Reforming the European Union : realizing the impossible
| Published: | Princeton, NJ [u.a.] : Princeton Univ. Press, 2012 |
|---|---|
| Persons: | , , , |
| Format: | Book / Printed Book |
| Language: | English |
| Physical description: | XVI, 227 S. : graph. Darst. |
| Item Description: |
Literaturverz. S. [209] - 219 |
| ISBN: | 9780691153933 9780691153926 |
| LEADER | 05513nam 2200445 u 4500 | ||
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| 003 | VRH01000000000000000898253 | ||
| 008 | t s2012 r ||| eng | ||
| 007 | tu||||||||||||||||||||| | ||
| 020 | |a 0-691-15393-0 |c (pbk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 978-0-691-15393-3 |c : (pbk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 978-0-691-15392-6 |c (hbk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 0691153922 | ||
| 090 | |a EG V Cac 224 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Finke, Daniel | |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Reforming the European Union |b realizing the impossible |c Daniel Finke ... |
| 260 | |a Princeton, NJ [u.a.] |b Princeton Univ. Press |c 2012, 2012 | ||
| 300 | |a XVI, 227 S. : graph. Darst. | ||
| 520 | |a " For decades the European Union tried changing its institutions, but achieved only unsatisfying political compromises and modest, incremental treaty revisions. In late 2009, however, the EU was successfully reformed through the Treaty of Lisbon. Reforming the European Union examines how political leaders ratified this treaty against all odds and shows how this victory involved all stages of treaty reform negotiations--from the initial proposal to referendums in several European countries. The authors emphasize the strategic role of political leadership and domestic politics, and they use state-of-the-art methodology, applying a comprehensive data set for actors' reform preferences. They look at how political leaders reacted to apparent failures of the process by recreating or changing the rules of the game. While domestic actors played a significant role in the process, their influence over the outcome was limited as leaders ignored negative referendums and plowed ahead with intended reforms. The book's empirical analyses shed light on critical episodes: strategic agenda setting during the European Convention, the choice of ratification instrument, intergovernmental bargaining dynamics, and the reaction of the German Council presidency to the negative referendums in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland. "-- | ||
| 655 | |a Aufsatzsammlung | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a König, Thomas | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Proksch, Sven-Oliver | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tsebelis, George | |
| 041 | 0 | 7 | |a eng |2 ISO 639-2 |
| 993 | |a 1304 | ||
| 993 | |a toc | ||
| 993 | |a 1301bb | ||
| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. [209] - 219 | ||
| 024 | 8 | |a 9780691153933 | |
| 024 | 3 | |a 9780691153933 | |
| 084 | |a EG: V Cac | ||
| 084 | |a VR 33.2 | ||
| 998 | |a EG: V Cac | ||
| 998 | |a Europarecht: Gesamtdarstellung in englischer Sprache. | ||
| 998 | |a EG: V Cac | ||
| 856 | |u https://aleph.mpg.de:443/F?func=service&doc_library=VRH01&local_base=VRH01&doc_number=000898253&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 ToC |m Völkerrecht Heidelberg |z VIEW | ||
| 992 | |a IMAGE 1 CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XI XIII XV INTRODUCTION CHAPTERONE: FROM THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION TO THE LISBON AGREEMENT AND BEYOND: A VETO PLAYER ANALYSIS BY GEORGE TSEBELIS 28 1.1 JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 32 1.2 VETO PLAYERS AND THEIR POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 38 1.3 A QUALIFIED MAJORITY IN THE COUNCIL: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES IT IMPEDE DECISION MAKING? 45 1.4 BATTLES OVER THE "DEFAULT SOLUTION" 54 1.5 CONCLUSION 60 CHAPTER TWO: REVEALING CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCES IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION BY SVEN-OLIVER PROKSCH 62 2.1 REVEALING PREFERENCES: COSPONSORSHIP OF AMENDMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 64 2.2 DATA AND METHOD 68 2.3 RESULTS: GISCARD'S CENTRAL POSITION WITHIN THE CONFLICT SPACE 70 2.4 CONCLUSION 75 CHAPTERTHREE:THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION BY GEORGE TSEBELIS AND SVEN-OLIVER PROKSCH 76 3.1 LIMITING THE NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS 78 3.2 SHAPING AMENDMENTS 88 3.3 THE ABSENCE OF VOTING 94 3.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 95 APPENDIX 3A 97 APPENDIX 3B 99 IMAGE 2 VIII * CONTENTS F . . ON THE REFORM CHAPTER FOUR: ACTOR AND POSITIONS THE TREATY OF NICE BY THOMAS KOENIG AND DANIEL FINKE CONVENTION TO 4.1 THE PROCESS OF REFORM: FROM THE THE RATIFICATION STAGE 4.2 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPACE AND THE LOCATION OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS' POSITIONS 4.3 OTHER ACTORS AND THE COHESIVENESS OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS' POSITIONS 4.4 REPRESENTING AND DELEGATING THE POSITION OF POLITICAL LEADERS 4.5 THE RATIFIERS: MEDIAN VOTERS AND POLITICAL PARTIES 4.6 SUMMARY VOTES ANNOUNCE POPULAR CHAPTER FIVE: WHY (UNPOPULAR) LEADERS BY THOMAS KOENIG AND DANIEL FINKE 5.1 POLITICAL LEADERS AND THEIR ANNOUNCEMENTS OF REFERENDUMS 5.2 RATIFICATION HURDLES IN EACH COUNTRY 5.3 DECISIONS ALONG THE RATIFICATION PATH: A STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION 5.4 THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REFERENDUM ANNOUNCEMENTS 5.5 FROM ANNOUNCING REFERENDUMS TO A REFLECTION PERIOD AND REFORM CRISIS | ||
| 992 | |a CHAPTER SIX: PRINCIPLAS AND AGENTS: FROM THE CONVENTION'S PROPOSAL TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY BY THOMAS KOENIG AND DANIEL FINKE 6.1 THE SETUP FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL BARGAINING 6.2 THE REACTION TO FAILURE: DELEGATING THE NEGOTIATION MANDATE 6.3 HOW DRIFTING AGENTS ENABLED A DISAGREEABLE COMPROMISE 6.4 FROM COMPROMISING AGENTS TO THE DEFEAT BY THE VOTE OF THE IRISH CHAPTER SEVEN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NEGATIVE REFERENDUMS: THE IRISH RESISTANCE BY THOMAS KOENIG AND DANIEL FINKE 7.1 THE STRATEGY OF THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY 7.2 MODERATE BUT WELL-DIRECTED CONCESSIONS 7 3 FROM TREATY REFORM TO CONSTITUTION BUILDING, AND BACK 103 107 111 116 120 125 127 129 132 134 137 142 147 151 154 158 160 166 170 173 177 184 IMAGE 3 | ||
| 852 | |c EG: V Cac: 224 |m BOOK | ||
| 999 | |a VRH50 |b MPVRH |c Institutsbibliothek |d EG: V Cac: 224 |e available |t Verfügbar |f 1 |g 0 |h N |i 3 |j BIB |k i | ||