Structure and effects in EU competition law : studies on exclusionary conduct and state aid
| Published: | Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2011 |
|---|---|
| Other titles: |
Structure and effects in European Union competition law |
| Persons: | , |
| Format: | Book / Printed Book / Conference paper |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | International competition law series
; 47 |
| Physical description: | XV, 343 S. |
| Item Description: |
Enth. 13 Beitr. |
| ISBN: | 9789041131744 |
| LEADER | 09099nam 2200469 ub4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | VR000901321 | ||
| 003 | VRH01000000000000000882968 | ||
| 008 | t s2011 r 1|| eng | ||
| 007 | tu||||||||||||||||||||| | ||
| 020 | |a 978-90-411-3174-4 | ||
| 020 | |a 9041131744 | ||
| 090 | |a EG XIII Ca 245 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Basedow, Jürgen <<[Hrsg.]>> | |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Structure and effects in EU competition law |b studies on exclusionary conduct and state aid |c ed. by Jürgen Basedow ; Wolfgang Wurmnest |
| 260 | |a Alphen aan den Rijn |b Kluwer Law International |c 2011, 2011 | ||
| 300 | |a XV, 343 S. | ||
| 655 | |a Konferenzschrift | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Wurmnest, Wolfgang <<[Hrsg.]>> | |
| 740 | 0 | 2 | |a Structure and effects in European Union competition law |
| 740 | 0 | |a Structure and effects in European Union competition law | |
| 041 | 0 | 7 | |a eng |2 ISO 639-2 |
| 993 | |a 1208 | ||
| 993 | |a ToC | ||
| 993 | |a 1207bb | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a International competition law series |v 47 | |
| 830 | 0 | |a VR000573850 | |
| 500 | |a Enth. 13 Beitr. | ||
| 024 | 8 | |a 9789041131744 | |
| 024 | 3 | |a 9789041131744 | |
| 084 | |a VR 33.11 | ||
| 084 | |a EG: XIII Ca | ||
| 998 | |a EG: XIII Ca | ||
| 998 | |a Wettbewerbsrecht: Gesamtdarstellung. | ||
| 998 | |a EG: XIII Ca | ||
| 696 | |a Bazedov, Jurgen | ||
| 856 | |u http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz347324193inh.pdf |3 ToC |m Völkerrecht Heidelberg |z VIEW | ||
| 992 | |a IMAGE 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTRIBUTORS XV PART I: THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH IN EU COMPETITION LAW 1 JIIRGEN BASEDOW INTRODUCTION 3 I. FOUR STAGES OF COMPETITION LAW DEVELOPMENT 3 II. THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH 4 III. PROGRAMME AND ISSUES OF THE SYMPOSIUM 6 IV. INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 7 CARLES ESTEVA MOSSO THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH PARADIGM - AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO EU COMPETITION POLICY 11 I. INTRODUCTION 11 II. THE PROGRESSIVE ADOPTION OF AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO EU COMPETITION LAW 13 A. REFORM OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS POLICY 13 B. GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81(3) EC/101(3) TFEU.. 14 C. THE NEW MERGER CONTROL REGIME 15 D. TURNING TOWARDS AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH IN ABUSE CONTROL 17 1. WHAT IS THE ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATION ABOUT? 17 2. WHAT IS THE FOCUS OF THE ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATION? 18 III. THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH 18 IV. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH VS. PROTECTING COMPETITION 21 V. WHAT NEXT? 22 DANIEL ZIMMER PROTECTION OF COMPETITION V. MAXIMIZING (CONSUMER) WELFARE 23 I. LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES 23 II. ASSESSMENT OF THE 'MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH' 30 III. CONCLUSION 37 IV. PROSPECTS 38 IX IMAGE 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS SVEND ALBAEK THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRIORITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 41 I. INTRODUCTION 41 II. MARKET POWER AND DOMINANCE 42 III. ANTI-COMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE 43 IV. SPECIFIC FORMS OF ABUSES 44 A. EXCLUSIVE DEALING 44 B. REBATES HAVING SIMILAR EFFECTS AS EXCLUSIVE DEALING 45 C. TYING AND BUNDLING 47 D. PREDATION 50 E. REFUSAL TO DEAL 50 DISCUSSION 53 PART II: STUDIES ON ARTICLE 102 TFEU 55 GIORGIO MONTI THE DOMINANCE THRESHOLD IN ARTICLE 102 TFEU 57 I. INTRODUCTION 57 II. THRESHOLDS 60 A. WHAT KIND OF THRESHOLD FOR ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CASES? 60 B. THRESHOLD-SCEPTICISM 66 C. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH 70 III. DOMINANCE 72 A. THE POWER TO EXCLUDE VERSUS THE POWER TO EXPLOIT 72 B. A SHIFT IN POLICY 76 C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF DOMINANCE AND FOR ENFORCEMENT 77 | ||
| 992 | |a 1. FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF DOMINANCE 77 2. FOR ENFORCEMENT 79 IV. CONCLUSIONS 81 CHRISTIAN EWALD THE DOMINANCE THRESHOLD: A COMMENT 83 I. INTRODUCTION 83 II. ECONOMICS AS THE ROUTE-MAP ...84 III. THE SCALIER BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND LAW: POLICY DISCRETION 86 IMAGE 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS IV. LEGAL 'REGULATING SCREWS': STANDARD OF PROOF AND THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 88 V. CONCLUSION 90 DISCUSSION 93 WOLFGANG WURMNEST PREDATORY PRICING: FROM PRICE/COST-COMPARISONS TO POST-CHICAGO THINKING 97 I. INTRODUCTION 98 II. BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE CASE LAW ON PREDATORY PRICING 102 A. THE AKZO-RULES 102 1. BASIC CONCEPT 102 2. REFINEMENTS 105 A) ADJUSTMENTS OF THE PRICE/COST-COMPARISONS 105 B) PROVING PREDATORY INTENT 106 B. ABOVE-COST PREDATION 107 C. RECOUPMENT 109 1. BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPT 109 2. US ANTITRUST LAW 110 A) BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE 110 B) STRINGENT LIABILITY STANDARDS TO AVOID FALSE POSITIVES 112 C) RECOUPMENT AS A TOOL FOR CUTTING BACK THE POWERS OF THE JURY 115 3. EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 116 A) TETRA PAK II: REJECTION OF THE RECOUPMENT REQUIREMENT 116 B) FRANCE TELECOM: RECOUPMENT AS ONE FACTOR TO SHOW PREDATORY INTENT 118 III. THE ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATION 120 A. SACRIFICE 121 B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE 124 1. PRICE/COST-CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOUPMENT OF LOSSES 124 A) GENERAL PRINCIPLE 124 B) NO STRICT RECOUPMENT TEST 125 2. MARKET STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT 125 A) STRUCTURAL FACTORS 126 B) STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 126 C. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 127 XI IMAGE 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS IV. ASSESSMENT 129 A. SACRIFICE 129 1. ESTABLISHING AAC AS A BASELINE-TEST FOR SACRIFICED PROFITS 129 2. SACRIFICE AND ABOVE-COST PREDATION 131 B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE 133 1. MARKET STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC THEORY 134 2. THE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 136 3. RECOUPMENT 138 C. PRICING BELOW AAC IS NOT ALWAYS ANTI-COMPETITIVE 139 V. CONCLUSION 140 PHILIPPE CHONE PREDATORY PRICING: A COMMENT 143 I. INTRODUCTION 143 | ||
| 992 | |a II. PROVIDING GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102 TFEU ENFORCEMENT: A CHALLENGING TASK 144 III. GENERAL STANDARDS FOR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 145 IV. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF TIME 146 V. COST TESTS AS 'SCREENING DEVICES' 147 VI. PREDATION 148 VII. SQUEEZE AND REFUSAL TO DEAL 151 VIII. REBATES 151 IX. BUNDLING 153 X. CONCLUSION 154 DISCUSSION 155 PART III: STUDIES ON STATE AID 159 ULRICH SCHWALBE EUROPEAN STATE AID CONTROL - THE STATE AID ACTION PLAN 161 I. INTRODUCTION 162 II. STATE AID CONTROL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF COMPETITION POLICY 163 A. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF STATE AID CONTROL 163 B. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF STATE AID CONTROL 164 C. PREVIOUS PRACTICE 165 III. THE SAAP 167 A. OBJECTIVES OF THE SAAP 167 1. MORE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES, BETTER ENFORCEMENT, HIGHER PREDICTABILITY AND ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY 167 2. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND MEMBER STATES 168 XII IMAGE 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3. A REFINED ECONOMIC APPROACH 169 4. FORM-BASED VS. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH 170 B. THE BALANCING TEST 171 1. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF STATE AID (STAGES 1 AND 2 OF THE TEST) 171 2. ADVERSE EFFECTS OF STATE AID AND BALANCING (STAGE 3 OF THE TEST) 172 3. THE RELEVANT WELFARE STANDARD 173 IV. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF THE REFINED ECONOMIC APPROACH 179 A. FINANCING OF STATE AID 180 B. SECOND-BEST PROBLEMS 183 V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAAP - SOME EXAMPLES 184 A. THE DE MINIMIS REGULATION 184 B. THE GENERAL BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION (GBER) 186 C. THE COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION 188 VI. CONCLUSION 191 PIET JAN SLOT THE GENERAL BLOCK EXEMPTION FOR STATE AID 193 I. INTRODUCTION 193 II. THE STATE AID ACTION PLAN 195 III. THE GENERAL BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION 196 A. INTRODUCTION 196 B. CHAPTER I: COMMON PROVISIONS 197 C. CHAPTER II: SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF AID 201 D. CHAPTER III: TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 203 IV. COMMENT 203 DISCUSSION 205 PART IV: ROUND TABLE ON STATE AID 209 | ||
| 992 | |a JUERGEN KUEHLING THE NEED FOR A MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH 211 I. INTRODUCTION 211 II. THE NOTION OF STATE AID 212 A. CASE REVIEW BY THE COURT AND PROOF THAT THERE IS AN ADVANTAGE - THE NECESSITY FOR A MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH AT THE LEVEL OF THE NOTION OF STATE AID 214 B. A MORE ECONOMIC REFLECTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CRITERION 'STATE RESOURCES' 215 XIII IMAGE 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS C. A STRICTER AND MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE CRITERIA OF 'DISTORTION OF COMPETITION' AND 'TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES'? 216 III. EXCEPTIONS FROM THE PROHIBITION OF STATE AIDS 220 IV. OUTLOOK 222 JOSEF AZIZI SOME REMARKS FROM A JUDICIAL POINT OF VIEW 225 I. INTRODUCTION 225 II. GC'S SCOPE OF CONTROL 226 A. GENERAL REMARKS 226 B. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL IN STATE AID MATTERS 227 1. VARIATIONS ACCORDING TO THE SPECIFIC LEGAL BASIS APPLIED 227 2. EXAMPLES FROM RECENT CASE LAW 228 III. POSSIBLE FUTURE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 'NEW APPROACH' FOR THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE 229 LUKAS REPA TOWARDS A MORE ECONOMIC CONTROL OF STATE AID IN EUROPE 231 I. INTRODUCTION 231 II. SAAP AND THE 'AID BALANCING TEST' 232 III. THE R&D&I FRAMEWORK 2006 233 IV. THE REFINED ECONOMIC APPROACH IN REGIONAL AID 234 V. THE GENERAL BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION 235 VI. SAAP AND THE BALANCING TEST UNDER ARTICLE 106(2) TFEU 236 VII. OUTLOOK FROM A PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE 238 VIII. CONCLUSION 239 WOLFGANG KERBER EU STATE AID POLICY, ECONOMIC APPROACH, BAILOUTS, AND MERGER POLICY: TWO COMMENTS 241 I. INTRODUCTION 241 II. WHAT DO WE WANT EU STATE AID POLICY DO FOR US? 243 III. STATE AID, BAILOUT PROBLEM, AND MERGER POLICY 249 ANNEX: MONOPOLKOMMISSION: THE 'MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH' IN EUROPEAN STATE AID CONTROL 253 INDEX 339 XIV | ||
| 852 | |c EG: XIII Ca: 245 |m BOOK | ||
| 999 | |a VRH50 |b MPVRH |c Institutsbibliothek |d EG: XIII Ca: 245 |e available |t Verfügbar |f 1 |g 0 |h N |i 6 |j BIB |k i | ||