Academic Journal

The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities.

Bibliographic Details
Title: The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities.
Authors: Urbinati, Niccolò1 (AUTHOR) niccolo.urbinati@unive.it
Superior Title: Economic Theory. Jul2023, Vol. 76 Issue 1, p45-68. 24p.
Subject Terms: *NEGOTIATION, BANACH spaces
Abstract: We study the Walrasian objection mechanism in the framework of economies with a measure space of agents and a separable Banach space of commodities whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. We provide several characterizations of Walrasian objections and use them to study the bargaining set of the economy, as defined in Mas-Colell (J Math Econ 18(2):129–139, 1989). Our main result shows that whenever the measure space of agents is saturated, every non-competitive allocation can be blocked with a Walrasian objection. This implies that the bargaining set, the core and the set of competitive allocations are equivalent solution concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Economic Theory is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Business Source Premier
Description
Description not available.