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|a 90-411-3829-3
|c cloth : alk. paper
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|a 978-90-411-3829-3
|c : cloth : alk. paper
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|a EG XIV F 43
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|a Ibañez Colomo, Pablo
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|a European communications law and technological convergence
|b deregulation, re-regulation and regulatory convergence in television and telecommunications
|c Pablo Ibáñez Colomo
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|a Alphen aan den Rijn [u.a.]
|b Wolters Kluwer
|c 2012, 2012
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|a XXVIII, 315 S. : graph. Darst.
|c 25 cm
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|a Zugl.: Florence, Europ. Univ. Inst., Diss., 2010
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|a Hochschulschrift
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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|a ToC
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|a 1209
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|a 1207bb
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|a European monographs
|v 78
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|a VR000056392
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|a Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph.D.)--European University Institute, 2010
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|a 5550: KABV/sred
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|a 9789041138293
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|a 9789041138293
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|a EG: XIV F
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|a VR 33.16
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|a VR 33.17
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|a EG: XIV F
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|a Postrecht. Fernmelderecht.
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|a EG: XIV F
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|a Colomo, Pablo Ibañez
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|a Ibañez Colomo, P.
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|a Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo
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|u http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz358907187inh.pdf
|3 ToC
|m Völkerrecht Heidelberg
|z VIEW
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|a IMAGE 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XIX LIST OF TABLES XXI LIST OF FIGURES XXIII FOREWORD BY J O A Q U IN A L M U N IA XXV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XXVII PARTI THE MULTIPLICATION OF REGULATORY REGIMES IN COMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 1 CHAPTER 1 TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON TELEVISION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3 1. TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AS AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS: FEATURES AND MAIN STAGES 4 1.1. CONVERGENCE AT THE LEVEL OF NETWORKS DURING THE 1960S THROUGH THE 1980S 5 1.1.1. THE EMERGENCE OF CABLE TELEVISION DURING THE 1960S AND THE 1970S 5 1.1.2. THE USE OF TERRESTRIAL NETWORKS FOR THE PROVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 6 1.2. THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES ON TELEVISION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE 1980S AND 1990S 7 1.2.1. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 7 IMAGE 2 1.2.2. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND TELEVISION SERVICES 7 1.2.3. INTERNET: A VIRTUAL NETWORK ON TOP OF PHYSICAL NETWORKS 8 1.3. LAST FRONTIERS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 9 2. TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE: MUTATIONS IN THE TELEVISION AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS 11 2.1. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE ON THE VALUE CHAIN 11 2.1.1. IMPACT ON THE TELEVISION VALUE CHAIN 11 2.1.2. IMPACT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS VALUE CHAIN 14 2.2. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS IN LEGACY REGULATION 14 2.2.1. FROM CHANNEL SCARCITY TOWARDS CONTENT SCARCITY 14 2.2.2. DIVERSITY OF CONTENT AND VIEWPOINTS 15 2.2.3. CONSUMER PREFERENCES, DEMAND ELASTICITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE ~ 16 2.2.4. FROM THE EXPLOITATION OF MARKET POWER TOWARDS THE CONTROL OF EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 18 3. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 19 3.1. TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE LEADS TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN REGIMES 19 3.1.1. TOOLS, OBJECTIVES AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 19 3.1.2. -COMPFITITIORLLAW AS-A SOURCE OF REGULATION- 21 3.2. ELEMENTS OF A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING REGULATION 22
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|a 3.3. TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AND THE REGULATION OF BOTTLENECKS 23 3.3.1. THE NOTION OF BOTTLENECK 23 3.3.2. REGULATORY APPROACHES TO BOTTLENECKS 24 3.4. A NOTE ON VOCABULARY 27 3.4.1. TECHNICAL VOCABULARY 27 3.4.2. VOCABULARY USED IN THE SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 29 CHAPTER 2 LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION: A DEFENSIVE REACTION TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 31 1. THE LEGACY MODEL 31 1.1. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 31 1.2. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN JUSTIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIVES 34 1.2.1. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE LEGACY REGIME 34 1.2.2. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS INFORMING INTERVENTION 35 1.2.3. OBJECTIVES AS JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE PERPETUATION OF LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION 36 IMAGE 3 1.3. MAIN FEATURES OF LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION 37 1.3.1. PLURALISM AS A PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE IN LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION 37 1.3.2. 'TAXATION BY REGULATION' IN TELEVISION 41 2. A DEFENSIVE REACTION TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE: MAIN FEATURES 42 2.1. COORDINATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 43 2.1.1. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE T V WF DIRECTIVE 43 2.1.2. ELEVATING TOOLS OF LEGACY REGULATION AT THE EU LEVEL 44 2.2. THE EXTENSION OF LEGACY REGULATION TO NEW PLAYERS AND TECHNOLOGIES 45 2.2.1. THE EXTENSION OF LEGACY REGULATION TO NON-TERRESTRIAL CHANNELS 45 2.2.2. THE EXTENSION OF LEGACY REGULATION TO POINT-TO-POINT ON-DEMAND SERVICES 47 2.3. THE PROTECTION OF THE LEGACY MARKET STRUCTURE 48 2.3.1. THE PROTECTION OF INCUMBENT OPERATORS THROUGH 'MUST-CARRY' 49 2.3.2. THE PROTECTION OF TERRESTRIAL TELEVISION 50 2.3.3. THE PROTECTION OF 'FREE TELEVISION' 51 2.4. CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFENSIVE REACTION TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 53 CHAPTER 3 ... THE RISE OF COMPETITION LAW AS A SOURCE OF TELEVISION REGULATION 57 1. BACKGROUND 57 1.1. EMERGING ISSUES HAVE LARGELY BEEN IGNORED IN TELEVISION REGULATION 57 1.2. REGULATORY OUTCOMES MAY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COMPETITION LAW 58 2. ON THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW AS REGULATION: DEFINING THE
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|a TERMS OF THE CONTROVERSY 59 2.1. COMPETITION LAW CAN MIMIC REGULATION 59 2.1.1. THE NEED FOR A BEHAVIOURAL TRIGGER IN PRACTICE 60 2.1.2. EX A N TE INTERVENTION IS A TYPICAL FEATURE OF COMPETITION LAW 62 2.1.3. COMPETITION LAW BECOMES PRESCRIPTIVE IN PRESENCE OF A BOTTLENECK SEGMENT 66 2.2. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW AS REGULATION 69 2.2.1. STANDARDS AND TIMING OF INTERVENTION 73 2.2.2. COMPETITION LAW AND RIVALRY BIAS 74 2.2.3. THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW 76 3. COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT AROUND THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 78 3.1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 78 IMAGE 4 3.1.1. TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 78 3.1.2. THE MONOPOLIZATION OF THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 80 3.1.3. BUSINESS MODELS AND THE EXTENT OF THE PREMIUM CONTENT MONOPOLY 83 3.2. DEALING WITH THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 86 3.2.1. O P E N I NG THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK IN A C Q U I S I T I ON M A R K E TS 87 3.2.1.1. EXCLUSIVE LICENSES UNDER ARTICLE 101(1) T F E U: THE PRINCIPLES OF CODITEL II 87 3.2.1.2. SHARING THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK UNDER ARTICLE 101 T F EU 90 3.2.1.3. OPENING THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK IN MERGER CASES 96 3.2.1.4. BEYOND COMPETITION LAW: EXPLICIT REGULATORY APPROACHES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 98 3.2.2. I S O L A T I NG THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK IN R E X P L O I T A T I ON M A R K E TS 100 3.2.2.1. DEALING WITH THE COLLAPSE OF RIVALRY IN THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 100 3.2.2.2. THE CONSOLIDATION OF 'TRIPLE PLAY': THE RESPONSE FROM COMPETITION LAW 103 3.2.2.3. BEYOND COMPETITION LAW: EXPLICIT REGULATORY APPROACHES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 104 CHAPTER 4 TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AND THE REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITS OF RE-REGULATORY REFORMS 109 1. REGULATORY REACTION TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 109 1.1. MAIN FEATURES OF LEGACY SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 109 1.2. THE RATIONALE BEHIND DEREGULATION 110
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|a 1.3. MAIN FEATURES OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 112 1.3.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 113 1.3.2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES BEHIND INTERVENTION 115 2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROMOTION OF COMPETITION IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 117 2.1. ARCHITECTURE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 117 2.1.1. JUSTIFICATIONS BEHIND THE CREATION OF AN AD HOC REGIME 117 2.1.2. A FORM OF COMPETITION LAW WITH A STRUCTURAL TRIGGER 118 2.2. MARKET SELECTION AND MARKET DEFINITION 119 2.2.1. THE 'THREE CRITERIA TEST' AS A STRUCTURAL TRIGGER 119 2.2.2. MARKET DEFINITION AND SMP ASSESSMENT 121 IMAGE 5 2.2.3. PRESUMPTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE IN DOWNSTREAM MARKETS 122 2.2.3.1. THE 'THREE CRITERIA TEST' AS A RESPONSE TO ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE 122 2.2.3.2. ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE AND IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS IN THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 123 2.3. REMEDIES 124 2.3.1. OPENING THE LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOTTLENECK TO COMPETITION BY LIMITING ITS SCOPE 124 2.3.2. MEASURES COMPLEMENTING BOTTLENECK ACCESS 125 3. TELEVISION NETWORKS AND TELEVISION CONTENT UNDER THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 127 3.1. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 128 3.1.1. 'ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES' 128 3.1.2. 'ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS' 129 3.1.3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 131 3.2. THE LINKS BETWEEN TELEVISION AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 133 3.2.1. CONFLICTS BETWEEN NATIONAL TELEVISION REGULATION AND THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 134 3.2.2. ADJUSTING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO MEET PLURALISM OBJECTIVES 137 3.3. SMP ASSESSMENT IN TELEVISION-RELATED MARKETS 139 3.3.1. 'MARKET 18' IN THE 2003 RECOMMENDATION 139 3.3.1.1. THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF'MARKET 18' 139 3.3.1.2. THE POSITION ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 140 3.3.1.3. THE FUTURE OF'MARKET 18' 141 3.3.2. OTHER MARKETS 142 CHAPTER 5 THE EMERGENCE OF 'CONFLICT POINTS' BETWEEN REGIMES 145
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|a 1. THE OUTCOME OF TWO CONFLICTING RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 145 1.1. TWO CONFLICTING RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 145 1.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MULTIPLICATION OF REGULATORY REGIMES 146 1.2.1. THE EMERGENCE OF THREE SOURCES OF REGULATION ACROSS THE COMMUNICATIONS VALUE CHAIN 146 1.2.2. THE RECOURSE TO DIFFERENT REGULATORY TECHNIQUES 148 1.2.2.1. ASSUMPTIONS IN REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE SECTOR 148 1.2.2.2. PRESUMPTIONS IN REGULATION: ANALYSIS OF THE EXPECTED BEHAVIOUR 149 IMAGE 6 1.2.3. FURTHERING DIVERGING OBJECTIVES 150 2. TOWARDS A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: DEALING WITH 'CONFLICT POINTS' BETWEEN REGIMES 150 2.1. UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF TOOLS AND CONFLICTS OF OBJECTIVES ACROSS THE VALUE CHAIN 150 2.2. CONFLICTS OF TOOLS AROUND THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 151 2.3. CONFLICTS OF OBJECTIVES AND THE EXPLOITATION OF TELEVISION CHANNELS 152 2.4. CONFLICTS OF TOOLS AND ACCESS BY CHANNELS TO NETWORKS AND MULTICHANNEL SERVICES 156 PART II AN ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORY CHOICES IN 'CONFLICT POINTS' BETWEEN REGIMES 159 CHAPTER 6 THE ACQUISITION AND THE EXPLOITATION OF TELEVISION RIGHTS: COMPETITION LAW AND RIVALRY BIAS 161 1. DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKING 161 1.1. EXPLAINING THE EXCLUSIVE AND NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF TELEVISION RIGHTS 163 1.1.1. INCENTIVES TO LICENSE ON AN EXCLUSIVE AND A NON-EXCLUSIVE BASIS 163 1.1.2. -IMPLIEAT-ION*-LOR~-POLIEY-MAKING 164 1.2. SHARING THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 164 1.2.1. BEHAVIOURAL TRIGGERS AND THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY 164 1.2.2. THE TENDENCY OF THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK TOWARDS MONOPOLY 165 2. PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION UNDER COMPETITION LAW 165 2.1. AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITION LAW CONCERNS 166 2.1.1. PRICE-FIXING 166 2.1.1.1. JOINT SELLING AS PART OF A BROADER AGREEMENT 168 2.1.1.2. JOINT SELLING, PRICE-FIXING AND TRANSACTION COSTS 170 2.1.2. OUTPUT RESTRICTIONS 173
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|a 2.1.3. 'CROSS-PLATFORM' BUNDLING 174 2.1.4. ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE 175 2.1.4.1. MARKET DEFINITION AND FORECLOSURE ASSESSMENT 176 2.1.4.2. LACK OF FORECLOSURE ASSESSMENT 177 2.1.4.3. THE LINK BETWEEN FORECLOSURE AND REMEDIES 178 2.2. AN ASSESSMENT OF REMEDIES: EFFECTIVENESS AND FEASIBILITY 180 2.2.1. REMEDIES PRESERVING COMPETITION 'FOR' THE MARKET IN ACQUISITION MARKETS 180 IMAGE 7 2.2.2. REMEDIES OPENING THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK 181 2.2.2.1. SHARING THE BOTTLENECK THROUGH SALE IN PACKAGES: A FAILED REMEDY 181 2.2.2.2. THE DUBIOUS PERTINENCE OF THE 'SINGLE BUYER RULE' 182 2.2.3. TREATING THE PREMIUM CONTENT BOTTLENECK AS 'COMMONS': A REMEDY FOR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 183 3. RECONSIDERING INTERVENTION UNDER COMPETITION LAW 184 3.1. COMPETITION 'FOR' THE MARKET IS THE VALID EXPRESSION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS IN ACQUISITION MARKETS 185 3.1.1. REMEDIES TO PRESERVE COMPETITION 'FOR' THE MARKET IN ACQUISITION MARKETS 185 3.1.2. FORECLOSURE CONCERNS IN NEIGHBOURING MARKETS DO NOT JUSTIFY THAT THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS IN ACQUISITION MARKETS IS ALTERED 186 3.2. ADJUSTING INTERVENTION UNDER ARTICLE 101 T F EU 187 3.2.1. ASSESSING RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION: HORIZONTAL ISSUES 187 3.2.1.1. MARKET POWER: A CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE ASSESSMENT 188 3.2.1.2. RULES OF 'PURELY SPORTING INTEREST' AND COMPETITION LAW 189 3.2.2. ASSESSING RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION: VERTICAL ISSUES 191 3.2.2.1. EXCLUSIVE LICENSING AND THE FORECLOSURE OF GENERALIST ADVERTISING-BASED CHANNELS 192 3.2.2.2. EXCLUSIVE LICENSING AND THE FORECLOSURE OF PREMIUM TELEVISION OPERATORS 193 3.2.2.3. EXCLUSIVE LICENSING AND RETAIL FORECLOSURE 193 CHAPTER 7 THE EXPLOITATION OF TELEVISION CHANNELS: THE LIMITS OF THE 'LOGIC OF FORECLOSURE' 195 1. DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKING 195 1.1. EXPLAINING THE EXCLUSIVE AND NON-EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY OF TELEVISION CHANNELS 197
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|a 1.1.1. INCENTIVES TO SUPPLY: A STATIC PERSPECTIVE 197 1.1.1.1. GENERALITIES 197 1.1.1.2. IMPACT OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON THE INCENTIVES TO SUPPLY 198 1.1.2. INCENTIVES TO SUPPLY AND DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS 199 1.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKING 200 1.2.1. INTERVENTION IN EXPLOITATION MARKETS VERSUS INTERVENTION IN ACQUISITION MARKETS 200 1.2.2. MANDATED SHARED ACCESS AND THE NATURE OF EXPLOITATION MARKETS 200 IMAGE 8 1.2.3. WELFARE EFFECTS AND STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION 201 2. PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION UNDER COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 202 2.1. MAKING SENSE OF THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE 'LOGIC OF FORECLOSURE' 202 2.2. AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITION LAW CONCERNS 203 2.2.1. EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY OF CHANNELS UNDER ARTICLES 101 AND 102 T F EU 203 2.2.1.1. QUALITATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CHANNELS AND ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE UNDER ARTICLE 101 T F E U: T E L E N O R / C A N A L + Z C A N AL D I G I T AL 204 2.2.1.2. QUANTITATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CHANNELS AND ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE UNDER ARTICLE 101 T F EU 204 2.2.2. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND DOWNSTREAM FORECLOSURE 205 2.2.2.1. ABILITY TO FORECLOSE 205 2.2.2.2. INCENTIVE TO FORECLOSE 206 2.2.2.3. ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVE IMPACT OF THE OPERATION 206 2.2.3. LEVERAGING UNDER ARTICLE 102 T F EU 208 2.2.3.1. OUTRIGHT AND CONSTRUCTIVE REFUSALS TO SUPPLY 208 2.2.3.2. SECONDARY-LINE DISCRIMINATION 211 2.2.3.3. TYING AND BUNDLING 212 2.3. TOWARDS4HE 'LOGIC-OF-REPLICATION' 214 2.3.1. THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW 214 2.3.2. THE RECOURSE TO 'PARA-COMPETITION LAW' 216 2.3.3. THE ADOPTION OF AD HOC REGIMES COMPLEMENTING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 218 2.3.3.1. OFCOM'S REGULATION OF WHOLESALE ACCESS TO PREMIUM CONTENT 218 2.3.3.2. THE REGULATORY REGIME ADVISED BY THE AUTORITE DE LA C O N C U R R E N CE 220 3. RECONSIDERING INTERVENTION UNDER COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 221 3.1. CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW AND THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 221
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|a 3.2. ADJUSTING REGULATORY INTERVENTION 223 CHAPTER 8 ACCESS BY CHANNEL OPERATORS TO NETWORKS AND MULTICHANNEL DISTRIBUTORS: DISTINGUISHING TOOLS AND OBJECTIVES 225 1. DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKING 227 IMAGE 9 1.1. ABILITY AND INCENTIVE TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST UNAFFILIATED CHANNEL OPERATORS 227 1.1.1. MARKET FEATURES HAVING AN IMPACT ON INCENTIVES TO CARRY " 227 1.1.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKING 228 1.1.2.1. STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION UNDER COMPETITION LAW 228 1.1.2.2. STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION UNDER LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION 229 1.1.2.3. STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION UNDER THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 230 1.2. SHAPING CARRIAGE OBLIGATIONS 230 1.2.1. THE AWARD OF REGULATORY PRIVILEGES: 'MUST-CARRY' 230 1.2.1.1. A ' P U B L IC UTILITY'APPROACH 231 1.2.1.2. A'UNIVERSAL SERVICE'APPROACH 231 1.2.2. THE LOGIC OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THIRD-PARTY ACCESS 232 1.2.2.1. RESERVING TRANSMISSION CAPACITY FOR THIRD PARTIES ' 232 1.2.2.2. F R A ND CONDITIONS 233 PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION UNDER SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 233 2.1. REGULATORY PRIVILEGES UNDER EU LAW 234 2.1.1. 'MUST-CARRY' UNDER PRIMARY-EULAWAND THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 234 2.1.1.1. PRINCIPLES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 'MUST-CARRY': U N I T ED P A N - E U R O PE C O M M U N I C A T I O NS 234 2.1.1.2. AVOIDING THE PRINCIPLES: K A B EL D E U T S C H L A ND 236 2.1.2. 'MUST-CARRY' AND ARTICLE 106(2) T F EU 237 2.2. THE MULTIPLICATION OF REGIMES AND TOOLS: THE LIMITS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 239 2.2.1. THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE HARMONIZATION OF 'MUST-CARRY' 239 2.2.2. THE INADEQUACY OF SMP AS A STRUCTURAL TRIGGER 240 RECONSIDERING INTERVENTION UNDER SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 241 3.1. THE ENDORSEMENT OF PLURALISM AND THE DEMISE OF LEGACY TOOLS 241 3.1.1. PLURALISM AS AN OVERARCHING OBJECTIVE 241
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|a 3.1.2. THE DEMISE OF THE 'PUBLIC UTILITY' APPROACH TO 'MUST-CARRY' 242 3.2. ADJUSTING EXISTING RULES TO MEET PLURALISM OBJECTIVES 243 3.2.1. DEFINING RULES AROUND TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 243 3.2.2. OTHER REGULATORY MECHANISMS 244 IMAGE 10 CHAPTER 9 REASSESSING THE ROLE AND SCOPE OF REGULATORY REGIMES 247 1. THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW AS REGULATION: A CRITICAL SUMMARY 249 1.1. VULNERABILITIES OF COMPETITION LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 249 1.1.1. THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPLEX ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES UNDER COMPETITION LAW 249 1.1.1.1. PERSISTENT BIASES IN THE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 249 1.1.1.2. REGULATORY CHOICES UNDER COMPETITION LAW 251 1.1.2. CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT UNDER COMPETITION LAW 251 1.1.2.1. ALTERING THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS TO ACCOMMODATE RIVALRY 252 1.1.2.2. THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW IN MARKET STRUCTURES ARTIFICIALLY CREATED THROUGH REGULATION 254 1.1.2.3. INFLUENCING THE EVOLUTION OF A SECTOR 255 1.2. VULNERABILITIES OF COMPETITION LAW: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 256 1.2.1. THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 256 1.2.1.1. THE COMBINATION OF THE INSTRUCTION AND THE ADJUDICATION FUNCTIONS IN AN AUTHORITY 256 1.2.1.2. POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND EXPECTED STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION 257 1.2.1.3. THE LIMITED SCOPE FOR THE RE-EXAMINATION OF THE PRACTICES 259 1.2.2. COMPETITION LAW AS REGULATION AND ITS UNIFORM APPLICATION ACROSS THE EU 260 1.2.2.1. THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW UNDER REGULATION 1/2003 260 1.2.2.2. THE ADOPTION OF EXPLICIT REGULATORY REGIMES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 261 2. THE LIMITS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: TOWARDS VERTICAL REGULATORY CONVERGENCE 262 2.1. FLAWS IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 263 2.1.1. THE EXCLUSION OF TELEVISION CONTENT FROM THE SCOPE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 263 2.1.1.1. THE CONTENT/NETWORK DIVIDE AND THE VALUE CHAIN IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 263
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|a 2.1.1.2. THE SCOPE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND COMPETITION IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 264 2.1.2. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 266 2.1.2.1. THE CONFUSION BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVES AND THE OUTCOMES OF REGULATION 266 IMAGE 11 2.1.2.2. TELEVISION-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 267 2.2. MATCHING REGULATION AND MARKET REALITY 268 2.2.1. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: FOCUS ON THE OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION 268 2.2.1.1. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF REGULATION TO MEET THE REALITY OF THE MARKET 268 2.2.1.2. REFINING THE TOOLS 270 2.2.2. THE CASE FOR EU HARMONIZATION 272 3. DEFINING THE RESPECTIVE SCOPE OF LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION AND THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 274 3.1. THE FUTURE OF LEGACY TELEVISION REGULATION 274 3.2. MANAGING THE SUBSTANTIVE OVERLAP WITH THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 275 BIBLIOGRAPHY 279 TABLE OF CASES 299 INDEX 305
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|c EG: XIV F: 43
|m BOOK
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|d EG: XIV F: 43
|e available
|t Verfügbar
|f 1
|g 0
|h N
|i 2
|j BIB
|k i
|
