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1
Book
Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis on Large Elections

Authors: Nunez, Matias, Courtin, Sébastien

Contributors: Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST), Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information Bruz (ENSAI)-École polytechnique (X)-École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique (ENSAE Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU), ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017)

Superior Title: https://enpc.hal.science/hal-03092397 ; Springer, 2020, 978-3-030-48598-6. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6⟩.

Subject Terms: Voting Rules, Voting Systems, Democracy, Elections, Electoral Systems, Probability, Social Choice Theory, Power Indices, Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Poisson Games, Computational Social Choice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Relation: hal-03092397; https://enpc.hal.science/hal-03092397

Availability: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6
https://enpc.hal.science/hal-03092397

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2
Academic Journal
A solution to the two-person implementation problem

Authors: Laslier, Jean-François, Núñez, Matías, Remzi Sanver, M.

Contributors: Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST), Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information Bruz (ENSAI)-École polytechnique (X)-École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique (ENSAE Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique (GENES), Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision (LAMSADE), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-17-EURE-0001,PGSE,Ecole d'Economie de Paris(2017), ANR-11-IDEX-0003,IPS,Idex Paris-Saclay(2011), ANR-11-LABX-0047,ECODEC,Réguler l'économie au service de la société(2011)

Superior Title: ISSN: 0022-0531.

Subject Terms: Nash implementation, Two players, Pareto efficiency, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Relation: halshs-03342559; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03342559; WOS: 000652015500002

Availability: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105261
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03342559

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3
Report
Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule

Authors: Balinski, Michel, Laraki, Rida

Contributors: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École polytechnique (X), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL), Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision (LAMSADE), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Superior Title: https://hal.science/hal-01304043 ; 2016.

Subject Terms: measuring, ranking, electing, majority rule, Condorcet consistency, tyranny of majority, intensity problem, majority-gauge, strategy-proofness, polarization, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Relation: hal-01304043; https://hal.science/hal-01304043; https://hal.science/hal-01304043/document; https://hal.science/hal-01304043/file/Cahier%20n%C2%B0%202016-04_BALINSKI-LARAKI.pdf

Availability: https://hal.science/hal-01304043
https://hal.science/hal-01304043/document
https://hal.science/hal-01304043/file/Cahier%20n%C2%B0%202016-04_BALINSKI-LARAKI.pdf


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7
Report
The allocation between the EU member states of the seats in the European Parliament Cambridge Compromise

Authors: Grimmett, Geoffrey, Laslier, Jean-François, Pukelsheim, Friedrich, Ramirez Gonzalez, Victoriano, Rose, Richard, J., Slomczynski, Wojciech, Zachariasen, Martin, Życzkowski, Karol

Contributors: Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge UK (CAM), Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), École polytechnique (X), Institut for Mathematik, Universität Augsburg Augsburg, Departement Matematica Aplicada, Universidad de Grenada, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Montréal, McGill University = Université McGill Montréal, Canada, Jagrellonian University, Department of Computer Science Copenhagen (DIKU), Faculty of Science Copenhagen, University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet (UCPH)-University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet (UCPH), Centrum Fizyki Teoretycznej, Polska Akademia Nauk = Polish Academy of Sciences = Académie polonaise des sciences (PAN), Institute of Physics, Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie = Jagiellonian University (UJ)

Superior Title: https://hal.science/hal-00609946 ; 2011.

Subject Terms: Proportional Representation, degressive proportionality, apportionment, European Parliament. Classification, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C63 - Computational Techniques • Simulation Modeling, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, [SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Relation: hal-00609946; https://hal.science/hal-00609946; https://hal.science/hal-00609946/document; https://hal.science/hal-00609946/file/cahier_de_recherche_2011-14.pdf

Availability: https://hal.science/hal-00609946
https://hal.science/hal-00609946/document
https://hal.science/hal-00609946/file/cahier_de_recherche_2011-14.pdf


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16
Book
Majority Judgment: Measuring Ranking and Electing

Authors: Balinski, Michel, Laraki, Rida

Contributors: Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST), Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information Bruz (ENSAI)-École polytechnique (X)-École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique (ENSAE Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision (LAMSADE), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Superior Title: https://hal.science/hal-01533476 ; MIT Press, 2010, 978-0-262-01513-4.

Subject Terms: Political Science, Game Theory, Social Choice, Voting Systems, [INFO]Computer Science [cs]

Relation: hal-01533476; https://hal.science/hal-01533476

Availability: https://hal.science/hal-01533476


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