CHAPTER, AS IT IS DEFINED AS A PERFORMATIVE ACT, FOCUSED NOT SO MUCH ON THE ACTION AND ITS CONSEQUENT RESULT, BUT ON THE 'HOW' OF POLI TICS, I.E. THE MANNER IN WHICH POLITICS IS BEING DONE AS AN ACTIVITY. IN OTHER WORDS, POLITICKING ARE POLITICISATION PERFORMANCES USED 'AS INSTRUMENTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER' (PALONEN, 2003 , P. 178). THE LATTER CONCEPT IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE IDEA OF POLITICS AS A 'SPECTACLE' WHICH IS 'STAGED' FOR A 'SPECTATOR', AND A VERSION OF CONSTRUCTED REALITY WHICH BLURS AND OBSCURES (DE-)POLITICISATION PROCESSES (EDELMAN, 1988 ). GOING BACK TO THE CONTEXT OF EU INTEGRATION, SOME AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT EU POLITICISATION WITH ITS RESPECTIVE IMPACT ON LEGITIMACY 'IS STAGED IN AND FOR THE MASS MEDIA' (DE WILDE ET AL., 2013 ,P .2 ) . APPLYING THIS LOGIC TO THE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMU NICATION STRATEGY, WE SEEK TO SHOW IN THIS CHAPTER THAT BY USING A NEW SET OF TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS AND STRATEGICAL TACTICS THAT INCLUDE THE AUDIENCE
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|a CENTRIC 'HEARTS AND MINDS APPROACH', THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAS BEEN TRYING TO 'MOVE THE NEEDLE' TO BRIDGE THE LEGITIMACY GAP THAT SEPARATES THE EU FROM ITS CITIZENS BY ADAPTING AND RESPONDING TO INCREASED EU POLITI CISATION. WE WILL FURTHER TRY TO UNDERSTAND, USING THE CONCEPTUAL TOOLS DESCRIBED ABOVE WHETHER THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE REALLY IS AN ACT OF POLITICISATION. IN ORDER TO DO SO, THE REST OF THE CHAPTER IS STRUCTURED AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, WE WILL BRIEFLY OUTLINE OUR METHOD FOCUSED ON AN AUDIENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION. THEN WE WILL LOOK AT HOW THE COMMISSION COMMUNICATES WITH CITIZENS WITH A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED STRATEGIC 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 249 COMMUNICATION DOCUMENTS FROM THE LAST THREE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ADMINISTRATIONS (FROM 2004 TO 2019), WITH THE AIM OF MAPPING THE EVOLU TIVE PROCESS OF ITS COMMUNICATION IN THE FACE OF CONTESTATION. WE WILL PUT A SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON THE JUNCKER COMMISSION (2014-2019), DEFINED BY THE FORMER PRESIDENT HIMSELF AS A ' VERY POLITICAL COMMISSION' (JUNCKER, 2015 ). THEN, A CASE STUDY OF ONE OF THE THREE CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS LAUNCHED BY THE JUNCKER COMMISSION, #EUANDME, WILL BE ANALYSED IN PARTICULAR, AS IT INVOLVES SEVERAL CHANGES IN THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNI CATION PROCEDURES. AFTER THESE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES, THE CHAPTER CLOSES ON A DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS FOUND ABOUT THE EC'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AND HOW THEY RELATE TO RELEVANT THEORIES ON LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES AND TYPES OF ACTIVITY-FORMS OF POLITICS. 2 RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN IN ITS QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY, THE COMMISSION HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTING A STORY LINE ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WITH VARIATIONS IN STORYTELLING, MEDIUM, AND APPROACH, BUT CONSISTENT IN ITS GOAL OF CLOSING THE LEGITIMACY GAP. IT HAS CREATED A RATIONAL/FUNCTIONAL WAY OF COMMUNICATING AS AN ARGUMENT TO 'SELL' THE BENEFITS OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT IN A MARKETING-STYLE MANNER, WHICH HAS
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|a PROVED EFFECTIVE ACCORDING TO SOME AUTHORS (VLIEGENTHART ET AL., 2008 ). IN AN INTERNET-DRIVEN CONTEXT, THIS LOGIC HAS DEVELOPED INTO NEW TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS THAT HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN COMMIS SION'S COMMUNICATION WITH EU CITIZENS. INTERACTION IN ONLINE PLATFORMS PROVIDES INSTITUTIONS AND CAMPAIGNERS WITH CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF DATA ABOUT THE AUDIENCES THEY ARE TRYING TO ENGAGE AND INFLUENCE. IN ADDITION, AS DATA BECOMES A STRONGER CURRENCY IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNET HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY ATTRAC TIVE BECAUSE OF THE PERSONAL DATA THAT IT ENABLES ACCESS. 'UNLIKE ANY EARLIER COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, EVERY ACTION AND INTERACTION ON THE INTERNET PRODUCES DATA POINTS THAT CAN BE COLLECTED, STORED, AGGREGATED, ANALYSED, AND PACKAGED FOR A VARIETY OF STRATEGIC PURPOSES' (PENNEY, 2017 , P. 102). A THOROUGH USE OF THE DATA PROVIDED VIA ONLINE INTERACTIONS, AND THE APPLICA TION OF THAT KNOWLEDGE TO UNDERSTAND TRENDS INTRINSIC TO TARGET AUDIENCES, BUILD FRAMES, TAILOR MESSAGES, AND IDENTIFY COMMUNICATION CHANNELS ARE TACTICS THAT WERE MOSTLY DEVELOPED BY MARKETING AND, MORE RECENTLY, BY NEWS MEDIA, THAT HAVE NOW BEEN ADDED TO THE EC'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGIC TOOLS. 250 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF NEWS MEDIA, USING THE CONCEPT OF 'MEASURABLE JOURNALISM', SOME SCHOLARS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE VERY ONLINE CAPABILITIES THAT ALLOW AUDIENCES TO ENGAGE IN TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION WITH NEWS ORGANISATIONS ALSO ALLOWS THOSE NEWS MEDIA TO CAPTURE DATA ON THEIR PREF ERENCES AND BEHAVIOUR. THE WAY IN WHICH NEWS MEDIA HAS ADOPTED AN AUDIENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH DELVED INTO THE INCREASING USE OF TECHNOLOGY CAN ILLUMINATE HOW INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE COMMISSION MAY USE THE DATA INSIGHTS. THIS APPROACH BRINGS TO REDEFINE MESSAGES, STORYTELLING AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS. IT INCLUDES THE CREATION OF NEW METHODS OF INTERACTION VIA SOCIAL MEDIA, AN IMPORTANT BOOST IN METRICS MONITORING AND
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|a SUBSEQUENT ADAPTATIONS OF CONTENT ACCORDING TO RESULTS. THIS AUDIENCE-CENTRIC DATA APPROACH APPLIED TO INSTITUTIONAL AND CORPO RATE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EU INSTITUTIONS, AND MORE SPECIFICALLY THE COMMISSION, IS AN AREA MUCH LESS EXPLORED BY SCHOLARS. THIS CHAPTER SEEKS TO INVESTIGATE THIS GAP BY ANALYSING THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY DURING THE JUNCKER COMMISSION, AFTER HAVING FIRST OUTLINED THE EVOLUTION OF ITS STRATEGY DURING THREE MANDATES, FROM 2004 TO 2019. TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION RESPONDS TO CITIZEN CONTESTA TION, A QUALITATIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WILL BE USED TO ANALYSE THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DOCUMENTS OF BOTH OF BARROSO'S MANDATES (2004-2009; 2009-2014) AND THE JUNCKER TENURE (2014-2019), AS THESE THREE PERIODS ARE INTERESTING BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN CONTESTATION-RIDDEN, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANT SHIFTS IN THE COMMUNICATION APPROACH TOWARDS CITIZENS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THE 13 DOCUMENTS INCLUDE COMMUNICA TIONS, REPORTS, WHITE PAPERS, STRATEGIC PLANS, CITIZEN CONSULTATIONS, AND STUDIES (SEE ANNEX I ). THE MOST RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY WILL BE FURTHER ANALYSED THROUGH THE CASE STUDY OF THE CORPO RATE COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN #EUANDME. THIS CAMPAIGN, COORDINATED BY DG COMM (SPECIFICALLY BY ITS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION UNIT), IS ONE OF THE THREE CAMPAIGNS THAT EMBODY THE JUNCKER'S COMMISSION STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COMMUNICATING EUROPE. WE HAVE CHOSEN #EUANDME AS THE CASE STUDY FOR THIS PAPER BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS MANY CHANGES IN THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES. FOR THE CASE STUDY OF #EUANDME, WE ANALYSE INTERNAL COMMISSION DOCUMENTS, EXPLAINING THE CRITERIA FOR THE CONCEPTION OF THE CAMPAIGN, THE MONITORING AND EVALUA TION FRAMEWORK USED AND BOTH THE INTERIM AND FINAL PERFORMANCE REPORTS. OTHER AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIALS INCLUDE CONFERENCES OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS OF THE CAMPAIGN. A SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WAS ALSO CONDUCTED WITH AN 11 THE EUROPEAN
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|a COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 251 EXTERNAL EXPERT INVOLVED IN THE CAMPAIGN. THE IDEA IS TO DETERMINE, BY ANALYSING THESE DOCUMENTS, IF THE PROPOSED CHANGES ON THE STRATEGY ARE PRESENT IN THE CONCEPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CORPORATE CAMPAIGN, AND WHETHER ELEMENTS OF PREVIOUS STRATEGIES REMAIN PRESENT. 3 FROM TOP-DOWN TO AUDIENCE-CENTRIC: MAPPING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EC ' S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAS DRAFTED NUMEROUS STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING LEGITIMACY THROUGH INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION IN THE STUDIED PERIOD BETWEEN 2004 AND 2019. THIRTEEN DOCUMENTS ANALYSED 2 SHOW THIS GOAL HAS REMAINED CONSTANT THROUGHOUT THE LAST THREE COMMISSION'S PRESIDENCIES. BEFORE BARROSO'S 2004-2009 TENURE, THE COMMISSION FOCUSED ON IMPROVING THE 'PERCEPTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR LEGITIMACY BY DEEPENING KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF ITS TASKS, STRUCTURE AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND BY ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE WITH ITS CITIZENS' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004 , P. 3). FIERCELY CRITICISED, THIS COMMISSION STRATEGY WAS THE OBJECT OF A REVIEW BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. IN A FORWARD-LOOKING REPORT, THE EP URGED FOR A RE-FOCUSING OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY TO ONE THAT WOULD CAREFULLY SELECT AND TARGET AUDIENCES AND DEVOTE GREATER ATTENTION 'TO THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGES PUT OUT, SO AS TO STIMULATE THE INTEREST OF CITIZENS BY TACKLING THEIR CONCERNS' (HERRERO-TEJEDOR, 2005 , P. 4). THE REPORT GOES ON TO SUGGEST TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE EU'S MESSAGES, FOCUS, AND APPROACH TO 'TOUCH PEOPLE'S FEELINGS', AND RECOMMENDS INCREASING THE USE OF ONLINE RESOURCES. 3.1 BARROSO I (2004-2009)-INSIDE OUT-'PUTTING THE HOUSE IN ORDER' THE FIRST BARROSO COMMISSION (2004-2009) MADE COMMUNICATION A PRIORITY AND SET GUIDELINES TO CONDUCT BOTH INTERNAL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND COMMUNICATIONAL ONES. INSTITUTIONALLY, IT SET OUT TO 'ENSURE MORE
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|a EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION ABOUT EUROPE SUPPORTED WITHIN THE COMMIS SION BY A MODERN AND MORE PROFESSIONAL APPROACH ACROSS ALL DEPARTMENTS' 2 SEE ANNEX I . 252 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN THROUGH A RESTRUCTURING OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SERVICES (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005A , P. 3), INCLUDING THE DESIGNATION OF A COMMISSIONER IN CHARGE OF COMMUNICATION. IN TERMS OF COMMUNICA TIONAL OBJECTIVES, THIS COMMISSION PROPOSED A 'FORWARD-LOOKING AGENDA FOR BETTER COMMUNICATION TO ENHANCE THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN EUROPE' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006B , P. 3). THEY POINT OUT TO WEAKNESSES OF PREVIOUS ENDEAVOURS TO REACH CITIZENS, MOSTLY ATTRIBUTING THE LEGITIMACY GAP TO 'CONTINUOUS FRAGMENTATION OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES BY INSUFFI CIENT COORDINATION', POLITICAL MESSAGES DIVORCED FROM 'CITIZENS' INTERESTS, NEEDS AND PREOCCUPATIONS', CAMPAIGNS FOCUSED ON 'THE POLITICAL ELITE AND MEDIA' AND TOO LITTLE EMPHASIS ON 'DIALOGUE AND PROACTIVE COMMUNICATION' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005A , P. 4). FOR THIS COMMISSION, COMMUNI CATION WAS DESCRIBED AS MORE THAN JUST INFORMING, AS 'AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005A , P. 3). LISTENING, COMMUNICATING, AND GOING LOCAL BECAME THE SUMMARY OF THE NEW VISION. HOWEVER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION MOVED SLOWER THAN THE POLITICAL PROCESS DID, AS IT WAS QUICKLY HALTED BY ONE OF THE BIGGEST CRISES THE UNION HAS ENDURED. 3.2 BARROSO II (2009-2014): 'MIRROR, MIRRORYY' WHEN THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS HIT DURING THE SECOND BARROSO TENURE (2009-2014), ITS IMPACT ON THE EU'S LEGITIMACY BECAME A MAJOR SOURCE FOR CONCERN OF THE COMMISSION: THE CRISIS MEANT 'NEW AND UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES FOR THE IMAGE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TRUST OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS IN ITS INSTITUTIONS' (IBID.) AND PROVOKED YET ANOTHER SHIFT IN COMMUNICATION: THE BIRTH OF THE COMMISSION'S CORPORATE
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|a COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. OLD REFLEXES DIE HARD, ESPECIALLY IN TIMES OF CRISIS. OBJECTIVES SUCH AS 'RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS ABOUT THE EU AS A WHOLE', 'ACHIEVE A MORE POSITIVE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND ITS ACTIVITIES', 'INFORM AND ENGAGE' (REDING & LEWANDOWSKI, 2013 , PP. 2-3) RE-ENTERED THE SPACE THAT HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY PREVIOUS OBJECTIVES SUCH AS 'MAKE THE EU INSTITUTIONS MORE RESPONSIVE, OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006B , P. 8). COMMUNICATION BECAME, ONCE AGAIN, LESS ABOUT LISTENING AND MORE ABOUT RESPONDING TO THE CONTESTATION, TO THE UNDERMINING OF THE EU'S LEGITIMACY BY 'SELLING' THE EUROPEAN PROJECTS' ADVANTAGES BY REPUTATION AND IMAGE MANAGEMENT. COMMUNICATING WITH CITIZENS BECAME, YET AGAIN, JUST INFORMING TO GET CITIZENS' SUPPORT, BY ASSUMING THAT THE LEGITIMACY GAP COULD BE BRIDGED 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 253 WITH INFORMATION. THIS SHIFT AWAY FROM WHAT HAD BEEN DEFINED BY WALL STROEM'S WHITE PAPER AS 'CITIZEN-CENTRIC' COMMUNICATION DID NOT MEAN THE COMMISSION STARTED FROM A TABULA RASA . CITIZEN DIALOGUES PERSISTED AND IN ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT COMMISSION, SEEKING 'THE VIEWS OF THE PUBLIC THROUGH DIALOGUES AND SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY' WAS POINTED OUT AS A PRIORITY, IN ONE OF THE FIRST EXPLICIT MENTIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL TO REACH CITIZENS (REDING & LEWANDOWSKI, 2013 ,P .4 ) . 3.3 JUNCKER (2014-2019): THE 'LAST CHANCE' COMMISSION-REACHING OUT TO CITIZENS AGAIN JUNCKER'S PITCH FOR A VERY 'POLITICAL COMMISSION' (DG COMMUNICATION, 2016 , P. 3) IS AT THE CORE OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY OF HIS TENURE (2014-2019). UNDER THE 'LISTEN-ADVISE-ENGAGE' MISSION STATEMENT, DG COMMUNICATION PROPOSED A STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO THE POLITICAL AMBI TIONS OF THE COMMISSION. ALL CORPORATE COMMUNICATION, ACCORDING TO THE STRATEGY, MUST LINK TO THE POLITICAL PRIORITIES. EVEN
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|a THOUGH PRIORITIES ARE TO BE RESEARCH-BASED AND CITIZENS' NEEDS ARE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH REMAINS PRESENT IN THIS STRATEGY. ENGAGEMENT WITH EUROPEAN CITIZENS, HOWEVER, REMAINED A PREOCCUPATION IN A PERIOD FOLLOWING BOTTOM-LOW TURNOUT IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, IN HIS 2015 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, JUNCKER PAINTED A GRIM PICTURE OF THE EU: 'OUR EUROPEAN UNION IS NOT IN A GOOD STATE. THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EUROPE IN THIS UNION. AND THERE IS NOT ENOUGH UNION IN THIS UNION. WE HAVE TO CHANGE THIS. AND WE HAVE TO CHANGE THIS NOW' (JUNCKER, 2015 ). JUNCKER COMMISSIONED A REPORT TO HIS SPECIAL ADVISER ON OUTREACH TOWARDS CITIZENS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF 'DESIGNING THE FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE CITIZEN-FOCUSED EUROPE' (VAN DEN BRANDE, 2017 ,P .8 ,EM P H A S I S ADDED). LEGITIMACY RE-APPEARED AS THE EVER-MISSING ELEMENT: 'THE UNION'S DELIVERY, DEMOCRACY AND DESTINY-ALL OF WHICH ARE STRONGLY INTERRELATED-ARE BEING QUESTIONED LIKE NEVER BEFORE. THE EU NEEDS TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO EARN RENEWED LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF THE EURO PEAN ELECTORATE' (VAN DEN BRANDE, 2017 , P. 6). THIS REPORT PRESENTS THE 'URGENT NEED' FOR A HABERMASIAN 'DISEMPOWERED DIALOGUE OF EMANCIPATED PEOPLE' (VAN DEN BRANDE, 2017 , P. 7), ALL THE WHILE AIMING AT PERSUADING CITIZENS OF THE EU'S LEGITIMACY AND VALUE IN THEIR LIVES THROUGH THAT SAME DIALOGUE, A CLEAR CONTRADICTION. A FULL CHAPTER IS DEDICATED TO THE NOTION OF 'CITIZEN-FOCUSED AND CITIZEN-OWNED EUROPE'. WITH THE 'GOING LOCAL' APPROACH OF THE BARROSO I COMMISSION AS A STARTING POINT, IT INTRODUCES A 254 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN NEW ELEMENT: THE CONCEPT OF 'MULTILEVEL CITIZENSHIP' BY WHICH THE EURO PEAN DIMENSION (ITS VALUES AND IDENTITY) IS ADDED TO THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ONES, WITHOUT REPLACING THEM. BY APRIL 2019, THE JUNCKER COMMISSION ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD HELD 1572 CITIZEN DIALOGUES IN 583
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|a LOCATIONS, PLUS AN ONLINE CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019 , P. 4). THE DIALOGUES AND THE ONLINE CONSULTATION ARE PRESENTED AS A GREAT SUCCESS ON THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, WITH 194,000 PARTICIPANTS BETWEEN 2015 AND 2019 AND A DIRECT IMPACT ON POLICY-MAKING (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019 , P. 4). HOWEVER, CRITICS SAY THAT THE COMMISSION OVERSTATES THAT SUCCESS: 'THE COMMISSION IS PROUD THAT 175,000 CITIZENS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THESE EVENTS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. IT'S AN IMPRESSIVE SOUNDING FIGURE, BUT WELL BELOW 1 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF EUROPE' (INMAN, 2019 ). ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT PRESENTED IN THE VAN DEN BRANDE REPORT IS A CLEAR RECOMMENDATION TO USE EMOTIONS IN ORDER TO CONNECT WITH CITIZENS: 'LEGITIMACY CAN ONLY BE SUSTAINED AS A VIRTUAL COHESIVE FORCE IF IT COMES FROM PEOPLE'S HEARTS, AS WELL AS THEIR MINDS ' (VAN DEN BRANDE, 2017 , P. 7, EMPHASIS ADDED). THE SLOGAN IS NOW USED BY THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS UNIT OF DG COMM WHEN PRESENTING THEIR CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (ZOURNATZI, 2018 ). A STUDY PUBLISHED IN JULY 2019 BY ITS JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE, ANNOUNCED THEIR NEXT STEPS IN RESEARCH OF BETTER TOOLS FOR POLITICAL COMMUNICATION WITH CITIZENS BY FOCUSING 'ETHICALLY' ON THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS, VALUES, FRAMING, METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE, AMONG OTHER CONCEPTS, IN POLICY-MAKING (MAIR ET AL., 2019 , P. 67); ARGUMENT SHOWING THAT FOCUS ON EMOTIONS AS WELL AS ON REASON IS OF GROWING INTEREST FOR THE COMMISSION. 3.4 NEW TOOLS FOR NEW TARGETS: DIALOGUE AND ONLINE RESOURCES AS THE COMMISSION'S STRATEGIES EVOLVED TOWARDS MORE FOCUS ON CITIZENS (AUDIENCES), THE MEANS AND TOOLS TO DO SO HAVE ALSO CHANGED. IN THE PRE-BARROSO I DOCUMENTS, INFORMATION PROFESSIONALS, PARTICULARLY JOURNAL ISTS, DECISION-MAKERS, AND THE 'GENERAL AUDIENCE' WERE THE MAIN GROUPS TARGETED BY THE COMMISSION (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004 , PP. 16-17). AT THE TIME, PEOPLE (COMMISSION RELAYS AND NETWORKS SUCH AS INFO
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|a POINTS, EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION CENTRES AND OTHER UNIVERSITY REFERENCE CENTRES) AND AUDIO-VISUAL MEDIA (EUROPE BY SATELLITE OR EBS; EURONEWS) WERE 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 255 THE MAIN TOOLS FOR THE OUTREACH PROPOSED. AS THE BARROSO I COMMIS SION LAID OUT A STRATEGY BASED ON LISTENING, COMMUNICATING AND GOING LOCAL, NEW AUDIENCES BECAME TARGETS: 'THESE DEBATES SHOULD INVOLVE "CIVIL SOCIETY, SOCIAL PARTNERS, NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES"YYTHERE WOULD BE AN ADDED VALUE IN LISTENING TO SPECIFIC TARGET GROUPS, SUCH AS YOUNG PEOPLE OR MINORITY GROUPS, THAT WERE NOT REACHED DURING THE REFER ENDUM CAMPAIGNS' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005B , P. 3). WITH THE NEW AUDIENCES, NEW TOOLS STARTED TO EMERGE. REPRESENTATIONS BECAME PRIME STAKEHOLDERS IN THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. THE ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL DEBATES AND OF COMMISSIONERS' VISITS TO MEMBER STATES, A EUROPEAN ROUND TABLE FOR DEMOCRACY, TARGETED FOCUS GROUPS AND PROGRAMMES SUCH AS CITIZENS FOR EUROPE ARE SOME OF THE NEW PROPOSALS DURING THIS PERIOD (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005B ). THE CRISIS-RIDDEN BARROSO II COMMISSION RE-FOCUSED THE STRATEGY INTO A MORE INFORMATIVE AND TOP-DOWN APPROACH, ALL THE WHILE MAINTAINING SOME OF THE TACTICS FROM THE PREVIOUS ENDEAVOURS. IT PROPOSED, IN ITS CORPORATE COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORK, TOOLS SUCH AS 'INTEGRATED COMMU NICATION CAMPAIGNS ON TELEVISION, WEB, PRINT, SOCIAL, OUTDOOR AND INDOOR MEDIA' CONTENT PRODUCTION, ACQUISITION OF MEDIA SPACE, ONLINE PROMOTION TECHNIQUES, 'ACTIVITIES AIMED AT CITIZENS' AS WELL AS STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS (REDING & LEWANDOWSKI, 2013 , PP. 4-5). THE REAL EMPHASIS ON ONLINE TOOLS CAME DURING THE JUNCKER COMMIS SION: 'SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITIES SHOULD BECOME ONE OF THE MAIN COMMUNICA TION CHANNELS FOR REPRESENTATIONS, COMPLEMENTING THEIR POLITICAL, MEDIA AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES' (DG COMMUNICATION, 2016 , P. 6). SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS TENURE'S
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|a COMMUNICATION STRATEGY ARE CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS, 'UPGRADING THE DIGITAL PRESENCE OF REPRESENTATIONS', A FOCUS ON MULTIMEDIA SERVICES, THE 'DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMME' AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF EUROPA SITE (DG COMMUNICATION, 2016 ). CITIZEN DIALOGUES, ROAD SHOWS, AND TOURS OF THE VICE-PRESIDENTS, THE EUROPE DIRECT CENTRES AND THE EUROBAROMETER REMAINED IN THE JUNCKER COMMISSION'S TOOLBOX TO REACH CITIZENS. THE 2016-2020 STRATEGY, WHICH POINTS TOWARDS AUDIENCE-CENTRIC TACTICS AND TOOLS, HAS, HOWEVER, TWO (OUT OF THREE) TOP-DOWN OBJECTIVES FOR DG COMM'S COMMUNICATION SERVICE: 'COMMISSION RECEIVES TARGETED MEDIA COVERAGE THROUGH RELEVANT PUBLICA TIONS AND CONTINUOUS ENGAGEMENT WITH MEDIA' AND 'CITIZENS ARE BETTER INFORMED ABOUT THE EU, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE COMMISSION'S POLITICAL PRIORITIES AND THEIR RIGHTS'. THE ONLY AUDIENCE-CENTRIC SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE IS 'CITIZENS EXPRESS THEMSELVES TOWARDS AND ENGAGE WITH EU COMMISSIONERS 256 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN PRE-BARROSO (2004) TOP-DOWN APPROACH - PEOPLE: COMMISSION RELAYS AND NETWORKS (INFO POINTS, EUROPE AND RURAL INFORMA YY ON AND PROMO YY ON CARREFOURS, EUROPEAN DOCUMENTA YY ON CENTRES (EDC) AND OTHER UNIVERSITY REFERENCE CENTRES (ABOUT 780 ALTOGETHER) 550 LECTURERS OF TEAM EUROPE) - AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA: EUROPE BY SATELLITE OR EBS; EURONEWS, OTHER COMMISSION SPONSORED OUTLETS. - ONLINE: EUROPA WEBSITES - EUROBAROMETER - EUROPE DIRECT (TELEPHONE) BARROSO I (2004-2009) INTRODUCYYON OF AUDIENCE CENTRIC APPROACH - PEOPLE: INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING TO ALLOW FOR BE YY ER COORDINA YY ON & PROFESSIONALISA YY ON OF COMMUNICA YY ON @ EC. REPRESENTA YY ONS AS "PRIME STAKEHOLDERS". EUROPEAN GOODWILL AMBASSADORS -AC YY VI YY ES: NA YY ONAL DEBATES; COMMISSIONERS VISITS TO MS; EUROPEAN ROUND TABLE FOR DEMOCRACY; TARGETED FOCUS GROUPS (SPECIAL A YY EN YY ON TO YOUNG PEOPLE & MINORI YY ES); CI YY ZENS FOR EUROPE PROGRAMME. - EUROBAROMETER: SPECI FI
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|a C EB ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE - ONLINE: INSCREASE USE OF INTERNET BARROSO II (2009-2014) CRISIS FOCUSED COMM. BACK TO TOP-DOWN - DISSEMINA YY ON OF INFORMA YY ON THROUGH INTEGRATED COMMUNICA YY ON CAMPAIGNS ON TELEVISION, WEB, PRINT, SOCIAL, OUTDOOR AND INDOOR MEDIA; - PRODUC YY ON OF CONTENT, INCLUDING PHOTOS, AUDIO-VISUAL, GRAPHIC AND WRI YY EN MATERIAL; - ACQUISI YY ON OF MEDIA SPACE, INCLUDING TV AND RADIO AIR YY ME, OUTDOOR AND INDOOR ADVER YY SING, WEB ADVERTS AND OTHER ONLINE PROMO YY ON TECHNIQUES AND PRINT MEDIA SPACE; - ORGANISA YY ON OF EVENTS, INCLUDING EXHIBI YY ONS, FORUMS, DIALOGUES AND OTHER AC YY VI YY ES AIMED AT CI YY ZENS; -S T U D I ES A N D EVA LU A YY ONS. JUNCKER (2014-2019) RELAUNCH OF AUDIENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH + DIGITAL - CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS - UPGRADING THE DIGITAL PRESENCE OF REPRESENTA YY ONS (SOCIAL MEDIA IN PAR YY CULAR) TO ENHANCE POLI YY CAL, MEDIA AND CI YY ZEN OUTREACH. -MU L YY MEDIA SERVICES - ENHANCEMENT OF EUROPA SITE - DIGITAL TRANSFORMA YY ON PROGRAMME -C I YY ZEN DIALOGUES- ROAD SHOWS AND TOURS OF THE VICE-PRESIDENTS -E U R O P E DI RECT - EUROBAROMETER - COMMISSIONS VISITORS' CENTRE FIG. 1 EVOLUTION OF THE MEANS AND TOOLS PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGIES, ACCORDING TO THE APPROACH (TOP-DOWN VS. AUDIENCE CENTRIC) THROUGH CITIZENS' DIALOGUES AND OTHER FORMS OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION (LIKE SOCIAL MEDIA)', WHICH IS MEANT TO 'STIMULATE CITIZENS' INTEREST IN EU AFFAIRS AND CONTRIBUTE TO RESTORING TRUST IN EU INSTITUTIONS' (DG COMMUNICATION, 2016 , PP. 18-19) (FIG. 1 ). 3.5 BACK AND FORTH: THE EVOLUTION OF THE EC'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY EACH COMMISSION CYCLE STUDIED HERE WAS CHARACTERISED BY DIFFERENT MOVES REGARDING ITS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. WHILE THE BARROSO I COMMISSION WAS DRIVEN BY A WISH TO MODERNISE ITS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY IN ORDER TO BE IN A LESS TOP-DOWN DYNAMIC THAT ALLOWED FOR MORE LISTENING TO EU CITIZENS AND BETTER ALIGNMENT OF ITS MESSAGING TO THE
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|a INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF THOSE CITIZENS, THE BARROSO II COMMISSION WAS HELD BACK ON ITS PREVIOUS AMBITIONS AND ENDED UP PRIORITISING ITS OLD LOGIC OF INFORMING RATHER THAN ACTUALLY LISTENING EU CITIZENS. THE JUNCKER COMMISSION, HOWEVER, PUT THE AMBITIONS OF THE BARROSO I COMMISSION ON ITS AGENDA THROUGH A STRATEGY OF 'LISTEN-ADVISE-ENGAGE' BASED ON A 'HEARTS AND MINDS' APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION. STILL, IN ITS SHIFT IN COMMUNICATION STYLE, IT 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 257 BEFORE 2004 CRISIS-FOCUSED COMM. FOCUS BACK ON INFO OVER DIALOGUE. INTRO TO CORPORATE. INTRODUCYYON OF DIALOGUE DIMENSION, RESEARCH ON AUDIENCES USE OF DATA TO TAILOR MESSAGES AND CHANNELS. MORE EMPHASIS ON AUDIENCE CENTRIC COMM. ELEMENTS FROM TOP-DOWN REMAIN. 2004-2009 2009-2014 T OP - DOWN 2014-2019 FIG. 2 EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION FOCUS/STYLE 2004-2019 REMAINED FOCUSED ON A TOP-DOWN APPROACH THAT MEANT TO COMMUNICATE ON THE POLITICAL PRIORITIES IT HAD PREDEFINED, THE LATTER BEING PRESENTED AS A REFLECTION OF THE ONGOING DEBATES AROUND THE EU IN THE EPS (FIG. 2 ). 4 THE #EUANDME CAMPAIGN: APPLYING THE STRATEGY IN JULY 2018, THE JUNCKER COMMISSION PRESENTED ITS PROPOSAL FOR CORPORATE COMMUNICATION, FOCUSING THE STRATEGY ON THREE MAIN STRANDS 'DESIGNED TO BE MUTUALLY REINFORCING AND CAPTURE ALL THE COMMISSION'S POLITICAL PRIORITIES' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018B , P. 1). AS EXPLAINED EARLIER, THE CAMPAIGN #EUANDME HAS BEEN CHOSEN AS A CASE STUDY TO LOOK AT THE CONCRETE TRANSLATION INTO TOOLS OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIC GUIDELINES OF THE JUNCKER COMMISSION AS WELL AS AT THE FRAMES USED TO BRING THIS CAMPAIGN TO FRUITION. ALL THREE CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS HAVE COMMONALITIES THAT SHOW AN EVOLUTION IN THEIR CONCEPTION, DEPLOYMENT, AND EVALUATION TOWARDS AN AUDIENCE-CENTRIC, DATA-BASED APPROACH THAT ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT INTRA-COMMISSION COOPERATION. A MORE HORIZONTAL APPROACH WAS TAKEN IN THE DESIGN OF THE CAMPAIGNS, WITH THE INVOLVE
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|a MENT OF THE REPRESENTATIONS UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF DG COMMUNICATION. THE AUDIENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH WAS DEPLOYED TO TEST THE CONTENTS OF THE 258 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN CAMPAIGNS, WITH THE USE OF FOCUS GROUPS 'ENSURING THAT THEY RESONATE WITH TARGET AUDIENCES' (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018B , P. 2). DECENTRALISED ACTIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES WERE IMPLEMENTED BY BOTH THE COMMIS SION REPRESENTATIONS AND THE EUROPE DIRECT INFORMATION CENTRES AT LOCAL LEVEL. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER, ACCESS HAS BEEN GRANTED TO SOME INTERNAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN #EUANDME. 3 THE CALL FOR TENDERS SHEDS LIGHT ON THE DG COMMUNICATION'S (AND SPECIFICALLY ITS UNIT A1 FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION'S) VISION FOR AN AUDIENCE-CENTRIC CAMPAIGN. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BID INCLUDE A DESIGN MADE FROM THE END-USER'S PERSPECTIVE, USEFUL FOR THEM, LOCALLY TAILORED AND FOCUSING NOT JUST ON FACTS, 'BUT REAL STORIES ABOUT REAL PEOPLE (USING DIFFERENT APPROACHES, INCLUDING TESTIMONIALS), WITH THE POTENTIAL TO STRIKE EMOTIONAL CHORDS' (DG COMM EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2016 , P. 10). THE OBJEC TIVES ARE PRESENTED AS 'CHALLENGES', WITH TRIGGERING INTEREST AND GENERATING A BETTER-INFORMED OPINION ABOUT THE EU AS THE PRIME CHALLENGE. THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE PRESENTED IS 'TO INSPIRE A SENSE OF BELONGING AND AN APPRECIATION OF CORE EU VALUES SHARED BETWEEN DIFFERENT CULTURES ON A CONTINENTAL SCALE' WITH A CONCRETE OUTPUT OF 'MEASURABLE PUBLIC RECOG NITION OF WHAT THE EU DOES FOR EUROPEANS' (DG COMM EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2016 , P. 3). THIS NEW APPROACH OF APPEALING TO 'HEARTS AND MINDS' RESONATES WITH THE VAN DEN BRADE REPORT AND IS PRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION AS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT EVOLUTIONS BROUGHT BY THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS: 'ANOTHER THING WE ARE DOING THAT IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE PAST IS THAT WE DON'T RELY ONLY ON FACTS AND FIGURES, WHICH IS OUR STRONG POINT, WE PRODUCE A LOT OF THAT IN THE EUROPEAN
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|a INSTITUTIONS. BUT HERE WE TRY, IN OUR CAMPAIGNS, TO STRIKE A MORE EMOTIONAL CHORD, APPEAL TO HEARTS AND MINDS' (ZOURNATZI, 2018 ). THIS MOVE TOWARDS EMOTIONS IS FURTHER EXPLAINED AS A WAY TO INFORM AND RAISE PUBLIC AWARENESS AROUND WHAT THE EU IS AND WHAT IT DOES, WHICH IN TURN, WOULD HOPEFULLY ALSO HELP WITH CITIZENS' ENGAGEMENT IN A TWO-WAY DISCUSSION, ACCORDING TO ZOURNATZI ( 2018 ). 3 SEE THE LIST ON ANNEX I . 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 259 4.1 TARGETING AND SEGMENTATION TO DEFINE AND REFINE AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION FOR #EUANDME, THE COMMISSION REQUESTED POTENTIAL BIDDERS TO CONSIDER, AMONG OTHER SOURCES, AVAILABLE POLLING DATA, POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE BY EC REPRESENTA TIONS, EUROBAROMETER DATA AND PUT TOGETHER A SPECIFIC DESK RESEARCH (DG COMM EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2016 , P. 5). IN PRACTICE, CAMPAIGN MATERIALS HAVE ALSO BEEN TESTED QUALITATIVELY THROUGH FOCUS GROUPS, USING A METHODOLOGY BASED ON IDENTIFYING THE KEY DRIVERS OF CITIZENS' BEHAVIOUR AND THE SOCIETAL TRENDS THAT EMERGE ACROSS THE EUROPEAN UNION. THE IDEA BEING THAT, UNDERSTANDING THE TRENDS AND DRIVERS THAT MOVE PEOPLE AT THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL LEVELS AND IN RELATION TO THEIR PEERS, ALLOWS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES TO BECOME LESS IMPORTANT (CLERCKX, 2019 ). TWO OF THE COMMON DRIVERS FOUND FOR EU CITIZENS BETWEEN AGES 17 AND 35 WERE AUTONOMY AND SIMPLICITY. AUTONOMY IS UNDERSTOOD HERE AS THE ABILITY TO START ONE'S OWN COMPANY; AS THE IDEA THAT GOVERNMENT OR BIG INSTITUTIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY; THAT THE MASTERY OF ONLINE TOOLS GIVES THEM WHAT IT TAKES TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES. THIS PROCESS, WITH THE CONSTRAINTS CREATED BY FACTORS SUCH AS BUDGET, ALLOWED FOR ADAPTATIONS OF THE CAMPAIGN, WHEN THE FEEDBACK FROM THE TARGET GROUP DEMANDED IT. 4.2 DEPLOYMENT: CO-CREATION AND ONLINE DISSEMINATION MEASURING SUCCESS HAS ALSO CHANGED FOR THE COMMISSION, WITH MAJOR INTEREST FOCUSING MORE ON THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ('MOVING THE NEEDLE')
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|a THAN ON REACH AND RECALL OF THE CAMPAIGN: '[FOR] THE FIGURE THAT MATTERS TO US, WHICH IS THE IMPACT, WE DO HAVE AN INCREASE UP TO 5% OF POSITIVE OPINION ABOUT THE EU (IN THE FIRST CORPORATE CAMPAIGN INVEST EU). WE SEE THAT BY REACHING OUT WITH THE CHANNELS AND AUDIENCES WE WANTED TO USE THERE IS A DISTINCT CHANGE; FOR US THIS IS VERY ENCOURAGING' (ZOURNATZI, 2018 ). ENGAGEMENT, HOWEVER, REMAINS AN ELUSIVE TARGET WHEN IT COMES TO YOUNG EUROPEANS. THE #EUANDME INTERIM REPORT SHOWS THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE INITIAL CAMPAIGN MATERIALS WERE GENERALLY CONSIDERED CLEAR AND AUTHENTIC, TRIGGERED THE POSITIVE EMOTIONS EXPECTED AND EXCEEDED REACH TARGETS, '[THE] VAST MAJORITY OF HUB VISITS THROUGH PAID MEDIA THAT LEADS TO HIGH BOUNCE RATE, LOW LEVEL OF INTERACTION AND SHORT AVERAGE 260 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN TIME SPENT ON THE HUB' (KOMMITMENT, 2019A , B ,P .1 9 ) . 4 THIS LACK OF ENGAGEMENT COULD PROVE PROBLEMATIC WHEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE WEBSITE WAS TO 'PLAY THE ROLE OF A GENERAL TEASER AND GENERATE TRAFFIC TOWARDS RELATED EU WEB SOURCES' (DG COMM EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2016 , P. 13). THE FINAL REPORT STATES THAT, FOR 2019 THE FOCUS OF THE CAMPAIGN ACTIONS WOULD BE SHIFTED TO ENGAGEMENT AND CLICKS RATHER THAN REACH, MOSTLY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR, BEFORE THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. INCREASED STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT, PAID INFLUENCERS AND INNO VATIVE FORMATS WERE PART OF THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED (KOMMITMENT, 2019A , B ,P .6 9 ) . 5 DISCUSSION: HOW ' POLITICAL ' WAS THE EC ' S RESPONSE TO ITS LEGITIMACY CRISIS? AS WE HAVE SEEN, THE STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS ANALYSED SHOW THAT ENGAGING WITH CITIZENS (AUDIENCES) AS AN ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO THE POLITICISATION OF EU DEBATES HAS BEEN AN OBJECTIVE, ADDRESSED IN A SLOW, EVOLUTIVE, BACK AND FORTH PROCESS, THAT HAS HAD IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS BOTH IN THE INTERNAL COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE AND IN THE APPROACHES, MEANS, AND TOOLS TO REACH
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|a CITIZENS. WE SHOWED THAT THERE WAS INDEED A REFORM OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY BY INTRODUCING THE USE OF NEW TOOLS AND APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATION WITH EU CITIZENS. HOWEVER, WE ALSO SHOW THAT, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE WITH THE CITIZENS HAS HAD MORE TO DO WITH LEARNING ABOUT THEIR NEEDS AND BEHAVIOURS IN ORDER TO BETTER CONVINCE THEM OF THE VALUE OF THE EURO PEAN PROJECT THAN IT HAS BEEN AN EXERCISE IN ACTIVE LISTENING THAT COULD ALLOW FOR TRUE ENGAGEMENT AND TRANSFORMATION, AS THE BARROSO I COMMIS SION'S INTENTION LED TO BELIEVE. THE DOCUMENTS SHOW HOW LISTENING HAS MOSTLY BEEN USED AS A MARKETING TOOL FOR GAINING INSIGHT IN ORDER TO SUBSE QUENTLY FRAME COMMUNICATION, AS WELL AS FOR VALIDATING PREDEFINED POLITICAL PRIORITIES, MESSAGES, AND COMMUNICATION ACTIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE GOAL SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO REFRAME POLITICISED DEBATES AROUND THE EU IN ORDER TO STEER THE NARRATIVE IN A MORE 'POSITIVE' DIRECTION, THEREBY INCREASING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S LEVERAGE TO 'CONVINCE' CITIZENS THAT THEIR NEEDS AND DESIRES ARE MET BY WHAT THE EU HAS TO OFFER. 4 THE INTERIM REPORT CALLS FOR CAUTION WITH THE TRAFFIC FIGURES, SINCE DISCUSSIONS WERE ONGOING ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE PIWIK MEASUREMENT TOOLS (KOMMITMENT, 2019A , B , P. 19, FOOTNOTE). 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 261 THE USE OF VALUES, EMOTIONS, METAPHORS, AND NARRATIVES IN POLICY MAKING, IN PARTICULAR IN FRAMING THE EU STORYLINE, IS AN INTERESTING STRATEGIC EVOLUTION IN COMMUNICATION EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN #EUANDME. 5 BY ASSUMING MORE OPENLY A 'POLITICAL APPROACH' TO COMMUNICATION IN LINE WITH THE OVERALL POLITICISATION OF THE EC, THE JUNCKER COMMISSION INTRODUCED MEANS AND TOOLS WIDELY USED BY POLITICAL MARKETING AND PRODUCT MARKETING, BUT WHICH WERE NEW TO EU INSTI TUTIONS. THIS SHIFT IN THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY SEEMS TO HAVE ALLOWED ITS COMMUNICATION END GOAL-TO
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|a CONVINCE CITIZENS OF THE BENEFITS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE EU IN THEIR DAILY LIVES-TO COME OUT IN THE OPEN. AND, BY DOING SO, THIS HAS TRANSFORMED THE CONCEP TION, DISTRIBUTION, AND MEASUREMENT OF THE EC STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS. IN TERMS OF THE LEGITIMACY STRATEGIES USED BY THE COMMISSION, WE THEREFORE COME TO SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS TO BOTH BIEGON( 2013 )A N D PANSARDI AND BATTEGAZZORRE ( 2018 ). THE FORMER HAD PROPOSED A TRIPTY CHAL TYPOLOGY TO EXPLAIN THE EC'S APPROACH TO LEGITIMATION FROM 1973 TO 1994, WHICH STILL APPLIES TO VARYING DEGREES TO THE THREE COMMISSIONS WE HAVE STUDIED. WHILE THE 'FUNCTIONALIST EUROPE' APPROACH STILL SEEMS TO BE DOMINATING THE THREE COMMISSIONS, OUR ANALYSES HAVE LED US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TWO PHASES WHICH WERE AIMING AT REFORMING THE OLD TOP-DOWN WAYS OF COMMUNICATING TO BRIDGE THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, NAMELY THE BARROSO I AND THE JUNCKER COMMISSIONS, WERE BOTH ALSO INDEBTED TO A 'DEMOCRATIC EUROPE' APPROACH TO LEGITIMACY. AS PERTAINS TO THE 'EUROPEAN IDENTITY' APPROACH, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT AS PRESENT IN THE BARROSO COMMISSIONS, WE CAN INDEED WITNESS IT IN JUNCKER'S COMMIS SION AND ITS EMPHASIS ON A SCHMITTERIAN-LIKE HOPEFUL VISION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AS THIS COMMISSION USED TERMS SUCH AS THE NEED FOR 'MORE UNION', THE WISH FOR A 'MULTI-LEVEL CITIZENSHIP' BASED ON A 'COMMUNITY OF VALUES' EXPRESSED THROUGH ITS TEN POLITICAL PRIORITIES. THESE POINTS ALSO ALIGN WITH THE RESULTS OF THE LATTER STUDY, WHICH HAD PORTRAYED BARROSO'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES AS FOLLOWING A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO LEGITIMATION BASED ON THE RATIONALITY OF EU DECISIONS BECAUSE OF ITS ECONOMIC EXPERTISE, AND HAD DEPICTED JUNCKER'S ADDRESS AS HOLDING STRONGER CLAIMS, SHOWING A LEGITIMATION STRATEGY ANCHORED IN THE USE 5 THE COMMISSION'S JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE HAS ALREADY MANIFESTED ITS PLAN TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH ON THESE TOPICS AND THEIR POTENTIAL USE
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|a TO GUIDE POLICY-MAKING AND COMMUNICATION (MAIR ET AL., 2019 ). THIS RESEARCH DESERVES CLOSE ATTENTION. 262 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN OF (MAINLY POLITICAL) VALUES AS WELL AS THE USE OF 'AUTHORITISATION', I.E. EMPHASISING THE LEGITIMATING POTENTIAL OF DEMOCRATIC RULES. THIS, IN TURN, LEADS US TO FINALLY REFLECT ON WHICH OF THE CONCEPTS RELATED TO POLITICISATION MENTIONED IN THE THEORETICAL PART ABOVE RELATE WITH THESE LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES. IN LINE WITH WHAT PALONEN ( 2003 )H AD PROPOSED IN VIEW OF POLITICS AS AN ACTIVITY, AS OPPOSED TO A FIELD AND ITS MORE PASSIVE FORMS OF POLITICS, WE MAY ASK OURSELVES WHETHER THE EC'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES OF THESE THREE COMMISSIONS PORTRAY A FORM OF POLITICISATION AND/OR POLITICKING. IN THE LOGIC OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT BEING A POLITICAL PROJECT FROM THE ONSET, THEN IT FOLLOWS THAT, FROM THE RESULTS OF OUR ANALYSIS, THE EC HAS NEVER ACTIVELY ENGAGED ITSELF IN THE PROCESS OF OVERT POLITICISATION IN ITS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. THE JUNCKER COMMISSION CERTAINLY MADE A MOVE TOWARDS NAMING ITSELF AS 'POLITICAL' IN ITS RHETORIC, BUT THE ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY SHOWS THAT THIS INTENTION HAS NOT BEEN FULLY PUT INTO PRACTICE. THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY SUBSTANTIAL TENTATIVE TO ACTIVELY ENGAGE WITH CITIZENS ON CONTROVERSIAL MATTERS, I.E. THERE IS NO CONCRETE ACTION THAT CREATED A FORM OF DISRUPTION OR NOVELTY. THE BARROSO I AND THE JUNCKER COMMISSIONS CAN HOWEVER BE SEEN AS TAKING PART IN THE PERFORMATIVE ACT OF POLITICKING, AS THEY HAVE DEVISED COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES TO RE-ROUTE POLITICISATION AROUND THE EU IN A MORE FAVOURABLE MANNER. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RESPONSE OF THE EC TO INCREASED POLITICISATION OF EU ISSUES IN THE EPS HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON REALIGNING ITS LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES (I.E. POLITICKING), BUT IT DID NOT RESULT IN IT ACTIVELY ENGAGING IN A REAL CONVERSATION/DEBATE WITH EU CITIZENS ON EU MATTERS (I.E. 'POLITICISATION') IN THE WAYS THE USE OF TERM 'POLITICAL
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|a COMMISSION' IN JUNCKER'S ADDRESS MIGHT HAVE IMPLIED. 6 CONCLUSION LEGITIMISING THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS BEEN THE CONSTANT PREOCCUPATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WITH THE UNDERLYING IDEA THAT A LACK OF INFOR MATION ABOUT THE BENEFITS OF THE EU PROJECT AND WHAT THE EU IS AND DOES IS AT THE ROOT OF CITIZEN CONTESTATION, THIS PAPER SET OUT TO RESPOND TO THE QUESTION: HOW HAS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY EVOLVED AS A RESPONSE TO INCREASED CONTESTATION AND POLITICISATION OF EU ISSUES? WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ANSWER THIS BY CONDUCTING A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DOCUMENTS FROM THE EC AND OTHER EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS BETWEEN 2004 AND 2019 AND BY LOOKING AT THE CASE OF THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN #EUANDME (5 JULY 2017 TO 31 DECEMBER 2019). 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 263 THE FOCUS WAS ON THE COMMUNICATION TOWARDS EU CITIZENS. THE HYPOTH ESIS PRESENTED WAS THAT ALTHOUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAD ONLY BEEN UNDERGOING A SLOW EVOLUTION OF ITS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY OVER THE YEARS, IT HAD MOST RECENTLY SHIFTED TOWARDS AN AUDIENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH, WITH A FOCUS ON WINNING 'HEARTS AND MINDS' AND AN INCREASED USE OF ONLINE TOOLS IN A COMMISSION THAT CLAIMED TO HAVE BECOME MORE 'POLITICAL', THEREBY POTENTIALLY PREDICTING A REAL SHIFT. BUT IN SPITE OF THE EVOLUTION OF INCREASINGLY TAKING EU CITIZENS' CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, THIS CHAPTER CONCLUDES THAT THE STRATEGY USED BY THE COMMISSION STILL DRAGS OLD HABITS OF TOP-DOWN, INFORMATIVE STYLE OF THE OLD BUREAUCRACY, AS EVEN JUNCKER'S 'VERY POLITICAL' COMMISSION HAS REMAINED FOCUSED IN ITS OWN PREDEFINED PRIORITIES, ALBEIT BY MODERNISING THE MEANS AND TOOLS DG COMMUNICATION USES IN THE CONCEPTION, DEPLOY MENT, AND EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS. 'MARKETING' THE EU, USING THE 'WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME' AUDIENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH, THERE FORE BOTH STANDS OUT AS THE LEGACY OF
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|a JUNCKER'S MORE OPENLY POLITICAL COMMISSION COMPARED TO PREVIOUS ONES, I.E. AN INCREASED LEVEL OF POLI TICKING, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REFLECTING MORE OF THE SAME (THOUGH MORE ADVANCED) UNDERLYING LOGIC TO COMMUNICATION TO EU CITIZENS THAT IT WAS ALREADY USING BEFORE FOCUSED ON CONVINCING CITIZENS OF ITS LEGITIMACY, THUS NOT REALLY MAKING A CLEAR BREAK FROM ITS OLD PATTERNS OF NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGING IN THE POLITICISATION PROCESS. ANNEX I. LIST OF THE DOCUMENTS ANALYSED BARROSSO I COMMISSION (2004-2009) A. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ON IMPLEMENTING THE INFORMA TION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION COM (2004) 196 FINAL. B. REPORT FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY (2004/2238(INI)). C. COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMISSION. ACTION PLAN TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATING EUROPE BY THE COMMISSION (SEC (2005) 985 FINAL). D. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 264 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS-THE COMMISSION'S CONTRIBU TION TO THE PERIOD OF REFLECTION AND BEYOND-PLAN-D FOR DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE AND DEBATE COM (2005) 494 FINAL. A. WHITE PAPER ON A EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION POLICY COM (2006) 35 FINAL. BARROSO II COMMISSION (2009-2014) COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION EUROPE 2020. A STRATEGY FOR SMART, SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH. COM (2010) 2020 FINAL. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. A BUDGET FOR EUROPE 2020-PART II: POLICY FICHES. COM (2011) 500 FINAL. PART II. COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMISSION FROM VICE-PRESIDENT REDING AND COMMISSIONER LEWANDOWSKI IN AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT BARROSO. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION UNDER THE
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|a MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2014-2020. SEC (2013) 486/2. JUNCKER COMMISSION (2014-2019) STRATEGIC PLAN 2016-2020 DG COMMUNICATION. REF. ARES (2016) 1,853,065-19/04/2016. REPORT COMMISSIONED BY JUNCKER: REACHING OUT TO EU CITIZENS: A NEW OPPORTUNITY "ABOUT US, WITH US, FOR US" 2017. COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMISSION FROM PRESIDENT JUNCKER AND COMMISSIONER OETTINGER. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION ACTION IN 2019-2020 UNDER THE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2014- 2020. C (2018) 4063 FINAL. CITIZENS' DIALOGUES AND CITIZENS' CONSULTATIONS. KEY CONCLUSIONS. PDF ISBN 978-92-76-02583-2 HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.2775/92815 NA-03-19-258-EN-N. MAIR D., SMILLIE L., LA PLACA G., SCHWENDINGER F., RAYKOVSKA M., PASZTOR Z., VAN BAVEL R., UNDERSTANDING OUR POLITICAL NATURE: HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE AND REASON AT THE HEART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING, EUR 29,783 EN, PUBLICATIONS OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 265 UNION, LUXEMBOURG, 2019, ISBN 978-92-76-08621-5, HTTPS:// DOI.ORG/10.2760/374191 , JRC117161. ANNEX II. LIST OF EUANDME DOCUMENTS AND OTHER RESOURCES FOR THE ANALYSIS INTERNAL COMMISSION DOCUMENTS REQUEST FOR A COMMUNICATION ACTION FOR A SPECIFIC CONTRACT TO BE PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MULTIPLE FRAMEWORK CONTRACT WITH RENEWED COMPETITIVE TENDERING FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES LINKED TO THE ORGANISATION OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS. A UNION THAT EMPOWERS. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICA TION CAMPAIGN TOWARDS EU CITIZENS. REFERENCE: PO/2015-16/A2 A1/01/17. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN TOWARDS EU CITI ZENS: 'A UNION THAT EMPOWERS'-MONITORING AND EVALUATION BY ICF MOSTRA. EUANDME INTERIM CAMPAIGN PERFORMANCE REPORT. AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIAL TINA ZOURNATZI, STRATEGIC HEAD OF UNIT, CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND VIDEOS (EUROPCOM, COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, NO. 2018). JULIAN CLERCKX, STRATEGIC DIRECTOR BIJ WIDE-THE STRATEGIC SOCIETAL INSTITUTE (CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND VIDEOS (EUROPCOM,
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|a COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, NO. 2018). EUROPEAN COMMISSION ( 2018A ). SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS JULIAN CLERCKX, STRATEGIC DIRECTOR BIJ WIDE-THE STRATEGIC SOCIETAL INSTITUTE, ORGANISATION THAT TESTED THE CAMPAIGN. CAROLIEN PEETERS, EUANDME CAMPAIGN MANAGER (FOR BACK GROUND, NOT CITED ON THE PAPER). 266 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN REFERENCES BARKER, R. (2001). LEGITIMATING IDENTITIES: THE SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF RULERS AND SUBJECTS . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. BIEGON, D. (2013). SPECIFYING THE ARENA OF POSSIBILITIES: POST-STRUCTURALIST NARRA TIVE ANALYSIS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES , 51 (2), 194-211. BOUZA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87-104. BRUEGGEMANN, M. (2005). HOW THE EU CONSTRUCTS THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE SEVEN STRATEGIES OF INFORMATION POLICY. JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC, 12 (2), 57-73. BRUTER, M. (2003). WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS FOR EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF NEWS AND SYMBOLS ON CIVIC AND CULTURAL EUROPEAN IDENTITY. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 36 (10), 1148-1179. BUNEA, A. (2020). UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S USE OF POLITI CISATION IN THE NEGOTIATION OF INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF CONSULTATIONS AND ISSUE FRAMING. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 27 (3), 439-459. CLERCKX, J. (2019, AUGUST 10). STRATEGIC DIRECTOR BIJ WIDE-THE STRATEGIC SOCIETAL INSTITUTE. (M. I. SOLDEVILA, INTERVIEWEUR) DE WILDE, P., MICHAILIDOU, A., & TRENZ, H. J. (2013). CONTESTING EUROPE: EXPLORING EUROSCEPTICISM IN ONLINE MEDIA COVERAGE . ECPR PRESS. DG COMMUNICATION. (2016). STRATEGIC PLAN 2016-2020 . DG COMMUNICATION. EDELMAN, M. (1988). CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE . UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2004). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
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|a TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ON IMPLEMENTING THE INFOR MATION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2005A). COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMISSION. ACTION PLAN TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATING EUROPE BY THE COMMISSION. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2005B). PLAN D FOR DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE AND DEBATE. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2006A). WHITE PAPER ON A EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION POLICY (PRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION). DEBATING EUROPE, INVOLVING PEOPLE. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2006B). WHITE PAPER ON A EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION POLICY: DEBATING EUROPE, INVOLVING PEOPLE. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2018A). WELCOME TO EU AND ME. CORPORATE CAMPAIGN. EU AND ME-EUROPEAN COMMISSION. RETRIEVED MAY 23, 2018, FROM HTTPS:// EUROPA.EU/EUANDME/FRONTPAGE_EN . 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 267 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2018B). COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMISSION FROM PRESIDENT JUNCKER AND COMMISSIONER OETTINGER. CORPORATE COMMUNICA TION ACTION IN 2019-2020 UNDER THE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2014-2020. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2019). CITIZENS' DIALOGUES AND CITIZENS' CONSULTATIONS. KEY CONCLUSIONS. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL . EUROPEAN COMMISSION, & DG COMM. (2016). REQUEST FOR A COMMUNICATION ACTION FOR A SPECIFIC CONTRACT TO BE PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MULTIPLE FRAMEWORK CONTRACT WITH RENEWED COMPETITIVE TENDERING FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES LINKED TO THE ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS . PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN TOWARDS EU CITIZENS. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, & DG COMM. N.D. A UNION THAT EMPOWERS. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN TOWARDS EU CITIZENS. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, & DG COMM. (2018, OCTOBER 3). DG COMM-FOR COMMUNICATION. KNOWLEDGE FOR POLICY-EUROPEAN COMMISSION . FISCHER, F. (2003). REFRAMING PUBLIC POLICY: DISCURSIVE POLITICS AND DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. FOELLESDAL, A.
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|a (2006). SURVEY ARTICLE: THE LEGITIMACY DEFICITS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION*. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 14 (4), 441-468. FOSSUM, J. E., & SCHLESINGER, P. R. (EDS.). (2007). THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A COMMUNICATIVE SPACE IN THE MAKING? ROUTLEDGE. GRONAU, J., & SCHMIDTKE, H. (2016). THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN WORLD POLI TICS-INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 42 (3), 535-557. HERRERO-TEJEDOR, L. F. (2005). REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EURO PEAN UNION'S INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , 2004/2238 (INI) A6-0111/2005. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. ICF MOSTRA. (2018). PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN TOWARDS EU CITIZENS: 'A UNION THAT EMPOWERS'-MONITORING AND EVALUATION FINAL PROPOSAL. INMAN, N. (2019, JULY 4). EUROPEANS HAVE A LOT TO SAY. BRUSSELS NEEDS TO LISTEN. NEWS ORGANISATION. POLITICO . RETRIEVED AUGUST 7, 2019, FROM HTTPS:// WWW.POLITICO.EU/ARTICLE/BRUSSELS-SHOULD-LISTEN-TO-EUROPEAN-CITIZENS/ . JUNCKER, J.-C. (2015). COMMISSION EUROPEENNE-STATE OF THE UNION 2015: TIME FOR HONESTY, UNITY AND SOLIDARITY. RETRIEVED SEPTEMBER 9, 2015, FROM HTTPS://EUROPA.EU/RAPID/PRESS-RELEASE_SPEECH-15-5614_EN.HTM . 268 M.-I. SOLDEVILA AND J. VANDER MEULEN KAUPPI, N., PALONEN, K., & WIESNER, C. (2016). THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITI CISATION OF THE EU. REDESCRIPTIONS: POLITICAL THOUGHT, CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND FEMINIST THEORY , 19 , 72-90. KOMMITMENT. (2019A). EUANDME INTERIM REPORT. INTERIM REPORT CAMPAIGN PERFORMANCE , P. 19. KOMMITMENT. (2019B). A UNION THAT EMPOWERS. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN TOWARDS EU CITIZENS. FINAL REPORT FWC PO/2015-16/A2-A1/01/17 . KOMMITMENT, BY MCCANN. MAIR,
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|a D., SMILLIE L., LA PLACA G., SCHWENDINGER F., RAYKOVSKA M., PASZTOR Z., & VAN BAVEL R. (2019). UNDERSTANDING OUR POLITICAL NATURE: HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE AND REASON AT THE HEART OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING. EU SCIENCE HUB-EUROPEAN COMMISSION . RETRIEVED JULY 11, 2019, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUR OPA.EU/JRC/EN/PUBLICATION/EUR-SCIENTIFIC-AND-TECHNICAL-RESEARCH-REPORTS/UND ERSTANDING-OUR-POLITICAL-NATURE-HOW-PUT-KNOWLEDGE-AND-REASON-HEART-POLITI CAL-DECISION . MEYER, C. (1999). POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THE INVISIBILITY OF POLITICS: EXPLORING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMUNICATION DEFICIT. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 37 (4), 617-639. MICHAILIDOU, A. (2010). VERTICAL EUROPEANISATION OF ONLINE PUBLIC DIALOGUE: EU PUBLIC COMMUNICATION POLICY AND ONLINE IMPLEMENTATION,[W:] MAPPING THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE . INSTITUTIONS, MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY, RED. C. BEE, E. BOZZINI, FARNHAM. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EU INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. PALONEN, K. (2003). FOUR TIMES OF POLITICS: POLICY, POLITY, POLITICKING, AND POLITICIZATION. ALTERNATIVES, 28 (2), 171-186. PANSARDI, P., & BATTEGAZZORRE, F. (2018). THE DISCURSIVE LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION: A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES (SOTEU). JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 40 (7), 853-871. PENNEY, J. (2017). THE CITIZEN MARKETER: PROMOTING POLITICAL OPINION IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA AGE . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. REDING, V., & LEWANDOWSKI, J. (2013). COMMUNICATION TO THE COMMISSION FROM VICE-PRESIDENT REDING AND COMMISSIONER LEWANDOWSKI IN AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT BARROSO. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION UNDER THE MULTIANNUAL FINAN CIAL FRAMEWORK 2014-2020. RETRIEVED JULY 29, 2019, FROM HTTPS://EC.EUROPA. EU/TRANSPARENCY/REGDOC/REP/2/2013/EN/2-2013-486-EN-2-1.PDF . SCHMIDT, V. A. (2013). DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION REVISITED: INPUT, OUTPUT AND 'THROUGHPUT.'
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|a POLITICAL STUDIES, 61 (1), 2-22. SCHMITTER, P. C. (1969). THREE NEO-FUNCTIONAL HYPOTHESES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 23 (1), 161-166. 11 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY YY 269 STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H. J. (2013). HOW EUROPEAN UNION POLITICIZATION CAN EMERGE THROUGH CONTESTATION: THE CONSTITUTION CASE. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES , 51 (5), 965-980. THEILER, T. (2005). POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS. VAN BRUSSEL, A. (2014). FROM INFORMING TO INTERACTING? EXPLORING THE EURO PEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 'TO BE ALL EARS.' JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 10 (1), 90-104. VAN DEN BRANDE, L. (2017). REACHING OUT TO CITIZENS: A NEW OPPORTUNITY 'ABOUT US, WITH US, FOR US.' REPORT FROM SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESI DENT JUNCKER . HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/COMMISSION/SITES/BETA-POLITICAL/FILES/REA CHING-OUT-TO-CITIZENS-REPORT_EN.PDF . VLIEGENTHART, R., SCHUCK, A. R., BOOMGAARDEN, H. G., & DE VREESE, C. H. (2008). NEWS COVERAGE AND SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1990-2006. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, 20 (4), 415-439. ZOURNATZI, T. (2018). EUROPCOM-CELEBRATING THE LOCAL IN PAN-EUROPEAN CAMPAIGNS. RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 9, FROM HTTPS://LIVESTREAM.COM/CORLIVE1/ EVENTS/8414614/VIDEOS/183319680 . ZUERN, M. (2016). OPENING UP EUROPE: NEXT STEPS IN POLITICISATION RESEARCH. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 39 (1), 164-182. CHAPTER 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVE OF EMMANUEL MACRON IN FRANCE LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND ALVARO OLEART 1 INTRODUCTION ON THE EVENING OF 7 MAY 2017, A 40-YEAR-OLD MAN WALKED INTO THE LOUVRE COURTYARD ON THE ACCORDS OF THE ODE TO JOY TO DELIVER HIS VICTORY SPEECH AFTER HIS ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. IN DOING SO, EMMANUEL MACRON CHOSE TO ADD A EUROPEAN SYMBOL TO THE EXISTING SYMBOLOGY OF FRANCE'S 'MONARCHICAL REPUBLIC'. THIS
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|a EPISODE IS INDICA TIVE OF A NEW POLITICAL ERA, WHERE THE GAULLIST TRADITION OF (OLD) MEN AT THE HELM OF A REPUBLIC FOCUSED ON EXPORTING FRANCE'S MODEL TO EUROPE WAS REPLACED BY A EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY ARTICULATED BY A CENTRIST L. BOUZA GARCIA ( B ) UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: LUIS.BOUZA@UAM.ES A. OLEART MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, MAASTRICHT, THE NETHERLANDS E-MAIL: A.OLEART@MAASTRICHTUNIVERSITY.NL THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_12 271 272 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART YOUNG PRESIDENT. THE EMERGENCE OF MACRON'S EUROPEAN DISCOURSE IN THE CONTEXT OF FRENCH POLITICS IS AN INTERESTING INNOVATION, CONSIDERING THE INCREASING POLITICISATION OF THE EU DURING THE LAST DECADE. UNLIKE THE CASE OF FRINGE PARTIES THAT 'USE' EUROPE AS ITS MAIN CAUSE GIVEN ITS LACK OF OTHER NATIONAL RESOURCES (SEE KAUPPI'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK), MACRON IS POLITI CISING EUROPE FROM A CENTRIST POSITION IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL SPECTRUM, ATTEMPTING TO USE ITS (NATIONAL) EXECUTIVE AND DISCURSIVE POWERS TO EXPAND THEM IN THE EU LEVEL AS A FORM OF FRENCH INFLUENCE. IN SPITE OF BEING FAR FROM PUTTING FRANCE IN A HEGEMONIC POSITION AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL, MACRON IS INNOVATING BOTH IN THE NATIONAL AND EURO PEAN CONTEXT. DURING HIS NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENCY IN 2017, THERE WERE REPEATED REFERENCES TO EU INTEGRATION THAT WERE NOT ONLY POSI TIVE, BUT ALSO HIGHLY SALIENT IN A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN, AND THE CAMPAIGN SYSTEMATICALLY USED THE EU AS PART OF THE STRATEGY THAT BROUGHT HIS POLITICAL BASE TOGETHER. THIS FRAMING LED TO SITUATE HIMSELF IN FRONTAL OPPOSITION TO THE WELL-KNOWN EUROSCEPTIC MARINE LE PEN, LEADER OF THE FAR RIGHT FRONT NATIONAL . IN THIS WAY, MACRON INCARNATES A BREAKING POINT REGARDING THE POLARISATION OF PRO-EUROPEAN
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|a DISCOURSES. MACRON'S POLITICAL STRATEGY SO FAR HAS NOT SOUGHT COMPROMISE IN A EUROPEAN CONSOCIATIONAL WAY, BUT RATHER HAS STAYED IN THE FRENCH MAJORITARIAN TRADITION WHEREBY THE PRES IDENT ATTEMPTS TO APPLY THE MANDATE HE INTERPRETS HAS RECEIVED DIRECTLY FROM THE PEOPLE. NOW THAT OPPOSITION HAS ERUPTED WITHIN FRANCE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, IT HAS DONE SO IN THE FORM OF POLITICAL PROTESTS SUCH AS THOSE OF THE YELLOW VEST MOVEMENT (CHAMOREL, 2019 ) AND GENERAL STRIKES AGAINST PENSION REFORMS. MACRON'S RESPONSE TO SOME OF THESE PROTESTS HAS ALSO BEEN STRONGLY INSPIRED BY RECENT EUROPEAN PRACTICES OF CONSULTATION, BECAUSE HE HAS ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN HIS PROGRAMME DIRECTLY VIA CITIZENS' CONSULTATIONS AND A 'GRAND NATIONAL DEBATE' (KEMPIN & TOKARSKI, 2019 ). WE ARE THUS INTERESTED IN A NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADER WITH VAST CONSTITU TIONAL POWERS AND IN ONE OF THE MAJOR MEMBER STATES OF THE EU, SUCH AS EMMANUEL MACRON, THAT IS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUBSTANTIAL INNOVATION IN THE WAY IN WHICH EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ARE DISCUSSED IN FRANCE, BUT ALSO BEYOND ITS BORDERS DUE TO HIS INFLUENCE UPON EU DEBATES AND OTHER NATIONAL ACTORS. WHILE OPPONENTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAVE BEEN THE MOST VOCAL AND SUBJECT TO EXTENSIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN AGENCY ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN SIDE, AND THE CHAPTER ATTEMPTS TO ANALYSE ONE OF THE MAIN ACTORS IN THIS REGARD, FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON. THE RESEARCH QUESTION THAT DRIVES THIS CHAPTER IS THE FOLLOWING: HOW IS 'EUROPE' NARRATED BY EMMANUEL MACRON SINCE THE START OF HIS RISE AS A EUROPEAN 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 273 POLITICAL FIGURE IN 2016? WE ANALYSE THE NARRATIVE OF EUROPE PUT FORWARD IN FOUR SPEECHES AND AN OP-ED FROM 2016 TO 2019. THE CHAPTER PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF AN EXCLUSIONARY VISION OF EUROPE THAT DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN 'GOOD PRO-EUROPEANS' SUCH AS MACRON, AND OFTEN SITUATES HIS CRITICS' VISION OF EUROPE AS EUROSCEPTIC, A POLITICAL STRATEGY THAT
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|a THE FRENCH PRESIDENT AIMS AT USING IN HIS FAVOUR. FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION TO OUR RESEARCH FOCUS, THE SECOND SECTION OUTLINES THE EMERGING GAL-TAN TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE DISCUSSED IN THE RECENT LITERATURE ON THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. THE THIRD SECTION DESCRIBES THE METHODOLOGY USED, AND WHY WE HAVE CHOSEN NARRATIVE ANAL YSIS TO RESEARCH MACRON'S DISCOURSE. THE FOURTH SECTION DESCRIBES THE FINDINGS, DETAILING THE ARTICULATION OF MACRON'S POLITICISING PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVE, WHICH WE CONCEIVE AS 'MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN'. THE FIFTH SECTION MAKES SENSE OF THE NARRATIVE, ARGUING THAT MACRON IS REPOLITICISING THE EU AS A POLITY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION IN ORDER TO RESHAPE THE STAKES IN FRENCH NATIONAL ELECTIONS: 'EUROPE' IS NOW AT STAKE IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS. FINALLY, THE CONCLUSION SUMMARISES THE CHAPTER. 2 THE END OF THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS SITUATES EUROPE AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT IN POLITICAL COMPETITION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: THE EMERGING GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE THERE HAS BEEN AN ACADEMIC CONSENSUS AS TO UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS UNTIL THE 1990S-EARLY 2000S AS AN ELITE-DRIVEN PROCESS (FLIGSTEIN, 2008 ; HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ), IN WHICH POLITICAL ELITES ADVANCED EU INTEGRATION WITH THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THIS 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' CAN BE SEEN PARTLY AS THE OUTCOME OF THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY POWERFUL NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL ACTORS WITH THE NECESSARY CAPITAL TO CONSTRUCT A CONSENSUS AND AVOID VISIBLE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES (BOUZA GARCIA, 2017 ). HOWEVER, THE RECENT POLITICISATION OF THE EU, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE MID-2000S (CHECKEL & KATZENSTEIN, 2009 ; STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ), HAS QUESTIONED THE STRONG TECHNOCRATIC CHARACTER AND ELITE-DRIVEN ELEMENTS OF EU POLITICS. THE INCREASING LITERATURE ON THE POLITICISATION OF EU AFFAIRS TENDS TO ARGUE THAT THERE IS AN EMERGING 'TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE' (HOOGHE & MARKS,
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|a 2018 ) THAT SITUATES EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE 274 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART NATION STATE, IN A TYPE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT THAT HAS BEEN CONCEPTUALISED AS INTEGRATION-DEMARCATION (KRIESI ET AL., 2012 ), A RATHER CULTURAL CLEAVAGE THAT GOES BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL LEFT-RIGHT. CONCEPTUALISED AS GAL-TAN (GREEN-ALTERNATIVE-LIBERTARIAN VS. TRADITIONAL-AUTHORITARIAN-NATIONALIST), THE TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE IS EXPLAINED AS AN EVOLUTION BY WHICH 'THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REALM OF ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL POLITICS BECOME BLURRED' (HAEUSERMANN & KRIESI, 2015 , P. 206). THIS CLEAVAGE IS OFTEN CONNECTED TO THE DEFENCE OF 'NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY' AND (OPPOSING) IMMI GRATION, AND OFTEN PLACES NATIONAL IDENTITY IN OPPOSITION TO OTHER NATIONAL OR SUPRANATIONAL IDENTITIES. IN CONSEQUENCE, THIS CLEAVAGE TENDS TO OPPOSE SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, PLACING GLOBALISATION'S 'WINNERS AND LOSERS' IN OPPOSITION, AS HIGHLY SKILLED COSMOPOLITAN WORKERS HAVE DIVERGENT VIEWS FROM LESS-SKILLED WORKERS THAT FACE MORE DIFFICULTY COMPETING IN A GLOBALISING WORLD. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 ) SITUATED RADICAL LEFT- AND RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN OPPO SITION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, IMAGINING THE GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE AS AN INVERTED U-CURVE. THE BREAK WITH THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' CAN BE SEEN ON THE ONE HAND AS A FAILURE OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL ELITES TO MAINTAIN THE CONSENSUS AND ITS DISCOURSE OF DEPOLITICISATION, THUS AVOIDING CONFLICT IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, BUT ALSO AS THE SUCCESS OF SKILLED SOCIAL ACTORS PUTTING FORWARD ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES TO WHICH OTHER ACTORS ADHERE. MUCH WORK HAS BEEN DONE IN RECENT YEARS ON ANALYSING THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTIC FAR RIGHT PARTIES (AKKERMAN ET AL., 2016 ; MUDDE, 2016 ) THAT HAVE TRAVELLED 'FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM' IN CONTESTING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (BRACK &S T A R T I N , 2015 ), AS WELL AS CRITICS OF NEOLIBERALISM IN THE EU IN AREAS
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|a SUCH AS TRADE POLICY (BOUZA & OLEART, 2018 ;O L E A R T , 2021 ). INSTEAD, IN THIS CHAPTER, WE FOCUS ON THE INNOVATIVE NARRATIVE STRATEGIES MOBILISED BY MACRON, A NEW PRO-EUROPEAN ACTOR THAT NOT ONLY RESPONDS TO THE INCREASING POLITICISATION OF EU AFFAIRS, BUT PLAYS ALONG WITH IT. IN THEIR SEMINAL ARTICLE ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN ISSUES, HOOGHE AND MARKS ( 2009 , P. 13) EMPHASISED THE ROLE OF AGENCY IN THE EMERGENCE OF THE GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE OPPOSITION REQUIRES POLITICAL ACTORS TO EMBODY IT, ARGUING THAT 'POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS MUST MOBILIZE THE TENSION'. THE DISCOURSE OF THE EMERGING GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE HAS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD ATTENTION IN RECENT YEARS, BUT MAINLY ON THE TAN SIDE. THUS, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAINSTREAM PRO-EUROPEAN ACTORS' DISCOURSE HAS RECEIVED LESS ATTENTION. RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT PRO-EUROPEAN ACTORS 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 275 ARE ATTEMPTING TO BRING BACK THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' ERA THROUGH DEPOLITICISATION, IN THIS CHAPTER, WE AIM TO DISENTANGLE THE COMPLEMEN TARY DYNAMICS OF BOTH POLITICISATION AND DEPOLITICISATION IN THE DISCOURSE OF MACRON, CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC 'USAGE OF EUROPE' (WOLL & JACQUOT, 2010 ). WE THUS ARGUE THAT EUROSCEPTIC NARRATIVES ARE NO LONGER IGNORED BY MAINSTREAM FORCES, BUT INSTEAD HAVE CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR PRO-EUROPEAN ACTORS TO EMBRACE THE GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE. IN THIS APPROACH, WE CONCEIVE OF THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL FIELD AS A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT WHERE THE STRATEGY AND SUCCESSES OF SOME ACTORS CREATE OPPO SITE RESPONSES BY OTHERS IN A CONSTANT JOCKEYING FOR POSITION (FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, 2012 ). HENCE, WE CONCEIVE MACRON'S ASSERTIVE AND POLAR ISING PRO-EUROPEANISM AS A STRATEGIC REACTION TO EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES OPERATING BOTH AT THE NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL. 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF MACRON ' S SPEECHES EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ARE
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|a UNDERGOING A NARRATIVE TURN. ACADEMIC DEBATE IS STARTING TO CONSIDER BOTH THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIOCULTURAL REPRE SENTATIONS OF EUROPEANNESS FOR UNDERSTANDING CITIZENS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU AND THE USAGE OF NARRATIVE STRATEGIES BY EU POLITICAL ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS TO SELECT, FRAME, EMPLOT, AND REPRESENT POLITICAL STRATEGIES ON EU INTEGRATION. ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT INTEREST FOR NARRATIVES OF THE EU IS PART OF THE BROADER ARGUMENTATIVE TURN IN SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE LAST TWO DECADES (FORESTER, 1993 ), IT ALSO DEPARTS FROM PREVIOUS APPROACHES, IN THAT NARRATIVE IN MANY ANALYSES REPLACES DISCOURSE WITHOUT EXPLICIT ELABORATION (BOUZA GARCIA, 2017 ). OFTEN AUTHORS AND POLITICAL COMMENTATORS REFER TO NARRATIVES AS METAPHORS OF A DOMINANT DISCOURSE OR THE ZEITGEIST ON A PARTICULAR ISSUE, A POSITION THAT DEPARTS FROM A POST-STRUCTURALIST UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE IN POWER STRUGGLES (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003 ). FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, THIS CHAPTER IS BASED ON A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS (OLEART & BOUZA GARCIA, 2019 ) OF MACRON'S DISCOURSE ON EUROPE. SUCH FOCUS UPON NARRATIVES IS JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS THAT THEY ARE CENTRAL TO THE TERMS IN WHICH PUBLIC DEBATE TAKES PLACE, WHICH IN TURN IS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN A MUCH MORE POLITICISED CONTEXT. WE CONCEIVE THE EU AS A POLITICAL SPACE UNDER DISPUTE BY DIFFERENT ACTORS, AND WHOSE MEANING IS TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN THE NATIONALLY FRAGMENTED EURO PEAN PUBLIC SPHERES (ERIKSEN, 2007 ). WE UNDERSTAND NARRATIVES AS A WAY 276 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART TO CONSTRUCT POLITICAL REALITY BY SKILLED SOCIAL ACTORS. AS SASSATELLI ( 2012 , P. 2) ARGUED, 'STORIES ARE COMPLEX ARTEFACTS. IT IS USEFUL TO DISTINGUISH AT LEAST THREE COMPONENTS: AN APPROPRIATELY SELECTIVE SERIES OF PAST EVENTS AND FORCES, A TEMPORAL SEQUENCE AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, AN "EMPLOTMENT" THAT ESTABLISHES CAUSAL LINKS AND COMMUNICATES, POSSIBLY, MORAL LESSONS.' NARRA TIVES DO NOT EMERGE AND CIRCULATE
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|a SPONTANEOUSLY, BUT RATHER ARE CREATED AND DISSEMINATED BY SKILLED SOCIAL ACTORS IN A PROCESS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF FACTS, EMPLOTTING ISSUES AND EVENTS IN A PARTICULAR WAY. NARRA TIVES ARE THUS THE RESULT OF SKILLED SOCIAL ACTORS ABLE TO ARTICULATE CERTAIN DISCURSIVE PATTERNS THAT SHAPE THE WAY IN WHICH POLITICAL STRUGGLES TAKE PLACE. FOLLOWING THE NARRATIVE ANALYSIS APPROACH, WE RELY ON THE NOTION OF FRAMES OF INTERPRETATION (LAKOFF, 2014 ;S N O W&B EN F O R D , 1988 ): SETS OF POLITICAL AND SEMANTIC REFERENCES THAT STRUCTURE THE POLITICAL DISCOURSES WITH WHICH ACTORS INTERPRET AND INTERVENE IN THEIR SOCIAL CONTEXT. THESE FRAMES ARE STRUCTURES OF INTERPRETATION IN A DOUBLE SENSE: THEY DETERMINE THE CHOICES OF WHAT IS INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED FROM THE DISCOURSES IN THE PROPER SENSE OF THE FRAME OF AN IMAGE, AND AT THE SAME TIME CONSTI TUTES THE SEMANTIC FIELD IN WHICH THE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS OPERATE. THEY ARE, NONETHELESS, STRUCTURES OPERATING AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY AND CAN THERE FORE CHANGE DEPENDING ON THE POWER RELATIONS AT PLAY. A NARRATIVE IS ARTICULATED AS A SET OF STORIES TO CREATE EXPLANATIONS AND HIGHLIGHT MORAL LESSONS THAT GO BEYOND A DECISION OR EVEN A CONCRETE POLICY; NARRATIVES ARE ARRANGEMENTS OF STORIES COMPOSED OF DIFFERENT FRAMES THAT CAN RESPOND TO DIFFERENT SITUATIONS: IF A STORY IS A DEFINITE ARTICULATION OF EVENTS, A NARRATIVE IS A RELATIVELY FLUID RELATIONSHIP OF STORIES THAT CAN BE RECONSTRUCTED IN THE PAST, AND AIMS TO RESPOND TO NEW NEEDS AND SITUATIONS. OUR ANALYSIS THUS CONSIDERS BOTH RELATIVELY STABLE NARRATIVE STRUCTURES AND ACTOR AGENCY VIA THE NOTION OF STORIES. IN OUR ANALYSIS, STORIES ACT AS MASTER FRAMES ARTICULATING A SERIES OF STRUCTURAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN FRAMES. HENCE, WE ANALYSE FRAMING AS A PROCESS OF SIGNIFICATION AND RESIG NIFICATION WHERE WE EMPHASISE THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL OBJECTS BY CONSIDERING THE SELECTION OF SEMANTIC FIELDS, USE OF PRONOUNS (WE, THEM) AND VERBAL TENSES, AND THE ARTICULATION
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|a OF REFERENCES BETWEEN THESE OBJECTS. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT FRAMES ARE NECESSARILY MORE FLUID THAN STORIES, BUT THAT FRAMES ARE CREATED BY ACTORS WHEREAS STORIES ARE BUILT ON THE DISPUTE OVER THE INTERSUBJECTIVELY ASSUMED CONNECTIONS OF THE FRAMES (E.G. SOVEREIGNTY AND NATION, EUROPE AND PEACE). THIS INFLUENCES THE BUILD-UP OF THE CORPUS OF ANALYSIS IN THAT IT MUST BE 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 277 COMPOSED OF DOCUMENTS ADDRESSING SIMILAR ISSUES AND ADDRESSING SIMILAR PUBLICS. WE HAVE THUS DECIDED TO FOCUS ON RELATIVELY EXTENSIVE DOCU MENTS WHERE MACRON IS GIVEN SPACE TO FREELY ADDRESS A MESSAGE TO A EUROPEAN PUBLIC ABOUT EUROPE. THIS FOR INSTANCE EXCLUDES TV OR RADIO INTERVIEWS CONSTRAINED BY TIME PRESSURES AND A MOSTLY NATIONAL AUDIENCE BUT INCLUDES INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS OR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS FOR PRESTIGIOUS WRITTEN INTERNATIONAL NEWSPAPERS OR REVIEWS. WE HAVE CHOSEN EMMANUEL MACRON'S DISCOURSE BECAUSE NOT ONLY HE IS A PROMINENT INNOVATOR IN THE PRO-EUROPEAN DISCOURSES AND THEIR USAGE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRATEGY, BUT BECAUSE AS THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE AND ONE OF THE KEY LEADERS OF THE PRO-EUROPEAN CENTRIST EU POLITICAL GROUP RENEW EUROPE, HIS POSITION FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE IS CENTRAL (SEE TRON COTA & IONITA'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK). THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENT IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN CENTRAL, AS PRESIDENTS SUCH AS CHARLES DE GAULLE, GEORGES POMPIDOU, VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, OR NICOLAS SARKOZY HAVE HAD A LASTING IMPACT ON THE INTEGRA TION PROCESS. THE TRADITION OF STRONG FRENCH PRESIDENTS THAT ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION CONTINUES WITH MACRON, WHOSE MAIN ARGUMENT IN HIS CAMPAIGN WAS PRECISELY THE SUPPORT FOR EURO PEAN INTEGRATION AGAINST THE FAR RIGHT AND EUROSCEPTIC CANDIDATE MARINE LE PEN. IN ORDER TO ANALYSE TO WHAT EXTENT POLITICAL ACTORS PURSUE NARRATIVE STRATEGIES THAT ARE ADAPTIVE TO CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE MOVES OF
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|a OPPONENTS AND AT THE SAME CONSTRAINED BY STRUCTURES, WE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF HOW THEIR DISCOURSE EVOLVES OVER TIME IN ORDER TO INCLUDE CHANGING CIRCUM STANCES. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE CHOSEN DOCUMENTS (SEE THE SOURCES IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY) THAT ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF MACRON'S VIEWS ON EUROPE EVERY YEAR FROM THE BUILD-UP OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL AMBITION UNTIL 2019, AFTER THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS (TABLE 1 ). THESE FIVE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN SEPARATELY AND INDUCTIVELY CODED, SO THAT THE COMMON FRAMES THAT INFORM THE ISSUES ADDRESSED BY EMMANUEL MACRON (E.G. 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY') CAN BE COMPARED AS TO THE MEANING STRATEGIES HE EMPLOYS IN EACH OF THEM. WE THUS CARRY A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (SEMANTIC FIELD) AND QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON VIA NVIVO (WORD CLUS TERING). THIS PROCEDURE NOT ONLY EMPHASISES TEMPORAL COMPARABILITY, BUT ALSO FACILITATES THE COMPARISON OF MACRON'S FRAMING TO THAT OF OTHER ACTORS. IN A SECOND STEP, WE HAVE FOCUSED ON THE CONNECTIONS MACRON ESTABLISHES BETWEEN THE FRAMES AND THE STORIES THAT EMERGE. 278 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART TABLE 1 DATA SET TO ANALYSE MACRON'S NARRATIVE ON 'EUROPE' DATE TYPE OF DOCUMENT VENUE 18 APRIL 2016 SPEECH COLLEGE OF EUROPE 26 SEPTEMBER 2017 SPEECH SORBONNE 20 APRIL 2018 SPEECH EU PARLIAMENT 4 MARCH 2019 LETTER PUBLISHED IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN MEDIA THE GUARDIAN AND OTHER EUROPEAN MEDIA 7 NOVEMBER 2019 INTERVIEW THE ECONOMIST 4 MACRON ' S POLITICISATION OF THE EU: MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN RATHER THAN PUTTING FORWARD A DEPOLITICISING NARRATIVE OF THE EU, THE DISCOURSE OF MACRON IS INSTEAD VERY POLITICISING, MAKING EUROPE AN INTE GRAL PART OF THE FRENCH POLITICAL ARENA. MACRON'S EUROPEAN NARRATIVE IS OPENLY CONFLICTUAL, AND DOUBLES DOWN IN ITS BID AGAINST EUROSCEPTICISM: WE CONCEIVE IT AS 'MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN' (MEGA). MACRON'S MEGA NARRATIVE IS ARTICULATED THROUGH THREE STORIES, EACH OF WHICH IS CONNECTED TO A NUMBER OF FRAMES, THAT ARE IN TURN RELATED TO MORE THAN ONE
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|a STORY. THE CENTRAL COMPONENT THAT BINDS TOGETHER MACRON'S EUROPEAN NARRA TIVE IS A SENSE THAT 'EUROPE' IS IN DANGER, AND THE WAY TO 'SAVE' EUROPE IS TO BRING TO THE FORE 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY', IN ORDER TO 'MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN'. THIS NARRATIVE, CONVENIENTLY, REGULARLY CONFLATES THE 'EU' WITH 'EUROPE'. THE THREE STORIES (SEE FIG. 1 ) ARTICULATED BY MACRON IDENTIFIED INDUC TIVELY ARE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN (SOVEREIGN) COMMUNITY OF VALUES, THE NEED TO FACE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ENEMIES, AND THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING A 'GLOBAL EUROPE' IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD. OUR ANALYSIS OF MACRON'S DISCOURSE SUGGESTS THAT THE DIFFERENT ISSUES HE ADDRESSES-FOR INSTANCE, TWO OF HIS BEST KNOWN DISCOURSES, THE SORBONNE AND EU PARLIAMENT SPEECHES CONTAIN POLICY WISH LISTS CLEARLY ARTICULATED BY FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS-ARE ARTICULATED INTO FIVE FRAMES. IN TURN, FIVE FRAMES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE THREE STORIES, AND SOME RELATE TO MORE THAN ONE OF THEM. OVERALL, EACH OF THESE STORIES BUILDS ON THE FIVE FRAMES, AND THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN FRAMES AND STORIES HELPS TO CONSTRUCT THE OVERALL MEGA NARRATIVE. 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 279 CHALLENGES TO EUROPE CHALLENGES TO EUROPE MEGA: MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN MEGA: MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN GLOBAL EUROPE GLOBAL EUROPE EUROPE AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES EUROPE AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES PREVENT A NEW EU CIVIL WAR PREVENT A NEW EU CIVIL WAR INTERNAL CHALLENGERS INTERNAL CHALLENGERS EU VALUES EU VALUES TAKE BACK CONTROL TAKE BACK CONTROL EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY LEVEL 1: NARRATIVE LEVEL 2: STORIES LEVEL 3: FRAMES FIG. 1 DIAGRAM OF MACRON'S MEGA NARRATIVE, FORMED BY THREE STORIES THAT INCLUDE FIVE FRAMES THE FIRST STORY IS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN (SOVEREIGN) COMMU NITY OF VALUES. IT INCLUDES SEVERAL DISCURSIVE INNOVATIONS, SINCE IN MOST CASES IT ATTEMPTS TO RESIGNIFY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
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|a BEYOND THE NATION STATE. SUCH TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATION (KINSKI AND CRUM) HAS BEEN MOBILISED MAINLY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, AND ARTICULATES THE EU AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES-IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFINITION OF THE EU OR 'EUROPE' AS A MARKET, A CLUB OR AN ALLIANCE: 'WHAT CONSTRUCTS AND FORGES OUR PROFOUND IDENTITY, THIS BALANCE OF VALUES, THIS RELATION WITH FREEDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE CANNOT BE FOUND ANYWHERE ON THE PLANET. THIS ATTACHMENT TO A MARKET ECONOMY, BUT ALSO SOCIAL JUSTICE' (MACRON, 2017 ). THE STORY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN (SOVEREIGN) COMMUNITY OF VALUES IS CONSTRUCTED AND REINFORCED BY TWO FRAMES. THE FIRST FRAME IS BASED ON A PARTICULAR READING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AS A 'EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR', WHICH IS CENTRAL TO JUSTIFYING HIS POLITICAL POSITIONS. FOR INSTANCE, IN THE LETTER PUBLISHED BY DIFFERENT EUROPEAN MEDIA, MACRON ( 2019 ) ARGUED THAT NEVER SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAS EUROPE BEEN SO NECESSARY. AND YET, SHE HAS NEVER BEEN SO MUCH IN DANGER. SOME WANT TO DESTROY IT. THEY ADVOCATE THE NATIONALIST WITHDRAWAL THAT DOES NOTHING (YY ) NATIONALISTS ARE MISGUIDED WHEN THEY CLAIM TO DEFEND OUR IDENTITY BY WITHDRAWING FROM 280 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART THE EU, BECAUSE IT IS EUROPEAN CIVILISATION THAT UNITES, FREES AND PROTECTS US. (YY) WE CAN'T LET NATIONALISTS WITH NO SOLUTIONS EXPLOIT PEOPLE'S ANGER. IN HIS FIRST MAJOR SPEECH ON EUROPE AS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE IN THE SORBONNE, MACRON EMPHASISED THAT THE NEED TO DEFEND EUROPE CLEARLY STEMS FROM THE CHALLENGES NOT ONLY TO EU INTEGRATION, BUT TO THE 'EURO PEAN WAY OF LIFE'. THE PATTERN CONTINUES IN HIS SPEECH AT THE EU PARLIA MENT, WHERE MACRON ( 2018 ) ARGUED THAT 'A SORT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR IS REAPPEARING, WHERE OUR DIFFERENCES, SOMETIMES OUR NATIONAL EGOISMS, APPEAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT UNITES US WITHIN A GLOBAL CONTEXT'. MACRON MAKES FORMER PRO-EUROPEAN LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT HAVING DEFENDED EUROPE SUFFICIENTLY, BUT STRESSES
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|a THAT THE TIMES HAVE CHANGED. THE SHELTERS 'BEHIND WHICH EUROPE COULD BLOSSOM HAVE DISAPPEARED. SO, TODAY, IT FINDS ITSELF WEAKER, EXPOSED TO THE SQUALLS OF TODAY'S GLOBALIZATION AND, SURELY EVEN WORSE, THE IDEAS WHICH OFFER THEMSELVES UP AS PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS'. THE SECOND FRAME THAT CONSTRUCTS EUROPE AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES STORY IS THE EMPHASIS ON 'EU VALUES', EVEN THOUGH MACRON'S APPROACH TO THEM IS MORE REACTIVE THAN FOUNDATIONAL: THE SHARED VALUES ONLY SEEM TO BE CLEARLY PERCEIVED BY THE EU PUBLIC AGAINST THE SERIES OF CHALLENGES MENTIONED ABOVE. WHEREAS ACTING ON SECURITY AND MIGRATION APPEAR AS THE KEY MEANS TO REAFFIRM EUROPE'S VALUES, OTHER CHALLENGES WHERE EUROPE NEEDS TO AFFIRM ITS VALUES ARE GENDER EQUALITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY, SOCIAL NEEDS, AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION. AS A RESULT, THIS COMMUNITY OF VALUES IS STRONGLY LINKED TO MACRON'S WISH LIST AND POLICY PROGRAMME, AS THE TERM 'VALUES' IN BOTH THE SORBONNE SPEECH IS ASSOCIATED WITH A NUMBER OF CHALLENGES IN WHICH THE EU MUST REAFFIRM THE SAID VALUES. SIMILARLY, IN THE PUBLIC LETTER PUBLISHED BY A NUMBER OF MAINSTREAM EURO PEAN NEWSPAPERS SUCH AS EL PAIS OR THE GUARDIAN, MACRON ARGUED THE FOLLOWING: WE WILL NEED A COMMON BORDER FORCE AND A EUROPEAN ASYLUM OFFICE, STRICT CONTROL OBLIGATIONS AND EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY TO WHICH EACH COUNTRY WILL CONTRIBUTE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOR INTERNAL SECURITY. ON MIGRATION, I BELIEVE IN A EUROPE THAT PROTECTS BOTH ITS VALUES AND ITS BORDERS. (YY). (MACRON, 2019 ) THE SECOND STORY THAT CONSTRUCTS MACRON'S MEGA NARRATIVE IS THE CHAL LENGES, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, THAT 'EUROPE' IS FACING. POLITICAL 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 281 IDENTITIES ARE NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF WHAT ELEMENTS ARE SHARED BY THE IN-GROUP, BUT ALSO BY WHO IS THE OUT-GROUP. THE IDEA THAT 'WE HAVE FORGOTTEN TO DEFEND EUROPE' IS CENTRAL IN MACRON'S POSI
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|a TIONING VIS-A-VIS THE EU, SINCE ITS DISCOURSE IS ORIENTED TOWARDS PORTRAYING HIMSELF AS THE DEFENDER OF 'EUROPE' VIS-A-VIS THOSE THAT ARE ENDANGERING IT. MACRON FRAMES ITS OPPONENTS AS 'NATIONALISTS' OR OUT-GROUPS, EVEN THOUGH HIS OWN DISCOURSE ADOPTS SEVERAL ELEMENTS THAT COULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS NATIONALIST. THE 'CHALLENGES TO EUROPE' STORY IS CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF TWO FRAMES. THE FIRST FRAME REFERS TO THE INTERNAL CHALLENGERS THAT ARE ENDANGERING EUROPE. IN ITS FIRST MAJOR SPEECH ON EUROPE AS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE IN THE SORBONNE, MACRON TOOK AIM AT THE OPPONENTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BECAUSE THE SAD PASSIONS OF EUROPE HAVE REARED THEIR HEADS ONCE MORE AND ARE DRAWING PEOPLE IN. THEY KNOW HOW TO MAKE US FORGET THE CONCERT OF MISFORTUNES WHICH IT HAS SURVIVED DOWN THE CENTURIES. THEY REASSURE US AND, I DARE SAY, THEY COULD TOMORROW CLINCH VICTORY, NOT BECAUSE THE PEOPLES ARE GULLIBLE! NOT BECAUSE THE EUROPEAN IDEA IS DEAD! BUT BECAUSE OUR WEAKNESS, BLINDNESS OR LACK OF AWARENESS HAVE CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR VICTORY. BECAUSE WE HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT WE MUST STAY BEHIND THIS AMBITION! BECAUSE WE HAVE FORGOTTEN TO DEFEND EUROPE! BECAUSE WE HAVE FORGOTTEN TO STAND UP FOR EUROPE! BECAUSE WE HAVE LET DOUBT TAKE HOLD. (MACRON, 2017 , EMPHASIS ADDED) AS IT CAN BE SEEN, MACRON USES STORYTELLING AS A WAY OF POINTING OUT THAT THE STATUS QUO IS NOT AN OPTION. THERE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES: MACRON'S PRO-EUROPEAN VISION OR THE 'NATIONALISTS': 'WE CAN'T LET NATIONALISTS EXPLOIT PUBLIC ANGER. I WANT AN AMBITIOUS PROJECT THAT LETS THE PEOPLE REALLY TAKE BACK CONTROL' (MACRON, 2019 ). THIS NARRATIVE SITUATES MACRON'S VISION AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE VISION OF 'EUROSCEPTICS', WHO ARE CHALLENGING THE VALUES UPON WHICH EUROPE HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED. IN DOING SO, MACRON PORTRAYS HIS VISION AS THE ONLY 'TRUE' ALTERNATIVE, WHICH MIRRORS TO A GREAT EXTENT THE EUROSCEPTIC NARRATIVE OF THE TAN
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|a SIDE OF VIKTOR ORBAN, MARINE LE PEN OR MATTEO SALVINI. THE SECOND FRAME CLOSELY RELATED TO THE 'CHALLENGES TO EUROPE' STORY IS THE EXTERNAL ENEMIES THAT MAKE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO 'DEFEND EUROPE', OFTEN LEADING TO THE SECURITISATION OR 'GEOPOLITICISA TION' (MEUNIER & NICOLAIDIS, 2019 ) OF 'EUROPE'. 'DEFENDING EUROPE' HAS RARELY BEEN PART OF THE EU INSTITUTIONAL NARRATIVES (BIEGON, 2013 )ASTH I S SEMANTIC FIELD HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN RATHER ASSOCIATED WITH DEFENCE POLICY 282 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART AND INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS NATO. THIS STORY FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGES TRADI TIONAL APPROACHES TO EU INTEGRATION AS 'SOMETHING THAT UNITES US' AND THAT CREATES BENEFITS FOR ALL AND TURNS IT INTO 'SOMETHING WORTH FIGHTING FOR'. MACRON IS THEREFORE APPLYING THE WELL-KNOWN QUOTE OF FORMER US PRESIDENT JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY TO HIS OWN PURPOSES, SUGGESTING TO STOP ASKING WHAT EUROPE DOES FOR YOU, AND INSTEAD ASKING WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR EUROPE . THIS ALLOWS MACRON BOTH TO OFFER A NEW FORM OF AFFIR MATIVE PRO-EUROPEANISM, AND TO ADDRESS AND CHALLENGE EUROPE'S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RIVALS (SEE FIFTH FRAMING BELOW). THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IS ALSO CRUCIAL IN CONFORMING A COHERENT NARRATIVE THAT WOULD UNITE ALL EUROPEANS. THIS IDEA OF UNITING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTIES INTO A EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY IS LARGELY JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS THAT CITIZENS DEMAND PROTEC TION FROM AN EXTERNAL ENEMY. IN HIS SPEECH IN FRONT OF THE EU PARLIAMENT, MACRON ( 2018 ) ARGUED THE FOLLOWING: 'CONFRONTED WITH ALL THE CURRENT TENSIONS WITH CERTAIN NEIGHBOURS SUCH AS RUSSIA, EUROPE HAS SHOWN A FRONT OF UNITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. WE NEED TO CONTINUE THIS WORK'. IN CONTRAST, MACRON ( 2018 ) CLEARLY ADDRESSES HIS PROJECT OF A SOVEREIGN EUROPE AS A WAY OF DEFENDING THE EUROPEAN WAY OF LIFE: 'I WANT TO BELONG TO A GENER ATION WHICH WILL DEFEND EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY BECAUSE WE FOUGHT FOR IT, BECAUSE IT MEANS SOMETHING AND
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|a BECAUSE IT IS THIS SOVEREIGNTY WHICH WILL ENABLE FUTURE GENERATIONS TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURES. I WILL NOT YIELD TO ANY FASCINATION FOR AUTHORITARIAN SOVEREIGNTIES'. THIS TREND CONTINUES WITH TERMS SUCH AS 'STRATEGIC AUTONOMY', A CONCEPT THAT HAS BECOME A BUZZWORD OF EU POLITICS WHEN DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF THE EU IN THE WORLD. THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PLURAL IS VERY CENTRAL IN MACRON'S DISCOURSE. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A STORY IN ITSELF, BUT IS USED IN TWO DIFFERENT SENSES. FIRSTLY, IT IS USED AS AN ADJECTIVE INCLUDED IN SOME OF THE STORIES: EUROPE MUST BE CONCEIVED AS A SOVEREIGN COMMU NITY OF VALUES. IN THIS ADJECTIVE USAGE, SOVEREIGNTY IS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE POLITY THAT IS NARRATIVELY IMAGINED, AND THUS IS INCLUDED IN A PROCESS OF DISPUTE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE MEANINGS: THE EU CAN BE CONCEIVED AS A SOVEREIGN COMMUNITY IN RELATIVELY SIMILAR TERMS TO WHAT EUROPEANS ARE USED TO. BUT SOVEREIGNTY IS ALSO USED AS A SPECIFIC FRAME WHERE ITS MEANING USUALLY DIVIDES IT BY POLICY SECTORS (ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY, DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY, HIGH-QUALITY FOOD SOVEREIGNTY), SUGGESTING THAT EACH CAN BE CONSTRUCTED IN A SEPARATE PROCESS. THIS INNOVATIVE USE OF LANGUAGE IS COMPATIBLE WITH TRADITIONAL HIGH-POLITICS DEMANDS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE RELATION BETWEEN MACRON AS A TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL LEADER AND MACRON THE HEAD OF STATE ADVOCATING FRANCE'S INTEREST IS PARTICULARLY COMPLEX AND INTERESTING. 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 283 THIS FRAME IS CENTRAL TO THE LAST STORY THAT WE HAVE TERMED 'TAKE BACK CONTROL'. MACRON RECURRENTLY DEPICTS EUROPE AS MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER IN THE PAST, AS IT IS THE ARENA WHERE EUROPEANS CAN REGAIN CONTROL OF THEIR DESTINY RATHER THAN PASSIVELY ACCEPT A SECONDARY ROLE IN HISTORY. IN DOING SO, MACRON IS CLEARLY OPPOSING HIS VIEW OF EUROPE TO A NATIONAL NARRATIVE OF FRANCE'S DECAY (' DECLINISME '). IN ORDER TO DO SO, HE EXPLICITLY RE-SIGNIFIES THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. IN
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|a MACRON'S WORDS, SOVEREIGNTY IS NO LONGER THE ABILITY OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO TAKE DECISIONS, BUT THE ABILITY OF THE EU AS A HUMAN COMMUNITY TO 'TAKE BACK CONTROL OF OUR DESTINY' (' REPRENDRE LE CONTROLE DE NOTRE DESTIN ' IS THE TITLE OF THE 2019 EU ELEC TIONS PROGRAMME OF 'RENAISSANCE', MACRON'S LIST), AND ENSURE ITS ABILITY TO STAND BY ITS CHOICE OF VALUES: 'ONLY EUROPE CAN, IN A WORD, GUARANTEE GENUINE SOVEREIGNTY OR OUR ABILITY TO EXIST IN TODAY'S WORLD TO DEFEND OUR VALUES AND INTERESTS. EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY REQUIRES CONSTRUCTING, AND WE MUST DO IT' (MACRON, 2017 ). THIS FRAME EMPHASISES THAT THIS IS A TIME WHEN MORE, NOT LESS, EUROPE IS NEEDED. EUROPEANS SHOULD DO MORE THINGS TOGETHER, NEED TO DEFINE STANDARDS AND FIND TOOLS THAT ALLOW THEM TO ADDRESS TOGETHER THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, DESPITE USING ABSTRACT NOTIONS SUCH AS VALUES AND SOVEREIGNTY, MACRON ASSOCIATES THESE TWO NOTIONS WITH RELATIVELY CONCRETE POLICY CHAL LENGES. HIS SPEECH IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MOVES ON TO SPEAK ABOUT SOVEREIGNTIES IN THE PLURAL AS A REMINDER THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS NO LONGER SOMETHING EUROPEANS 'HAVE' BUT AS SOMETHING THAT MUST BE CONSTRUCTED SECTOR BY SECTOR. THIS FRAMING IS CLEARLY RELATED TO THE IDEA IN THE SECOND FRAME THAT THE TIMES HAVE CHANGED. NOT ONLY DOES EUROPE HAVE TO FACE ITS CHALLENGERS, IT MUST DO SO IN A CONTEXT, AND WITH TOOLS THAT ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IT HAS BEEN USED TO: A CONTEXT WHERE GEOPOLITICAL THREATS [YY] GIVE EUROPE A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH GROWS DAY BY DAY. A CONTEXT OF LARGE-SCALE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, FROM THE LEVANT TO THE SAHEL, BUT ALSO THE EMERGENCE OF MAJOR AUTHORI TARIAN POWERS AND A CLEAR STRATEGY TO CHALLENGE THE FRAMEWORK OF MULTILAT ERALISM WHERE EUROPE PLAYED A FULL ROLE AND WHICH WAS ALSO THE FRAMEWORK NOT ONLY FOR EUROPEAN INFLUENCE BUT ALSO FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN PEACE. OUR DISCUSSION ALSO TAKES PLACE AT A
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|a TIME OF GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, WHICH PUT A QUESTION MARK OVER THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY WHICH 284 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART WAS THE BASIS FOR OUR MAJOR COMPROMISES, FOSTER FEARS WHICH LEAD TO THE REASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN MAJOR BALANCES AND FORCE US TO RETHINK THE RULES FOR OUR COLLECTIVE ACTION. (MACRON, 2018 ) MACRON IS NOT ONLY CALLING FOR 'MORE EUROPE', HE ALSO SEES THE NEED OF HAVING A BETTER EUROPE, AS IF REMINDING EUROPEANS THAT EU INTEGRATION MADE EUROPE GREAT AND THAT THIS SPIRIT IS WORTH RECOVERING. THE FRAMING ASSUMES THAT EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY CAN ALREADY BE CONCEIVED, BUT THAT IT STILL REQUIRES CONSTRUCTING. HIS 2018 SPEECH AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IS MORE DETAILED ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS RELATION TO NATIONAL ONES, AND ALSO TO THE VALUES AND POLICIES MACRON ASSOCIATES WITH EUROPE. TO DEFEND THE EUROPEAN IDEA IS NOT TO DEFEND AN ABSTRACT IDEA, SOME SORT OF DILUTION OF OUR OWN INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY, BUT IT IS TO ACT IN THE FAITH THAT FACED WITH SUCH GREAT GLOBAL CHANGES, SUCH LARGE-SCALE TRANSFORMATIONS, THIS TIME IN WHICH WE ARE LIVING, WE NEED A SOVEREIGNTY WHICH IS STRONGER THAN OUR OWN, WHICH WORKS ALONGSIDE OUR OWN AND DOES NOT REPLACE IT, AS ONLY THIS SOVEREIGNTY CAN PROVIDE THE RIGHT ANSWERS TO LARGE-SCALE MIGRATION, GLOBAL INSECURITY AND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS. (MACRON, 2018 ) THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STORY ABOUT THE NEED TO DEFEND EUROPE ARE CONSPICUOUSLY PRESENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SORBONNE SPEECH, WHICH SUGGESTS THE NEED FOR MORE COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY. THIS SHOWS THAT NARRATIVES ARE NOT ONLY INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, BUT OF ACTION, AS DEVICES TO GAIN LEVERAGE IN THE GLOBAL STAGE TO ADVANCE CERTAIN POLICY PROPOSALS. BY EMBRACING THE SEMANTIC FIELD OF SECURITY, MACRON IS MAKING THE EU AN OBVIOUS TERRAIN FOR DISCUSSIONS
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|a ABOUT SECURITY IN EUROPE, WHICH HAS SO FAR NOT BEEN THE 'COMMON SENSE' IN NARRATIVES ABOUT THE DIVISION OF TASKS BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO. THIS STORY CAN ALSO BE CONNECTED TO ANOTHER KEY PROCESS OF SECURITISATION OPERATING IN MACRON'S DISCOURSE, THE MANAGEMENT OF MIGRA TION AS A BORDER PROTECTION ISSUE. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IS EXEMPLARY OF THE USAGE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED FRAMES TO CONSTRUCT A STORY CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL BALANCES IN THE DEFENCE POLICY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EU. CONFRONTED WITH EACH OF THESE CHALLENGES, WE NOW NEED TO TAKE TANGIBLE ACTION. THE FIRST KEY, THE FOUNDATION OF ANY POLITICAL COMMUNITY, IS SECURITY. IN EUROPE, WE ARE SEEING A TWO-FOLD MOVEMENT: GRADUAL AND INEVITABLE 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 285 DISENGAGEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, AND A LONG-TERM TERRORIST THREAT WITH THE STATED GOAL OF SPLITTING OUR FREE SOCIETIES. IN THESE AREAS, EUROPE IS AT LAST AWARE OF ITS FRAGILITIES AND THE NEED TO ACT IN CONCERT. WE NEED TO STEP UP THE WORK UNDER WAY TO COMBAT THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND TERRORIST PROPAGANDA ONLINE. WE HAVE STARTED DOING SO, A FEW OF US. WE NEED TO ENHANCE OUR CYBER SECURITY AND CREATE A COMMON AREA OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE. (MACRON, 2017 ) THE EXTERNAL CHALLENGES THAT ARE ENDANGERING EUROPE FRAME IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE THIRD AND LAST STORY, 'GLOBAL EUROPE', AND IS AN ESSEN TIALLY GEOPOLITICAL WAY OF LOOKING AT EUROPE, FOCUSED ON PROTECTING IT FROM EXTERNAL ENEMIES THAT ARE ENDANGERING IT. HOWEVER, THIS STORY IS NOT SIMPLY A SECOND VERSION OF THE DEFENCE STORY REFERRED ABOVE, IT RATHER FOCUSES ON THE ACTORS AND PROCESSES THAT ARE DIMINISHING THE GLOBAL INFLUENCE OF 'EUROPE', REFERRING IN MOST CASES TO RUSSIA AND CHINA. MACRON ENVISAGES EUROPE AS A GEOPOLITICAL PLAYER THAT, GIVEN THE SHIFT TOWARDS THE PACIFIC OF THE UNITED STATES, NEEDS TO UNITE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS GLOBAL RELEVANCE. THIS MEANS THAT EUROPE NEEDS TO STOP BEING INGENUOUS IN AREAS SUCH AS TAXATION,
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|a DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGIES OR CARBON EMISSIONS AND LIVE UP TO A WORLD WHERE TRADITIONAL RULES NO LONGER APPLY. AND RATHER THAN BEMOANING THE FACT THAT THE CURRENT LEADERS IN THE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ARE AMERICAN, TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE CHINESE, WE MUST CREATE EUROPEAN CHAMPIONS, WE MUST INVENT IN THIS GLOBAL UPHEAVAL FAIR SECURITIES AND EFFICIENT REGULATIONS. I WANT A EUROPE WHICH SUCCEEDS IN THIS DIGITAL TRANSITION, BUT IT IS DISRUPTING OUR POINTS OF REFERENCE AND OUR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. AND TODAY, THIS DIGITAL CONTINENT HAS NO STANDARDS, OR MORE PRECISELY, IT HAS A LAW: THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST. IT IS EUROPE'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFINE ITS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK SO AS NOT TO EFFECTIVELY BE SUBJECT TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST HERE. (MACRON, 2017 ) THE 'GLOBAL EUROPE' STORY CONNECTS WELL WITH THE ATTEMPT TO REFRAME 'SOVEREIGNTY' AS EUROPEAN, IN THIS WAY SUPPORTING THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING THE EU AS A POWERFUL POLITICAL PLAYER ON THE GLOBAL STAGE. OVERALL, THE NARRATIVE AND THE STORIES THAT ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATE WELL HOW MACRON'S GAL DISCOURSE MIRRORS IN MANY WAYS THE TAN SIDE: DISCUSSIONS ABOUT 'VALUES','SOVEREIGNTY', AND 'TAKING BACK CONTROL' REINFORCE THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU AS A POLITY, FACILITATING THE 286 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART DISCURSIVE OPPOSITION BETWEEN 'EUROPE' AND THE NATION STATES, BEST ILLUS TRATED BY THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY' (MACRON) AND 'NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY' (LE PEN). 5 MACRON REPOLITICISES THE EU AS A POLITY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION: ' EUROPE ' I SATSTA KEINN AT I ONA LE L ECT I ONS BASED ON THESE FINDINGS, OUR MAIN ARGUMENT IN THIS CHAPTER IS THAT WHEREAS EUROSCEPTIC ACTORS HAVE BEEN MOSTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POLITICISATION OF EU AFFAIRS AT THE TRANSNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEVEL THAT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE GAL-TAN DIVISION, THIS HAS
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|a REMAINED THE STORY OF AN ASYMETRIC POLARISATION. IN DOING SO WE INTEND TO POINT OUT THAT THE BREAKING OF THE PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS BY EUROSCEPTIC NARRATIVES HAS SO FAR ONLY AFFECTED A PART OF PUBLIC OPINION: WHILE THE EU AND GLOBALISA TION BECAME A FIRST-ORDER ISSUE FOR VOTERS OF 'TAN' PARTIES, GAL PARTIES HAVE MAINTAINED A 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' APPROACH FOR A LONG TIME BY NOT COMPETING AGAINST OTHER PRO-EUROPEAN PARTIES OR DEVELOPING POLARISED COUNTER-NARRATIVES TO RESPOND TO EUROSCEPTICISM. HOWEVER, WE ARGUE THAT THE SUCCESSES OF EUROSCEPTIC AND ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT FORCES IN THE PERIOD SPANNING FROM THE EURO CRISIS OF 2010-2011 TO THE BREXIT REFERENDUM OF 2016, AND ITS DRAMATIC EFFECT ON SOME MAINSTREAM PRO-EUROPEAN FORCES HAVE CREATED A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS RESPONDING TO EUROSCEPTIC POSITIONS. AMONG THESE EUROSCEPTIC AND ANTI ESTABLISHMENT FORCES, WE INCLUDE THE EUROSCEPTIC SURGE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 2014 AND, ESPECIALLY, THOSE OCCURRING IN DOMESTIC CONTEXTS OF ITALY OR THE UNITED KINGDOM. TO BE CLEAR, THIS HAS NOT BEEN THE ONLY RESPONSE BY PRO-EUROPEAN FORCES, AS THE INCREASINGLY SCEPTIC ATTITUDE TO THE EU AMONG DUTCH OR AUSTRIAN CONSERVATIVES SHOWS. CONTRARY TO MOST PREVIOUS ANALYSES OF NEOLIBERALISM AS AN ATTEMPT TO DE-POLITICISE EUROPEAN ISSUES, MACRON SEEMS TO CONSCIOUSLY POLITICISE EUROPEAN ISSUES WITH DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES. FIRST, MACRON'S POLITICAL STRATEGY SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE SHOCKWAVE OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2017: ACCORDING TO BICK ERTON ( 2017 , P. 273), 'MACRON'S MOVEMENT - EN MARCHE! - IS MAINLY AN ELECTORAL PLATFORM, BUT IS ALSO PART OF THE SPLINTERING AND FRAGMEN TATION OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN FRANCE SEEN ALSO IN ITS MORE RADICAL COUSIN, THE NUIT DEBOUT MOVEMENT'. IN THIS SENSE, PRO-EUROPEANISM IS 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 287 NOT ONLY A MORE SALIENT ISSUE NATIONALLY NOW, BUT ALSO IT IS A
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|a COMMON GROUND FOR THE FORCES AND VOTERS BASE THAT SUPPORTED MACRON AGAINST LE PEN IN 2017, WHEREAS OTHER CLEAVAGES (LEFT AND RIGHT) MAY DIVIDE HIS MODERATE SOCIALIST, CENTRIST AND MODERATE CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS. IN THIS SENSE, POLITICISING PRO-EUROPEANNESS AS A POLITICAL POSITION CLEARLY DIFFER ENTIATED HIM FROM OTHERS AND CONTRIBUTES TO BUILD AND SOLIDIFY A NEW POLITICAL FORCE ON ONE EXTREME OF THE EMERGING 'INTEGRATION - DEMARCATION' CLEAVAGE, WHEREAS POLITICAL COMPETITION ON OTHER CLEAVAGES MAY REACTIVATE THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS IN ' LA REPUBLIQUE EN MARCHE '. SECOND, MACRON IS NOT ALONE IN THIS AFFIRMATIVE PRO-EUROPEAN POSITION, AS OTHER EUROPEAN ACTORS SUCH AS BELGIUM'S GUY VERHOFSTADT OR SPAIN'S CIUDADANOS PARTY HAVE CAMPAIGNED ON SIMILAR GROUNDS. JUST AS POLITI CISING EUROPEAN AFFAIRS HAS SUCCEEDED IN CREATING A NEW POLITICAL FORCE AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL, AT THE EU LEVEL THIS STRATEGY CONTRIBUTES TO PROVIDE MACRON WITH SUPPORT BEYOND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOGIC, GAINING INFLU ENCE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EVENTUALLY OVER COMMISSIONERS IDENTIFIED WITH THE NEW 'RENEW EUROPE' GROUP. NOT ONLY NATIONAL POLI TICS ARE BECOMING MORE EUROPEANISED, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ARE INCREASINGLY POLITICISED, INCLUDING THE SANCTA SANCTORUM OF DIPLOMACY, THE COUNCIL. AS DE WILDE ( 2019 ) HAS ARGUED, WE ARE INCREASINGLY WITNESSING AN EXTEN SION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL FIGHTS TO THE FIELD OF AGENDA-SETTING, INCREASING BARGAINING CAPACITY AND PRESSURE VIA A STRATEGY DENOMINATED 'DISCURSIVE INTERGOVERNMENTALISM', IN WHICH THE BARGAINING BETWEEN NATIONAL GOVERN MENTS TAKES PLACE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE. MACRON'S NARRATIVE PLAYS INTO THIS PROCESS, CONSOLIDATING THE CENTRIST PRO-EUROPEAN BLOCK NOT ONLY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, BUT ALSO IN THE WIDER POLITICAL DEBATE. THIRD, POLITICISATION IS ALSO USED TO CHANGE THE OBJECT OF DEBATE. PARA DOXICALLY, JUST AS EUROSCEPTIC FORCES MOVED CRITICISMS FROM THE POLITY TO THE POLICIES OF THE EU, MACRON
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|a HAS REPOLITICISED THE EU POLITY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION ARGUING THAT WHAT IS AT STAKE IN RECENT ELEC TORAL COMPETITIONS IS NOT ONLY OFFICE AND PROGRAMMES, BUT THE EUROPEAN WAY OF LIFE. IN THIS WAY, MACRON'S NARRATIVE IS MAKING EU POLITICS MORE BINARY, AS THE DIVISION SEEMS TO BE BETWEEN PRO-EUROPEANS AND NATION ALISTS AND EUROSCEPTICS, AND IT LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR OTHER PRO-EUROPEAN POLITICAL VISIONS. THIS MAKES FRENCH PRESIDENT MACRON AN INDISPENSABLE POLITICAL LEADER IN THE EU, WHERE LEADERSHIP IS OFTEN AMBIGUOUS AND NOT SALIENT. 288 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART MACRON'S NARRATIVE MAKES INVISIBLE OTHER PRO-EUROPEAN POSITIONS ON EUROPE, AND CAN BE CONCEPTUALISED AS A 'USAGE' OF EUROPE TO GAIN POLIT ICAL CAPITAL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (SEE KAUPPI'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK), AND WHO PLACES HIMSELF AS A KEY LEADER IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. MACRON'S NARRATIVE SEES FRANCE AS INHERENTLY EMBEDDED IN 'EUROPE', USING 'EUROPE' AS A NATIONAL RESOURCE FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION, AS 'EUROPE' IS A METAPHOR FOR 'FRANCE'. AS EUROPE IS MAINLY A NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, MACRON'S NARRATIVE SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS NO 'FRANCE' WITHOUT 'EUROPE', INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINING NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICS. 6 CONCLUSION: MACRON IS TRYING TO MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN TO REMAIN POLITICALLY COMPETITIVE IN FRANCE THE CHAPTER HAS ANALYSED HOW 'EUROPE' IS NARRATED BY EMMANUEL MACRON SINCE THE START OF HIS RISE AS A EUROPEAN POLITICAL FIGURE. OUR FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT, WHILE MAKING THE EU A CENTRAL MATTER OF DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL DEBATE, MACRON'S VERSION OF EUROPE NOTABLY DEPOLITICISES POLICY RELATED DISCUSSIONS, SUCH AS INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY WITHIN THE EU, WHILE ENCOURAGING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU AS A POLITY. IN DOING SO, MACRON IS ENCOURAGING POLITICISATION AS A MANICHEAN PRO VS ANTI-EUROPE, AS IF EACH NATIONAL ELECTION IS A REFERENDUM ON EUROPE, IN WHICH HE
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|a POSI TIONS HIMSELF AS ITS DEFENDER. IN THIS WAY, MACRON'S DISCOURSE MIRRORS CLOSELY THE LANGUAGE OF PROMINENT BREXITEERS, SUCH AS 'TAKE BACK CONTROL', AND COULD GO AS FAR AS BEING A SORT OF EUROPEAN NATIONALISM, WHICH IS WHY WE HAVE CONCEPTUALISED HIS NARRATIVE AS 'MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN'. THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE STRENGTHENS NATIONALISTS, AS IT DOES NOT LEAVE SPACE FOR A DEBATE ON WHAT TYPE OF 'EUROPE' (E.G. SOCIAL EUROPE VS NEOLIBERAL EUROPE) SHOULD BE BUILT. THE CONSEQUENCE OF MACRON'S NARRATIVE ON EUROPE IS THAT THE OPPOSITION TO HIS VERSION OF 'EUROPE' BECOMES 'EUROSCEPTIC'. IN CONTRAST TO THIS VISION OF 'EUROPE', A DIFFERENT PRO-EUROPEAN ONE COULD UNDERSTAND IT IN A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT WAY, ARGUING THAT THERE ARE RELATIONS OF DOMINATION WHERE POWER WITHIN THE EU IS UNEVENLY DISTRIBUTED. IN THE MIDST OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE, THIS CHAPTER IS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THAT WILL HELP TO UNDERSTAND THE FRAMING OF THE DISCUSSION. NORMATIVELY, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE AND THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE SHOULD BE OPEN TO DIFFERENT AND CONTRASTING VISIONS OF 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 289 THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, RATHER THAN A REFERENDUM-LIKE PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF THE EU. HOWEVER, MACRON'S POLITICISATION OF EUROPE REMAINS AN INTERESTING INNOVATION IN THE DISCOURSE OF NATIONAL LEADERS, AS IT IS CONTRIBUTING TO FURTHER INTERTWINE EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL POLITICS. ADDITIONALLY, THIS CHAPTER IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY AS THE FRENCH PRES IDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 2022 APPROACH IN A CONTEXT IN WHICH THE MAIN TWO CANDIDATES SEEM TO BE THE SAME AS IN 2017: EMMANUEL MACRON AND MARINE LE PEN. MACRON'S EMBRACEMENT OF (EUROPEAN) SOVEREIGNTY WAS AN EARLY ILLUSTRATION OF A WAY OF 'IMAGINING' EUROPE (OLEART & VAN WEYEN BERG, 2019 ) THAT WAS NOT INCLUSIVE, SITUATING OPPONENTS AND SUPPORTERS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
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|a AGAINST EACH OTHER. THIS COOPTATION OF THE FRENCH FAR RIGHT'S LANGUAGE ILLUSTRATES THAT, FAR FROM BEING OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER, MACRON AND LE PEN'S NARRATIVE REINFORCE EACH OTHER, MAKING INVISIBLE OTHER LEGITIMATE WAYS OF 'IMAGINING' EUROPE. IN THIS WAY, IT IS NOT ONLY INTERESTING TO ANALYSE THE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT STORIES IN MACRON'S EUROPEAN NARRATIVE, BUT ALSO WHAT IS MISSING IN IT. WHILE THE NARRATIVE EMPHASISES THE NEED FOR 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY' AS A RESPONSE TO THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS THAT PUT 'EUROPE IN DANGER', THERE ARE NO INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO RENEW EUROPE IN A FEDERAL WAY, BUT RATHER IN A TRADITIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANNER. MACRON'S NARRATIVE FOLLOWS A NEOFUNCTIONALIST READING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY, AN ELEMENT THAT PLAYS A CENTRAL ROLE, GIVEN THE NUMEROUS HISTORICAL REFERENCES THAT ARE MOBILISED TO JUSTIFY ITS POLITICAL PROPOSALS. EUROPE IS IN A SIMILAR DANGER TO THE ONE UNDERGONE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AND THE ONLY WAY TOWARDS SALVATION IS TO BUILD EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY. INTERESTINGLY, IN THIS NARRATIVE, 'EUROPE' IS CONSTANTLY EQUATED TO THE EU: THERE IS NO 'EUROPE' WITHOUT THE EU. THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY WOULD HELP TO COUNTER THE RISE OF OTHER GLOBAL PLAYERS, AND WOULD ALLOW 'EUROPE' TO COMPETE SUCCESSFULLY WITH THEM. PARADOXICALLY, MACRON'S MEGA NARRATIVE CONNECTS TO THE DE GAULLEAN TERMINOLOGY-SUCH AS IN THE CENTRALITY OF THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY-IN A DISPUTE FOR DE GAULLE'S LEGACY BETWEEN HIM AND LE PEN. IN SPITE OF THEIR DIFFERENT VISIONS OF EUROPE, BOTH ATTEMPT TO PLACE THEMSELVES AS STRONG PRESIDENTS THAT INFLUENCE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, IN THIS WAY 'NATIONALISING' EUROPE. MACRON'S NARRATIVE MAKES INVISIBLE ALTERNATIVE PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVES BY SITUATING THEM AS OUTSIDE HIS EUROPEAN NARRATIVE, CONSIDERED THE PRO EUROPEAN BLUEPRINT. THIS IS PROBLEMATIC FROM A DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM PERSPECTIVE, SINCE
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|a MACRON'S NARRATIVE DE-LEGITIMISES OTHER OPTIONS THAT 290 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE PRO-EUROPEAN NARRATIVE: MACRON IS THE 'REAL' PRO EUROPEAN. LE PEN AND MACRON ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: BOTH PUSH A PRO VS ANTI-EU POLITICISATION. MACRON'S NARRATIVE OF EUROPE IS POLITICISING, AS IT REINFORCES THE GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE. THE REINFORCEMENT OF PRO VS ANTI-EU IS A STRATEGIC NARRATIVE CHOICE THAT HAS DEEP POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. THE RECENT PROTESTS LED BY THE 'YELLOW VESTS' (GROSSMAN, 2019 ), AS WELL AS MOBILISATIONS RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE (E.G. THE FRIDAYS FOR FUTURE MOVEMENT LED BY GRETA THUNBERG, SEE WIESNER'S CHAPTER IN THIS BOOK) ILLUSTRATE THAT MACRON'S OPPOSITION IS NOT ONLY COMING FROM THE FAR RIGHT, BUT ALSO FROM LEFT-WING GROUPS THAT ARE NOT NECESSARILY 'EUROSCEPTIC'. THEREFORE, THE REFERENDUM-LIKE DIVISION BETWEEN SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF THE EU OF THE MEGA NARRATIVE MAKES THE EUROSCEPTIC FAR RIGHT MACRON'S BEST BET TO GAIN MORE SYMBOLIC POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE EU, AS MACRON AND LE PEN'S DISCOURSES SEEM TO MIRROR EACH OTHER. THUS, MACRON PREFERS ALTERNATIVES SUCH AS THOSE OF ORBAN AND LE PEN RATHER THAN THE EUROPEAN GREENS, WHOSE NARRA TIVES OF EUROPE ARE RADICALLY DIFFERENT, BUT HOWEVER IN FAVOUR OF FURTHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE CRITICISM OF THE STATUS QUO UNDER MACRON'S EUROPEAN NARRATIVE FALLS THEREFORE UNDER THE 'EUROSCEPTIC' UMBRELLA, WHICH IN TURN SITUATES THE POLITICAL DEBATE IN THE GAL-TAN CLEAVAGE. MACRON'S NARRATIVE, WHILE IT IS MAKING EUROPE PART OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL POLIT ICAL DEBATE, IT IS DOING SO IN A WAY THAT REINFORCES RATHER THAN HINDERS NATIONALIST FRAMES. BIBLIOGRAPHY AKKERMAN, T., DE LANGE, S. L., & ROODUIJN, M. (EDS.). (2016). RADICAL RIGHT WING POPULIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE: INTO THE MAINSTREAM? ROUTLEDGE. ARO, J., & HEISKALA, R. (2018). A PROMOTER OF VALUES OR A SHOPKEEPERS'
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|a EMPIRE? ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY AND THE TRADE POLICY OF THE EU. IN R. HEISKALA & J. ARO (EDS.), POLICY DESIGN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (PP. 67-86). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. BACHRACH, P., & BARATZ, M. (1962). THE TWO FACES OF POWER. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 56 , 947-952. BECK, U. (2013). NON A L'EUROPE ALLEMANDE. VERS UN PRINTEMPS EUROPEEN . AUTREMENT. BELAND, D., & COX, R. H. (EDS.). (2010). IDEAS AND POLITICS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. BICKERTON, C. (2017). AN ANTI-SYSTEM PRESIDENT IN FRANCE? JUNCTURE, 23 (4), 271 274. 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 291 BIEGON, D. (2013). SPECIFYING THE ARENA OF POSSIBILITIES: POST-STRUCTURALIST NARRA TIVE ANALYSIS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 51 (2), 194-211. BOUZA GARCIA, L. (2017). THE NARRATIVE TURN IN EUROPEAN STUDIES. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES, 25 (3), 340-353. BOUZA, L., & OLEART, A. (2018). FROM THE 2005 CONSTITUTION'S 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' TO TTIP'S 'EMPOWERING DISSENSUS': THE EU AS A PLAYING FIELD FOR SPANISH CIVIL SOCIETY. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH, 14 (2), 87-104. BRACK, N., & STARTIN, N. (2015). INTRODUCTION: EUROSCEPTICISM, FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 36 (3), 239-249. BULLER, J., & FLINDERS, M. (2005). THE DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF DEPOLITICIZATION IN THE AREA OF BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY 1. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 7 (4), 526-543. BURNHAM, P. (2001). NEW LABOUR AND THE POLITICS OF DEPOLITICIZATION. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 3 (2), 127-149. CHAMOREL, P. (2019). MACRON VERSUS THE YELLOW VESTS. JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 30 (4), 48-62. CHECKEL, J. T., & KATZENSTEIN, P. J. (EDS.). (2009). EUROPEAN IDENTITY . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. CZARNIAWSKA, B. (2004). NARRATIVES IN SOCIAL
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|a SCIENCE RESEARCH .SAG E. DE WILDE, P. (2011). NO POLITY FOR OLD POLITICS? A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 33 (5), 559-575. DE WILDE, P. (2019). MEDIA LOGIC AND GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (8), 1193-1212. DELLA PORTA, D., & CAIANI, M. (2009). SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND EUROPEANIZATION . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. EISING, R. (2009). THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN EUROPE: INTEREST MEDIATION, CAPITALISM AND EU POLICY MAKING . ROUTLEDGE. ERIKSEN, E. (2007). CONCEPTUALISING EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: GENERAL, SEGMENTED AND STRONG PUBLICS. IN J. E. FOSSUM & P. R. SCHLESINGER (EDS.), THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A COMMUNICATIVE SPACE IN THE MAKING? (PP. 23-41). ROUTLEDGE. FAIRCLOUGH, N. (2003). ANALYSING DISCOURSE: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH . ROUTLEDGE. FLIGSTEIN, N. (2008). EUROCLASH: THE EU, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. FLIGSTEIN, N., & MCADAM, D. (2012). A THEORY OF FIELDS . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. FORESTER, J. (1993). THE ARGUMENTATIVE TURN IN POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING . DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 292 L. BOUZA GARCIA AND A. OLEART FOSSUM, J. E., & TRENZ, H.-J. (2006). THE EU'S FLEDGING SOCIETY: FROM DEAF ENING SILENCE TO CRITICAL VOICE IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION-MAKING. JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY, 2 (1), 57-77. GROSSMAN, E. (2019). FRANCE'S YELLOW VESTS-SYMPTOM OF A CHRONIC DISEASE. POLITICAL INSIGHT, 10 (1), 30-34. HAAS, E. (1968). TECHNOCRACY, PLURALISM AND THE NEW EUROPE. IN J. NYE (ED.), INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM. LITTLE BROWN. HAEUSERMANN, S., & KRIESI, H. (2015). WHAT DO VOTERS WANT? DIMENSIONS AND CONFIGURATIONS IN INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PREFERENCES AND PARTY CHOICE. IN P. BERA MENDI, S. HAEUSERMANN, H. KITSCHELT, & H. KRIESI (EDS.), THE POLITICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM (PP. 202-230). CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. THE POLITICS OF ADVANCED
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|a CAPITALISM. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2018). CLEAVAGE THEORY MEETS EUROPE'S CRISES: LIPSET, ROKKAN, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 25 (1), 109-135. KEMPIN, R., & TOKARSKI, P. (2019). MACRON, THE YELLOW VESTS AND THE NATIONAL DEBATE: PLAYING FOR TIME, NOT SOLVING THE POLITICAL LEGITIMACY CRISIS . KINSKI, L., & CRUM, B. (2020). TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN EU NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS: CONCEPT, CASE STUDY, RESEARCH AGENDA. POLITICAL STUDIES, 68 (2), 370-388. KRIESI, H., GRANDE, E., DOLEZAL, M., HELBLING, M., HOEGLINGER, D., HUTTER, S., & WUEEST, B. (2012). POLITICAL CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. LAKOFF, G. (2014). THE ALL NEW DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE . CHELSEA GREEN PUBLISHING. MEUNIER, S., & NICOLAIDIS, K. (2019). THE GEOPOLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 57 (S1), 103-113. MUDDE, C. (ED.). (2016). THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT: A READER . TAYLOR & FRANCIS. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. OLEART, A., & BOUZA GARCIA, L. (2019). LA LUTTE NARRATIVE POUR LA SIGNIFICATION ET LA POLITISATION DE L'EUROPE DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS DU TTIP: LE RECIT DE L'EU ROPE BOUCLIER CONTRE LE POPULISME TRANSNATIONAL. POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE, 66 (4), 16-42. OLEART, A., & VAN WEYENBERG, A. (2019). INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE. POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE, 66 (4), 6-14. RODRIK, D. (2011). THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: WHY GLOBAL MARKETS, STATES, AND DEMOCRACY CAN'T COEXIST . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 12 MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN: THE POLITICISING YY 293 SASSATELLI, M. 2012. HAS EUROPE LOST THE PLOT? EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR A NEW NARRATIVE IMAGINATION .
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|a ESSAY PUBLISHED BY THE EUROPEAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION. HTTP:// WWW.NARRATIVES.EU/READING-ROOM/MONICA-SASSATELLI . SCHATTSCHNEIDER, ELMER ERIC. (1980 [1960]). THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE . WANDSWORTH. SNOW, D. A., & BENFORD, R. D. (1988). IDEOLOGY, FRAME RESONANCE, AND PARTICI PANT MOBILIZATION. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH, 1 (1), 197-217. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H. J. (2013). HOW EUROPEAN UNION POLITICIZATION CAN EMERGE THROUGH CONTESTATION: THE CONSTITUTION CASE. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 51 (5), 965-980. STROBY JENSEN, C. (2003). NEO-FUNCTIONALISM. IN M. CINI (ED.), EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. WOLL, C., & JACQUOT, S. (2010). USING EUROPE: STRATEGIC ACTION IN MULTI-LEVEL POLITICS. COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS, 8 (1), 110-126. ZUERN, M., BINDER, M., & ECKER-EHRHARDT, M. (2012). INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND ITS POLITICIZATION. INTERNATIONAL THEORY, 4 (1), 69-106. SOURCES INTERVIEW IN THE ECONOMIST (7 NOVEMBER 2019). LETTER PUBLISHED IN THE GUARDIAN AND OTHER EUROPEAN MEDIA (4 MARCH 2019). SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE (18 APRIL 2016). SPEECH IN THE EU PARLIAMENT (20 APRIL 2018). SPEECH IN THE SORBONNE (26 SEPTEMBER 2017). CHAPTER 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU-A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR EXPLORING THE POLITICISING STRATEGIES IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES TARU HAAPALA, ALVARO OLEART, AND JAN BEYER THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION HAS BEEN FIRMLY ANCHORED IN THE EU STUDIES LITERATURE (E.G. STATHAM & TRENZ, 2013 ; HUTTER ET AL., 2016 ). HOWEVER, THE QUEST FOR UNRAVELLING ITS COMPLEXITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IS FAR FROM T. HAAPALA ( B ) UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID, MADRID, SPAIN E-MAIL: TARU.HAAPALA@UAM.ES A. OLEART MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, MAASTRICHT, THE NETHERLANDS E-MAIL: A.OLEART@MAASTRICHTUNIVERSITY.NL J. BEYER UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM E-MAIL: JAN.BEYER@ULB.BE THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.),
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|a TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_13 295 296 T. HAAPALA ET AL. OVER. CLASSICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF EU POLITICISATION HAVE TENDED TO PAINT THE CONCEPT EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY IN NEGATIVE TERMS, PERCEIVING IT AS A 'CONSTRAINING' FACTOR (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ) FOR EUROPEAN INTE GRATION. THESE APPROACHES HAVE COMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU RESULTS IN A STRUCTURAL OPPOSITION BETWEEN 'PRO-EUROPEANS' AND EUROSCEPTICS. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE EU'S FATE AND FORTUNE HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED AS THREATENED BY THE REVITALISATION OF THE POLITICAL DEBATES AROUND THE EU AND THE INCREASE OF ACTORS ENGAGING IN THEM. THEY HAVE TENDED TO CHARACTERISE IT AS A VICE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, DISRUPTING THE STATUS QUO OR THE TECHNOCRATIC AND DEPOLITICISED POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES. IN CONTRAST TO A PORTRAYAL OF EU POLITICISATION AS A HURDLE IN THE WAY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THIS BOOK HAS PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES TO VIEW THE POTENTIAL VIRTUES THAT EU POLITICISATION MAY OFFER, RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THE MERE VICES. BUT IT HAS ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE WAYS OF RE-THINKING THE CONCEPT IN EU STUDIES LITERATURE AND BEYOND. THIS BOOK STARTS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PREDOMINANTLY NEGA TIVE TENOR THAT POLITICISATION HAS GAINED IN THE EU STUDIES LITERATURE IS PARTLY ROOTED IN THE FACT THAT POLITICISATION REMAINS UNDER-CONCEPTUALISED (SEE ALSO WIESNER, 2021 ). IN ITS ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THIS GAP, THE BOOK HAS OFFERED A MULTITUDE OF CASE STUDIES TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU. FOCUSING ON THE TRACES OF POLITICISATION HAS PUT THE FOCUS ON EU POLITICISATION AS SHOWING DIFFERENT DYNAMICS AND STRATEGIES BY DIFFERENT ACTORS WHICH ARE POINTING TO VARIOUS DIRECTIONS DEPENDING ON THE AGENTS AND THEIR POLITICAL PURPOSES AS WELL AS THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH THEY WERE CREATED. BY OFFERING DIVERSE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES, THIS BOOK SHOWS THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN
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|a WHICH POLITICISATION CAN BE STUDIED OR CARRIED OUT EMPIRICALLY TO ANALYSE THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN GIVEN AND HOW DIFFERENT ACTORS HAVE UTILISED IT IN THE EU CONTEXT. HENCE, THE IDEA THAT POLITICISATION SHOULD NOT BE CONCEIVED AS A MONOLITHIC CONCEPT LIES AT THE CORE OF THIS VOLUME AND ADDRESSES A PARAMOUNT GAP IN THE LITERATURE. IT RESONATES WITH THE RECENT ENDEAVOUR BY OTHER SCHOLARS WHO HAVE ENGAGED WITH DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES IN WHICH EU POLITICISATION CAN BE UNDERSTOOD AND RE-CONCEPTUALISED (E.G. WIESNER, 2021 ; KAUPPI ET AL., 2016 ). THROUGH A COMBINATION OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, THIS BOOK ADVANCES THE DEBATE BY DISENTANGLING THE MULTIFACETED NATURE OF THE CONCEPT OF EU POLITICISATION. INFLUENCED BY THE PREVIOUS WORK OF THE EDITORS, WHO HAVE BEEN STUDYING POLITICISATION FROM DIFFERENT EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL ANGLES (OLEART, 2021 ; WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ), THIS COLLECTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 297 SHOWS A MORE PLURALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF EU POLITICISATION FROM CONCEP TUAL, EMPIRICAL, AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS BOOK ARE STRUCTURED AROUND THREE THEMATIC CLUSTERS. IN THE FIRST CLUSTER, THE CHAPTERS ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF HOW TO CONCEPTUALLY ANALYSE THE EU AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE ROLE THAT POLITICISATION CAN BE SEEN PLAYING IN IT. THE SECOND ONE SCRUTINISES THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICI SATION OF THE EU AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED INCREASE IN EU CONTESTATION. FINALLY, THE THIRD THEMATIC CLUSTER TRACES DIFFERENT NARRATIVES OF EU POLITICISATION, COVERING INSTITUTIONAL AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELATED CONCEPTS SUCH AS 'SOVEREIGNTY', IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. WITHIN THE THREE CLUSTERS, EACH CHAPTER OF THIS BOOK ILLUMINATES VARIOUS FACETS OF THE CONCEPT OF EU POLITICISATION. IN THE FIRST THEMATIC CLUSTER, THE CHAPTERS BY CLAUDIA WIESNER, ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN, NIILO
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|a KAUPPI, AND KARI PALONEN INVITE US TO RETHINK EU POLITICISATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITY TRANSFORMATION BY DELVING INTO THE CONCEPTUAL COMPLEXITIES FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES. WIESNER SUGGESTS A REDEFINITION OF POLITICISATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT AS A MULTI-STAGE AND MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPT, PROPOSING A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EU POLITICISATION WHICH HELPS TO BETTER GRASP ITS PROCESSES AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER BY ELENA GARCIA-GUITIAN PROPOSES A THEORETICAL APPROACH MINDFUL OF NORMATIVE CONNOTATIONS TO LOOK AT THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF OPERATIONAL ISING EU POLITICISATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. THE FOCUS IS ON THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' DISCOURSE WITHIN THE EU POLITICISATION LITERATURE. THE MAIN ARGUMENT IS THAT THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACCURATELY TAKE INTO CONSIDERA TION THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WHICH SHOWS MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF WHAT COULD BE DEFINED AS POLITICISATION. BOTH CONTRIBUTIONS SHOW THAT, FOR A DEEPER CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICISATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC ARENAS AND LEVELS OF OPERATION IN WHICH IDEAS SURROUNDING EUROPE EVOLVE. THE AUTHORS ILLUSTRATE HOW WE NEED TO PAY HEED TO THE SPECIFIC STRATEGIES AND FRAMES ACTORS EMPLOY AT DIFFERENT LEVELS WHEN TALKING ABOUT THE EU. IN THE REST OF THE CHAPTERS OF THE FIRST CLUSTER, THE ROLE OF ACTORS IS PUT IN SPECIAL FOCUS. THE CHAPTERS BY KARI PALONEN AND NIILO KAUPPI SHOW THAT POLITICISATION IS NOT A PURELY ANALYTICAL CONCEPT EMPLOYED BY SCHOLARS TO GRASP AND DESCRIBE PHENOMENA THEY OBSERVE, BUT IT IS SOMETHING THAT IS ACTIVELY SHAPED AND RESHAPED BY DIVERSE ACTORS ON THE GROUND. THIS CAN BE SEEN ESPECIALLY IN KARI PALONEN'S CONTRIBUTION, WHICH LOOKS AT THE USE 298 T. HAAPALA ET AL. OF THE CONCEPT BY PARLIAMENTARIANS IN THE DEBATES OF THREE PARLIAMENTS, THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG, THE UK HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND THE EURO PEAN PARLIAMENT (EP). HIS
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|a CHAPTER OFFERS A COLOURFUL AND NUANCED PICTURE OF THE VOCABULARY OF POLITICISATION USED BY PARLIAMENTARIANS, REFERRING TO DIFFERENT VIEWS ON POLITICS AND EVALUATIONS OF EUROPEANISATION. IT SHOWS THAT POLITICIANS THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THESE CONCEPTS ALREADY BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT. SIMILARLY, KAUPPI'S ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH EXTREME RIGHT PARTY FRONT NATIONAL 'S USAGE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND EU POLITICISATION FOR GAINING A MORE MAINSTREAM STATUS IN NATIONAL POLITICS HELPS TO MAKE SENSE OF HOW THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME FIRST-ORDER ELECTIONS BY 2019 (FOR THIS ARGUMENT, SEE CHAPTER 2 BY CLAUDIA WIESNER). FOR SMALLER, NON-CARTEL PARTIES, SUCH AS THE FRONT/RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL , EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF DIRECT ELECTIONS OF THE EP IN 1979, FIRST-ORDER ELECTIONS. IT IS ONLY THANKS TO THE 'EUROPEAN RESCUE' OF THE EXTREME RIGHT-WING PARTY THAT IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN USING EUROPEAN POLITICAL CAPITAL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL THROUGH (MIS-)USES OF FUNDS PROVIDED BY REPRESENTATION IN THE EP AND CONVERTING THESE FUNDS INTO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CAPITAL THROUGH (LIMITED) SUCCESSES IN PRESIDENTIAL, NATIONAL, AND REGIONAL/LOCAL ELECTIONS. KAUPPI ARGUES THAT WITHOUT THE EUROPEAN RESCUE AND EU POLITICISATION, THE SUSTAINED PRESENCE OF THE FRONT/RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL IN FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. TO SUM UP, THE FIRST THEMATIC CLUSTER UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR A RE CONCEPTUALISATION OF POLITICISATION IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPE. BY INVOKING THE MULTILEVEL NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN POLITY, THE AUTHORS SHOW HOW DIFFERENT ARENAS, BOTH IN TERMS OF LEVELS (NATIONAL, REGIONAL, OR SUPRANA TIONAL) AND SPACES (SOCIAL MEDIA, TRADITIONAL MEDIA, OR PARLIAMENTS), AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL ACTORS FORCE US TO MAKE DISTINCT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MODALITIES AND OUTCOMES OF POLITICISATION. THEY ALSO ILLUSTRATE HOW THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU CAN POTENTIALLY
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|a CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCREASING INTER CONNECTION OF EUROPEAN PUBLICS. THE FACILITATION OF COOPERATION AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL BETWEEN NATIONAL ACTORS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES MEANS THAT, UNLIKE MUCH OF THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE ARGUES, POLITICISATION DOES NOT, BY DEFAULT, ANTAGONISE 'PRO-EUROPEANS' AND 'EUROSCEPTICS'. IT UNDERSCORES A CENTRAL THREAD OF THIS BOOK: POLITICISATION CAN BE USED AS A STRATEGY TO DEPICT BOTH VICES AND VIRTUES OF EUROPEANISATION. THE AUTHORS IN THE SECOND THEMATIC CLUSTER SCRUTINISE THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU, AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED INCREASE IN EU CONTESTATION. 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 299 THE JANUS-FACED MEANINGS OF POLITICISATION AS BOTH A VICE AND A VIRTUE CAN BE SEEN CLEARLY IN TARU HAAPALA'S CHAPTER. IT ILLUSTRATES HOW THE POLITI CISATION OF THE EU IN THE 'TWITTERSPHERE' CAN COMPLEMENT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS A SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO VITALISE THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES. THE CHAPTER SHOWS, HOWEVER, HOW POLITICISING STRATEGIES USED IN THE TWITTERSPHERE CAN BE A MIXED BAG IN WHICH POLITICAL DEBATES CAN TURN INTO INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC WHILE THEY CAN ALSO PRODUCE LEGISLATIVE INITIA TIVES BY PRODUCING SPILLOVER EFFECTS INTO THE SETTING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY AGENDA. IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER, STERGIOS FOTOPOULOS AND LUCIANO MORGANTI DISCUSS THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN TWITTERSPHERE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LEAD CANDIDATES' CAMPAIGN FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRESIDENCY ( SPITZENKANDIDATEN ), AND INTENTIONALLY COUNTERS THE NOTION OF POLITICISA TION AS A VICE AND PROPOSES TO FOCUS ON THE VIRTUES. IT ILLUSTRATES HOW TWITTER CAN FACILITATE TRANSNATIONAL, AD HOC , AND ONLINE SPHERES DIMIN ISHING THE CONSTRAINTS OF NATIONAL BORDERS AND MASS-MEDIATED COMMUNI CATION. THE AUTHORS THUS DEPICT HOW THE TWITTERSPHERE MIGHT EMBODY AN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR BOTTOM-UP POLITICISATION. COMPLEMENTING THE
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|a PREVIOUS CHAPTER, LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND JORGE TUNON NAVARRO'S CONTRI BUTION ANALYSES TO WHAT EXTENT THE PERSONALISATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE TRANSNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICISATION OF THE EU. THE CHAPTER FINDS THAT, WHILE THE PERSONALISATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CAN RESONATE IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES, IT ALSO SHOWS THAT THE PERSONALISATION OF EU POLITICS LEAVES SPACE FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF CHAR ACTERS IN THE PLOT. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NATURE OF THIS DISCURSIVE EXERCISE DETERMINES IN ADVANCE THE ECONOMY OF ATTENTION, WITH LEADERS' PERSONALITIES ONLY MARGINALLY INFLUENCING THE AMOUNT OF ATTEN TION. THEREFORE, THE 'DISCURSIVE INTERGOVERNMENTALISM' (DE WILDE, 2019 ) AT PLAY DOES NOT NECESSARILY TRANSLATE INTO WIDER DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE. THE CHAPTER CONCLUDES BY ARGUING THAT THE ONGOING PERSON ALISATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL EUROPEAN POLITICS APPEALS TO MEDIA AND INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICS, BUT IT IS NOT YET REFLECTED IN PAN-EUROPEAN ELECTION AGENDAS. LASTLY, THE CONTRIBUTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD THEMATIC CLUSTER CONTAIN A COMBINATION OF CROSS-CASE AND WITHIN-CASE ANALYSES. TRACING THE MULTITUDE OF FRAMES AND NARRATIVES EMPLOYED BY THE VARIOUS ACTORS WHO POLITI CISE EUROPE IS ONE OF THE STRONG EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS CLUSTER. THEY UNDERSCORE THE PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVES THAT EMERGE WHEN POLIT ICAL ACTORS ENGAGE WITH THE EU AND SHOW HOW ANTAGONISTIC AND AGONISTIC 300 T. HAAPALA ET AL. FRAMING STRATEGIES (CF. OLEART, 2021 ) CO-EXIST IN THE FACE OF THE VARIOUS CRISES THE EU HAS EXPERIENCED IN THE LAST DECADE. THIS BECOMES PARTIC ULARLY RELEVANT IN THE CHAPTER BY RAMONA COMAN, ANA ANDGULADZE, JAN BEYER, AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN. IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF PATTERNS OF POLITI CISATION IN THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE EU PRIOR TO THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS, THE AUTHORS CARVE OUT A MULTITUDE OF CONFLICT LINES THAT HAVE SHAPED THE DISCUSSION AROUND EUROPE SUCH AS DEBATES OVER INTERGOVERN MENTAL
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|a CONFLICTS, NATIONAL VS. SUPRANATIONAL, GOVERNMENT VS. OPPOSITION, SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY VS. THREATS TO DEMOCRACY, SUPPORTERS OF IMMI GRATION VS. ANTI-IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION VS. DISINTEGRATION. WHILE THE AUTHORS CLEARLY ILLUSTRATE THAT THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPE GOES FAR BEYOND A PURELY REJECTIONIST (OR ANTAGONISTIC) STANCE THAT CLASSICAL WORKS ON EU POLITICISATION WOULD HAVE ASSUMED, THEY CLAIM THAT THE DISTINCT PATTERNS OF POLITICISATION REMAIN A REFLECTION OF DOMESTIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES. IN OTHER WORDS, LOCAL POLITICAL TENSIONS IN EACH MEMBER STATE FILTER THE WAYS IN WHICH EU POLITICISATION TAKES PLACE. MIRUNA BUTNARU-TRONCOTYYA AND DRAGOS , IONIT , YY A'S CHAPTER TRACES THE ELEMENTS OF WHAT THE AUTHORS CONCEPTUALISE AS 'SUPRANATIONAL POLITI CISATION'. THE AUTHORS DEPICT THE CLASH OF FRAMING STRATEGIES GEARED TOWARDS EMPHASISING A 'EUROPEAN IDENTITY' AND THOSE PRESERVING 'NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY' IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE TRANSNATIONAL DEBATE THAT STARTED IN MARCH 2017. THE CHAPTER STRESSES HOW THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TRIED TO INTEGRATE VARIOUS ANTI-EU NARRATIVES OF A GROUP OF 'SOVEREIGNIST' LEADERS INTO A LARGER, TRANSNATIONAL REFLECTION PROCESS, TOGETHER WITH OTHER VIEWS ON THE EU, IN ORDER TO DIVERT CITIZENS' DISCONTENT INTO A MULTIPLYING FORUM OF OPEN DIALOGUE. IN AN EFFORT TO ANALYSE THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S REACTIONS TO EU POLITICISATION, MARIA-ISABEL SOLDEVILA'S AND JULIE VANDER MEULEN'S CHAPTER ILLUSTRATES HOW EUROPEAN POLITICAL BODIES ARE ACTIVELY REFLECTING UPON THE PHENOMENON. TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF THREE CONSEC UTIVE COMMISSIONS, NAMELY THE BARROSO I, BARROSO II, AND THE JUNCKER COMMISSIONS, THE CHAPTER EXPLORES HOW THE COMMISSION HAS ADAPTED ITS LEGITIMATION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN RESPONSE TO POLITICISATION OVER TIME. THE AUTHORS ANALYSE THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION AND THE DEEPENING OF A 'HEARTS AND MINDS' APPROACH TO INTERACTING
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|a WITH EU CITIZENS, INVOLVING THE USE OF NEW DIGITAL AND MARKETING TOOLS TO BRIDGE THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THAT FUELS CONTESTATION AGAINST THE EU. AS AN INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATE, FRANCE RECEIVES MOST ATTENTION IN THIS BOOK AS THE COUNTRY MIGHT PROVIDE LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES WITH REGARD 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 301 TO HOW EU POLITICISATION CAN RESHAPE THE POLITICAL PLAYING FIELD ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL. THE LAST CHAPTER OF THE THIRD THEMATIC CLUSTER, BY LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND ALVARO OLEART, ADDRESSES THE EUROPEAN NARRATIVE OF EMMANUEL MACRON, ELECTED PRESIDENT OF FRANCE IN 2017 ON THE BASIS OF A STRONG PRO-EUROPEAN POLITICAL PLATFORM. THE CHAPTER ANALYSES HOW 'EUROPE' IS NARRATED BY EMMANUEL MACRON SINCE THE START OF HIS RISE AS AN ENTREPRENEURIAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL FIGURE, AND ARGUES THAT HIS NARRATIVE IS BUILT UPON ENCOURAGING EU POLITICISATION AS A MANICHEAN PRO VS ANTI EUROPE. IN DOING SO, MACRON'S DISCOURSE MIRRORS CLOSELY THE LANGUAGE OF PROMINENT BREXITEERS, SUCH AS 'TAKE BACK CONTROL', WHICH IS WHY THE AUTHORS CONCEPTUALISE HIS NARRATIVE AS 'MAKE EUROPE GREAT AGAIN'. CONSE QUENTLY, MACRON'S NARRATIVE ON EUROPE TENDS TO SITUATE THE OPPONENTS OF HIS VERSION OF 'EUROPE' AS 'EUROSCEPTIC', WHICH HAS IMPORTANT (NEGATIVE) NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS. THE THREE THEMATIC CLUSTERS TOGETHER PROVIDE THE READER WITH A CLEAR IDEA OF THE MULTIFACETEDNESS AND MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF EU POLITICISA TION. THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS BOOK UNDERSCORE THIS POINT THROUGH THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE MULTITUDE OF ARENAS IN WHICH POLITICISA TION CAN OCCUR, THE DIFFERENT FRAMING STRATEGIES OR THE DEGREE OF CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL AWARENESS OF THE CONCEPT ITSELF. THIS BOOK, HENCE, PROVIDES US WITH A POWERFUL LENS FOR FUTURE ANALYSES IN THE AREA OF RESEARCH. THIS ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICISATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT IS HELPFUL TO TRACE THE WAY IN WHICH NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICS ARE
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|a INCREASINGLY INTERTWINED AND WILL BE PARAMOUNT FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES THAT THE EU IS FACING. 1 LOOKING AHEAD: LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE VICES AND VIRTUES OF EU POLITICISATION THE INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS BOOK DO NOT ONLY PROVIDE AN ANALYTICAL LENS FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE UP TO THIS POINT, BUT THEY ALSO OFFER A FRAMEWORK TO BETTER GRASP CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS. EVEN AT THE TIME OF WRITING, A PLETHORA OF EVENTS THAT ARE UNFOLDING SEEM TO RESONATE STRONGLY WITH THE INSIGHTS OF THIS BOOK. IN PARTICULAR, THE WAY THAT THE EU HAS DEALT WITH THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS BROUGHT COMMON POLICY PRIORITIES ACROSS ALL EU MEMBER STATES. THIS OCCURRENCE HAS MEANINGFULLY SHAPED THE POLITICAL DEBATE AT THE EUROPEAN, NATIONAL, AND REGIONAL LEVELS, AS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAS LED THE PROCUREMENT PROCESSES TO PURCHASE THE VACCINES 302 T. HAAPALA ET AL. REPRESENTING EU MEMBER STATES. THE PUBLIC ROWS WITH ASTRAZENECA, ONE OF THE PRIVATE VACCINE PROVIDERS, FURTHER FACILITATED THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU IN SEVERAL MEMBER STATES. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF THIS POLITICISATION, THE BREAK WITH THE 'PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS' HAS NOT LED TO A 'CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS' (HOOGHE & MARKS, 2009 ). WHAT HAS BEEN DEFINED AS POLITICISA TION HAS NOT PREVENTED EU DECISIONS TO ADDRESS THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC. IN JULY 2020, DESPITE THE POLITICISED NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AGREEMENT TO ISSUE COMMON EUROPEAN DEBT, THERE WAS A BREAKTHROUGH FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE EU 'CROSSED THE RUBICON' (SANDBU, 2020 )A S THE COVID-19 CRISIS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AS A EUROPEAN ONE THAT REQUIRED A BEYOND THE NATION STATE POLICY APPROACH ILLUSTRATED BY THE MUTUALISATION OF DEBT. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL HOW THE EU WILL BE REGARDED IN THE POLITICISED CONTEXT IN THE EYES OF THE CITIZENS, ONCE THE CRISIS IS OVER COME. INCREASINGLY, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS MOBILISE AGAINST 'BRUSSELS' AND TRAITS OF
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|a 'VACCINE NATIONALISM' HAVE BECOME VISIBLE. HOWEVER, THE EXCEP TIONALLY HIGH SALIENCE OF EUROPEAN ISSUES IN TIMES OF THE PANDEMIC REMAINS UNDENIABLE PROVEN BY THE PROMINENT PLACE BRUSSELS HOLDS IN NATIONAL DEBATES. AND, THE SPACE FOR FUTURE STUDIES ON POLITICISATION IN THE EU (AND BEYOND) WILL ONLY BROADEN. FURTHERMORE, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS BOOK SHOW THAT MANY OF THE FEATURES THAT WERE INTENSIFIED DURING THE PANDEMIC WERE ALREADY SHOWING IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. THE POLITICISATION OF THE PANDEMIC ON A GLOBAL SCALE HAS ILLUSTRATED THAT THERE ARE INSTANCES IN WHICH CONTRO VERSIES ARE CREATED OVER TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES. THE INCREASING TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CONTESTATIONHAS AGAIN BROUGHT TO THE FRONT THE EU AS A POLITY, AS IT WAS ILLUSTRATED BY THE INITIAL LACK OF THE EU RESPONSE TO COVID-19 THAT PUT A STRAIN ON TRANSNATIONAL AGENDAS AND SHOWED PROB LEMS OF COORDINATION. THE EU CONTINUES TO BE A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY THAT CREATES CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS AMONG DIFFERENT PLAYERS, PROVIDING A BROADER PLAYING FIELD FOR DIFFERENT ACTORS TO POLITICISE ISSUES. HOWEVER, THE INCREASING POLITICISATION CONTRASTS WITH THE 'NEW INTERGOVERNMENTALISM' (BICKERTON ET AL., 2015 ), IN WHICH THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL BECOMES THE MAIN FORUM OF EU DECISION-MAKING AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES, RATHER THAN SUPRA- OR TRANSNATIONAL, DRIVING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN CONCEPTUALISED AS 'DISCURSIVE INTERGOVERNMENTALISM' BY DE WILDE ( 2019 ) WHO ARGUES THAT EXECUTIVE ACTORS (MAINLY NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS) REMAIN THE MOST SALIENT SPEAKERS IN EU POLITICISATION. THE COVID-19 CRISIS HAS EXPOSED THESE INHERENT TENSIONS EMBEDDED IN THE 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 303 EU INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE BY PRIORITISING A FORM OF GOVERNANCE CHARAC TERISED AS 'EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM' (CRUM, 2013 ), IN SPITE OF THE EMERGING EU POLITICISATION AND THE INCREASE OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. THINKING ABOUT
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|a THE DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS BY WHICH EU POLITI CISATION MIGHT BE FACILITATED IN THE UPCOMING YEARS, AND THE DIFFERENT ARENAS IN WHICH IT MIGHT OCCUR, SHOULD ALSO MAKE SCHOLARS THINK OF THE GLOBAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND ITS IMPACT ON POLITICISATION. THE EU POLICY MAKING HAS TRADITIONALLY FAVOURED INSTITUTIONALISED BRUSSELS-BASED PEAK ASSOCIATIONS AND UMBRELLA GROUPS THAT AGGREGATE AND REPRESENT DIVERSE INTERESTS AT THE EU LEVEL, WHICH IN TURN HAS CREATED TENSIONS WITH GRASS ROOTS GROUPS BASED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL ACROSS EU MEMBER STATES. THIS HAS ENCOURAGED A POLICY PROCESS IN THE 'BRUSSELS BUBBLE' WHEREBY EU POLITICS IS RELATIVELY AUTONOMOUS FROM THE NATIONAL POLITICAL DEBATES, AND THUS THE DISCUSSIONS ON EU ISSUES ARE DEPOLITICISED. ON THIS BASIS, VIVIEN SCHMIDT ( 2006 ) HAS CONCEPTUALISED THE EU POLICY-MAKING AS 'POLICY WITHOUT POLI TICS'. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, POLITICISATION MAY ENCOURAGE A PROCESS BY WHICH THERE IS AN INCREASING MATCHING OF 'POLICY WITH POLITICS' AT THE EURO PEAN LEVEL, THEREBY MAKING EU POLITICS MORE DEMOCRATIC, OVERCOMING THE 'OPPOSITION DEFICIT' (RAUH & DE WILDE, 2018 ) THAT HAS TRADITIONALLY EXISTED IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. RECENTLY, WE ARE ALSO WITNESSING A SPIKE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICISATION. POLITICISATION IS NOT UNIQUE TO THE EU, AS IS SHOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE RISE (AND FALL) OF US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP WHICH HAS TRIGGERED PROTESTS ACROSS EUROPE AGAINST THE FAR RIGHT. THE INCREASING INTERACTIONS OF SUPRANATIONAL POLITICS BEYOND THE EU, ILLUSTRATED ESPECIALLY BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, CLASHES WITH THE LACK OF INTEGRATED SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES. GIVEN THESE DEVELOPMENTS, FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE WAYS IN WHICH POLITICISATION TAKES PLACE, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE EU BUT ALSO AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, IS MORE RELEVANT THAN EVER. 2 CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU HAS ILLUSTRATED THAT THERE IS A MULTI TUDE OF
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|a POLITICISING STRATEGIES AT PLAY IN EUROPE. PRESUMABLY, THEY REMAIN PRESENT IN THE UPCOMING FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATES THAT ARE DESIGNED TO VOICING CONCERNS AND IDEAS FROM THE GRASSROOTS. IN THIS BOOK, LUIS BOUZA GARCIA AND ALVARO OLEART ANALYSED EMMANUEL MACRON'S EUROPEAN NARRA TIVE IN THE FRAMING OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 304 T. HAAPALA ET AL. DEBATE SHOULD IDEALLY BE OPEN TO DIFFERENT AND CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, RATHER THAN A REFERENDUM-LIKE PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF THE EU. HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT MACRON'S POLITICISATION OF EUROPE IS AN INTERESTING INNOVATION IN THE DISCOURSE OF NATIONAL LEADERS, AS IT IS CONTRIBUTING TO FURTHER INTERTWINE EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL POLITICS. IN GENERAL, THE POLITICISING STRATEGIES CAN INTRODUCE BOTH VICES AND VIRTUES IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC DEBATES, FOR EXAMPLE, IN TERMS OF EFFORTS OF DEPICTING POLITICISATION. ONE OF THE CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE RESEARCH OF TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS WILL BE WHETHER OR NOT EU POLITICISATION IS CHANNELLED IN AN AGONISTIC WAY (CONRAD & OLEART, 2020 ) AND IN WHAT CONTEXTS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN PARLIAMENTS (CF. WIESNER ET AL., 2017 ) OR SOCIAL MEDIA. CONNECTED WITH IT IS THE EXPANDING RANGE OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN EUROPEAN POLITICS AND CONFRONTING POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES WHILE ACCEPTING THE EU AS THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ARENA. THIS BOOK HAS EMPHASISED, IN LINE WITH PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP (E.G. WIESNER, 2021 ), THAT FURTHER RESEARCH IS NEEDED TO FULLY GRASP THE COMPLEXITY OF POLITICISATION IN THE EU. FUTURE STUDIES CAN BENEFIT FROM THE APPROACH REFLECTED IN THIS BOOK THAT COMBINES DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES. THE BOOK HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPLORE CONCEPTUALLY THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH EU POLITICISATION IS INTERPRETED AND PERFORMED BY DIFFERENT ACTORS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS. AS THERE IS AN INCREASE IN NON-ESTABLISHED POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE NEW PLAYING FIELDS OF EU
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|a DEBATES, IT BECOMES LESS TENABLE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EU POLITICISATION TO RELY ON PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED DEFINITIONS. TO ANALYSE THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE MULTIFACETEDNESS OF EU POLITICISATION REQUIRES MORE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE VARIETIES OF ACTING IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS AND PLAYING FIELDS. METHODOLOGICALLY, BOTH FURTHER CROSS-CASE AS WELL AS WITHIN-CASE ANALYSES WILL BE REQUIRED TO UNDERSTAND THE DIVERSE WAYS IN WHICH POLITICISATION PLAYS OUT IN DIFFERENT ARENAS, BOTH IN TERMS OF LEVELS (FOR EXAMPLE, NATIONAL ARENAS VS EUROPEAN ONE) AS WELL AS SPACES (SOCIAL MEDIA, MAINSTREAM MEDIA, PARLIAMENTS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SO ON). THE SPECIFIC DOMAINS IN WHICH EU POLITICISATION CAN BE STUDIED CAN INCLUDE BOTH LARGE-SCALE SURVEY DESIGNS TO UNDERSTAND THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES, AS WELL AS IN-DEPTH QUALITATIVE RESEARCH TO GRASP MOTIVATIONS, STRATEGIES, AND LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL ACTORS WHEN THEY ENGAGE WITH EURO PEAN ISSUES. MOREOVER, STUDIES THAT WILL BRIDGE THE QUALITATIVE/QUANTITATIVE DIVIDE WILL HELP US TO GET A COMPREHENSIVE IDEA ABOUT THE WAYS IN WHICH 13 EPILOGUE: TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU YY 305 THE EU BECOMES POLITICISED, AND THE IMPACT THE POLITICISATION HAS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THERE ARE WAYS THROUGH WHICH THE EU COULD CONTRIBUTE TO BRIDGING AND INTERTWINING NATIONAL AND EU POLITICS IN A DEMOCRATIC WAY INSTITU TIONALLY. POLITICISATION IS NOT MERELY SOMETHING THAT JUST 'HAPPENS' DUE TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES (SUCH AS THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC) AROUND US, BUT IT IS ACTIVELY TRIGGERED BY INTERPRETATIONS, BY POLITICAL ACTORS CHAL LENGING THE STATUS QUO AND PUTTING FORWARD CRITICAL ARGUMENTS IN PUBLIC DEBATES, INCLUDING POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, THINK-TANKERS, SCHOLARS, AND SOCIAL MEDIA PERSONALITIES. IN OTHER WORDS, BY BECOMING A PART OF THE EU POLITICISATION PLAYING FIELD, ONE BECOMES A POLITICAL ACTOR. ACTORS CAN POLITI CISE ISSUES IN ONLINE PLATFORMS BY OFFERING OPINIONS THAT CAN POTENTIALLY BECOME VIRAL, NOT JUST
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|a NATIONALLY BUT ALSO TRANSNATIONALLY, AS EU-RELATED POLARISING VIEWS TEND TO USE ARGUMENTS THAT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE WIDER EUROPEAN PUBLIC (KINSKI & CRUM, 2020 ). THE FACT THAT EU POLITICISATION CAN BE SEEN AS BOTH VICE AND VIRTUE, AS THE PHENOMENON IS FUNDAMENTALLY ABOUT THE USE OF POLITICISING STRATEGIES WITH BOTH NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CONNOTATIONS, EMPHASISES THAT SCHOLARS HAVE TO BE AWARE OF THE NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS EMBEDDED IN THE CONCEP TUALISATIONS EU POLITICISATION. THIS BOOK HAS SHOWN THAT MORE RESEARCH IS NEEDED ON THE IMPACT THAT SCHOLARSHIP ON EU POLITICISATION ITSELF HAS OVER THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS IT IS USED AS A VICE AND A VIRTUE. FUTURE RESEARCH PROJECTS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCEPTUAL COMPLEXITY OF EU POLITICISATION AND PAYING HEED TO AN OPEN-MINDEDNESS WITH REGARD TO BOTH METHODS AS WELL AS NORMATIVE PRESUMPTIONS WILL GREATLY ADVANCE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW EUROPE IS PERCEIVED, DEBATED, AND UNDERSTOOD. AS EUROPE IS APPROACHING A CROSSROAD THAT CAN EITHER LEAD TO FURTHER FRAGMENTATION, AS QUASI-AUTHORITARIAN LEADERS UNDERMINE THE RULES AND NORMS ON WHICH THE EU IS BUILT OR OPEN NEW PATHWAYS TO INTEGRATION, AS FORMER TABOOS SUCH AS THE EUROPEAN MUTUALISATION OF DEBT SEEM TO ERODE, THE RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH IN EU POLITICISATION IS NOW MORE PARAMOUNT THAN EVER. IN THIS SENSE, THIS BOOK CAN OFFER A BLUEPRINT FOR CONCEPTUALLY AND METHODOLOGICALLY RICH FUTURE RESEARCH ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, EU POLITICISATION, AND BEYOND. IT WILL ASK RESEARCHERS TO BE MINDFUL OF SOME OF THE CAVEATS OF CLASSICAL EU POLITICISATION STUDIES AND OPEN AVENUES FOR EXCITING, NEW UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF HOW THE EU GETS POLITICISED AND WHAT ARE ITS EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS. 306 T. HAAPALA ET AL. REFERENCES BICKERTON, C. J., HODSON, D., & PUETTER, U. (2015). THE NEW INTERGOVERNMEN TALISM: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE POST-MAASTRICHT ERA. JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 53 (4), 703-722. CONRAD, M., & OLEART, A.
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|a (2020). FRAMING TTIP IN THE WAKE OF THE GREEN PEACE LEAKS: AGONISTIC AND DELIBERATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FRAME RESONANCE AND COMMUNICATIVE POWER. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 42 (4), 527-545. CRUM, B. (2013). SAVING THE EURO AT THE COST OF DEMOCRACY? JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 51 (4), 614-630. DE WILDE, P. (2019). MEDIA LOGIC AND GRAND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 26 (8), 1193-1212. HOOGHE, L., & MARKS, G. (2009). A POSTFUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTE GRATION: FROM PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS TO CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 39 (1), 1-23. HUTTER, S., GRANDE, E., & KRIESI, H. (EDS.). (2016). POLITICISING EUROPE: INTEGRATION AND MASS POLITICS . CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. KAUPPI, N., WIESNER, C., & PALONEN, K. (2016). THE POLITIFICATION AND POLITICI SATION OF THE EU. REDESCRIPTIONS, 19 (1), HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.7227/R.19.1.5 KINSKI, L., & CRUM, B. (2020). TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN EU NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS: CONCEPT, CASE STUDY, RESEARCH AGENDA. POLITICAL STUDIES, 68 (2), 370-388. OLEART, A. (2021). FRAMING TTIP IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES: TOWARDS AN EMPOWERING DISSENSUS FOR EU INTEGRATION . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. RAUH, C., & DE WILDE, P. (2018). THE OPPOSITION DEFICIT IN EU ACCOUNT ABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM OVER 20 YEARS OF PLENARY DEBATE IN FOUR MEMBER STATES. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 57 (1), 194-216. SANDBU, M. (2020, JULY 22). EU CROSSES THE RUBICON WITH ITS EMERGENCY RECOVERY FUND. FINANCIAL TIMES . HTTPS://WWW.FT.COM/CONTENT/BD570DDE-3095-4074 BD37-18003F2BD3C2 . ACCESSED JULY 30, 2020. SCHMIDT, V. A. (2006). DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: THE EU AND NATIONAL POLITIES . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. STATHAM, P., & TRENZ, H. J. (2013). THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPE. CONTESTING THE CONSTITUTION . ROUTLEDGE. WIESNER, C. (ED.). (2021). RETHINKING POLITICISATION IN POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY AND INTER NATIONAL RELATIONS. PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY .
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|a PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. WIESNER, C., HAAPALA, T., & PALONEN, K. (2017). DEBATES, RHETORIC AND POLITICAL ACTION: PRACTICES OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS. RHETORIC, POLITICS AND SOCIETY . PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. INDEX A AGENDA, AGENDA-SETTING, 14 , 68 , 75 , 76 , 87 , 88 , 94 , 101 , 114 , 116 - 119 , 121 - 123 , 125 - 127 , 129 - 131 , 133 , 134 , 143 , 161 , 165 , 167 , 177 - 179 , 230 , 252 , 256 , 287 , 299 , 302 , 303 AGONISM, 7 ALEMANNO, ALBERTO, 121 ANTAGONISTIC, 7 , 14 , 299 , 300 B BARROSO, JOSE MANUEL, 83 , 231 , 245 , 246 , 250 - 256 , 260 - 262 , 264 , 300 C CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, CITIZEN CONSUL TATION, 134 , 145 , 236 , 246 , 250 CIVIL SOCIETY, 4 , 6 , 52 , 58 , 59 , 62 , 140 , 175 , 191 , 217 , 255 , 275 CONCEPTUALISATION, 11 , 22 , 25 , 39 , 47 CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (COFOE), 2 , 8 , 121 , 162 , 171 , 238 CONFLICT, 3 , 5 , 7 , 8 , 13 , 22 , 23 , 26 , 29 , 31 - 33 , 39 , 40 , 50 , 52 , 53 , 56 , 118 , 120 , 169 , 188 - 192 , 194 , 195 , 203 - 207 , 209 - 214 , 218 , 220 , 221 , 227 , 233 , 237 , 245 , 247 , 273 , 274 , 283 , 300 , 302 CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY, 31 , 34 , 53 CONSTRAINING DISSENSUS, 28 , 52 - 54 , 302 CONTESTATION, 2 , 10 , 13 , 37 , 50 , 140 - 144 , 146 , 154 , 177 , 187 , 188 , 191 , 192 , 221 , 228 , 243 - 245 , 247 , 249 , 250 , 252 , 262 , 284 , 297 , 298 , 300 , 302 CONTROVERSY, CONTROVERSIALITY, 5 , 26 , 27 , 48 - 50 , 52 , 54 , 59 , 78 , 85 , 86 , 88 , 101 , 105 , 114 , 115 , 117 , 120 , 126 , 217 , 262 THE EDITOR(S) (IF APPLICABLE) AND THE AUTHOR(S), UNDER EXCLUSIVE LICENSE TO SPRINGER NATURE SWITZERLAND AG 2022 T. HAAPALA AND A. OLEART (EDS.), TRACING THE POLITICISATION OF THE EU , PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7 307 308 INDEX COUNTRIES BELGIUM, 104 , 151 , 188 , 189 , 192 , 195 , 200 , 287 FRANCE, 7 , 9 , 22 , 35 , 50 , 57 , 96 , 101 , 103 , 104 , 160 , 188 , 189 , 192 , 193 , 201 , 204 , 205 , 221 , 224 , 225 , 236 , 271 , 272 , 277 , 280 - 283 , 286 , 288 ,
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|a 300 , 301 GERMANY, 31 , 32 , 38 , 41 , 69 , 72 , 78 , 151 , 160 , 188 , 189 , 192 , 221 , 224 , 225 , 236 HUNGARY, 188 , 189 , 192 , 193 , 212 , 221 , 224 , 225 , 230 - 234 , 236 , 237 POLAND, 36 , 151 , 188 , 189 , 192 , 193 , 201 , 205 , 206 , 208 , 221 , 224 , 225 , 230 - 234 , 236 , 237 ROMANIA, 36 , 188 , 189 , 192 , 193 , 202 , 203 , 206 , 221 , 224 - 226 , 231 , 233 SPAIN, 54 , 160 , 168 , 170 , 172 , 188 , 189 , 192 , 200 , 205 , 287 UNITED KINGDOM (UK), 9 , 54 , 129 , 145 , 149 - 151 , 169 , 193 , 218 , 286 COVID-19, 2 , 6 , 10 , 14 , 53 , 154 , 221 , 301 - 303 , 305 D DEBATE TYPES ON AGENDA AND OF AGENDA, 76 , 88 , 116 - 118 , 121 - 123 , 125 , 126 , 130 , 133 , 167 PARLIAMENTARY, 68 , 70 , 78 , 79 , 86 , 116 , 120 , 122 - 125 , 127 , 128 , 130 , 133 , 161 PUBLIC, 6 , 11 , 13 , 30 , 55 , 114 - 118 , 120 , 124 , 125 , 128 , 130 , 131 , 133 , 134 , 143 , 219 , 221 , 246 , 252 , 275 , 299 , 304 , 305 SCHOLARLY, 4 , 220 , 236 TELEVISED, 140 , 149 , 152 , 153 DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, 8 , 10 , 45 - 47 , 57 - 61 , 85 , 192 , 243 , 244 , 246 , 261 , 300 DEMOCRATISATION, 2 , 7 , 58 , 67 , 82 , 84 , 86 , 133 DEPOLITICISATION, 8 , 9 , 24 , 47 , 48 , 51 , 54 , 57 , 248 , 274 , 275 DISCOURSE, 6 , 14 , 24 , 34 , 47 , 48 , 55 , 57 , 58 , 92 , 113 , 118 , 143 , 144 , 163 - 165 , 167 , 179 , 191 , 206 , 212 , 218 , 223 , 224 , 236 , 246 , 250 , 272 - 278 , 281 , 282 , 284 , 285 , 289 , 290 , 297 , 301 , 304 DISCURSIVE ENTREPRENEURS, 13 , 219 , 223 E ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 12 , 38 , 104 , 118 , 139 , 144 , 162 , 166 , 177 EMPIRICAL, 3 , 9 , 10 , 12 - 14 , 21 - 24 , 28 , 34 , 39 , 40 , 142 , 145 , 163 , 177 , 189 , 244 , 249 , 272 , 285 , 296 , 297 , 299 , 305 EMPOWERING DISSENSUS, 2 , 29 EP ELECTIONS, 11 , 22 , 34 - 38 , 92 , 94 , 96 , 97 , 100 , 101 , 106 , 166 , 177 EU POLITICAL GROUPS ALLIANCE OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE (ALDE), 140 , 165 , 171 EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVES AND REFORMISTS (ECR), 39 , 72 , 73 , 140 , 165 , 169 EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (EPP), 38 , 72 , 73 ,
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|a 83 , 85 , 87 , 140 , 146 , 148 , 172 GAUCHE UNITAIRE EUROPEENNE/NORDIC GREEN LEFT (GUE/NGL), 130 , 176 GREENS - EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE (GREENS/EFA), 165 INDEX 309 PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF SOCIALISTS AND DEMOCRATS (S&D), 82 , 84 , 85 RENEW EUROPE (RENEW), 39 , 165 , 277 , 287 , 289 EU POLITICISATION. SEE POLITICISATION EUROCRITICISM, 31 EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (ECSC), 56 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC), 1 , 2 , 10 , 12 , 13 , 114 , 118 , 121 , 125 , 131 , 134 , 141 , 144 , 159 , 162 , 166 , 193 , 210 , 218 , 221 , 223 , 225 - 231 , 233 , 236 , 237 , 243 - 252 , 254 , 255 , 257 - 260 , 262 , 263 , 297 - 301 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (ECT), 31 , 34 , 53 , 55 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 140 , 149 , 193 , 218 , 227 , 230 , 231 , 280 , 302 EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY, 7 , 206 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC), 170 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 2 - 4 , 7 - 11 , 13 , 21 , 23 , 25 , 27 , 28 , 33 , 45 - 53 , 55 , 56 , 61 , 73 , 84 , 87 , 97 , 100 , 106 , 141 , 143 , 153 , 160 , 172 , 187 , 189 - 191 , 195 , 201 , 203 , 213 , 217 , 220 , 222 , 223 , 227 , 233 , 234 , 237 , 247 , 249 , 261 , 272 - 274 , 277 , 281 , 289 , 290 , 296 , 297 , 302 , 305 EUROPEANISATION, 4 , 8 , 67 , 82 - 84 , 97 , 113 , 133 , 141 , 153 , 165 , 219 , 222 , 298 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP), 2 , 12 , 22 , 35 , 36 , 38 , 39 , 46 , 48 - 50 , 54 , 58 , 59 , 61 , 69 - 72 , 75 , 82 , 85 , 87 , 88 , 92 - 96 , 98 - 100 , 102 , 105 , 106 , 114 , 116 , 117 , 124 , 126 , 128 - 131 , 140 , 143 , 144 , 146 , 149 , 160 - 162 , 165 , 167 , 168 , 179 , 193 , 210 , 218 , 224 - 226 , 228 - 231 , 233 , 234 , 238 , 251 , 263 , 264 , 283 , 284 , 286 , 287 , 298 , 299 EUROPEAN POLITICS, 3 - 5 , 7 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 21 , 48 , 49 , 52 , 56 , 57 , 84 , 93 , 116 , 122 , 133 , 134 , 143 , 144 , 160 , 166 , 179 , 288 , 297 , 299 , 301 , 303 , 304 EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE (EPS), 5 - 8 , 12 , 160 , 188 , 195 , 213 , 227 , 244 , 247 , 257 , 262 , 273 , 275 , 299 EUROPEAN UNION (EU), 1 - 14 , 21 - 23 , 25 - 32 , 34 - 39 , 41 , 45 - 52 , 54 - 63 , 68 , 71 -
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| 992 |
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|a 73 , 75 , 77 , 82 - 85 , 87 , 91 - 97 , 101 , 102 , 104 - 106 , 116 , 121 , 122 , 124 , 126 , 128 , 131 - 134 , 140 , 142 - 145 , 148 , 150 , 152 - 154 , 160 - 162 , 164 , 165 , 167 - 173 , 177 , 187 - 196 , 199 - 205 , 207 - 214 , 217 , 219 - 238 , 243 - 248 , 251 - 253 , 256 , 258 - 264 , 272 - 275 , 278 - 290 , 296 - 305 EUROSCEPTICISM, 278 , 286 EUROZONE CRISIS, 143 , 149 , 153 , 220 , 221 EXTINCTION REBELLION, 130 F FARAGE, NIGEL, 117 , 130 , 207 FIRST-ORDER ELECTIONS, 92 , 298 FRAGMENTATION, 3 , 6 , 173 , 174 , 179 , 219 , 236 , 245 , 252 , 286 , 305 FRAMING, 12 , 160 - 162 , 165 , 167 , 169 , 177 , 205 , 214 , 226 , 246 , 254 , 261 , 272 , 276 , 277 , 282 - 284 , 288 , 300 , 301 , 303 FRASER, NANCY, 6 , 7 , 119 FUTURE OF EUROPE DEBATE, 1 , 8 - 14 , 160 , 166 , 169 , 171 , 218 , 219 , 310 INDEX 223 - 227 , 230 , 232 , 237 , 247 , 277 , 288 , 303 G GILETS JAUNES, YELLOW VEST MOVEMENT, 98 , 106 GREEN-ALTERNATIVE-LIBERTARIAN VS. TRADITIONAL-AUTHORITARIAN NATIONALIST (GAL-TAN), 273 - 275 , 286 , 288 , 290 I IDEOLOGY, 101 , 164 INTERGOVERNMENTAL, 4 , 8 , 13 , 46 , 60 , 162 , 165 - 167 , 171 , 177 , 179 , 188 , 190 , 192 , 194 , 195 , 203 , 212 - 214 , 229 , 233 , 287 , 289 , 299 , 300 , 302 J JUNCKER, JEAN-CLAUDE, 1 , 13 , 140 , 146 - 148 , 150 , 152 , 166 , 168 , 169 , 171 , 172 , 210 , 218 , 224 - 231 , 236 , 237 , 245 , 246 , 249 , 250 , 253 - 257 , 261 - 264 , 300 L LEGITIMACY, 1 , 2 , 6 , 8 , 11 , 27 , 29 , 45 , 47 , 51 , 57 - 62 , 81 , 94 , 105 , 119 , 128 , 134 , 141 , 145 , 153 , 219 - 223 , 231 , 236 , 237 , 244 - 249 , 251 - 254 , 261 , 263 LE PEN, MARINE, 11 , 14 , 94 , 97 , 98 , 100 - 107 , 204 , 272 , 277 , 286 , 287 , 289 , 290 M MAASTRICHT TREATY, 28 , 46 , 48 , 50 , 54 , 244 MACRON, EMMANUEL, 9 , 13 , 14 , 94 , 96 - 98 , 101 , 104 , 107 , 160 , 162 , 165 , 167 - 179 , 204 , 205 , 212 , 225 , 226 , 234 , 235 , 272 - 275 , 277 - 290 , 301 , 304 MEDIA COVERAGE, 12 RECEPTIVENESS, 12 SCRUTINY, 13 , 132 MEDIA ORGANISATIONS ADEVARUL (ROMANIA), 192 , 195
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| 992 |
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|a 197 , 202 , 203 , 206 , 210 , 212 - 214 LE FIGARO (FRANCE), 34 , 104 , 192 , 195 , 200 , 204 , 207 GAZETA WYBORCZA (POLAND), 192 , 195 - 197 , 200 - 202 , 206 , 210 , 213 , 214 THE GUARDIAN (UK), 149 , 278 , 280 L'HUMANITE (FRANCE), 34 MAGYAR NEMZET (HUNGARY), 192 , 195 , 197 , 198 , 202 , 205 , 207 , 209 - 214 LE MONDE (FRANCE), 34 , 104 , 192 , 195 , 199 - 201 , 204 , 207 EL MUNDO (SPAIN), 192 , 195 , 200 , 205 , 207 , 209 , 210 LIBERATION (FRANCE), 34 LA LIBRE (BELGIUM), 192 , 195 , 199 , 200 , 203 , 207 EL PAIS (SPAIN), 192 , 195 , 200 , 205 , 209 , 280 LE SOIR (BELGIUM), 192 , 195 , 199 , 200 , 203 , 204 , 207 DE STANDAARD (BELGIUM), 192 , 194 , 195 , 199 , 200 , 203 DIE TAGESZEITUNG (GERMANY), 192 , 195 , 200 , 205 INDEX 311 DIE WELT (GERMANY), 192 , 195 , 200 , 205 , 207 MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (MEP), 100 - 102 , 104 , 105 , 117 , 130 , 210 MEMBER OF THE PARLIAMENT (AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL) (MP), 75 MERKEL, ANGELA, 148 , 160 , 165 , 166 , 168 - 170 , 172 - 179 , 225 , 235 MOUFFE, CHANTAL, 7 MULTI-FACETED, 2 , 3 , 9 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, SYSTEM, 5 , 50 N NARRATIVE, 8 , 10 , 12 , 14 , 31 , 49 , 53 , 58 , 62 , 161 , 190 , 209 , 218 , 219 , 223 - 225 , 227 , 231 , 234 , 236 , 246 , 247 , 254 , 260 , 261 , 273 - 284 , 286 - 290 , 297 , 299 - 301 , 303 NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS BUNDESTAG (GERMANY), 32 , 70 , 72 , 73 , 75 , 77 , 84 , 87 , 298 HOUSE OF COMMONS (UK), 72 , 74 , 76 , 79 , 82 , 83 , 87 , 127 , 298 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (FRANCE), 94 , 98 , 99 NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES ALTERNATIV FUER DEUTSCHLAND (AFD), 31 , 32 , 205 CIUDADANOS (CS), 176 , 287 DANSKE FOLKEPARTI , 94 LA FRANCE INSOUMISE , 96 , 102 , 103 FRONT NATIONAL , 11 , 35 , 92 , 94 - 106 , 272 , 298 PERUSSUOMALAISET , 94 RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL , 11 , 35 , 92 , 101 , 104 - 106 , 298 LA REPUBLIQUE EN MARCHE , 97 , 101 , 287 SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA , 94 , 95 SYRIZA, 140 UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP), 71 , 87 , 92 , 94 , 130 VLAAMS BELANG , 95 NEOFUNCTIONALISM, 25 , 27 , 29 NEOLIBERALISM, 7
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| 992 |
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|a , 24 , 274 , 286 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS), 32 - 34 , 38 , 41 , 55 , 62 , 93 , 104 , 130 , 167 NORMATIVE, 9 , 14 , 24 , 39 , 41 , 45 - 49 , 51 - 53 , 55 , 56 , 58 , 59 , 69 , 86 , 87 , 91 , 92 , 106 , 116 , 126 , 199 , 201 , 288 , 297 , 301 , 304 , 305 O ONLINE PLATFORMS, 114 - 116 , 118 , 120 , 122 , 124 , 126 , 129 , 131 - 134 , 249 , 305 ORBAN, VIKTOR, 204 - 206 , 209 - 211 , 225 , 232 , 233 P PARADIASTOLE. SEE RHETORICAL PARLIAMENTARISM, 118 , 119 , 126 PARLIAMENTARY AGENDA, 88 , 122 , 299 ASSEMBLY, 114 - 119 , 123 DEBATE, 68 , 70 , 78 , 86 , 116 , 120 , 122 - 125 , 127 , 128 , 130 , 133 , 161 DEMOCRACY, 71 , 105 , 119 , 123 , 128 FORM OF GOVERNMENT, 114 , 118 PROCEDURE. SEE PROCEDURE, RULES OF PROCEDURE QUESTIONS, 104 REPRESENTATION, 32 , 62 , 118 RHETORIC, 11 , 117 , 119 , 121 , 123 , 126 , 127 VOCABULARY, 68 , 116 PARTY 312 INDEX LEADER, LEADERSHIP, 31 , 62 , 100 - 102 , 105 , 117 , 167 , 176 MANIFESTOS, PROGRAMMES, 114 , 161 , 165 , 168 , 171 POLITICS, 12 , 31 , 32 , 128 , 190 , 228 PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS, 8 , 10 , 11 , 25 , 27 - 30 , 47 - 49 , 51 - 54 , 56 , 61 , 63 , 191 , 244 , 273 - 275 , 286 , 297 , 302 PERSONALISATION, 12 , 160 - 162 , 164 - 167 , 177 - 179 , 299 PLURALITY, 3 , 116 , 119 , 125 , 299 POLARISATION, 12 , 13 , 23 , 38 , 40 , 58 , 97 , 140 - 142 , 146 , 149 , 150 , 152 - 154 , 163 , 167 , 168 , 177 , 188 , 189 , 191 , 194 , 219 , 220 , 226 , 272 , 286 POLICYMAKING, 4 , 5 , 8 , 47 , 48 , 52 , 56 , 61 , 153 , 296 , 303 POLICY WITHOUT POLITICS, 8 , 141 , 303 POLITICAL ACTIVITY, 3 - 5 , 11 , 30 , 40 , 96 , 102 , 103 , 117 , 119 , 122 , 124 , 125 , 130 , 132 - 134 , 299 ACTORS, 5 , 6 , 11 , 49 , 115 , 129 , 146 , 160 , 164 , 165 , 187 , 224 , 228 , 273 - 275 , 277 , 299 , 304 , 305 CAPITAL, 92 - 98 , 101 , 102 , 106 , 288 , 298 COMMUNICATION, 116 , 139 , 144 , 161 , 163 , 164 , 228 , 254 COMMUNITY, 7 , 26 , 284 CONTESTATION, 140 - 142 , 144 , 146 , 154 , 284 , 302 DEBATE, 4 , 9 , 12 , 29 , 31 , 53 , 54 , 114 , 117 - 119 , 121 , 122
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| 992 |
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|a 124 , 126 , 129 , 145 , 163 , 229 , 288 , 290 , 296 , 299 , 301 , 303 ELITES, 25 , 28 , 30 , 32 , 47 - 50 , 54 , 143 , 252 , 273 , 274 FIELD, 92 - 96 , 98 , 105 - 107 , 171 , 275 INSTITUTIONS, 24 , 92 , 95 , 127 LIFE, 68 , 83 , 119 , 142 , 144 PARTIES, 4 , 22 , 29 , 30 , 32 , 33 , 35 , 47 , 61 , 62 , 93 , 96 - 98 , 100 - 102 , 106 , 114 , 115 , 128 , 132 , 140 , 144 , 146 , 148 , 153 , 161 , 167 , 171 , 173 , 178 , 188 , 191 , 228 , 229 , 255 PURPOSES, 2 , 32 , 68 , 133 , 296 RESISTANCE, 190 RHETORIC, 120 , 121 , 125 , 127 , 129 , 133 STRATEGY, 41 , 92 , 93 , 101 , 102 , 104 - 106 , 272 , 273 , 275 , 277 , 286 THEORY, 4 , 92 , 127 POLITICISATION, 2 - 14 , 22 - 35 , 37 , 39 - 41 , 47 - 55 , 57 , 58 , 60 - 63 , 67 - 88 , 97 , 98 , 100 , 105 , 106 , 114 - 117 , 123 , 130 , 131 , 133 , 134 , 140 - 143 , 152 - 154 , 160 - 163 , 166 , 177 , 179 , 188 - 192 , 194 , 195 , 203 , 213 , 214 , 217 - 224 , 226 - 229 , 231 , 234 , 236 - 238 , 244 , 245 , 247 , 248 , 260 - 263 , 272 - 274 , 278 , 285 - 290 , 295 - 305 POLITICKING, 23 , 67 , 69 , 70 , 74 , 77 , 86 , 88 , 124 , 130 , 248 , 262 , 263 POLITICS, 3 - 5 , 7 - 9 , 22 , 23 , 25 , 26 , 35 , 38 , 39 , 47 - 53 , 55 , 56 , 61 , 62 , 67 - 77 , 80 , 82 - 85 , 87 , 88 , 92 , 93 , 96 - 98 , 100 , 102 , 106 , 114 - 117 , 119 - 125 , 128 , 129 , 131 , 133 , 139 , 141 , 143 , 154 , 160 , 162 - 164 , 179 , 188 - 190 , 227 , 247 - 249 , 262 , 272 , 274 , 287 , 289 , 298 , 303 - 305 AS ACTIVITY, 3 - 5 , 11 , 23 , 30 , 39 , 40 , 69 , 88 , 96 , 102 , 103 , 117 , 119 , 122 , 124 , 125 , 130 , 132 - 134 , 248 , 262 , 299 INDEX 313 AS SPHERE, 23 , 52 , 118 - 122 , 129 , 131 POLITIFICATION, 220 , 248 POLITY, 3 , 8 , 25 , 26 , 35 , 37 , 58 , 62 , 67 , 69 , 70 , 84 , 86 , 92 , 93 , 128 , 141 , 166 , 171 , 177 , 191 , 192 , 221 , 222 , 273 , 282 , 285 , 287 , 288 , 297 , 298 , 302 POLYCRISIS, 160 , 217 , 221 PROCEDURE, RULES OF PROCEDURE, 11 , 12 , 46 , 59 , 85 , 87 , 88 , 114 - 117 , 119 - 126 , 128 , 130 , 172 , 208 , 249 , 250 , 277 PUBLIC
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| 992 |
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|a SPHERE, 3 - 7 , 9 , 11 , 13 , 24 , 47 , 51 - 53 , 55 , 60 , 62 , 140 , 141 , 145 , 146 , 150 , 153 , 154 , 161 , 163 , 188 , 189 , 191 , 192 , 222 , 274 , 287 Q QUALITATIVE, 161 , 169 , 193 , 219 , 259 , 304 ANALYSIS, 146 , 168 , 173 , 175 , 194 , 248 , 250 , 262 , 277 RESEARCH, 41 , 146 , 304 QUANTITATIVE, 161 , 193 , 304 ANALYSIS, 277 RESEARCH, 31 , 41 , 146 R REFERENDUM, 1 , 22 , 28 , 32 , 34 , 55 , 162 , 190 , 218 , 236 , 255 , 286 , 288 - 290 , 304 REPRESENTATION (POLITICAL), 11 , 32 , 46 , 48 , 58 , 59 , 61 - 63 , 72 , 74 , 98 , 161 , 255 , 257 , 259 , 275 , 279 , 298 RHETORICAL QUALITIES, 69 , 70 SCHEME, 69 STRATEGY, 2 , 87 TECHNIQUE, 13 TOPOI, 68 S SALIENCE, 12 , 13 , 23 , 31 - 33 , 40 , 50 , 51 , 58 , 60 , 140 - 142 , 167 , 173 , 174 , 188 , 189 , 191 , 194 , 195 , 213 , 220 , 227 , 302 SALVINI, MATTEO, 4 , 204 , 205 , 281 SANCHEZ, PEDRO, 160 , 165 , 168 - 170 , 172 , 173 , 176 , 177 , 179 SCHMITT, CARL, 71 , 74 , 145 , 163 SCHULZ, MARTIN, 85 , 87 , 140 , 147 , 148 , 164 SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS, 35 , 98 , 106 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 46 SKINNER, QUENTIN, 2 , 68 , 70 , 86 , 88 , 114 - 116 SOCIAL MEDIA, 4 , 10 , 11 , 33 , 40 , 41 , 97 , 113 - 118 , 121 - 126 , 128 - 131 , 133 , 134 , 139 , 140 , 142 , 144 , 146 , 147 , 153 , 154 , 161 , 163 , 164 , 167 , 250 , 253 , 255 , 256 , 297 , 298 , 304 , 305 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 32 , 38 , 52 , 58 , 160 , 163 , 304 SOVEREIGNTY, 4 , 5 , 7 , 10 , 13 , 51 , 57 , 169 , 170 , 172 , 208 , 214 , 219 , 220 , 222 , 224 - 226 , 228 , 230 - 234 , 236 , 237 , 246 , 273 , 274 , 277 , 278 , 282 - 287 , 289 , 297 , 300 SPEAKER (OF PARLIAMENT), 70 , 72 , 82 , 86 , 164 , 225 , 233 , 302 SPEECH ACT, 11 , 41 , 67 , 69 - 71 SPITZENKANDIDATEN , 12 , 140 - 142 , 144 - 154 , 160 , 163 , 171 , 179 , 230 , 299 STORIES, STORYTELLING, 57 , 92 , 201 , 203 , 246 , 249 , 250 , 258 , 276 - 282 , 284 - 286 , 289 314 INDEX SUPRANATIONAL, 4 , 8 , 13 , 51 , 63 , 93 , 95 , 114 , 117 , 134 , 144 , 166 , 188 , 190 , 192 , 194 , 195 , 203 , 210 , 211 , 213 , 214
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| 992 |
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|a 218 , 219 , 222 - 224 , 226 , 229 , 231 - 234 , 236 - 238 , 247 , 274 , 298 , 300 , 302 , 303 SUPRANATIONAL POLITICISATION, 13 , 166 , 218 , 219 , 222 - 224 , 226 , 237 , 238 , 247 , 300 T THUNBERG, GRETA, 38 , 290 TRADE UNIONS, 4 , 34 , 56 , 72 TRANSNATIONAL, 6 , 7 , 12 , 13 , 46 , 51 , 62 , 94 , 96 , 114 , 139 , 140 , 152 , 160 - 162 , 165 , 167 , 171 - 173 , 177 , 189 , 218 , 219 , 224 , 225 , 227 , 229 , 230 , 236 , 237 , 247 , 273 , 275 , 282 , 286 , 299 , 300 , 302 , 304 , 305 TREATY OF LISBON, 217 , 222 TWITTER, 12 , 115 - 118 , 120 - 122 , 124 , 125 , 129 , 130 , 132 - 134 , 140 - 142 , 144 - 152 , 154 , 160 , 161 , 163 , 164 , 166 , 167 , 173 - 178 , 299 TWITTERSPHERE, 11 , 12 , 114 , 116 - 120 , 124 , 126 , 128 , 130 - 134 , 141 , 142 , 145 , 147 - 150 , 152 , 154 , 161 - 164 , 167 , 175 , 179 , 299 V VERHOFSTADT, GUY, 140 , 147 , 149 , 287 VON DER LEYEN, URSULA, 10 , 132 , 140 , 238 W WEBER, MAX, 67 , 70 , 74 , 80
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| 852 |
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|c EG: VII Ad: 426
|m BOOK
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| 999 |
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|a VRH50
|b MPVRH
|c Institutsbibliothek
|d EG: VII Ad: 426
|e unavailable
|t Nicht verfügbar
|f 1
|g 1
|h N
|i 1
|j BIB
|k i
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