The foundations of European Union competition law : the objective and principles of article 102

The foundations of European Union competition law : the objective and principles of article 102

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Published:Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 2011
Persons: Nazzini, Renato -
Format: Book / Printed Book
Language:English
Edition:1. publ
Series:Oxford studies in European law
Physical description:XLIII, 435 S. : graph. Darst.
Item Description:
Literaturverz. S. [403] - 425
ISBN:9780199226153
record_format marc
spelling Nazzini, Renato
The foundations of European Union competition law
the objective and principles of article 102
Renato Nazzini
1. publ
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
2011, 2011
XLIII, 435 S. : graph. Darst
Oxford studies in European law
Literaturverz. S. [403] - 425
Erscheint auch als (Online-Ausgabe): Nazzini, Renato: The foundations of European Union competition law
Online-Ausg.: Nazzini, Renato: The foundations of European Union competition law
http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz302029222inh.pdf
ToC
Völkerrecht Heidelberg
VIEW
language English
format 0/Buch/
1/Buch/PrintBuch/
author Nazzini, Renato
spellingShingle Nazzini, Renato
The foundations of European Union competition law : the objective and principles of article 102
Oxford studies in European law
author_facet Nazzini, Renato
Nazzini, Renato
author_role -
author_sort Nazzini, Renato
author2 Nazzini, Renato
author2_role -
title The foundations of European Union competition law : the objective and principles of article 102
title_sub the objective and principles of article 102
title_short The foundations of European Union competition law
title_full The foundations of European Union competition law the objective and principles of article 102 Renato Nazzini
title_fullStr The foundations of European Union competition law the objective and principles of article 102 Renato Nazzini
title_full_unstemmed The foundations of European Union competition law the objective and principles of article 102 Renato Nazzini
title_sort foundations of european union competition law : the objective and principles of article 102 renato nazzini
series Oxford studies in European law
publisher Oxford Univ. Press
publishDate 2011
physical XLIII, 435 S. : graph. Darst
edition 1. publ
isbn 9780199226153
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url http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz302029222inh.pdf
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dedup_id_str NazziniRenatoThefoundationsofEuropeanUnioncompetitionlawOxfordUnivPress
toc_content CONTENTS LIST OFFIGU RES XV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XVII TABLE OF CASES XIX TABLE OF TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS XXXIX TABLE OF EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION XLI TABLE OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION XLV 1 INTRODUCTION 1 A. THE PROBLEM 1 B. THE METHOD 3 C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INQUIRY 5 I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 2 NORMATIVE THEORY OF COMPETITION LAW 11 A. INTRODUCTION 11 B. NON-WELFARE OBJECTIVES 14 (1) THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND A COMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURE 14 (2) ECONOMIC FREEDOM 18 (3) FAIRNESS 21 (4) PROTECTION OF COMPETITORS AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 24 (5) MARKET INTEGRATION 26 (6) MARKET LIBERALIZATION 29 (7) CONSUMER CHOICE 30 C. SOCIAL WELFARE 32 (1) THE SEARCH FOR THE ECONOMIC PURPOSE OF THE LAW 32 (2) SOCIAL WELFARE, CONSUMER WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 33 (3) THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE LONG-TERM SOCIAL WELFARE OBJECTIVE 39 (4) CONSUMER WELFARE 40 (A) DEFINITION OF THE LONG-TERM CONSUMER WELFARE OBJECTIVE 40 (B) REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 41 (C) IMPERFECTIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNA
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[403] - 425 tErscheint auch als (Online-Ausgabe): Nazzini, Renato: The foundations of European Union competition law tOnline-Ausg.: Nazzini, Renato: The foundations of European Union competition law tErscheint auch als (Online-Ausgabe): Nazzini, Renato: The foundations of European Union competition law8 a97801992261533 a9780199226153 aEG: XIII Ca aVR 33.11 a|37 aEG: XIII Ca aWettbewerbsrecht: Gesamtdarstellung. aEG: XIII Ca uhttp://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz302029222inh.pdf3ToCmVölkerrecht HeidelbergzVIEW aCONTENTS LIST OFFIGU RES XV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XVII TABLE OF CASES XIX TABLE OF TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS XXXIX TABLE OF EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION XLI TABLE OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION XLV 1 INTRODUCTION 1 A. THE PROBLEM 1 B. THE METHOD 3 C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INQUIRY 5 I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 2 NORMATIVE THEORY OF COMPETITION LAW 11 A. INTRODUCTION 11 B. NON-WELFARE OBJECTIVES 14 (1) THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND A COMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURE 14 (2) ECONOMIC FREEDOM 18 (3) FAIRNESS 21 (4) PROTECTION OF COMPETITORS AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 24 (5) MARKET INTEGRATION 26 (6) MARKET LIBERALIZATION 29 (7) CONSUMER CHOICE 30 C. SOCIAL WELFARE 32 (1) THE SEARCH FOR THE ECONOMIC PURPOSE OF THE LAW 32 (2) SOCIAL WELFARE, CONSUMER WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 33 (3) THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE LONG-TERM SOCIAL WELFARE OBJECTIVE 39 (4) CONSUMER WELFARE 40 (A) DEFINITION OF THE LONG-TERM CONSUMER WELFARE OBJECTIVE 40 (B) REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 41 (C) IMPERFECTIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 43 (D) ENFORCEMENT, EFFICIENCY, AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY 43 (E) THE MISUSE OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE OBJECTIVE 44 (5) A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE: CONSUMER HARM AS A TEST TO ACHIEVE A SOCIAL WELFATE OBJECTIVE 45 (A) THE PROBLEM 45 (B) INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 46 (C) SELF-SELECTION 46 (D) LOBBYING 48 (E) LIMITED (NOT GENERAL) VALIDITY OF CONSUMER HARM AS A TEST 48 D. CONCLUSION CONTENTS THE DESIGN OF THE OPTIMAL ABUSE TESTS 51 A. INTRODUCTION 51 B. THE SEARCH FOR A SINGLE TEST 52 C. INTENT 57 (1) ORIGINS OF THE TEST 57 (2) DEFINING INTENT 57 (3) NAKED ABUSE AS A TEST OF INTENT 59 (4) THE TEST OF INTENT BEYOND NAKED ABUSE AND ITS LIMITATIONS 63 D. THE NO ECONOMIC SENSE TEST 66 E. THE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 72 (1) CONSISTENCY OF THE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST WITH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 72 (2) UNDER-INCLUSIVENESSOFTHE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 74 (3) OVER-INCLUSIVENESS OF THE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR aTEST 76 (4) THE PROBLEM OF MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS 77 (5) EXTENSION OF THE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST TO ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION 79 (A) THE PROBLEM 79 (B) GENERAL WELFARE EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION 80 (C) COMPETITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION ON INTERMEDIATE MARKETS 88 (D) THE MARKET-DISTORTING DISCRIMINATION TEST 91 F. THE CONSUMER HARM TEST 92 (1) GENERAL FORMULATIONS OF THE CONSUMER HARM TEST 92 (2) ADVANTAGES OF THE CONSUMER HARM TEST 93 (3) PROBLEMS OF OVER- AND UNDER-ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONSUMER HARM TEST 94 (4) ADMINISTRABILKY OF THE CONSUMER HARM TEST 95 (5) EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES AND CONSUMER HARM 97 G. CONCLUSION 100 II LEGAL FOUNDATIONS THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 102 107 A. INTRODUCTION 107 B. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 102 108 (1) THE GENERAL PROHIBITION OF AN ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION 108 (2) THE ILLUSTRATIVE LIST 110 (3) THE INTERNAL MARKET 113 (A) THE LINK BETWEEN THE COMPETITION RULES AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 113 (B) THE INTERNAL MARKET AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 115 (C) THE SOCIAL WELFARE OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 116 (D) THE COMPETITION RULES AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNION 119 (4) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 121 (A) A METHODOLOGICAL GLOSS 121 (B) THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 122 (C) FROM THE ECSC TREATY TO THE SPAAK REPORT 122 (D) THE DRAFTING OF THE TEXT OF ARTICLE 102 126 (E) LONG-TERM SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 131 CONTENTS XI C. THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EU COMPETITION RULES IN THE CASE LAW AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION 133 (1) INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 102, ARTICLE 101, AND MERGER CONTROL 133 (2) THE EU COMPETITION RULES AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATIES 134 (A) ARTICLE 102 134 (B) ARTICLE 101 134 (C) MERGER CONTROL 137 (3) REJECTION OF CONSUMER WELFARE AS AN OBJECTIVE OF EU COMPETITION LAW 138 (4) FAIRNESS 144 (A) FAIRNESS AND EQUALLY EFFICIENT COMPETITORS 144 (B) FAIRNESS AND LESS EFFICIENT aCOMPETITORS 148 (5) ECONOMIC FREEDOM 150 D. CONCLUSION 152 5 THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ABUSE TESTS IN EU LAW 155 A. INTRODUCTION 155 B. THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST IN CONTEXT 157 (1) PROPORTIONALITY AS AN ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE 157 (2) PROPORTIONALITY AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW 158 (3) THE PROPORTIONALITY FRAMEWORK UNDER ARTICLE 101 161 C. PROPORTIONALITY UNDER ARTICLE 102 164 (1) THE PROPORTIONALITY FRAMEWORK IN THE CASE LAW 164 (2) THE PROPORTIONALITY FRAMEWORK IN THE GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102 167 D. THE LIMITED USEFULNESS OF THE DEFINITION OF ABUSE IN HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE 169 E. CONTINENTAL CAN AND THE CONCEPT OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION 172 F. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DOMINANT UNDERTAKING 174 G. CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN DOMINANCE, CONDUCT, AND EFFECT 176 (1) CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND COMPETITIVE HARM 176 (2) MULTI-MARKET ABUSES 179 (A) INPUT/OUTPUT AND COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS 179 (B) NEIGHBOURING MARKETS 180 (C) THE TEST FOR MULTI-MARKET ABUSES 185 H. CONCLUSION 185 III TESTS OF ABUSE 6 THE TESTS OF INTENT 187 A. INTRODUCTION 187 B. THE NAKED ABUSE TEST 188 (1) NAKED ABUSE AS A GENERAL TEST 188 (2) NAKED ABUSE AND FREE TRADE 191 (A) FREE TRADE AS A KEY DRIVER OF LONG-TERM SOCIAL WELFARE 191 (B) ABOVE-COST REBATES 191 (C) REFUSAL TO SUPPLY 193 XII CONTENTS (D) RAISING RIVALS'COSTS 195 (E) DISCRIMINATION IJ' (F) NAKED EXPLOITATION 200 C. INTENT AND THE RISK OF SYSTEMATIC FALSE CONVICTIONS 201 (1) PREDATION 201 (A) THE PROBLEM 201 (B) INADEQUACY OF THE RECOUPMENT TEST 203 (C) THE TEST OF INTENT IN PREDATION 205 (D) RECOUPMENT AS PREDATORY INCENTIVE 206 (E) THE NO ECONOMIC SENSE TEST AS A TEST OF INTENT 208 (0 THE PREDATION TEST IN THE GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102 209 (2) ABUSE OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 210 D. INTENT AND THE RISK OF SYSTEMATIC FALSE ACQUITTALS 211 (1) TYING 211 (A) THE PROBLEM 211 (B) THE ENFORCEMENT RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TYING 212 (C) INTENT AND INCENTIVE FOR ANTI-COMPETITIVE TYING 215 E. EVIDENCE OF aINTENT AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 217 F. CONCLUSION 219 7 THE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 221 A. INTRODUCTION 221 B. PREDATORY CONDUCT 222 (1) PREDATION AND EXCLUSION OF AS EFFICIENT COMPETITORS 222 (2) THE PROBLEM OF THE PERMISSIBLE COST BENCHMARKS 223 C. MARGIN SQUEEZE 229 D. CONDITIONAL ABOVE-COST REBATES 232 (1) PROTECTION OF LESS EFFICIENT UNDERTAKINGS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 102 232 (2) STATIC APPLICATION OFTHE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 235 (3) DYNAMIC APPLICATION OFTHE AS EFFICIENT COMPETITOR TEST 239 E. UNCONDITIONAL ABOVE-COST REBATES 242 F. MIXED BUNDLING 244 G. EXCLUSIVITY 245 H. DISCRIMINATION 248 (1) ARTICLE 102(C) AS THE EXCLUSIVE LEGAL BASIS 248 (2) CRITICISM OFTHE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 102(C) TO EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 249 (3) MARKET-DISTORTING DISCRIMINATION AND COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 250 I. CONCLUSION 255 8 THE CONSUMER HARM TEST 257 A. INTRODUCTION 257 B. THE CONSUMER HARM TEST IN VERTICAL FORECLOSURE 257 (1) THE CONCEPT OF VERTICAL FORECLOSURE 257 (2) REFUSAL TO SUPPLY 258 (A) THE PROBLEM OF BALANCING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND COMPETITIVE HARM 258 (B) INDISPENSABILITY 262 CONTENTS XIII (C) INTENSITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECT 265 (D) RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 267 (E) CLARIFYING THE CONSUMER HARM TEST IN REFUSAL TO SUPPLY 269 (F) REFUSAL TO SUPPLY AN EXISTING CUSTOMER 272 (3) MARGIN SQUEEZE AS A VERTICAL FORECLOSURE STRATEGY 273 C. EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES 275 (1) THE NEED FOR LIMITING PRINCIPLES 275 (2) ENHANCED DOMINANCE TEST 277 (3) ENHANCED CONSUMER HARM TEST 279 (4) POST-EXCLUSIONARY EXPLOITATION TEST 280 D. CONSUMER HARM AS THE DEFAULT TEST FOR EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 282 E. CONCLUSION 284 9 DEFENCES 287 A. INTRODUCTION 287 B. BURDEN OF PROOF AND EVIDENTIAL BURDEN 289 C. THRESHOLDS OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 294 D. PROPORTIONALITY DEFENCES 300 (1) STRUCTURE OF THE TEST 300 (2) THE MEETING COMPETITION DEFENCE 301 E. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION DEFENCES 304 (1) STRUCTURE OF THE TEST 304 (2) EFFICIENCY DEFENCES 309 (A) ALLOCATIVE aEFFICIENCY 309 (B) PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 311 (C) DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 313 (3) SOCIAL WELFARE DEFENCES 317 F. CONCLUSION 321 IV ANALYTIC OF THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE 10 SINGLE DOMINANCE A. INTRODUCTION B. DOMINANCE AS THE ABILITY TO HARM COMPETITION C. DOMINANCE AS MARKET POWER D. BARRIERS TO ENTRY (1) DYNAMIC TEST OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY (2) SUNK COSTS (3) ECONOMIES OF SCALE (4) ECONOMIES OF SCOPE AND PRODUCT RANGE (5) NETWORK EFFECTS (6) SWITCHING COSTS (7) VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSIVE OR PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO INPUTS OR CUSTOMERS (8) FINANCIAL STRENGTH (9) SPARE CAPACITY 327 327 328 333 342 342 346 347 348 349 349 351 353 354 XIV CONTENTS E. COUNTERVAILING BUYER POWER 355 F. CONCLUSION 357 11 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 359 A. INTRODUCTION 359 B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 360 C. NON-OLIGOPOLISTIC COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 364 (1) HORIZONTAL NON-OLIGOPOLISTIC COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 364 (A) THE TWO-PRONGED STRUCTURE OF THE TEST 364 (B) COLLECTIVE ENTITY TEST 364 (C) DOMINANCE TEST 367 (2) VERTICAL NON-OLIGOPOLISTIC COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 368 D. OLIGOPOLISTIC COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 370 (1) STRUCTURE OF THE TEST 370 (2) INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS 375 (A) THE IMPALA APPROACH 375 (B) ABILITY TO COORDINATE 375 (C) INCENTIVE TO COORDINATE 382 (D) NO INCENTIVE TO DEVIATE 383 E. ABUSE OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 385 F. CONCLUSION 387 V THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE 102 12 GENERAL CONCLUSION 389 A. INTRODUCTION 389 B. TOWARDS A COHERENT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 102 389 C. OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES, AND TESTS CLARIFIED 391 (1) OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 391 (2) ASSESSMENT OF CONDUCT 393 (3) ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE 397 D. ADDRESSING THE MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT CASE LAW AND ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE 397 BIBLIOGRAPHY 403 INDEX 427 cEG: XIII Ca: 240mBOOK aVRH50bMPVRHcInstitutsbibliothekdEG: XIII Ca: 240eunavailabletNicht verfügbarf1g1hNi5jBIBki
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