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07500nam 2200361 u 4500 |
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t s2016 r ||| eng |
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|a 978-0-19-968039-9
|c Festeinband : £70.00
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|a 0199680396
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|a VR XIV Fc 30
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|a Proulx, Vincent-Joël <<[VerfasserIn]>>
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|a Institutionalizing state responsibility
|b global security and UN organs
|c Vincent-Joël Proulx
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|a First edition
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|a Oxford
|b Oxford University Press
|c 2016, 2016
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| 300 |
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|a xxxii, 361 Seiten
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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|a 1608
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|a toc
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|a Oxford monographs in international law
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|t Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe: Proulx, Vincent-Joël: Institutionalizing state responsibility
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|a VR: XIV Fc
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|a VR: XIV Fc
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|a Staatshaftung. Gesetzgebungsorgan.
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|a VR: XIV Fc
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|u http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz452112869inh.pdf
|3 ToC
|m Völkerrecht Heidelberg
|z VIEW
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|a CONTENTS TABLE OF CASES XIX TABLE OF LEGISLATION XXIII ABBREVIATIONS XXXI INTRODUCTION 1 A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 1 B. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 6 PART I THE ROLE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FACE OF GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS: UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS, CHALLENGES, AND SHORTCOMINGS INTRODUCTION TO PART I 11 1. CROSSING THE CONCEPTUAL RUBICON: UNDERSTANDING SECONDARY NORMS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 13 1.1 THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY: CODIFICATION, ATTRIBUTION, AND SECONDARY NORMS 13 1.2 THE ILC'S ARSIWA AND THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIVIDE 18 1.2.1 THE MECHANICS OF THE ARSIWA 20 1.2.2 THE PROBLEMS OF AUTOQUALIFICATION AND SELF-JUDGING 27 1.3 THE LOADED NOTION OF ATTRIBUTION' AND NICARAGUA'S LEGACY: MERGING STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND USE OF FORCE REPERTOIRE 29 1.4 CONCLUSION: THE EVOLUTION OF STATE PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS 37 2. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE LIGHT OF UNFORESEEN TRANSNATIONAL PHENOMENA 39 2.1 INTRODUCTION 39 2.2 THE PROBLEM OF STATE SUPPORT OF TERRORISM 41 2.3 THE IMPACT OF 9/11: CONFLATION OF USE OF FORCE REPERTOIRE WITH STATE RESPONSIBILITY 44 2.4 OTHER GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS: THE LIMITS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 48 2.4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, GLOBAL WARMING, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 49 2.4.2 RISK ASSESSMENT AND PRECAUTIONARY APPROACHES 56 2.4.3 UNGOVERNED SPACES AND TERRITORIES 63 2.4.4 CYBERTERRORISM 66 CONCLUSION TO PART I 73 XVI CONTENTS PART II IMPLEMENTING STATE RESPONSIBILITY AFTER 9/11: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES INTRODUCTION TO PART II 77 3. ADVANCING STATE RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH UN INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS 83 3.1 ASSESSING EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS IN IMPLEMENTING STATE RESPONSIBILITY 84 3.1.1 THE DEBATE OVER INSTITUTIONALIZED IMPLEMENTATION: SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES 84 3.1.2 FAIRNESS IN IMPLEMENTATION: AN OVERARCHING CONCERN 93 3.1.3 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 96 3.1.3.1 SUBSTANTIVE FORAYS INTO STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ICJ AS 'LEGISLATOR' 98 3.1.3.2 JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS 104
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|a 3.1.3.3 THE COURT AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 110 3.1.3.4 CONCLUSION: A LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR POLITICAL DECISIONS 113 3.1.4 THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 114 3.1.4.1 INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 115 3.1.4.2 TOWARDS A SUPPORTIVE ROLE 117 3.1.5 THE SECURITY COUNCIL 118 3.1.5.1 PROSPECTS AND LIMITS 119 3.1.5.2 THE COUNCIL'S'QUASI-JUDICIAL'EXERCISE OF POWERS 126 3.2 POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ICJ AND SECURITY COUNCIL 136 3.2.1 THE JUDICIAL REVIEW QUESTION 136 3.2.1.1 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 138 3.2.1.2 OTHER TRIBUNALS 141 3.2.2 FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP AND SURROUNDING ISSUES: TOWARDS COMPLEMENTARY ROLES FOR THE COUNCIL AND ICJ 143 3.2.3 LISPENDENS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY 148 3.3 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS LEGISLATOR AND IMPLEMENTER 151 4. INSTITUTIONALIZING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN COUNTERTERRORISM CONTEXTS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 155 4.1 INTRODUCTION 155 4.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY NORMS: COUNTERMEASURES, RECIPROCITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 4.2.1 INTER-STATE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS: COUNTERMEASURES AS THE CLASSIC REMEDY 167 4.2.2 THE LIMITS OF RECIPROCITY: MOVING AWAY FROM DECENTRALIZED AND UNILATERAL REMEDIES 173 4.2.3 MOVING BEYOND THE 'POLITICAL V LEGAL' DIVIDE: RESISTING OVERLY RIGID DICHOTOMIES 178 4.3 CHAPTER VII POWERS 187 CONTENTS XVII 4.4 THE EXTENT OF COUNCIL PRACTICE 190 4.4.1 PROTECTION OF COLLECTIVE INTERESTS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 192 4.4.2 THE CESSATION OF INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL CONDUCT 195 4.4.3 OBLIGATION OF REPARATION AND RETURN TO LEGALITY UNDER CHAPTER VII 200 4.4.4 OBLIGATION OF REPARATION AND RETURN TO LEGALITY OUTSIDE THE CHAPTER VII FRAMEWORK 205 4.4.5 SATISFACTION, GUARANTEES, AND ASSURANCES OF NON-REPETITION 211 4.4.6 OBLIGATION OF NON-RECOGNITION OF THIRD STATES AND THE DUTY TO COOPERATE 214 4.4.7 TOWARDS STRICTER SANCTIONS IN GLOBAL SECURITY: COUNTERTERRORISM
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|a AND BEYOND 217 4.4.8 TOWARDS A BROADER REMEDIAL SCHEME: FORCIBLE COUNTERMEASURES AND BEYOND 219 4.4.9 SCHOLARLY REACTIONS AND DEBATES 221 4.5 DETERMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SURROUNDING ISSUES 223 4.5.1 MOVING BEYOND THE 'POLITICAL V LEGAL' DIVIDE: THE COUNCIL AS IMPLEMENTER 223 4.5.2 THE COUNCIL'S APPLICATION OF ATTRIBUTION AND RESPONSIBILITY MECHANICS 243 4.6 ELUCIDATING THE RELATIONSHIP: IDENTIFYING COMMONALITIES 248 4.6.1 EXPANDING CHAPTER VII TO INCLUDE STATE RESPONSIBILITY 248 4.6.2 THE COUNCIL'S POWERS IN RELATION TO SECONDARY NORMS 250 4.6.3 THE RIGHTS OF STATES VIS-A-VIS IMPLEMENTATION NOTWITHSTANDING COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT 254 4.6.4 A STRADDLING OF OBJECTIVES: THE SUI GENERIS CASE OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY 257 CONCLUSION TO PART II 261 PART III STATE RESPONSIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTION IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY SCHEME: FORCIBLE COUNTERMEASURES, RECOURSE TO FORCE, AND THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK INTRODUCTION TO PART III 271 5. DRAWING ON SELF-CONTAINED REGIMES: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE USE OF FORCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 279 5.1 INTRODUCTION 279 5.2 KEEPING STATE RESPONSIBILITY LAW INSULATED: JUST HOW SELF- CONTAINED IS THE RECOURSE TO FORCE LEGAL SCHEME? 280 5.2.1 THE ARSIWA AND USE OF FORCE 280 5.2.2 POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS DERIVED FROM STATE AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 283 5.2.3 INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES: THE ILC, ICJ, AND SECURITY COUNCIL 289 5.2.4 THE SHIFT TO INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERRORISM 293 5.3 CONCLUSION: THE CONTROVERSIAL REMEDY OF FORCIBLE COUNTERMEASURES 298 XVIII CONTENTS 6. PLEASE KILL RESPONSIBLY: COUNTERACTING GLOBAL SECURITY VIOLATIONS WITH FORCE 303 6.1 INTRODUCTION: NEXT STEPS IN FURTHER DEFINING STATE RESPONSIBILITY 303 6.2 THE ROLE OF SELF-DEFENCE IN THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE COUNTERTERRORISM CONTEXT 304 6.2.1 SELF-DEFENCE AS A COUNTERMEASURE 304 6.2.2 BYPASSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL: PARALLEL COLLECTIVE (COUNTER) MEASURES AND THEIR LIMITS 307
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|a 6.2.3 RECOURSE TO FORCE IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 317 6.2.4 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AS A BASIS FOR INVOKING SELF-DEFENCE 326 6.2.5 CONCLUDING REMARK ON SELF-DEFENCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 333 6.3 A RESEARCH AND POLICY PROSPECTUS FOR THE FUTURE: GUIDELINES AND BUILDING BLOCKS 338 CONCLUSION TO PART III 343 CONCLUSION 347 INDEX 353
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|c VR: XIV Fc: 30
|m BOOK
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|a VRH50
|b MPVRH
|c Institutsbibliothek
|d VR: XIV Fc: 30
|e available
|t Verfügbar
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|h N
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